Falcon et al v. State Farm Lloyds et al

Filing 69

ORDER GRANTING 27 Motion to Exclude James Fields' Testimony; GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART 29 Motion to Exclude Marion Armstrong's Testimony; GRANTING 28 Motion to Exclude Stephen Hadhazi's Testimony; DENYING 43 Motion to Exclude Stephen Waide's Testimony. Signed by Judge David A. Ezra. (kkc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AUSTIN DIVISION
ANDRES FALCON and DONNA
FALCON,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
STATE FARM LLOYDS,
Defendant.

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No. 1:12-CV-491-DAE

ORDER: (1) GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE EXPERT
TESTIMONY OF JAMES FIELDS; (2) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING
IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE EXPERT TESTIMONY OF
MARION ARMSTRONG; (3) GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
STRIKE EXPERT TESTIMONY OF STEPHEN HADHAZI; AND
(4) DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO STRIKE EXPERT TESTIMONY OF
STEPHEN WAIDE
On May 5 and 6, 2014, the Court heard Defendant’s and Plaintiffs’
motions to strike and conducted evidentiary hearings pursuant to Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (the “Daubert hearings”). Robert
L. Collins, Esq., Audrey E. Guthrie, Esq., and Richard A. Grigg, Esq., appeared on
behalf of Plaintiffs, and Richard W. South, Esq., and Christopher Shuley, Esq.,
represented Defendant.
After reviewing the motions and the supporting and opposing
memoranda, and considering the testimony proffered at the Daubert hearing, the
1

Court (1) GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Strike Expert Testimony of James
Fields (Dkt. # 27); (2) GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendant’s
Motion to Strike Expert Testimony of Marion Armstrong (Dkt. # 29);
(3) GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Strike Expert Testimony of Stephen Hadhazi
(Dkt. # 28); and (4) DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike Expert Testimony of
Stephen Waide (Dkt. # 43).
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Andrew and Donna Falcon (the “Falcons”) purchased a
homeowners insurance policy (Policy No. 83-LV-9557-4) (the “Policy”) through
Defendant State Farm Lloyds (“State Farm”) covering their property at 131
Rainbow drive, Bastrop, Texas (the “Property” or the “Falcon residence”). (Dkt.
# 1-2 ¶ 7.) The Falcons timely made all required premium payments under the
policy. (Id.)
In September 2011, a wildfire occurred in Bastrop County (the
“Bastrop fire” or the “Bastrop wildfire”). (Id.) On September 6, 2011, the Falcons
contacted State Farm stating that they believed their house had been destroyed by
the Bastrop fire. (Dkt. # 46 ¶ 2.) State Farm issued the Falcons a $5,000 advance
to assist them while they were barred from their home by the authorities. (Id.)
Although the fire did not cause significant physical damage to the Property, the

2

Falcons filed a claim with State Farm seeking to recover under their policy for
damage caused by exposure to the fire’s smoke. (Id.)
On September 9, 2011, State Farm assigned Vidale Coleman, a
catastrophe claims adjuster, to evaluate the Falcons’ claim. (Id. ¶ 3.) On
September 12, 2011, Coleman drove to the Property and found it was still standing.
(Id. ¶ 4.) Coleman and the Falcons agreed that Coleman would inspect the
Property on September 16, 2011. (Id. ¶ 5.)
On September 16, 2011, Coleman inspected the Property with Donna
Falcon. (Id. ¶ 6.) According to State Farm, Coleman “did not find any direct fire
damage to the roof or the exterior of the house.” (Id.) However, Coleman did find
“minor fire damage” on the deck and damage to the trees and lights in the yard.
(Id.) Coleman also allowed for “cleaning of the interior and exterior of the
residence due to soot, and food loss at the residence.” (Id.) State Farm claims that
Donna Falcon asked about smoke damage to the carpet and that Coleman informed
her “she would first need to attempt to clean the carpet before State Farm would
authorize replacement.” (Id.) Similarly, Donna Falcon asked whether State Farm
would replace one of the refrigerators due to the smell caused by rotting food
remaining in there after the power went out. (Id. ¶ 8.)

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State Farm states that the Falcons contacted Service Master who
estimated the cost to clean the residence was $8,103.75. (Id. ¶ 7.) State Farm
received this estimate around September 23, 2011. (Id.)
On September 26, 2011, Coleman prepared an estimate allowing for
(1) the policy limit of $8,245.00 for the trees, shrubs, and other plants in the yard;
and (2) $8,398.12 for remediation of the house, including the cleaning by Service
Master and repairs to the deck. (Id. ¶ 8.) State Farm denied coverage for the
refrigerator because the damage was not caused by a “covered peril.” (Id.) It then
issued a check to the Falcons for $11,643.12 for the total, less the $5,000 advance
State Farm had already provided to the Falcons. (Id.) Additionally, State Farm
issued a check for $1,505.94, covering the Falcons’ alternative living expenses
($1,045.94), food loss ($250.00), and damage to personal property ($210.00). (Id.)
Coleman discussed these payments with the Falcons, and the check was sent
around September 26, 2011. (Id.)
On October 7, 2011, Coleman issued a new statement of loss that
included an additional $991.90 in forced evacuation expenses and $114.78 to clean
the Falcons’ personal property. (Id. ¶ 10.) State Farm issued a check; however,
the Falcons did not receive it, so State Farm stopped payment and reissued the

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check. (Id.) In addition, State Farm paid another $2,037.84 in living expenses and
forced evacuation expenses.1 (Id. ¶ 11.)
According to State Farm, Donna Falcon contacted State Farm
regarding the invoice she received from Service Master. (Id. ¶ 12.) Donna Flacon
claimed she did not have the money to pay the invoice and that she believed State
Farm would be responsible for it. (Id.) State Farm told her that it had issued
payment to the Falcons covering this expense, and it was their responsibility to pay
the contractors. (Id.)
Subsequently, State Farm received a letter from the Falcons’ attorney
seeking full payment of the claim and attaching an estimate from Stephen Hadhazi,
a public adjuster, claiming the Falcons were entitled to payment in the amount of
$112,766.59 to remediate the Property entirely. (Id. ¶ 13.)
In response, State Farm engaged Glen Hart, a claims adjuster, to reinspect the Property and review the claim. (Id. ¶ 14.) On March 2, 2011, Hart
reviewed the claim and contacted the Falcons’ attorney; Hart then sent the Falcons’
attorney a letter on March 15, 2012, seeking to set up a specific time to re-inspect
the Property. (Id. ¶ 15.) Hart received no reply until April 23, 2012, when the
Falcons’ attorney told Hart he could re-inspect the Property on April 30, 2012. (Id.
¶ 18.)

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According to State Farm, there is no dispute over this amount. (Dkt. # 46 ¶ 11.)
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Meanwhile, on April 5, 2012, State Farm received an invoice from
National Smoke Contaminant Testing, a business owned by James Fields, in the
amount of $2,900 and a lab report from Armstrong Forensic Laboratory, Inc.,
(“Armstrong Labs”) dated January 17, 2012. (Id. ¶ 16.) State Farm sent this report
to Ninyo & Moore, an environmental sciences consulting company, for review on
April 11, 2012. (Id.) State Farm refused to pay the invoice because it had not
ordered or authorized the test. (Id.)
On April 30, 2012, Hart inspected the Property with Donna Falcon
and a representative from Service Master. (Id. ¶ 18.) According to State Farm,
“Hart noted that the Falcons had removed all of the carpet in the house and
installed hard wood floors.” (Id.) Additionally, Hart reported that he “did not find
any soot in the interior of the residence, and the representative from Service Master
who attended the re-inspection indicated the house had been properly cleaned.”
(Id.)
On May 3, 2012, Ninyo & Moore reported to State Farm that “the
Armstrong lab report was incomplete and was not sufficient to provide any
meaningful information about the condition of the Falcons’ house.” (Id. ¶ 19.)
On May 7, 2012, the Falcons filed suit against State Farm and Rivers
Alexander Schara, an agent of State Farm. (Dkt. # 1-2.) The Falcons contend that
State Farm and Schara failed to properly investigate their insurance claim as
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required by the policy. (Id.) The Falcons alleged that (1) State Farm breached its
contractual obligations, (2) State Farm and Schara breached the duty of good faith
and fair dealing, (3) State Farm and Schara violated Chapter 541 of the Texas
Insurance Code, (4) State Farm and Schara violated the Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices Act, (5) State Farm violated § 542 of the Texas Insurance Code, and
(6) State Farm and Schara caused the Falcons mental anguish. (Id. ¶¶ 10–18.) The
Falcons seek multiple damages, punitive damages, attorney’s fees, and special
damages from State Farm and Schara. (Id. ¶¶ 19–24.)
On June 6, 2012, State Farm and Schara removed the case to this
Court. (Dkt. # 1.) Subsequently, State Farm and Schara moved to dismiss Schara
from the suit because Schara had been improperly joined. (Dkt. # 7.) The Court
granted the motion, and Schara was dismissed on August 6, 2012. (Dkt. # 9.)
On October 7, 2013, State Farm moved to strike the expert testimony
of James Fields. (Dkt. # 27.) State Farm then moved to strike the expert testimony
of Stephen Hadhazi on October 9, 2013, and it moved to strike the expert
testimony of Marion Armstrong on October 11, 2013. (Dkt. ## 28, 29.)
On November 21, 2013, the Falcons moved to strike the expert
testimony of Stephen Waide. (Dkt. # 43.)
The majority of the expert testimony that the parties challenge is
based upon various air quality and particulate matter samples taken at the Falcon
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residence. First, Fields took between twenty and twenty-five samples of
particulate matter from the Falcon residence in the Fall of 2011. (Dkt. # 30-3 at
38.) Of these, Fields sent two alcohol swabs to Armstrong Labs. (Dkt. # 29-5 at
2.) Armstrong Labs generated a report analyzing these swabs dated December 29,
2011. (Id.)
Armstrong Labs received another sample from Fields on January 11,
2012. (Dkt. # 29-6 at 2.) This time, Fields sent a sterile cotton swab. (Id.)
Armstrong Labs generated a report analyzing the swab dated January 17, 2012.
(Id.) A second identical report containing a different address for Fields was issued
on January 28, 2012. (Id. at 4.)
Additionally, on October 4, 2012, Exponent Laboratories conducted
an assessment of the Falcon residence and property. (Dkt. # 29-2 at 10.) During
this assessment, Exponent collected nine surface samples of which they tested six
samples and one blank sample. (Id.) Exponent also collected nine surface vacuum
samples of which they tested six samples and one blank sample. (Id.)
During the summer of 2013, Fields returned to the Falcon residence
and took an air quality sample using a device known as a Sep-Pak; this sample was
then sent to Armstrong Labs for analysis. (Dkt. # 29-7 at 2.) Armstrong produced
a report on this sample dated July 9, 2013. (Id.)

