Martinez v. City of Alton, Texas

Filing 13

OPINION re: 12 MOTION for Summary Judgment (Signed by Judge Micaela Alvarez) Parties notified.(klopez, 7)

United States District Court
Southern District of Texas

ENTERED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MCALLEN DIVISION
TOMAS DAVALOS MARTINEZ,
Plaintiff,
VS.
CITY OF ALTON, TEXAS,
Defendant.

March 15, 2018
David J. Bradley, Clerk

§
§
§
§ CIVIL ACTION NO. 7:17-CV-00189
§
§
§
§
OPINION

The Court now considers the City of Alton, Texas’s (“Defendant”) motion for summary
judgment.1 After duly considering the record and relevant authorities, the Court GRANTS the
motion.
I.

BACKGROUND

Tomas Davalos Martinez (“Plaintiff”) brings an excessive force claim against Defendant
for the actions of police officer Jason Salinas (“Salinas”)—Defendant’s employee.2 The available
evidence indicates Salinas was stationed at a four-way stop when he observed Plaintiff’s failure
to make a complete stop.3 Salinas pulled Plaintiff over, approached Plaintiff’s window, and
noticed that Plaintiff’s car was still running.4 Salinas advised Plaintiff of the basis for the stop,
and requested Plaintiff’s driver’s license and proof of insurance.5 Plaintiff “became irate and
began yelling he did make a stop.”6

1

Dkt. No. 12.
Dkt. No. 1 pp. 2–3.
3
Dkt. No. 12-1 p. 2; Dkt. No. 12-1 p. 6.
4
Dkt. No. 12-1 p. 2; Dkt. No. 12-1 p. 6.
5
Dkt. No. 12-1 p. 2; Dkt. No. 12-1 p. 6.
6
Dkt. No. 12-1 p. 2; see also Dkt. No. 12-1 p. 6.
2

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Plaintiff refused to provide his driver’s license despite Salinas’s continual orders to
produce it.7 In light of Plaintiff’s still-running vehicle, as well as his aggressive behavior, Salinas
“became concerned of the driver attempting to flee,”8 and ordered Plaintiff to step out of the
vehicle four times. Plaintiff refused all four times.9 Salinas then opened Plaintiff’s door and
attempted to extract Plaintiff.10 Plaintiff stiffened his body and grabbed his seat to prevent this,
but Salinas was eventually successful.11 After being extracted, Plaintiff allegedly began pushing
Salinas into the roadway where traffic was passing by. 12 Salinas then attempted to handcuff
Plaintiff.13
To prevent being handcuffed, Plaintiff stiffened his arms and tucked them under his
chest.14 Plaintiff placed his leg behind Salinas’s leg.15 “For fear of being tripped,” Salinas twisted
his “body while holding onto the driver and guided him to the ground. During the process
[Salinas] observed the driver hit the left side of [Plaintiff’s] face on the asphalt.”16 Plaintiff still
hid his arms under his chest to prevent being handcuffed, and Salinas placed his knee on
Plaintiff’s back to effectuate the arrest.17 Plaintiff refused to walk with Salinas to the police
vehicle.18 He eventually “relented and sat in the vehicle but refused to place his legs in the
vehicle.”19 Salinas “observed the driver to have a swollen left cheek” which was “bleeding,” and

7

Dkt. No. 12-1 p. 2; Dkt. No. 12-1 p. 6.
Dkt. No. 12-1 p. 2.
9
Dkt. No. 12-1 p. 2; Dkt. No. 12-1 p. 6.
10
Dkt. No. 12-1 p. 2; see also Dkt. No. 12-1 p. 6.
11
Dkt. No. 12-1 p. 2; Dkt. No. 12-1 p. 6.
12
Dkt. No. 12-1 p. 2; see also Dkt. No. 12-1 p. 6.
13
Dkt. No. 12-1 p. 2; Dkt. No. 12-1 p. 6.
14
Dkt. No. 12-1 p. 2; Dkt. No. 12-1 p. 6.
15
Dkt. No. 12-1 p. 2; Dkt. No. 12-1 p. 6.
16
Dkt. No. 12-1 p. 2; see also Dkt. No. 12-1 p. 6.
17
Dkt. No. 12-1 p. 2.
18
Id.
19
Id.
8

