Guzman v. Hacienda Records and Recording Studio, Inc.
Filing
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying 20 MOTION to Dismiss 1 Complaint. (Signed by Judge Gregg Costa) Parties notified.(arrivera, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
VICTORIA DIVISION
JOSE O GUZMAN,
Plaintiff,
VS.
HACIENDA RECORDS AND
RECORDING STUDIO, INC., et al,
Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:12-CV-00042
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This is a copyright infringement case involving two Tejano songs. Plaintiff
José O. Guzman alleges that Defendants copied the “original lyrics and music” in
his song, “Triste Aventurera,” by producing, selling, and distributing records
containing a substantially similar, yet differently named song, “Cartas de Amor.”
Docket Entry No. 1 ¶¶ 13, 16. Defendants now seek dismissal pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), or alternatively a more definite statement pursuant to Rule 12(e), on the
ground that Guzman failed to plead the infringement allegations with sufficient
specificity. Having reviewed the parties’ briefs and the applicable case law, the
Court DENIES Defendants’ motion.
The crux of Defendant’s motion is whether Guzman’s Complaint meets the
pleading standard set forth by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8(a)(2)
requires that a claim for relief contain “a short and plain statement of the claim
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showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). To survive a
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a claim for relief must be “plausible on its
face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim has facial
plausibility “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Defendants argue that Guzman’s Complaint fails to meet this standard,
because it does not identify the exact elements of “Triste Aventurera” that “Cartas
de Amor” copied. But by identifying the two works at issue and alleging that
Defendants copied the original lyrics and music in his copyrighted work, Guzman
pleaded a claim that was plausible on its face. Kelly v. L.L. Cool J., 145 F.R.D. 32
(S.D.N.Y. 1992), is informative. In that case, the court rejected arguments nearly
identical to Defendants’ when evaluating a complaint alleging that L.L. Cool J.
copied parts of plaintiff’s song “Jingling Baby” in his 1991 hit “Mama Said Knock
You Out”:
Broad, sweeping allegations of infringement do not comply with Rule
8. Plaintiff’s complaint however, narrows the infringing act to the
publishing and distribution of two songs, “Mama Said Knock You
Out” and “Jingling Baby” in 1991, which is sufficiently specific for
the purpose of Rule 8. Defendant argues that it is not possible to
determine from the complaint the nature of the claimed infringement.
However, such a level of specificity is not required in a complaint.
Id. at 36 n.3 (citations omitted).
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Though Kelly was decided before the Supreme Court clarified the federal
pleading standard in Twombly and Iqbal, under those decisions “the height of the
pleading requirement is relative to circumstances.” Cooney v. Rossiter, 583 F.3d
967, 971 (7th Cir. 2009) (Posner, J.); see also Kadmovas v. Stevens, 706 F.3d 843,
844 (7th Cir. 2013) (noting that “some [claims] require more explanation than
others to establish their plausibility” (citations omitted)); Hamilton v. Palm, 621
F.3d 816, 817 (8th Cir. 2010) (“Twombly and Iqbal did not abrogate the notice
pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2).”). Complex claims, like those in Twombly and
Iqbal, require more specificity than simple ones, such as Kelly’s and Guzman’s.
This makes sense given that Twombly and Iqbal are “designed to spare defendants
the expense of responding to bulky, burdensome discovery unless the complaint
provides enough information to enable an inference that the suit has sufficient
merit to warrant putting the defendant to the burden of responding to at least a
limited discovery demand.” In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 630 F.3d 622,
625 (7th Cir. 2010). To the extent Twombly and Iqbal are animated by concerns
that vague allegations will lead to broad, “fishing expedition” discovery, that
concern is not present here because the complaint provides notice of an allegation
limited to the copying of a three-minute song. The complaint cabins discovery to
discrete items, such as the sales data relating to the allegedly infringing song, the
creation and production of the allegedly infringing and infringed songs, and not
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much else.
Defendants have cited no post-Iqbal cases imposing a higher pleading
requirement in the copyright context than the Kelly court did. After Guzman filed
his response to Defendants’ motion, the Court held a telephone conference in
which defense counsel represented that, in a recent case in this District involving
Beyoncé, the court required plaintiffs to identify the constituent elements copied in
an allegedly infringed song in order to meet the federal pleading standards. The
Court allowed Defendants to file a supplemental brief containing the Beyoncé case
and any similar cases, but Defendants’ brief only cited Armour v. Knowles, No.
4:05-cv-2407 (S.D. Tex.), in which the plaintiff voluntarily amended her complaint
against Beyoncé. Docket Entry No. 25 at 5. Contrary to Defendants’ position,
“even post-Twombly, Rule 8 requires only the pleading of the basic elements of an
infringement claim, albeit allegations that rise above the speculative level. There
is no heightened pleading requirement for copyright-infringement claims.” 6 Patry
on Copyright § 19:3 (2013); see also Schneider v. Pearson Educ., Inc., No. 12 Civ.
6392(JPO), 2013 WL 1386968, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2013) (ruling that
plaintiff’s infringement allegations, “though not brimming with details, are specific
enough to meet the requirements of Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 8” and citing cases).
In sum, Guzman has adequately stated a claim for copyright infringement.
He has pleaded sufficient content to establish the elements of a copyright claim—
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namely, ownership of a valid copyright and copying of constituent elements of his
original work. See Positive Black Talk Inc. v. Cash Money Records Inc., 394 F.3d
357, 367 (5th Cir. 2004) (stating elements of copyright infringement claim),
abrogated on other grounds by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154
(2010). The Complaint provides sufficient notice to allow Defendants to defend
against the claim and to limit discovery. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss and in the Alternative, Motion for More Definite Statement (Docket Entry
No. 20) is DENIED.
SIGNED this 20th day of May, 2013.
___________________________________
Gregg Costa
United States District Judge
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