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LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an
opinion or otherwise if:
a. the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
b. the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
c. the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods;
d. the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to
the facts of the case.
Fed. R. Evid. 702. This rule lays responsibility on the court to “ensure that any
and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.”
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
“In rulings on the admissibility of expert opinion evidence the trial
court has broad discretion . . . .” Wellogix, Inc. v. Accenture, L.L.P., 716 F.3d
867, 881 (5th Cir. 2013) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The
Fifth Circuit maintains that district courts are to “function as gatekeepers and
permit only reliable and relevant expert testimony to be presented to the jury.”
Wilson v. Woods, 163 F.3d 935, 937 (5th Cir. 1999). It is the role of the district
court to assure “that the proffered witness is qualified to testify by virtue of his
‘knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Evid.
702). A court “should refuse to allow an expert witness to testify if the witness is
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not qualified to testify in a particular field or on a given subject.” Id. However, if
an expert’s testimony constitutes shaky, but admissible evidence, the court should
rely on “vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful
instruction on the burden of proof” to mitigate the shakiness of the testimony. Id.
(quoting Pipitone v. Biomatrix, Inc., 288 F.3d 239, 250 (5th Cir. 2002)). “Courts
act as gatekeepers of expert testimony ‘to make certain that an expert, whether
basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the
courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an
expert in the relevant field.’” Recursion Software, Inc. v. Double-Take Software,
Inc., No. 4:10-CV-403, 2012 WL 1576252,*2 (E.D. Tex. May 4, 2012) (quoting
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999)).
To be reliable and therefore admissible under Rule 702 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, expert testimony as to a scientific, technical, or
other specialized area must: (1) assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (2) be based upon
sufficient facts or data; (3) be the product of reliable principles and
methods; (4) and have reliably apply the principles and methods to the
facts.
Padre Enterprises, Inc. v. Rhea, No. 4:11CV674, 2013 WL 4284925, at *1 (E.D.
Tex. Aug. 13, 2013). In determining whether testimony is reliable, the court relies
on numerous factors including, “(1) whether the expert’s theory or technique can
be or has been tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to
peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error of the
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challenged method; and (4) whether the theory or technique is generally accepted
in the relevant scientific community.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94. In evaluating
these factors, the court must focus on the expert’s “principles and methodology,
not on the conclusions” generated. Id. at 594. “[I]n a jury trial setting, the Court’s
role under Daubert is not to weigh the expert testimony to the point of supplanting
the jury’s fact-finding role; instead, the Court’s role is limited to that of a
gatekeeper, ensuring that the evidence in dispute is at least sufficiently reliable and
relevant to the issue before the jury that it is appropriate for the jury’s
consideration.” Retractable Tech., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., No. 2:08CV-16-LED-RSP, 2013 WL 4574258, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 27, 2013).
“In addition to being reliable, expert testimony must ‘help the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.’” Roman v.
Western Mfg., Inc., 691 F.3d 686, 694 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Fed. R. Evid.
702(a)). Under Rule 702, this means that the proffered expert testimony must be
relevant. Id. “Expert testimony which does not relate to any issue in the case is
not relevant, and ergo, non-helpful.” Id. (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). “Expert testimony is admissible
only if the proponent demonstrates that: (1) the expert is qualified; (2) the evidence
is relevant to the case; and (3) the evidence is reliable.” Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc.,
121 F.3d 984, 988–89 (5th Cir. 1997).
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“The burden to demonstrate that the expert’s findings and conclusions
are based on valid scientific method, and are therefore reliable, is placed on the
party seeking its admission.” Castellow v. Chevron USA, 97 F. Supp. 2d 780, 783
(S.D. Tex. 2000).
DISCUSSION
I.

Plaintiffs’ Expert: James Fields
State Farm objects to Fields’ testimony arguing that he is not qualified

to render an expert opinion on the following topics: (1) that the samples he took
from the Falcon residence in the fall of 2011 and August 2013 were in accordance
with any accepted methodology or standard; (2) that the fall 2011 and August 2013
samples were representative or indicative of damage to the Falcon home; (3) that
the fall 2011 and August 2013 samples were handled in accordance with any
accepted methodology or standard; (4) the nature or extent of damage to the Falcon
residence; (5) whether a homeowner is obligated to disclose smoke damage on a
Texas Seller’s disclosure form or under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act;
and (6) whether smoke damage has reduced the value of the Falcon residence.
(Dkt. # 27 at 3.)
As a preliminary matter, the Falcons argue that to the extent Fields is
presenting testimony regarding facts, rather than opinions, it is not subject to a

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Daubert challenge. The Court agrees, and to the extent that Fields testifies to his
personal observations, that testimony is not subject to a Daubert challenge.
A.

Fields’ Qualifications as an Expert in Smoke Contaminant Testing
According to Fields’ curriculum vitae, his education consisted of a

high school degree completed in 1971 and five years of night school in the
business school at the University of Houston.2 (Dkt. # 27-1.) Subsequently, Fields
worked in a variety of jobs including bank teller, bank purchasing agent, grocery
store assistant manager, and sales manager. (Id.) In 1995, Fields transitioned into
real estate. (Id.) Between 1995 and 2000, Fields built and sold office warehouse
projects. (Id.) Then in 2000, he became the Director of Real Estate for an
unnamed “large developer” in Southern Texas. (Id.) Fields retained this position
until 2008. (Id.) Between 2009 and 2010, Fields lists his occupation as semiretired real estate broker and developer. (Id.) In 2011, Fields formed and became
president of National Smoke Contaminant Testing. (Id.)
Fields claims he became an expert in how and where smoke damage
occurs “through extensive training with Mr. Dale Everett.” (Id.) Fields states that
Everett is his business partner and the retired Assistant Fire Chief of the Houston
Fire Department with twenty-three years of experience. (Id.) Fields asserts that
“Mr. Everett spent countless hours going over Fire Department tapes - movies and

2

Fields did not graduate from the University of Houston. (Dkt. # 27-1.)
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reference materials n [sic] an education process that has been invaluable. Mr.
Everett is the CEO of our company.” (Id.)
State Farm challenges Fields’ qualification as an expert capable of
testifying about the smoke contamination testing he conducted and the alleged
smoke damage to the Falcon residence. (Dkt. # 27 at 4.) State Farm asserts that
Fields’ education and work history have not provided him with scientific, technical
or other specialized knowledge that qualifies him as an expert. (Id.) State Farm
argues that Fields’ only qualifications derive from discussions with Everett, a
single discussion with Marion Armstrong, a certified industrial hygienist with
Armstrong Labs, and self-study of unidentified materials. (Id. at 5.) State Farm
contends that Fields is not qualified to testify that he took the samples from the
Falcon residence in accordance with any accepted methodology or standard. (Id. at
4–5.)
In response, the Falcons argue that Fields has a “comprehensive
knowledge of the appropriate processes and methods of smoke damage test sample
collection.” (Dkt. # 30 at 4–5.) The Falcons contend that Fields’ interactions with
Everett qualify him as an expert. (Id.) The Falcons assert that Everett has more
than twenty years of experience training firefighters and professionals regarding
smoke and smoke damage. (Id.) Additionally, the Falcons maintain that Everett
observed Fields take samples on multiple occasions. (Id.) The Falcons assert that
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Fields has conducted between 225 and 250 “smoke damage tests and interviewed
occupants in over 150 homes and other structures in connection with the Bastroparea wildfire events that damaged the Falcon home by heat and smoke.” (Id.) The
Falcons contend that Fields has conducted similar testing in Arizona, Colorado,
Indiana, and Washington. The Falcons claim that through these experiences,
Fields has learned from the homeowners of the damage that smoke can cause to
structures and personal property. (Id.)
The Court must thoroughly examine Fields’ qualifications. First,
from Fields’ curriculum vitae, it is apparent that Fields does not possess any formal
education regarding the effects of smoke on a residential structure or regarding
proper procedures for determining whether a structure has been damaged by
smoke. (Dkt. # 30-5 at 2.) Fields has not completed any educational degree
beyond high school; he does possess some post-secondary education, but this
concentrated in business administration and does not appear to have any
applicability to smoke damage or testing. (Id.; Dkt. # 30-3 at 41:23–42:1.)
The Court recognizes that formal education is not the only means to
obtain expertise in a relevant area; and therefore, the Court must evaluate whether
Fields’ self-study and experience is enough to qualify him as an expert. In Fields’
case, he relies on discussions he had with Everett, as well as self-study of literature

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provided to him by Everett, and a conversation with Marion Armstrong as the basis
for his expertise.3 (Dkt. # 30-6 at 1.)
1.