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thus “advised dispatch to have EMS [on] standby . . . in order to provide the driver with medical
attention.”20
Plaintiff sued Defendant for excessive force in federal court.21 Defendant filed the instant
motion for summary judgment,22 and Plaintiff never responded, rendering the motion
unopposed23 and ripe for review. The Court now turns to its analysis.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 56, summary judgment is proper when
there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.”24 A fact is material “if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action,”25
while a genuine dispute is present “only if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant.”26 As a result, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under
the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”27
The movant bears the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact,28 but is freed from this initial burden on matters for which the non-movant would bear the
burden of proof at trial; in that event, the movant’s burden is reduced to merely pointing to the
absence of evidence.29 The non-movant must then affirmatively demonstrate the existence of a
genuine issue of material fact.30 This demonstration must specifically indicate facts and their

20

Id.; see also Dkt. No. 12-1 p. 6.
Dkt. No. 1.
22
Dkt. No. 12.
23
See L.R. 7.3–7.4 of the Local Rules of the Southern District of Texas.
24
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
25
Burrell v. Dr. Pepper/Seven UP Bottling Grp., Inc., 482 F.3d 408, 411 (5th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
26
Fordoche, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 463 F.3d 388, 392 (5th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).
27
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
28
See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
29
See id. at 323–25; see also Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Avenell, 66 F.3d 715, 718–19 (5th Cir. 1995).
30
See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323.
21

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significance,31 and cannot consist solely of “[c]onclusional allegations and denials, speculation,
improbable inferences, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic argumentation[.]”32
In conducting its analysis, the Court may consider evidence from the entire record,
viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant.33 Rather than combing through the record
on its own, however, the Court looks to the motion for summary judgment and response to
present the evidence for consideration.34 Parties may cite to any part of the record, or bring
evidence in the motion and response.35 By either method, parties need not proffer evidence in a
form admissible at trial,36 but must proffer evidence substantively admissible at trial.37
III.

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff’s excessive force claim brought against Defendant via 42 U.S.C. §1983 fails for
two reasons. First, it fails because Plaintiff did not respond to the instant motion, and has thus
failed to supply any evidence to support the essential elements of his underlying excessive force
claim. Second, Plaintiff’s excessive force claim—even if it was valid as against Salinas—could
not properly be brought against Defendant. Plaintiff’s complaint sets forth two distinct theories
of liability imputation under §1983. The first is a custom/policy theory by which Defendant may
be held responsible for Salinas’s action because Salinas was merely acting pursuant to
Defendant’s dictates. The second is a failure to train/supervise theory. Both theories fail for the
same reason—a complete lack of evidence.

31

See Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998).
U.S. ex rel. Farmer v. City of Hous., 523 F.3d 333, 337 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing TIG Ins. Co. v. Sedgwick James of
Wash., 276 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 2002)).
33
See Moore v. Willis Indep. Sch. Dist., 233 F.3d 871, 874 (5th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
34
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
35
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
36
See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324 (“We do not mean that the nonmoving party must produce evidence in a form
that would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary judgment.”).
37
See Bellard v. Gautreaux, 675 F.3d 454, 460 (5th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he evidence proffered by the plaintiff to satisfy
[her] burden of proof must be competent and admissible at trial.”).
32

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A.

