Martinez v. State Farm Lloyds
Filing
21
OPINION AND ORDER re 18 Motion for Summary Judgment; 20 Motion for Extension of Scheduling Order Deadlines. (Signed by Judge Micaela Alvarez) Parties notified.(bgarces, 7)
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
November 08, 2016
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MCALLEN DIVISION
David J. Bradley, Clerk
GLORIA MARTINEZ,
Plaintiff,
VS.
STATE FARM LLOYDS,
Defendant.
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§ CIVIL ACTION NO. 7:16-CV-183
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OPINION AND ORDER
The Court now considers “Defendant’s Second Amended Motion for Summary
Judgment,”1 filed by State Farm Lloyds (“Defendant”) and the “Agreed Motion to Extend the
Scheduling Order Deadlines,”2 filed by Gloria Martinez (“Plaintiff”) and Defendant. After duly
considering the record and relevant authorities, the Court GRANTS summary judgment and
DENIES the motion to extend the scheduling order deadlines.
I.
Background
Plaintiff’s claims arise from a storm that damaged her property in 2012 or 2014.3 It is
undisputed that Plaintiff first gave notice of a loss on September 25, 2014, when Plaintiff
reported an insurance claim to Defendant.4 Various communications were exchanged between
that date and July 1, 2015, when Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant in state court, alleging
breach of contract and extra-contractual claims.5 On April 20, 2016, within 30 days of being
served, Defendant removed the case to this Court.6 In June 2016, Defendant filed a motion for
1
Dkt. No. 18.
Dkt. No. 20.
3
Dkt. No. 1-1, at ¶ 8.
4
Dkt. No. 18-2, at p. 2; Dkt. No. 18-2, at p. 33; Dkt. No. 18-3, at p. 188.
5
Dkt. No. 1-1, at ¶¶ 24–65.
6
Dkt. No. 1. Defendant was served with the Original Petition on March 24, 2016.
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summary judgment,7 which was thereafter amended twice. The second amended motion for
summary judgment is the one now before the Court. Plaintiff responded only to the original
motion for summary judgment, but the Court will consider Plaintiff’s affidavit in determining
whether a fact issue exists. The Court will address the merits of the instant motion for summary
judgment before addressing the motion to extend the deadlines.
II.
Summary Judgment Legal Standard
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is proper when there is
“no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.”8 “A fact issue is ‘material’ if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action,”9 while a
“genuine” dispute is present “only if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.”10 As a result, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under
the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”11
In a motion for summary judgment, the movant bears the initial burden of showing the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact.12 In this showing, “bald assertions of ultimate facts”
are insufficient.13 Absent a sufficient showing, summary judgment is not warranted, the analysis
is ended, and the non-movant need not defend the motion.14 On the other hand, the movant is
freed from this initial burden on matters for which the non-movant would bear the burden of
proof at trial; in that event, the movant’s burden is reduced to merely pointing to the absence of
evidence.15 If the movant meets its initial burden, the non-movant must then demonstrate the
7
8
9
Dkt. No. 8.
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
Burrell v. Dr. Pepper/Seven UP Bottling Grp., Inc., 482 F.3d 408, 411 (5th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
Fordoche, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 463 F.3d 388, 392 (5th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).
11
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
12
See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
13
Gossett v. Du-Ra-Kel Corp., 569 F.2d 869, 872 (5th Cir. 1978) (citation omitted).
14
See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323.
15
See id. at 323–25; see also Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Avenell, 66 F.3d 715, 718–19 (5th Cir. 1995).
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existence of a genuine issue of material fact.16 This demonstration must specifically indicate
facts and their significance,17 and cannot consist solely of “[c]onclusional allegations and
denials, speculation, improbable inferences, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic
argumentation.”18
In conducting its analysis, the Court considers evidence from the entire record and views
that evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant.19 Thus, although the Court refrains
from determinations of credibility and evidentiary weight, the Court nonetheless gives credence
to all evidence favoring the non-movant; on the other hand, regarding evidence that favors the
movant, the Court gives credence to evidence that is uncontradicted and unimpeachable, but
disregards evidence the jury is not required to believe.20 Rather than combing through the record
on its own, the Court looks to the motion for summary judgment and response to present the
evidence for consideration.21 Parties may cite to any part of the record, or bring evidence in the
motion and response.22 By either method, parties need not proffer evidence in a form admissible
at trial,23 but must proffer evidence substantively admissible at trial.24
16
See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323–25.
See Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998).
18
U.S. ex rel. Farmer v. City of Hous., 523 F.3d 333, 337 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing TIG Ins. Co. v. Sedgwick James of
Wash., 276 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 2002)).
19
See Moore v. Willis Indep. Sch. Dist., 233 F.3d 871, 874 (5th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
20
See id.
21
See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e).
22
See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
23
See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324 (“We do not mean that the nonmoving party must produce evidence in a form
that would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary judgment.”).
24
See Bellard v. Gautreaux, 675 F.3d 454, 460 (5th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he evidence proffered by the plaintiff to satisfy
his burden of proof must be competent and admissible at trial.”).
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III.
Discussion
a.
Breach of Contract Claim
Defendant’s argument in favor of summary judgment proceeds sequentially to address
the claim for breach of contract before the extra-contractual claims, a rubric which the Court
finds helpful for the analysis.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff is barred from maintaining a breach of contract claim as a
matter of law for two alternative reasons, depending on the actual date of loss. Defendant’s first
argument is that if October 18, 2012 is the date of loss, Plaintiff’s notice to Defendant on
September 25, 2014, nearly two years after the date of loss, fails to comply with the notice
requirement in the insurance contract. In Texas, satisfying insurance policy notice requirements
is a condition precedent to coverage.25 Failure to do so “constitutes a breach of contract and
relieves the insurer of the obligation to defend or indemnify.”26 The insurance contract in this
case provides that “[a]fter a loss to which this insurance may apply, you shall . . . give immediate
notice to us or our agent.”27 While the insurance contract does not specify what qualifies as
“immediate notice,” twenty-three months surely does not suffice.28 As a result, if the date of loss
is October 18, 2012, Plaintiff is barred from maintaining a breach of contract claim. The Court
notes however, that in her affidavit, Plaintiff has abandoned any claim that the loss occurred on
October 18, 2012. Specifically, Plaintiff avers that “I do not know where the October 18, 2012
Date of Loss came from. I did not provide that date to State Farm.”29 Thus, it is clear that
25
Flores v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s Co., 278 F.Supp.2d 810, 815 (S.D. Tex. July 16, 2003).
Nan Travis Memorial Hospital v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 394 F.2d 112, 112 (5th Cir. 1968).
27
Dkt. No. 8-1, at pp. 39–40 (emphasis added).
28
See Flores, 278 F.Supp.2d at 820 (finding that six months was not “‘prompt’ or reasonable as a matter of law”);
Assicurazioni Generali, SpA v. Pipe Line Valve Specialties Co., Inc., 935 F.Supp. 879, 888 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 21,
1996) (internal citation omitted) (“Pipeline did not report the accident or the lawsuit to Plaintiff until March 22,
1993, almost 17 months after the occurrence and more than two months (68) days after receipt of the Original
Petition. By no stretch of the imagination can this notification of the accident be deemed ‘as soon as practicable.’”).
29
Dkt. No. 15-1, at p. 2.
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Plaintiff does not assert any causes of action arising from a loss on October 18, 2012. To the
extent that Plaintiff’s original petition alleged claims arising from an October 18, 2012 claim and
Defendant’s handling of that claim, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment.
Defendant’s second argument is that if August 13, 2014 is the date of loss, Plaintiff is
barred from maintaining a breach of contract claim because there was no insurance coverage on
that date. Indeed, Defendant’s summary judgment evidence establishes that Plaintiff’s insurance
coverage ceased on July 3, 2013 due to non-payment of premiums.30 Plaintiff has proffered no
evidence to controvert the lack of coverage. As a result, Plaintiff cannot assert any claims arising
from an August 13, 2014 loss or Defendant’s handling of such claim. The Court need not
evaluate separately the remaining claims, as absent the existence of a contract, there is no
separate independent duty owed by Defendant to Plaintiff.
IV.
Holding
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of Defendant
and against Plaintiff, and DENIES as moot the motion to extend the scheduling order deadlines.
Plaintiff’s claims are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. A separate final judgment will
issue.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DONE at McAllen, Texas, this 8th day of November, 2016.
___________________________________
Micaela Alvarez
United States District Judge
30
Dkt. No. 18-1, at p. 2.
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