Fields’ Consultation with Everett

Fields bases much of his expertise on his partnership with Everett.
According to Fields, prior to conducting smoke contaminant testing, Fields read
“some information and some articles . . . about fire science and smoke” that Everett
provided to him. (Dkt. # 30-3 at 72:19–25.) Fields did not keep possession of
these articles, but rather returned them to Everett. (Id. at 73:1–2.) Fields also
stated he educated himself through the internet; however, when asked during his
deposition about what he had read, he could not recall any specifics:

3

In his deposition, Fields also mentions that he spoke with a doctor at ACT Labs,
whose name he could not remember.
Q.
A.

The only thing you remember about that conversation was his
suggestion that you use a poly puff filter, correct?
Poly foam filter, yes.

(Dkt. # 30-3 at 103:20–23.)
Fields also stated that he spoke to a Dr. Wooters at Armstrong Labs.
Q.

A.

You also talked to Dr. Wooters at Armstrong Labs. And the
only thing that you recall that he told you to use use was to use
a chain of custody form, to make sure your samples weren’t
tampered with and to send the sample FedEx, correct.
Correct.

(Dkt. # 30-3 at 104:6–11.) 
16

Q.

A.
Q.

A.

Okay. You also told me that you looked at the internet and
some books for some technical information about becoming a
smoke contaminant testing technician, correct?
Correct.
Again, as of last September you had no idea what those books
were nor could you recall what you had looked at on the
internet. Is that true still today?
I cannot quote you a specific article or a specific author or a
specific website that I went to to review information.

...
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Well, is it true, sir, that you looked on the internet to try to
figure out how to do your sampling?
As part of my process, yes, I did review sites on the internet.
But you can [sic] tell me what you read or what it might have
said, correct?
No, I sure can’t.

(Id. at 74:2–12, 103:8–14.)
Similarly, Fields had only a limited recollection of what his
discussions with Everett entailed. (Id. at 73:16–74:1.) He did recall that Everett
advised him to identify from where a sample was taken and observed Fields take
samples approximately twelve times; however, that appears to be the extent of his
recall of their conversations. (See id. at 50:16–25; 104:19–22.)
It is unclear what value Everett could add to Fields’ expertise in
smoke contaminant sampling. There is no evidence that Everett has any
experience or training in conducting smoke contaminant sampling, and Fields
stated that Everett has never conducted smoke testing on behalf of National Smoke
Contaminant Testing. (Id. at 50:16–19.)
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2.

Conversation with Armstrong

In early 2013, Fields met with Armstrong to discuss the samples he
had been sending and the process for taking air quality samples. (Id. at 26:10–15.)
The meeting lasted between one and two-and-a-half hours, and they discussed
general testing issues as well as the sample media Fields was using. (Id. at 27:13–
24.) According to Fields, “[w]e discussed air quality testing that can be done in the
houses and the effect that they show as far as offgassing and different contaminants
that are involved from that.” (Id. at 28:7–10.) However, Armstrong did not
provide him with any materials to study; instead, they “talked in general terms
about how it is done and why it’s done that way.” (Id. at 28:16–17.) Armstrong
did not provide Fields with any industry-wide standards for smoke sampling, and
Fields did not ask if any existed. (Id. at 29:15–20.) Fields also spoke with a
chemist at Armstrong Labs, Dr. Wooters, who Fields stated did not have any issues
with the samples he was sending to Armstrong Labs. (Id. at 30:6–13.) However,
Fields was not able to recall any specifics of these conversations. There is no
indication to the Court that these conversations constituted a thorough evaluation
of the techniques Fields was using.
During this meeting, Fields and Armstrong also discussed the use of a
Sep-Pak filter to sample air quality. (Id. at 31:19.) Again, Fields could not recall
specifics of the conversation, and there is no indication that it was anything more
18

than a vague discussion of Sep-Pak samples. The Court notes that Fields had never
before used a Sep-Pak to sample air quality; however, between the meeting with
Armstrong in early 2013 and when he took a Sep-Pak sample at the Falcon
residence in July 2013, Fields took between twenty and twenty-five Sep-Pak
samples. (Id. at 31:17–24.) The Court finds that there is no evidence that this
conversation qualified Fields as an expert on this topic.
In his deposition, Fields clarified that the meeting with Armstrong
was not a training session, but just Fields checking that everything was fine. (Id. at
66:1–8.) Fields stated that Armstrong “reviewed what I was doing and how I was
doing it and she was very comfortable with what I was doing and how I was
providing sampling and she encouraged me to keep doing so, you know.” (Id. at
66:5–8.) In his affidavit, Fields claims that his sampling procedures were
“developed by myself, my partner Dale Everitt [sic] (a Retired Deputy Chief of the
City of Houston Fire Department for 23 years who trained firefighters at A&M
Fire School for 30 years), and Marion Armstrong.” (“Fields’ Aff.,” Dkt. # 30-6 at
1.) However, the Court notes that Fields did not meet with Armstrong until early
2013, long after he took the first samples from the Falcon residence in the fall of
2011. (Id.)
Upon consideration of the evidence, the Court finds that Fields’ selfstudy and experience do not qualify him as an expert in smoke contaminant
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sampling and testing procedures. First, Fields had no experience with smoke
contaminant testing prior to the Bastrop fires. (Dkt. # 30-3 at 67:19–22.) Second,
Fields’ “course of study” that he claims qualifies him as an expert in smoke
contaminant testing is woefully inadequate. Fields cannot point to any literature
from which he derived his knowledge, and he can provide little detail about the
knowledge he obtained from Everett or Armstrong. Additionally, Fields did not
make any effort to inform himself of any industry standards or practices for
sampling.
Q.

A.
…
Q.

A.
Q.
A.

Would it interest you in your business to know that there’s a
standard practice for sampling and testing of possible carbon
black fugitive emissions?
Is that a question?

Would it be of interest to you in your business to know that
there is an ASTM method for testing in the profession that
you’re in?
I would be interested, but it doesn’t necessarily mean it’s a
requirement.
Well, I understand, sir. You certainly haven’t sought it out
though?
No, I haven’t.

(Id. at 105:7–10, 105:13–21.)
Fields’ course of self-study appears to have left significant gaps in his
knowledge. Fields was even unfamiliar with the concept of taking a blank sample
as a control to ensure that there was no extraneous source of contamination. (Dkt.
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# 30-3 at 142:23–143:4.) When asked how Fields educated himself on how to use
a Sep-Pak, he stated “Dr. Spurgeon4 showed me how to do air quality tests. I went
through the protocol with Marion Armstrong and she said to do it the exact same
way and use a Sep-Pak . . . .” (Id. at 134:21–24.) However, Dr. Spurgeon did not
use Sep-Paks to conduct air quality tests, so it is unclear how Fields’ conversation
with him prepared Fields to use a Sep-Pak. (Id. at 135:4–5.) And Fields readily
admitted that he did nothing else to educate himself about the proper use of a SepPak other than read the instructions. (Id. at 135:11–136:2.) Additionally, during
his deposition, Fields could not state at what temperature the Sep-Pak samples
need to be kept to remain viable other than that they needed to be chilled. (Id. at
136:21–137:5.)
Although Fields claims to have extensive experience testing for
smoke contaminants, asserting that he has taken between 225 and 250 samples as
of September 2013 (id. at 75:7–10), the Court finds that taking a large number of
samples without the necessary knowledge or reliable procedures does not qualify
an individual as an expert. Similarly, although Fields relies heavily on Everett’s
qualifications as the basis for his own expertise, there is no evidence in the record
regarding Everett’s qualifications in the area of smoke contaminant testing.

4

Dr. Spurgeon is apparently an industrial hygienist in California. (Dkt. #30-3 at
132:2–10.) From the record it appears that Fields has interacted with him, but
there is no indication of the depth of their relationship. (Id.)
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Additionally, as discussed infra, Fields’ lack of knowledge of proper
sampling procedure demonstrates that he is not qualified as an expert in smoke
contaminant sampling. First, when asked about standard sampling procedures,
Fields was unaware as to whether there were standard sampling procedures, and
stated that even if he had known of them, he would not have felt required to
employ them. (Dkt. # 30-3 at 105:4–21.)
Second, as discussed above, Fields failed to take a field blank sample.
At the Daubert hearing, certified industrial hygienist Michael Cleveland testified
that, as an industrial hygienist, he could not reach a valid opinion based upon a
sample of either air or particulates taken without a field blank. (“Tr.1,” Dkt. # 62
at 60:3–7.)
Third, Fields was unaware of the intricacies of calibrating the Sep-Pak
he used to take air quality samples at the Falcon residence. (See Dkt. # 30-3 at
138:20–140:1.) He stated he simply attached a calibration mechanism to the SepPak and then left the device on for an hour to collect a sample. (Id. at 139:2–
140:1.) Fields could not state how many liters of air were collected during that
hour or how long he took to calibrate the Sep-Pak. (Id.) Only later did Fields
recall that he had used an SKC-Rotameter to calibrate the Sep-Pak. (Dkt. # 30-6 at
2.) However, at the Daubert hearing, Cleveland testified that calibrating a Sep-Pak
is an intricate process; the Sep-Pak must be calibrated to either a primary standard
22

or to a secondary standard that was, itself, calibrated to a primary standard.
Cleveland testified that calibration is necessary because sampling devices, like
Sep-Paks, are not accurate out of the box, and an inaccurately calibrated Sep-Pak
can create bias in the samples. (Tr.1 at 64:1–9.) Cleveland testified that an SKCRotameter is a secondary standard and any results from it would be unreliable if it
had not been previously calibrated to a primary standard. (Id. at 64:10–16.)
Fields’ deposition makes no mention of these necessary procedures, and in fact, his
testimony does not show he had any substantive knowledge of required calibration
procedures. (See Tr.1 at 20–23.)
“Before a district court may allow a witness to testify as an expert, it
must be assured that the proffered witness is qualified to testify by virtue of his
‘knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.’” United States v. Cooks,
589 F.3d 173, 179 (5th Cir. 2009). The burden of demonstrating an expert’s
qualifications rests with the party proffering the expert’s testimony. Orthoflex,
Inc. v. ThermoTek, Inc., Nos. 3:11-CV-0870-D, 3:10-CV-2618-D, 2013 WL
6476371, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 2013).
For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have
not met their burden. Fields is not qualified as an expert to testify regarding smoke
contaminant testing procedures or smoke damage. It is clear to the Court that
Fields has only a basic knowledge of these disciplines, not an expertise in the field.
23

For these reasons, the Court will not permit Fields to testify regarding (1) whether
the samples he took from the Falcon residence were taken and handled in
accordance with any accepted methodology or standard; (2) whether the samples
he took were indicative of smoke damage to the Falcon residence; and (3) the
nature and extent of damage to the Falcon residence. However, this does not
preclude Mr. Fields from providing factual testimony regarding what he did or
observed.
B.

