Castillo-Saucedo v. United States of America

Filing 4

OPINION AND ORDER. A certificate of appealability is DENIED. Case terminated on 7/21/2015.(Signed by Judge Micaela Alvarez) Parties notified.(bgarces, 7)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MCALLEN DIVISION
FIDENCIO ALBERTO CASTILLOSAUCEDO
Plaintiff
VS.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

§
§
§
§
§ CIVIL ACTION NO. 7:15-CV-148
§ CRIM. CASE NO. 7:11-CR-1387
§

OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court is a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence filed by
Fidencio Castillo Saucedo (“Castillo”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

2255.1

The Court, having

considered the record, finds that an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary because the record
demonstrates conclusively that Castillo is not entitled to relief.
I.

Procedural History
Castillo was charged on September 8, 2011 with being found in the United States after

being previously deported, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (a) and (b).2 Castillo pled guilty and
was sentenced to term of seventy-seven months in custody.3 Judgment was entered on January
17, 2012.4 A notice of appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was
filed on January 11, 20125 but the appeal was dismissed as frivolous on August 11, 2012.6

1

Civ. Dkt. No. 1. “Civ. Dkt.” refers to filings in this case. Hereafter “Cr. Dkt.” will be used to refer to the
companion criminal case, United States v. Castillo-Saucedo, Case No. 7:11-cr-1387. “MC. Dkt.” will refer to the
related civil case that was recharacterized into this civil case, Castillo-Saucedo v. United States, Case No. 7:15-mc00740.
2
Cr. Dkt. 1.
3
Cr. Dkt. Entry dated 01/10/2012.
4
Cr. Dkt. No. 29.
5
Cr. Dkt. No. 24.
6
Cr. Dkt. No. 38.

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Castillo subsequently sought, but was denied, retroactive application of the “fast-track”
program.7
Castillo then filed a “Bill of review, under All Writs Act and Under the Habeas Corpus”
on June 17, 2013.8 The Court notified Castillo that “Bills of Review have been abolished” and
that the All Writs Act “would be an inappropriate vehicle for the relief” sought.9 Castillo was
warned that if he did not withdraw or amend his pleading within thirty days it would be
“recharaterized as a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C §
2255.”10 Castillo did not respond so the Court recharacterized the pleading as a motion pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 by Order dated April 8, 2015.11
II.

Law and Analysis
Castillo is entitled to relief pursuant to § 2255 under four limited grounds: (1) his

sentence was in violation of the constitution or laws of the United States; (2) the District Court
lacked jurisdiction to impose the sentence; (3) the length of a sentence was in excess of the
statutory maximum; and (4) the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack.12 Thus, the
Court must wade through Castillo’s motion to determine whether any of these grounds entitle
him to relief. In doing so, the Court is cognizant that Castillo is proceeding pro se and as such,
his pleading are subject to less stringent standards than those drafted by attorneys.13
Nonetheless, even construed liberally, Castillo’s pleading are difficult to decipher. Castillo
makes various convoluted claims; the ones closest to being cogent are ineffective assistance of

7

Cr. Dkt. No. 40, 41.
MC. Dkt. No. 1.
9
MC. Dkt. No. 2.
10
Id.
11
MC. Dkt. No. 3.
12
28 U.S.C. § 2255 (a).
13
Haines v Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
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counsel, improper jurisdiction, and errors made by the Court. The Court briefly considers each
in turn.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are analyzed under the two-prong test set forth
in Strickland v. Washington.14 To prevail, a movant must meet both prongs of the test or the
entire claim fails.15 The first prong is that the attorney’s performance fell below the standard for
reasonably effective assistance.16 In this respect, deference is owed to the attorney regarding his
or her choice of defense pursuant to “the reasonableness of the professional judgments on which
they are based.”17 The second prong necessary for the movant to prevail is that the actions of the
attorney prejudiced the outcome in some way, such that if it were not for the attorney’s actions
the judgment would have been in his favor.18
Castillo first claims that counsel was ineffective by not giving him adequate advice. In
this regard, Castillo references various alleged failures, most of which are completely
nonsensical. One claim that could potentially have merit, that Castillo did not understand his
rights and did not understand the nature of the charges against him, is wholly unsupported by any
facts. Similarly, Castillo’s claim that counsel failed to raise certain defenses, might in some
cases constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Here, however, it is completely frivolous. To
illustrate, Castillo contends that counsel should have raised a Nuremberg defense.19 The
Nuremberg defense applies to defendants who “undertook acts that were required by domestic
law but violated international law,” or whose acts were ordered by a political or military

14

466 U.S. 668 (1984).
Id. at 689.
16
Id. at 687.
17
Id. at 681.
18
Id. at 682.
19
Dkt. No. 1 at 9 ¶ 2.
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superior.20 Castillo does not assert that his reentry to the United States was the result of his
abidance of any superior’s order or laws of another country. Lastly, Castillo claims that his
counsel conspired with the prosecution. This claim is also without merit as Castillo offers no
facts to support the claim and what he does state is a non sequitur.
Castillo has failed to meet either Strickland prong. Accordingly, his claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel is DISMISSED.
Challenge to Court’s Jurisdiction
Castillo also alleges that the District Court’s jurisdiction was improper because “he had
the right to leave any country and freedom of movement as well as the right to not be arbitrarily
assigned a nationality for the purpose of manufactur[ing] diversity of citizenship/jurisdiction.”21
Castillo also claims rights as a “stateless person” and under various international law treaties that
would have allowed him to “become a world citizen and travel abroad.”22
As previously noted, Castillo was charged with being found in the United States after
being previously deported, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (a) and (b).23 Section 1231 of Title 18
United States Code provides that “[t]he district courts of the United States shall have original
jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all offenses against the laws of the United
States.” Castillo was charged with violating the law of the United States. Thus, this Court’s
jurisdiction was proper.
Errors Made by the Court
Castillo also alleges various errors made by the Court. More specifically, Castillo claims
that the Court abused its discretion in applying her personal judgment and discretion. Castillo
20

United States v. Maxwell, 254 F.3d 21, 29 (1th Cir. 2001); United States v. Lee, 744 F.2d 1124, 1125 (5th Cir.
1984).
21

Id. at 11 ¶ 1.
Id.
23
Cr. Dkt. No. 1.
22

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does not detail in what manner the Court applied its personal judgment or discretion. Castillo
also claims the Court erred in not admitting expert testimony and medical records as to his
mother’s medical condition and need for a kidney transplant. Regardless of the inadequacy of
these pleadings, none of these alleged errors rise to the level of constitutional claims.
Furthermore, errors that could have been raised on direct appeal but were not are not properly
asserted in a § 2255 motion. Accordingly, this claim is also without merit.
III.

Conclusion
Castillo has failed to show that he is entitled to relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

Accordingly, Castillo’s recharacterized § 2255 is DISMISSED with prejudice. Should Castillo
seek a certificate of appealability, same is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DONE at McAllen, Texas, this 21st day of July, 2015.

___________________________________
Micaela Alvarez
United States District Judge

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