Chaffin v. Braden et al

Filing 36

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON CLAIM CONSTRUCTION. (Signed by Judge Nancy F. Atlas) Parties notified.(sashabranner, 4)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
VICTORIA DIVISION

MARK N. CHAFFIN,
Plaintiff,
v.
MICHAEL R. BRADEN and
LBC MANUFACTURING,
Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:14-0027

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
This patent case is before the Court for construction of the disputed claim terms
in United States Patent No. 6,932,912 (“the ’912 Patent”). The Court conducted a
hearing pursuant to Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996)
(“Markman hearing”), on September 29, 2015. Based on the evidence before the
Court, the arguments presented by counsel, and the governing legal authorities, the
Court issues this Memorandum and Order construing those disputed claim terms that
require construction.
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Mark N. Chaffin is the owner of the ’912 Patent, entitled “Wastewater

Treatment System of Residential Septic Systems.” He is also the inventor of the
patented system. The patent covers a wastewater treatment system in which liquid
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chlorine is continuously discharged into a storage-mixing tank containing sewage
effluent. Specifically, a pump in the storage-mixing tank circulates the sewage
effluent through a venturi chamber and creates suction which draws chlorine into the
flowing sewage effluent stream, mixing the chlorine and the sewage effluent.
Chaffin sued Defendants Michael R. Braden and LBC Manufacturing (“LBC”)
alleging infringement of Claims 7, 8, 11, 14, 15, and 20-24 of the ’912 Patent. The
parties filed a Joint Claim Construction Chart [Doc. # 26], and Amended Joint Claim
Construction Chart [Doc. # 33], and extensive briefing on the disputed claim terms.
The disputed claim terms include related terms “in constant fluid communication
with” (in Claim 7) and “in continuous communication with” (in Claim 22). Also in
dispute is the claim term “the volume of chlorine drawn from the chlorine supply
canister during a period of continuous sewage effluent recirculation varies with the
duration period of continuous sewage effluent recirculation” (in Claim 20). The Court
conducted a Markman hearing regarding these claim terms, and now issues this claim
construction ruling.
II.

GENERAL LEGAL STANDARDS FOR CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
“It is a bedrock principle of patent law that the claims of a patent define the

invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.” Aventis Pharm., Inc.
v. Amino Chems. Ltd., 715 F.3d 1363, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quoting Phillips v. AWH

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Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)). The patent claims in issue
must be construed as a matter of law to determine their scope and meaning. See, e.g.,
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996), aff’g, 52 F.3d 967,
976 (Fed. Cir.) (en banc); Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 503 F.3d
1295, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
“There is a heavy presumption that claim terms are to be given their ordinary
and customary meaning.” Aventis, 715 F.3d at 1373 (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at
1312-13; Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
Therefore, Courts must “look to the words of the claims themselves . . . to define the
scope of the patented invention.” Id. (citations omitted); see also Summit 6, LLC v.
Samsung Elec. Co., Ltd., __ F.3d __, 2015 WL 5515331, *4 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The
“ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would
have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e.,
as of the effective filing date of the patent application.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313;
see also ICU Med., Inc. v. Alaris Med. Sys., Inc., 558 F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed. Cir.
2009). This “person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not
only in the context of the particular claim in which the disputed term appears, but in
the context of the entire patent, including the specification.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at
1313; ICU, 558 F.3d at 1374.

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Intrinsic evidence is the primary resource for claim construction. See PowerOne, Inc. v. Artesyn Techs., Inc., 599 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312). For certain claim terms, “the ordinary meaning of claim
language as understood by a person of skill in the art may be readily apparent even to
lay judges, and claim construction in such cases involves little more than the
application of the widely accepted meaning of commonly understood words.”
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. For other claim terms, however, the meaning of the claim
language may be less apparent. To construe those terms, the Court considers “those
sources available to the public that show what a person of skill in the art would have
understood disputed claim language to mean . . . [including] the words of the claims
themselves, the remainder of the specification, the prosecution history, and extrinsic
evidence concerning relevant scientific principles, the meaning of technical terms, and
the state of the art.” Id.
The claims “provide substantial guidance as to the meaning of particular claim
terms.” Id. The Court may consider the context in which the terms are used and the
differences among the claims. See id. “Because claim terms are normally used
consistently throughout the patent, the usage of a term in one claim can often
illuminate the meaning of the same term in other claims.” Id. Because the claims “are
part of a fully integrated written instrument,” the Court may also consider the