Fields’ Qualifications Regarding the Value of Real Estate Impacted
by Smoke Damage and Disclosure Obligations
Fields also has held himself out as expert on the effect of smoke

contamination on real estate obligations and property values. (Dkt. # 30-1 at 1, 3.)
As discussed above, Fields does not possess any formal education related to real
estate disclosure obligations or the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. (See
Dkt. # 30-5 at 2–3.) However, Fields has been involved in the real estate business
since 1995. (Id.) Between 1995 and 2000 Fields worked as a self-employed real
estate broker/developer, and then between 2000 and 2008, Fields worked as the
Director of Real Estate for a large developer in Texas and New Mexico. (Id.)
Fields’ curriculum vitae does not name the developer, but it does state that Fields
was responsible for all land acquisition, retail leasing, condominium sales, and
property sales. (Id.)
24

In his expert report, Fields states that “the Falcons will be required to
disclose the smoke and fire damage to their property should they ever seek to sell
it.” (Id. at 1.) He avers that this disclosure is required under the Texas Real Estate
Commission’s Seller’s Disclosure Statement because it requires sellers to disclose
known defects. (Dkt. # 30-1 at 3–4.) Fields states that the Falcons also will be
obligated to disclose smoke damage under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices
Act. (Id. at 4.) Fields opines:
the seller of real property in Texas is not permitted to conceal material
facts that affect the value of the property. Knowledge that the air
within a dwelling causes health complaints or electronics failures is
knowledge of a condition that materially affects the use and value of
the home. To conceal it from a prospective buyer, while selling the
property as a home is likely a violation of Texas’ Deceptive Trade
Practices Act.
(Id.) Next, Fields contends that disclosure is required because occupants of homes
exposed to wildfire smoke often have health problems including respiratory issues
and headaches. (Id. at 3.) Finally, Fields asserts that “[b]uyers will view unremediated homes as damaged.” (Id. at 4.)
1.

Opinions regarding the Seller’s Disclosure Statement and Texas
Deceptive Trade Practices Act

First, Fields bases his determination that the Falcons will have to
disclose smoke damage to their residence solely on his reading of the Seller’s
Disclosure Statement:

25

Q.

A.

Are you aware of any – is there a commentary, a note, some
sort of technical journal in the broker industry that says that you
have to report smoke damage to a potential buyer of your
home? Do you know of any such document that says that?
Other than the buyer’s – the seller’s disclosure statement that
they have to sign.

(Dkt. # 30-3 at 17:5–12.) However, the only provision in the Seller’s Disclosure
Statement that Fields can point to states that the seller must disclose “[a]ny
condition on the property which may materially – affects the physical health or
safety of the individual.” (Id. at 17:19–21.) Fields indicated that he believed this
would require the disclosure of smoke damage because “he met with real estate
companies and [he] discussed with the agents the dangers and concerns of smoke
damage.” (Id. at 19:23–25.) Additionally, Fields was unsure of whether a seller
would have to report smoke damage that had since been remediated. (Id. at 19:14–
19.) Fields has no experience selling property that has been exposed to wildfire
smoke. (Id. at 143:18–21.)
Fields’ knowledge about a seller’s disclosure obligation stems only
from brief discussions with real estate agents and his reading of the Seller’s
Disclosure Statement. Jury members are just as capable of reading the Seller’s
Disclosure Statement themselves, and therefore, the Court finds Fields will not
provide any specialized experience, skill, or knowledge that can help the jury

26

interpret the relevant provision of the Seller’s Disclosure Statement. Therefore,
Fields’ expert testimony on this subject is excluded.
2.

Opinions Regarding Any Diminution in Property Value due to
Smoke Damage

Fields’ opinions regarding diminution in property value are based on
nothing more than his speculation and hearsay.
Q.
A.

Have you ever done any research into valuation or price as it
may be affected by smoke inundation in the wildfire context?
I have not done any research myself.

(Dkt. # 30-3 at 143:22–25.) When pressed further, Fields stated, “[t]he only thing
I’ve done is talk to a group of realtors there that indicated how the fire had affected
the houses and housing market there.” (Id. at 144:3–5.)
Q.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

A.

And just so the jury is clear. You’re in this business, burn
business. There’s research—market research and data that you
can actually go to to see what impact potential exposure to wild
fire smoke may have on the valuation of a house; isn’t that
true?
That is probably true. I don’t know if it’s true, but I’m going to
guess it’s just.
Okay. And you –
I’m not going to argue with you about it.
And you haven’t searched that out, have you?
No.
Okay. And I take it you’re not—you’re not offering yourself as
an expert on whatever monitary [sic] number the house has
been devalued by this claim that you’ve got to disclose that?
You’re not here to testify about that, are you?
No.

(Dkt. # 30-3 at 144:8–24.)
27

The Falcons cannot point to any specialized education, training, or
knowledge that would qualify Fields as an expert to testify on any diminution in
value of the Falcon residence due to alleged smoke exposure or damage. The
Falcons argue that Fields’ fifteen-years of experience as a real estate broker
qualifies him to offer this testimony. (Dkt. # 30 at 7.) However, this argument is
undermined by Fields’ deposition, in which he admits that although he maintained
his real estate license between 2008 and 2011, he did not sell a lot of real estate
during that time period. (Dkt. # 27-2 at 26.) The burden is on the Falcons to
demonstrate Fields’ expertise in this area, and the Court finds that they have not
done so.
The Court finds that Fields is not qualified to offer expert testimony
on any of the above subjects. Generally, this conclusion would alleviate the need
to evaluate the reliability of Fields’ sampling methods and samples; however,
because the samples taken by Fields form the basis for the Falcons’ other experts’
opinions, particularly those offered by Marion Armstrong, the Court must address
the reliability Fields’ samples and sampling techniques.
C.

Reliability of Fields’ Samples
As above, the burden to demonstrate reliability rests with the

proponent of expert testimony. Orthoflex, 2013 WL 6476371, at *1. Under
Daubert and Rule 702, the Court is tasked with “making a preliminary assessment
28

of whether the reasoning or methodology . . . is scientifically valid and of whether
that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts at issue.”
Pipitone, 288 F.3d at 244 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). To
evaluate reliability, Daubert contains a non-exclusive list of factors a court may
look to, including (1) whether the proffered theory or method has been or can be
tested; (2) whether the theory or method has been subjected to peer review and
publication; (3) any known or potential rates of error; and (4) whether the theory or
method has gained general acceptance in the scientific community. Id. (citing
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94). This inquiry is a flexible one and must be adapted
to suit the particular contours of each case. Id.
1.

Fields’ Particulate Samples

Fields sent in two sets of samples of particulate matter to Armstrong
Labs which resulted in laboratory reports dated December 29, 2011 and January
17, 2012.5 (Dkt. ## 29-5, 29-6.)
Fields first took samples at the Falcon residence during the fall of
2011. (Dkt. # 30-3 at 38:10–13.) During this visit, he collected between twenty
and twenty-five samples of particulate matter. (Id. at 38:14–17.) These samples
were taken using Q-tip swabs, sterile swabs, alcohol swabs and slides. (Id. at

5

There is also a laboratory report from Armstrong Labs dated January 28, 2012;
however, this report is identical to the January 17, 2012 report.
29

38:25–39:1.) However, at his deposition, Fields did not know how many of each
type he took. (Id. at 40:2–6.)
Fields sent one sample to Armstrong Labs and stored the remaining
samples at his office in a climate-controlled bag.6 (Id. at 32:14–33:3.) Fields
maintains that these bags are labeled with the date and location where the sample
was taken. (Id. at 35:9–12.) However, at his deposition, Fields could not state
from where he took samples because he had not brought the sample bags with him
and had no other record of the information.7 (Id. at 36:23–37:8; 88:20–25.)
First, it appears that Fields did not collect samples in accordance with
any generally accepted protocol. Fields claims his methods derived from
conversations with Everett and a single post hoc conversation with Armstrong.
(Dkt. # 30-6 at 1; Dkt. # 30-3 at 27:5–19.) However, during his deposition, Fields
could not point to any established process that he used—there was no written
protocol, he provided no justification for the locations from which he took
samples, and he created no documentation that would allow another individual to
evaluate his process. Fields could not even say for certain whether he had tested

6

Fields clarified that he stored the samples in a Ziploc bag placed in a container in
an air-conditioned office. (Dkt. # 30-3 at 92:23–93:10.)
7