Excessive Force

A claim for excessive force derives from the Fourth Amendment, and has three essential
elements: “(1) an injury that (2) resulted directly and only from the use of force that was
excessive to the need, and (3) the use of force . . . was objectively unreasonable.”38 This analysis
is extremely fact intensive.39 When considering the objective reasonableness of the use of
excessive force, courts must consider “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect
poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively
resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”40
Here, the first element is satisfied because Defendant admits that Plaintiff suffered
injuries to his face. However, Plaintiff has failed to submit any evidence from which the Court
could reasonably infer objectively unreasonable excessive force. Rather, Defendant’s evidence
generally indicates that Plaintiff was obstinate, refused to comply with Salinas’s reasonable
orders, resisted arrest, and even endangered Salinas by pushing him into oncoming traffic. In
light of these facts—and that they are the only facts presented—Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the
second and third essential elements of his excessive force claim.
B.

Custom or Policy

Even if Plaintiff had submitted evidence supporting his excessive force claim, any
liability arising from it could not be imputed from Salinas to Defendant via § 1983. Respondeat
superior “does not apply to § 1983 actions.”41 Thus, “[l]ocal governments are responsible only
for their own illegal acts.”42 A plaintiff attempting to successfully sue a municipality via § 1983
38

James v. City of W. Columbia, 2018 WL 1033253, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 21, 2018) (quoting Bush v. Strain, 513
F.3d 492, 500–01 (5th Cir. 2008)).
39
Bush, 513 F.3d at 501.
40
See e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (U.S. 1989).
41
Deal v. City of Fort Worth, Texas, 2016 WL 6806237, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 16, 2016) (citing Monell v. New
York City Dep't of Soc. Serys., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)).
42
Deal, 2016 WL 6806237, at *2 (citing Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011)).

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must establish: “(1) an official policy (2) promulgated by the municipal policymaker (3) [that]
was the moving force behind the violation of a constitutional right.”43 Here, Plaintiff has failed to
set forth any evidence supporting these three elements. Thus, Plaintiff’s attempt to impute
liability from Salinas to Defendant via § 1983 fails.
C.

Failure to Train or Supervise

Section 1983 also provides for municipal liability if the municipal defendant fails to
adopt and implement policies in a manner evincing deliberate indifference to the claimant’s
constitutional rights.44 This type of municipal liability is rare.45 A plaintiff hoping to establish it
must prove “(1) that the highly predictable consequence of not training or supervising the officer
was that the officer would violate the Constitution; and (2) that this failure to train or provide
supervision was the moving force that had a specific causal connection to the constitutional
injury.”46 Importantly, “[c]laims of inadequate training generally require that the plaintiff
demonstrate a pattern of conduct.”47 A plaintiff must prove that state legal minimum training is
itself inadequate when the state officer in question received state minimum training.48
Here, Plaintiff has failed to present any evidence supporting the first and second elements
of his failure to train or supervise theory. Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to submit any evidence
demonstrating any particular pattern of conduct by Defendant. Defendant has supplied evidence
that Salinas received state-minimum police training,49 and Plaintiff has not produced evidence

43

Pena v. City of Rio Grande City, 879 F.3d 613, 621 (5th Cir. 2018).
See Thomas v. City of Galveston, Texas, 800 F. Supp. 2d 826, 841 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (citing City of Canton v.
Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989)).
45
Thomas, 800 F. Supp. 2d 826, 841 (“[M]unicipalities are not normally liable for inadequate training of employees
. . . .”).
46
Id. (citing Brown v. Bryan County, OK, 219 F.3d 450, 461 (5th Cir. 2000)).
47
Thomas, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 841 (citing Sanders–Burns v. City Of Plano, 594 F.3d 366, 382 (5th Cir. 2010)).
48
Sanders-Burns, 594 F.3d at 382.
49
See Dkt. No. 12-2 pp. 33–42; Dkt. No. 12-4 p. 8.
44

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that Texas requirements are somehow inherently deficient. Thus, Plaintiff’s failure to train or
supervise theory also fails.
IV.

HOLDING

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED,
and Plaintiff’s excessive force claim against Defendant is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Pursuant to Rule 58, a final judgment will issue separately.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DONE at McAllen, Texas, this 15th day of March, 2018.
___________________________________
Micaela Alvarez
United States District Judge

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