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specification and the patent’s prosecution history. Id. at 1315, 1317. When the claims
use separate terms, “each term is presumed to have a distinct meaning.” Primos, Inc.
v. Hunter’s Specialties, Inc., 451 F.3d 841, 847 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
III.

CONSTRUCTION OF DISPUTED CLAIM TERMS
As to the disputed claim terms in the Amended Joint Claim Construction Chart

[Doc. # 33], the Court has carefully reviewed the ’912 Patent, specifically its claims
and specifications, and the prosecution history. The Court also has considered
counsels’ arguments presented at the Markman hearing, and governing Federal Circuit
authority. On this basis, the Court construes the following disputed terms in the
claims of the ’912 Patent.
A.

“In Constant Fluid Communication With” and “In Continuous
Communication With”

The parties dispute the proper construction of the claim terms “in constant fluid
communication with” (in Claim 7) and “in continuous communication with” (in Claim
22). Defendants argue that the claim terms do not require construction by the Court
but, instead, should be given their ordinary and customary meaning. The Court
concludes that construction of the claim terms is required.
The claim phrases “in constant fluid communication with” and “in continuous
communication with” are part of longer phrases that both continue “with substantially
the entire contained chlorine supply . . ..” The Court has reviewed the disputed claim
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terms in the context of each entire claim, and has considered the parties’ arguments
and explanations during the Markman hearing. On that basis, the subject terms are
construed to mean that the second open end of the chlorine supply tube is located in
a position that allows it to be in contact with the fluid in the chlorine canister at all
times as long as there is a non-negligible amount of chlorine in the canister.
B.

“The Volume of Chlorine Drawn from the Chlorine Supply Canister
During a Period of Continuous Sewage Effluent Recirculation Varies
with the Duration Period of Continuous Sewage Effluent
Recirculation”

The parties dispute the proper construction of the claim term “the volume of
chlorine drawn from the chlorine supply canister during a period of continuous
sewage effluent recirculation varies with the duration period of continuous sewage
effluent recirculation” in Claim 20. Plaintiff requests a construction that “the longer
the sewage effluent is recirculated without stopping, the greater the volume of chlorine
that is dispensed.” See Amended Joint Claim Construction Chart [Doc. # 33], p. 4.
Defendants primarily argue that the claim term does not require construction by the
Court but, instead, should be given its ordinary and customary meaning. Having
considered the intrinsic evidence and the parties’ arguments during the Markman
hearing, the Court now agrees that this claim term is a “‘straightforward term’ that
require[s] no construction.” See Summit 6, __ F.3d __, 2015 WL 5515331 at *5.

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Logic dictates, and the parties agree, that the total volume of chlorine drawn
from the chlorine supply canister necessarily increases the longer the sewage effluent
is recirculated. The claim term, however, does not state that the volume increases.
Instead, the claim term requires only that the volume vary. To construe this claim
term to require the volume of chlorine to increase would add a limitation not
contained in the claim.
The claim term “varies with” is a commonly used term that has no special
meaning in the relevant art. See id. As a result, because this claim term language is
clear, no construction by the Court is required.
IV.

CONCLUSION
The Court has considered the intrinsic evidence, including the prosecution

history. The Court also has considered the parties’ oral arguments and explanations
during the Markman hearing, which the Court found very helpful and informative.
Based on this consideration of the intrinsic evidence and the parties’ arguments, as
well as the application of governing claim construction principles, the Court construes
the disputed terms in Claims 7 and 22 of the ’912 Patent as set forth herein. The Court
concludes that no construction is necessary for the disputed claim term in Claim 20.
It is SO ORDERED.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, this 1st day of October, 2015.

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NAN Y F. ATLAS
SENIOR UNI
STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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