Fields states he did not bring copies of the bags because “[w]ell, because I own
them and I haven’t been paid for them. Everybody else gets paid, but I don’t. So,
you know, I didn’t bring them.” (Dkt. # 30-3 at 35:17–19.)
30

any of the soft surfaces in the Falcon residence, stating “I do not remember, but I
believe I did do soft surface testing at their house.” (Dkt. # 30-3 at 95:20–23.)
Although Fields could not name any industry-wide protocols for sampling, at the
Daubert hearing, Defendants proffered the testimony of Michael Cleveland, a
certified industrial hygienist, who testified that there are published standards for
how one should sample for particulate matter or chemicals in the air. (Tr.1 at
51:3–52:3.) Cleveland also criticized Fields’ failure to take a field blank to assess
whether any of the particulate samples he took could have been contaminated. (Id.
at 56:22–57:10.) Cleveland stated, in reference to both particulate and air samples,
that when you fail to take a field blank, “[i]t destroys the reliability [of the sample]
because you don’t know whether the substances that were picked up on the
sampling media came from what you sampled on the surface or what you may
have—come from you and contaminating the sampling media just by handling the
sampling media.” (Id. at 58:9–13.) Emphasizing the importance of taking a field
blank, Cleveland stated, “I’ve never taken—taken any sort of industrial hygiene
sample, whether for the air, or for surface [particulate] where I did not prepare
field blanks as part of the sampling.” (Id. at 59:25–60:2.)
Second, the samples Fields sent off to Armstrong Labs do not appear
to be representative. Rather than sending a variety of samples in an attempt to
evaluate the actual condition of the Falcon residence, Fields sent samples which
31

appeared to show smoke contamination. Fields chose which samples to send
visually, and stated,“[a]nd you know, if I would have one that has an odor that
smells like smoke, I would probably choose to send that one too. It’s usually not
by smell. It’s by sight.” (Dkt. # 30-3 at 92:10–13.) Fields even stated that he
chose a sample with a darker stain on it because, he was “looking for issues of
smoke damage to the house and that is one of the indicators that [he had] found to
be consistent in [his] testing.” (Id. at 92:14–18.) Additionally, when asked why
Fields only sent one sample to Armstrong Labs in January 2012, Fields stated,
“[i]t’s hard for me to remember back to January 10th, 2012, but evidently that was
the sample that I felt would have smoke contaminants on it.” (Dkt. # 30-3 at
94:16–20.) The inherent bias in Fields’ method makes the samples unreliable. See
U.S. Info. Sys., Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local Union No. 3, AFL-CIO,
313 F. Supp. 2d 213, 233–34 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (excluding expert testimony when it
relied on a biased sample of data that was skewed to reflect the desired
conclusion). “The reliability of any analysis depends upon an unbiased selection
of the sample data.” Id. at 233. Here, Fields has clearly failed to apply any
scientifically competent methodology to ensure that he provided a sample to
Armstrong Labs that was representative of the condition of the Falcon residence.
Instead, Fields sent only those samples which he believed confirmed his

32

conclusion. (See id. at 92:10–13.) Because the samples provided by Fields for
analysis were biased, the Court finds that they are unreliable.
Fields also indicated that he only sent a few samples because he was
not always receiving the payments he believed he was due. (Dkt. # 30-3 at 91:14–
25.) Fields stated, “[k]nowing that I’m not going to get paid doesn’t make me just
send every damn one of them, or I would.” (Id. at 91:23–25.) A sample size
determined by Fields’ financial motivations does not give this Court confidence in
the reliability of Fields’ methods.
Third, Fields failed to account for any other potential sources of
smoke contamination, thereby providing Armstrong Labs with an incomplete
picture from which to draw conclusions. Fields did not inquire as to whether the
Falcons smoked cigarettes (id. at 86:9–12); whether they had or used a fireplace
(id. at 86:15–23); whether they had a barbeque pit (id. at 87:3–5); or whether they
knew of any other source of smoke particulate (id. at 87:8–11). Although Fields
did not hold himself out as an expert on potential sources of contamination,
because Armstrong Labs relied entirely on his samples to reach its conclusions
without any other investigation, the Court finds that the failure to provide
information regarding other possible sources of contamination makes any
conclusion drawn from these samples faulty, at best. See U.S. Info. Sys., Inc., 313

33

F. Supp. 2d at 238 (“An expert must demonstrate that he has adequately accounted
for obvious alternative explanations in order for his testimony to be reliable.”).
Fourth, there was a significant delay in the time between when Fields
collected one of the samples and when he sent it to Armstrong Labs. (Dkt. # 30-3
at 96:24–97:6.) Fields only explanation for this delay was that it may have been
because of the holidays. (Id. at 97:1–6.) Further, Fields could not provide any
documentation of how the sample was stored during this delay. (Id. at 97:9–14.)
Q.

A.

Well, do you have any kind of chain of custody slip in here that
shows how [the sample] was dealt with by you in between the
time you took it and the time you sent it to Armstrong?
Other than my good word saying I had custody of it, no.

(Id.) Although this in itself may not invalidate the sample, it certainly indicates a
lack of rigor in Fields’ process of collection and transmission of the samples and
weighs in favor of a finding of unreliability.
After careful consideration of Fields’ particulate sampling methods,
the Court finds that his methodology is unreliable. His samples represent a skewed
data set and are the product of unreliable techniques and handling procedures.
Therefore, the Court excludes these samples and any expert testimony based upon
them as unreliable.

34

2.

Fields’ Air Quality Samples

In July of 2013, Fields returned to the Falcon residence and took a
Sep-Pak sample of the air quality. (Dkt. # 30-3 at 41:9–12.) As discussed above,
Fields training for how to take a Sep-Pak sample consisted of a few conversations
with industrial hygienists and his own reading of the directions on the Sep-Pak.
(Id. at 134:19–25, 135:15–19.)
When asked about the protocol for taking a Sep-Pak sample,8 Fields
testified that “[y]ou tear it open. You take – there’s a cap on the end of each of it
and you attach that to your vacuum pump and you set it up on a tripod and elevate
it and you turn [it] on and run it for one hour.” (Id. at 138:8–11.) When asked
whether and how he calibrated it, Fields stated that he had a calibration
mechanism, and he calibrated the pump for one thousand CCMs per hour. (Id. at
138:17–21.) Fields continued, “[a]ll I do is set it on the one and for 60 minutes.
That’s how you calibrates [sic] the vacuum pump.” (Id. at 139:3–5.) Even in his
subsequent affidavit, all Fields could state regarding calibration was that the SepPak was “calibrated before each use with an SKC-Rotameter.” (Dkt. # 30-6 at 2.)
Fields did not take a blank sample, and during his deposition, he stated he was not
familiar with the concept. (Dkt. # 30-3 at 142:23–25.) As discussed above,

8

Fields was also unfamiliar with the protocol for storing a Sep-Pak, stating he did
not know at what temperature a Sep-Pak had to be kept, just that it should be
chilled. (Dkt. # 30-3 at 136:21–137:5.) 
35

Cleveland testified that field blanks are necessary “to make sure that you couldn’t
contaminate the samples by the way you have handled the sampling material.”
(Tr.1 at 53:19–23.)
Defendants presented Cleveland’s testimony to establish that Fields
did not properly calibrate the Sep-Pak filter, and therefore, the samples obtained
from it were unreliable. Cleveland testified that Fields’ method of calibration,
using an SKC-Rotameter is considered to be a secondary method of calibration.
(Id. 62:19–22.) He stated that the commonly accepted protocol when taking a SepPak sample is to calibrate it to a primary standard for accuracy, like a bubble tube.
(Id. at 61:2–11.) He testified that in order for an accurate sample to be taken with
an SKC-Rotameter, it must first have, itself, been calibrated to a primary standard.
(Id. at 64:10–16.) Cleveland stated that these calibration practices are commonly
accepted in the industrial-hygienist community and could be found in “the White
Book,” published by the American Industrial Hygeine Association, which
Cleveland refers to as “the bible in our business.” (Id. at 51:10–20.) However,
Cleveland could find no indication in Fields’ affidavit or deposition that the SKCRotameter he had used had first been calibrated to a primary standard. (Id. at
64:17–23.)
The Court finds that based on the testimony and exhibits presented,
the Falcons have failed to establish the reliability of the air quality samples taken
36

by Fields. The testimony of Cleveland, a certified industrial hygienist with
decades of experience in taking surface and air quality samples, relying on
published industry standards, casts serious doubt on the accuracy of Fields’
techniques. Additionally, Fields’ own testimony demonstrated his lack of
understanding of the procedures and sampling methods he was using. Although
the Falcons’ counsel insinuated that there was no concrete information that Fields
had improperly calibrated the Sep-Pak (Tr.1 at 71:21–24), as the proponent of the
testimony, it was the Falcons’ burden to affirmatively demonstrate to the Court that
the procedure used by Fields was reliable. They have not done so.
After consideration of the testimony, arguments, and exhibits, the
Court finds that Fields’ apparent lack of knowledge of calibration procedures, his
failure to demonstrate that he calibrated the Sep-Pak properly, and his failure to
take any field blanks as controls, demonstrate that these samples are inherently
unreliable and cannot be used to form the basis of any expert opinion.
In conclusion, the Court finds that both the particulate and air quality
samples taken by Fields and sent to Armstrong Labs for analysis are unreliable.
The Court excludes these samples as well as any expert testimony or opinion based
upon them.

37

II.

Plaintiffs’ Expert: Marion Armstrong
State Farm challenges Armstrong’s expert opinions on the following

topics: (1) damage to the Falcons’ property and residence; (2) the necessity of
remediating the Falcon residence; (3) whether the Falcons’ health conditions are
related to the alleged smoke damage in the Falcon residence; and (4) whether
industrial standards for exposure to formaldehyde and acrolein can be used to
establish residential standards. (Dkt. # 29 at 2.)
A.

Armstrong’s Qualifications
As a preliminary matter, the Court finds that Armstrong is well

qualified to offer expert testimony on matters related to industrial hygiene.
Armstrong received a Bachelor of Arts degree from Austin College in 1985 with
majors in Chemistry and Philosophy. (Dkt. # 29-3 at 30.) She obtained a Masters
of Science in Public Health from the University of Utah Rocky Mountain Center
for Occupational and Environmental Health with a specialty in Industrial Hygiene
in 1987. (Id.) And finally, she received a Masters of Business Administration
from Texas Christian University in 2006. (Id.) Additionally, Armstrong is a
Certified Industrial Hygienist with the American Board of Industrial Hygiene
(Certificate # 5657) and a Licensed Mold Assessment Consultant in the State of
Texas (License # MAC0278). (Id.)

38

Armstrong has been with the Armstrong Labs since 1996, where she
has held positions as a Senior Consultant, President, and Vice President of
Services. (Id.) Prior to that, she worked with various organizations in roles
managing health and safety, as an industrial hygienist, and as a laboratory
technician. (Id.) Additionally, she has developed numerous programs concerning
topics related to industrial hygiene. (Id.) Armstrong has more than twenty years
of experience developing and conducting training programs including courses
related to indoor air quality assessment, sample collection, evidence handling, and
respiratory protection certification. (Id. at 31–32.) She also has completed
numerous continuing education programs related to industrial hygiene. (Id. at 33–
36.)
However, as well educated and qualified as Armstrong may be, the
Court has already found that the samples provided to Armstrong were unreliable
and not suitable to form the basis of an expert’s opinion,9 therefore, the Court will

9

Although there may be some argument that as an expert, Armstrong is qualified
to determine what are and are not reliable samples upon which to base her opinion,
the Court finds that Armstrong’s deposition testimony makes clear that she
disclaims all responsibility for the scientific reliability of the samples she analyzed,
and for this reason, the Court will not defer to her judgment regarding the
reliability of those samples. In her deposition, Armstrong testified: 
Q.

Do you have the same level of confidence with samples you
haven’t taken?
39

exclude any of Armstrong’s opinions that rely solely on the samples provided by
Fields.
B.

Armstrong’s Offered Opinions
Armstrong’s opinions are contained in three expert reports dated

August 14, 2013 (“August Report,” Dkt. # 29-2), September 26, 2013 (“September
Report,” Dkt. # 29-3), and October 1, 2013 (“October Report,” Dkt. # 29-4).
1.

The August Report

In the August Report, Armstrong offers her opinions critiquing the
reports of two other laboratories, Ninyo & Moore and Exponent. (Dkt. # 29-2 at
2.) The Ninyo & Moore Report, dated May 3, 2012, was a report issued by Ninyo
& Moore critiquing Armstrong Labs’ analysis of Fields’ samples and the
conclusions Armstrong Labs drew from those samples. (Id.) The Exponent Report

A.

I have confidence in the consultants who submit samples to us.
I mean, I – I take it for granted that everybody does the job that
they say they have done. . . .

(Dkt. # 29-1 at 25:19–24.) Similarly, Armstrong explicitly states, “[v]arious
information contained within [her expert report] may have been received from
third parties and Armstrong assumes no responsibility for its accuracy.” (Dkt.
# 29-2 at 12.)
Additionally, Armstrong Labs issued various disclaimers including that
“Armstrong is not responsible for any Client errors resulting from improper or
incorrect sampling procedures, atmospheric conditions at the time of sampling,
from shipping conditions or methods.” (Dkt. # 29-7 at 2.)
40

was issued by Exponent, a forensic laboratory, that collected and analyzed its own
samples from the Falcon residence. (Id. at 10–11.)
a.

Armstrong’s Opinions Regarding Wildfire Smoke
Generally

The August Report begins with a discussion of the general behavior of
wildfire smoke particulates and the effect wildfire smoke can have on nearby
residences. (Dkt. # 29-2 at 2–4.) Given her extensive experience in industrial
hygiene, this is the type of opinion she is qualified to render. Additionally,
opinions regarding the typical behavior and general effect of wildfire smoke will
be helpful to the jury. Therefore, the Court finds that Armstrong’s opinions on this
topic are admissible.
b.

Armstrong’s Opinions Critiquing the Ninyo & Moore
Report from May 3, 2012

Because the May 3, 2012 Ninyo & Moore Report was a critique of
Armstrong Labs’ analysis of the Fields samples, and the Court has already
excluded the Fields samples, Armstrong’s opinions regarding the Ninyo & Moore
Report are irrelevant, and will not be admitted.10

10

The Court notes that Armstrong has never visited the Falcon residence and her
opinions regarding smoke contamination arise solely from samples sent by Fields
and her analysis of the Exponent Report. (Dkt. # 29-1 at 6:3–4.)
41

c.

Armstrong’s Opinions Regarding the Exponent Report

The August Report also contains a critique by Armstrong of a report
issued by Exponent Labs analyzing samples collected on October 4, 2012 from the
Falcon residence (the “Exponent Report”). (Dkt. # 29-2 at 10–11.) Armstrong
criticizes the fact that Exponent’s samples were taken “no more than 3–4 feet from
the floor” and only two of the sample locations “appear to be areas that could
reasonably represent the exterior wall cavities of the structure.” (Id. at 11.) The
Court finds that Armstrong’s education, training, and experience qualify her to
offer these opinions and that these opinions are worthy of consideration by the
jury.
2.

The September Report

To prepare the September Report, Armstrong expanded the scope of
documents she analyzed and reviewed. Along with offering her opinions regarding
the May 3, 2012 Ninyo & Moore Report, the Exponent Report, and the behavior
and effect of wildfire smoke generally, Armstrong also offered her analysis of four
Armstrong Labs laboratory reports. (Dkt. # 29-3 at 2.) Armstrong additionally
reviewed the Defendant’s document production and the videotaped depositions of
Tanya McLendon and Vidale Coleman. (Id.) To the extent that Armstrong’s
opinions are duplicative of the August Report, the Court will permit or exclude
them as discussed above.
42

a.

The Armstrong Laboratory Reports

In the September Report, Armstrong offered her opinions regarding
four laboratory reports created by Armstrong Labs issued December 29, 2011,
January 17, 2012, June 28, 2012, and July 9, 2013. (Id. at 2.) Each of these lab
reports analyzed samples taken from the Falcon residence by Fields and sent to
Armstrong Labs. (Id. at 5.) Because the Court already has excluded these samples
as unreliable, any opinions Armstrong has regarding the corresponding lab reports
or conclusions she has drawn from these samples are unreliable and no longer
relevant, and the Court excludes them. This includes opinions that the Falcon
residence was damaged by the Bastrop wildfire, that not all of the damage had
been remediated, that smoke particulates and chemicals remained in the residence,
and whether further remediation of the Falcon residence is necessary.
3.

The October Report

Armstrong issued a final report on October 1, 2013, after reviewing
Donna Falcon’s deposition and speaking with her on the phone on September 30,
2013. (Dkt. # 29-4 at 2.) To the extent Armstrong’s conclusions in this report are
duplicative of the August Report and September Report, they are permitted or
excluded as discussed above.

43

a.

Armstrong’s Opinions regarding the General Hazards of
Exposure to Smoke Components

Armstrong begins her October report with a general discussion of the
symptoms that may result from exposure to smoke. (Id. at 3.) As the basis for her
opinions, Armstrong cites to standards from government agencies including the
Environmental Protection Agency, the National Institute for Occupational Safety
and Health, and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. (Id.) As an
industrial hygienist, Armstrong is qualified to discuss the general problems that
may arise from exposure to wildfire smoke or its components. During her
deposition, Armstrong stated:
Q.

A.
Q.
A.

Is it fair to say, Ms. Armstrong, that you can tell us based on
your training and education what the literature might say with
regard to what a chemical might cause in terms of physical
symptoms? Is that fair?
That’s fair, yes. . . .
. . . [T]hat’s the extent of what you can testify to with regard to
– to health issues; is that fair?
Well, that’s what an industrial hygienist does, yes, sir.

(Dkt. # 29-1 at 14:3–15.)
The Court finds her opinions regarding the general hazards of smoke
exposure admissible because they are based on both her experience and on
standards issued by government agencies. The Court is finds that Armstrong’s
opinions on this topic are reliable and worthy of consideration by the jury.

44

b.

Armstrong’s Opinions Regarding Exposure Limits

Armstrong next discusses the permissible limits for exposure to
smoke components. (Dkt. # 29-4 at 4–6.) Armstrong maintains that there are “no
regulatory standards or industry guidelines for indoor air quality in a residential
setting associated with smoke or the gaseous components of smoke.” (Id. at 4.)
Armstrong asserts that there are published exposure limits for formaldehyde and
acrolein in an occupational environment and opines that it is permissible to
manipulate these numbers to develop exposure limits for indoor residential
environments. (Id.) In her deposition, Armstrong states that she took the
maximum level of exposure permitted in a workplace environment for an eighthour day and used a multiplicative factor to obtain the maximum level of exposure
that would be safe in a residential environment. (Dkt. # 29-1 at 56.) Based on
these extrapolations and the Sep-Pak air quality sample provided by Fields,
Armstrong concluded that the levels of acrolein and formaldehyde detected in the
Falcon residence exceeded safe exposure limits. (Dkt. # 29-4 at 6.)
Because these conclusions are based on the air quality sample
provided by Fields that the Court has already excluded, Armstrong’s conclusion
that formaldehyde and acrolein are present in the residence in levels in excess of
exposure limits are unreliable, and the Court excludes them.

45

Additionally, the Court finds that Armstrong’s conclusions regarding
exposure limits must be excluded because her methodology is scientifically
unreliable. State Farm contends, and this Court agrees, that Armstrong should not
be permitted to render an opinion regarding safe exposure limits for formaldehyde
and acrolein in a residential environment because her method of extrapolating
residential exposure limits from workplace exposure limits is unproven and not
generally accepted. (Dkt. # 29 at 9.)
First, Armstrong has not shown that her methods are the result of any
testing or experiment. Neither has she provided any evidence establishing that her
method of extrapolation is accurate. State Farm contends that exposure standards
usually are developed through “in-depth toxicological reviews and analysis of
exposure scenarios that generally take months or years to develop.” (Dkt. # 29 at
10.) In contrast, Armstrong has not provided any evidence that her method derived
from any review, analysis, or accepted theory of exposure effects.
Second, there is no general acceptance of Armstrong’s methodology
in the scientific community. Armstrong based her extrapolation calculations on
nothing more than her own intuition, she can name no study or article supporting
her calculations. (Dkt. # 29-1 at 54:1–22.) Armstrong claims that this is just what
industrial hygienists do; however, she cannot point to a single piece of peer-

46

reviewed literature approving of her calculations or providing any basis for her
methods. (Id.)
Armstrong has not put forth any evidence supporting her assertion that
this is an appropriate way to estimate residential exposure limits. In fact, the
American Industrial Hygiene Association has stated that occupational exposure
limits “are not meant to apply to the general population and are not to be used as
community-based standards. Furthermore, the application of some set safety factor
(e.g. divide the [occupational exposure limit] by 100) to produce a communitybased standard from an [occupational exposure limit] is equally inappropriate.”
(Dkt. # 29-11 at 59.) Additionally, Stephen Waide, a certified industrial hygienist,
testified he had never seen the occupational exposure limits manipulated the way
Armstrong did, stating, “I have many times seen hygienists bring those out and –
and show them what those numbers are as – for informational purposes, but I’ve
never seen anybody try to extrapolate and get – get new numbers based on that.”
(“Tr.2,” Dkt. # 63 at 205:16–19.)
Additionally, Armstrong failed to account for inherent differences
between the scenario she is extrapolating from, a workplace environment, and the
scenario she is extrapolating to, a residential environment. State Farm asserts that
workplace standards are often calculated based upon a theory of exposure for
twenty-four hours per day, seven days per week, to a continual source of the
47

chemical. (Id.) That data is particularly inapplicable here because the Bastrop fire
was a discrete event, not a continuous source of formaldehyde and acrolein. State
Farm maintains that the two relevant chemicals, formaldehyde and acrolein, have
very short half-lives (Dkt. # 29-11 at 26, 196); therefore, the exposure levels would
dramatically decrease when the precipitating event, the Bastrop wildfire, was no
longer occurring. (Id.; Tr.2, at 230:14–231:2.) Similarly, Armstrong does not
appear to take into account varying factors in concentrations of chemicals in
different locales. (See Dkt. # 29-11 at 27 (“Rural or suburban air generally
contains lower concentrations of formaldehyde than urban air. Indoor air often
contains higher levels of formaldehyde than outdoor air.”); id. at 70 (“The levels of
formaldehyde in indoor air are often ten times higher (or more) than levels
outdoors . . . .”).) Armstrong’s failure to account for these differences, or even
reference them, casts serious doubt on the reliability of her methods.
Armstrong’s methods do not “bear the necessary indicia of intellectual
rigor” that Daubert requires prior to admission. See Black v. Food Lion, Inc., 171
F.3d 308, 312 (5th Cir. 1999). “Without question the burden is on the proponent of
evidence to prove its admissibility. Moreover, mere assurances by an expert
witness as to the accuracy of his own methods or results, in the absence of other
credible supporting evidence, is insufficient.” Castellow v. Chevron, USA, 97 F.
Supp. 2d 780, 792 (S.D. Tex. 2000).
48

Armstrong’s methods for extrapolating indoor residential chemical
exposure limits lack any scientific foundation and are unreliable. Armstrong’s
own assurances that her methods are reliable are not enough to permit the Court to
allow her testimony. See id., 97 F. Supp. 2d at 792. Therefore, the Court excludes
Armstrong’s testimony regarding the ability to extrapolate from occupational
exposure limits to accurate residential exposure limits.
c.

Armstrong’s Opinions Regarding the Cause of Donna Falcon’s
Alleged Health Conditions

Armstrong opines that Donna Falcon’s symptoms are consistent with
exposure to the components of wildfire smoke and indicates that Donna Falcon had
not reported these symptoms prior to the Bastrop wildfire. (Dkt. # 29-4 at 6.)
However, the Court notes that as of September 27, 2013, the date of Armstrong’s
deposition, Armstrong had not reviewed any of Donna Falcon’s medical history or
even spoken to the Falcons. (Id. at 6:1–2, 12:2–4.) Additionally, at her deposition,
Armstrong testified that she did not believe that she would be offering any
opinions regarding Donna Falcon’s alleged health problems. (Dkt. # 29-4 at
12:21–25.) However, a mere four days later, Armstrong tendered her October
report and concluded that Donna Falcon’s symptoms are consistent with wildfire
smoke exposure.

49

State Farm argues that Armstrong is not qualified to render an opinion
on the relationship between the Donna Falcon’s alleged health problems and any
alleged smoke damage in the Falcon residence. (Dkt. # 29 at 8.) In assessing a
Daubert challenge, “the court must make an objective, independent validation of
the principles and methods used by the expert to insure that they have a sound and
reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of the discipline at issue.”
Castellow, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 784.
First, the Court finds that it is well within Armstrong’s expertise to
discuss common symptoms resulting from exposure to smoke particulates.
However, in this case, Armstrong’s opinions that Donna Falcon’s symptoms are
consistent with exposure to smoke particulate appears to be based on the results of
Armstrong Lab’s analysis of the Fields samples. Because the Court has excluded
the Fields samples, they cannot form the basis for her opinion, and her testimony
on this subject must be excluded.
Second, although as an industrial hygienist, Armstrong likely is
familiar with the symptoms that can result from exposure to smoke, she is not a
medical doctor, and the Falcons have not provided any evidence that Armstrong is
qualified to testify that the Bastrop fire was the cause of Donna Falcon’s
symptoms. See e.g., King v. Synthes (U.S.A.), 532 F. Supp. 2d 828, 832 (S.D.

50

Miss. 2006) (finding that a proffered expert who lacked a medical degree was not
qualified to render an opinion regarding causation of a medical injury).
Third, Armstrong’s method for reaching her conclusion as to
causation is unreliable. Armstrong reached her conclusion that Donna Falcon’s
symptoms were consistent with wildfire smoke exposure without knowledge of
whether there were any other possible causes and without even reviewing Donna
Falcon’s medical history. (Dkt. # 29-1 at 12:2–7.) For example, Armstrong does
not address the fact that at least one of the Falcons smoked (Dkt. # 30-3 at 86:9–
12), that Donna Falcon may have been exposed to smoke particulates from a fire
place or barbeque pit (Dkt. # 30-3 at 87:1–7), or that the chemicals may have come
from internal furnishings within the house. It is a general scientific principle that
correlation does not imply causation; however, Armstrong has taken nothing more
than a correlation and concluded that “Ms. Falcon’s signs/symptoms that have
been experienced since the 2011 wildfire event and continue whenever occupying
the Subject Property are the same as the health effects of the noted smoke
components identified to be present in the Subject Property.” (Dkt. # 29-4 at 6.)
In forming this opinion, Armstrong did not review Donna Falcon’s medical files or
conduct any in-depth review of her health condition. “Before a conclusion on
causation can be reliably drawn, the expert must make some reasonable attempt to
eliminate some of the most obvious causes.” U.S. Info. Sys., Inc., 313 F. Supp. 2d
51

at 238. Armstrong has not done this; her conclusions are, at best, based upon a
severely incomplete assessment of the Falcons’ environment, and are therefore,
unreliable.
Therefore, the Court excludes Armstrong from testifying that the
symptoms Donna Falcon complained of are due to exposure to wildfire smoke
components remaining in the Falcon residence. Armstrong provides no expertise
on this subject; all she can do is repeat what Donna Falcon told her. Therefore,
because Donna Falcon is capable of relating that information herself to the jury,
Armstrong’s testimony on this subject is excluded.
In conclusion, the Court finds Armstrong qualified to testify, in
general, to the symptoms commonly caused from exposure to residual chemicals
and particles from smoke; however, Armstrong has not established that she is
qualified to testify to the cause of Donna Falcon’s particular symptoms. Any of
Armstrong’s opinions that the Falcon residence posed a health hazard or was the
cause of Donna Falcon’s symptoms are excluded.
III.

Plaintiffs’ Expert: Stephen Hadhazi
State Farm has moved to strike the testimony of Stephen Hadhazi to

the extent that he opines (1) whether and to what extent the Falcon residence
suffered smoke damage as a result of the Bastrop wildfire and (2) whether State

52

Farm’s agents acted in bad faith, made material misrepresentations to the Falcons,
or acted unconscionably in their handling of the Falcons’ claim. (Dkt. # 28 at 2.)
Hadhazi’s curriculum vitae states that he is a Licensed Public
Insurance Adjuster in both Florida (Lic. # E150691) and Texas (Lic. # 1388578).
(Dkt. # 36, Ex. C at 2.) Additionally, he states that he has consulting experience in
indoor air quality testing for mold and asbestos and that he has served as an
appraiser on more than 200 cases and an umpire in more than thirty cases. (Id.)
However, Hadhazi does not list for whom he worked or whether he operated as an
independent contractor during this time, and it is unclear whether the 200 cases he
refers to are legal cases or simply instances where he has been employed as an
appraiser. (Id.) Hadhazi has also had training in insurance adjusting. (Id.) He
states that he received training from the Vale School of Adjusting in 1998, from
Leonard’s School of Adjusting in 1997, and that he worked as a property claims
adjuster for Allstate Insurance (Pilot) between 2004 and 2005. (Id.)
Hadhazi states that he has also received air quality training. (Id.) He
maintains that he is a Certified Indoor Environmentalist (as per the Indoor Air
Quality Association) 2000–2002; a Certified Mold Remediator (as per the Indoor
Air Quality Association) 2000–2002; and a Certified Mold Remediation
Supervisor (as per the Indoor Air Quality Association) 2000–2002. (Id.)

53

Finally, Hadhazi states that he attended Remediation Technician
Training in 2000, and he also attended Mold and Sewage Remediation Technician
Training.11 (Id.) Hadhazi does not state through what institution or organization
he took these classes, whether there was any certification possible from them, or
whether he completed these classes. (Id.)
A.

Testimony Regarding Smoke Damage to the Falcon Residence due to
the Bastrop Wildfire
State Farm first contends that Hadhazi is not qualified to render an

expert opinion on any smoke damage resulting from the Bastrop wildfire. (Dkt.
# 28 at 2.) State Farm argues that Hadhazi has never estimated a wildfire case as a
public adjuster, and his only experience comes from damage estimates he created
for the Falcons’ attorney in fifty to one hundred other cases. (Id.)
State Farm also challenges the reliability of Hadhazi’s methods. (Dkt.
# 28 at 3–4.) State Farm argues that Hadhazi’s investigation of the smoke damage
was inadequate and unreliable because he did not document what anyone told him
when he visited the Falcon residence, did not take any field notes, did not take any
photos or make any notes of alleged dirty or smoke damaged areas, and cannot
recall any specific place where he found smoke damage, soot damage, or char,
except on the roof. (Id. at 4.) State Farm argues that his assessment is grounded

11

Hadhazi does not list when he attended Mold and Sewage Remediation
Technician Training.
54

solely in a conversation with Donna Falcon where she stated she smelled smoke
and that she did not believe Service Master cleaned the house properly. (Id.)
Further, State Farm asserts that Hadhazi failed to consult or use the Institute of
Inspection Cleaning and Restoration Certification standards and did not consult
any other standards or peer-reviewed articles to assist in evaluation of damage to
the Falcon residence. (Id. at 4–5.) State Farm criticizes Hadhazi for failing to
differentiate between smoke damage that may have come from the Bastrop fire and
smoke damage from other potential sources. (Id. at 5.) Additionally, State Farm
faults Hadhazi’s estimate of the cost to clean personal property or the exterior of
the residence because Hadhazi did not conduct any testing of any items, consult
any guide or other source, or take any measurements or notes. (Id. at 6.) State
Farm claims that Hadhazi simply “manufactured the number of $12,311.47 to
clean non-porous items.” (Id.)
Hadhazi stated that he came up with this number using “just personal
experience.” (Dkt. # 28-2 at 21.) Hadhazi’s deposition reveals
Q.
A.

Q.
A.

You just eye-balled it and came up with this $12,311.47
number?
I did go room by room, and I came up with totals for
each room in the home, I added them up, and that’s what
it came to.
Totals of what?
Of how long I thought it was going to take to clean the
non-porous items in those specific rooms.
55

(Id. at 22:4–8.)
State Farm also challenges Hadhazi’s conclusion with respect the roof
of the Falcon residence. (Id. at 7.) State Farm argues that Hadhazi’s opinion that
the roof should be replaced is unreliable because Hadhazi knew nothing about the
roof other than that it was metal. (Id.) State Farm argues Hadhazi did not contact
a metal roof manufacturer, research metal roofs, or test any of the allegedly smoke
impacted grommets to determine if they were deteriorated. (Id.) State Farm
contends that Hadhazi’s reliance on his experience alone is misplaced here and
makes his testimony unreliable. (Id. at 8.)
In contrast, the Falcons argue that Hadhazi’s experience qualifies him
to opine on the type, extent, and cost of remediation to bring the Falcon residence
to its condition prior to the Bastrop fire. (Dkt. # 36 at 3.) The Falcons point to
Hadhazi’s work experience with Harris County Construction, where his work
focused on residential insurance claims and roofing replacement and repair, and his
experience with Allstate Insurance Company where he handled numerous
residential property claims as a claims adjuster. (Id. at 4.)
Although Hadhazi may not have specific experience with wildfires, he
states that he educated himself regarding the effects of smoke, soot, char, and ash
when he previously worked on five wildfire cases in which he completed damage
assessments. (Dkt. # 28-2 at 67–68.)
56

The Court finds that Hadhazi’s methods for reaching his damage
estimate are unreliable, and his testimony will therefore be excluded. Hadhazi can
point to no actual method he used, other than “eyeballing” what he perceived to be
damaged in the home. Hadhazi provided no documentation of his methods and
therefore precluded any assessment of the accuracy of his conclusions. When
asked whether his estimate could be assessed for validity, Hadhazi’s only response
was, “Well, I guess, you could perform the work and see if – if you’re able to do it
for that.” (Id. at 21:3–4.) This statement does not convince the Court of the
reliability of Hadhazi’s methods. Additionally, Hadhazi made no attempt to meet
with State Farm or Service Master to discuss the differences in their damage
estimates. (Id. at 14:23–15:6.)
Similarly, Hadhazi performed no quantifiable test to serve as the basis
for his damage estimate or to support his conclusion that the roof needed to be
replaced. In his report, Hadhazi states that the roof’s washers were disintegrating
and the foam plugging at the baffles had degraded, and there was discoloration
consistent with oxidation. (Dkt. # 36-1 at 19.) In his very next sentence, he stated,
“[t]he roof had obviously been covered with very hot ash and had been
fire/heat/smoke damaged and was a covered loss under this policy.” (Id.) This
naked conclusory statement is the antithesis of proper scientific investigation.

57

Hadhazi provides no other basis for his assessment of the extent of damage to the
roof. (Id.)
Additionally, Hadhazi’s conclusion that the alleged damage to the
Falcon home was due to the Bastrop wildfire is unsound. (Dkt. # 36-2 at 11:6–9.)
Hadhazi bases this opinion on nothing more than the proximity of the Falcon
residence to the wildfire. In reaching his conclusion, Hadhazi made no attempt to
account for any other possible source of smoke contamination; he summed up his
causation analysis stating, “[w]ell, it was a fire and fire burned a lot of trees as well
as homes, and the home of the Falcons was in the area of the fire, and it was
inundated by smoke and heat; high winds; and their home was damaged.” (Dkt.
# 36-2 at 14:12–15.) His only other basis for concluding the Falcon residence had
been damaged by the Bastrop wildfire was Donna Falcon’s statement that the
house did not smell of smoke before the wildfire. (Id. at 16:20–24.)
Because of the lack of scientific process employed here, the Court
excludes Hadhazi’s testimony regarding the extent of damage to the Falcon
residence. His opinions as to the cause of the alleged damage are unreliable and
lack a sound scientific foundation.
B.

Hadhazi’s Opinions Based Upon Fields’ Samples
Some of Hadhazi’s opinions are based upon the results of the analysis

of Fields’ samples. As discussed above, because the Court has excluded these
58

samples as unreliable, any expert opinion based upon these samples will similarly
be excluded.
C.

Testimony Regarding State Farm Agents’ Conduct
State Farm argues that Hadhazi’s testimony regarding State Farm’s or

its agents’ bad faith and insurance code violations should be excluded. (Dkt. # 28
at 8.) State Farm argues that Hadhazi’s opinion that State Farm acted in bad faith
is based on nothing more than the fact that Hadhazi’s estimate differed from State
Farm’s. (Id.) State Farm asserts that because Hadhazi did not review any of the
State Farm claims file, the Service Master estimate for remediation, the depositions
of State Farm’s agents, or the Falcons’ depositions, his opinion on whether State
Farm acted with bad faith is unfounded and unreliable. (Id. at 9.) State Farm
points out that Hadhazi cannot name who made misrepresentations to the Falcons
and cannot properly define what constitutes good or bad faith. (Id. at 9–10.)
In response, the Falcons argue that Hadhazi’s licensing as a public
adjuster is sufficient to qualify him to assess the “physical loss of or damage to
structural or personal property, and structural or personal property values.” (Dkt.
# 36 at 6.)
The Court agrees that Hadhazi’s licensing qualifies him in areas of
public adjusting. However, Hadhazi was not engaged as a public adjuster in this
case, rather he states in his report that he “was engaged to provide independent
59

consultation and evaluation of the damage, the coverage and of State Farm and its
adjusters’ claim handling in relation to this case.” (Dkt. # 36, Ex. 1 at 18.)
The Court finds that Hadhazi’s experience is not enough to render his
testimony reliable when all of his opinions are based on guesswork. Hadhazi’s
report is filled with conclusory statements for which he provides no support,
including the statement, “insurers frequently provide adjusters with cost data that is
inappropriate for the loss being adjusted at the time repairs are sought, and expect
their adjusters to estimate a scope of work that constitutes a partial remediation in
the hope that it will satisfy a policyholder rather than scope a full remediation.”
(Dkt. # 36-1 at 17.) Hadhazi also states, “I do not agree that serial partial
remediation is reasonable because it virtually guarantees the policyholder cannot
be paid the remediation costs properly, in full, and within the timelines provided by
the Texas Insurance Code.” (Id.) Statements like the latter make the Court very
skeptical of Hadhazi’s conclusions; Hadhazi essentially advocates that insurance
companies should always immediately replace a damaged item, without attempting
to clean it first. From a common sense perspective, this is absurd.
Additionally, the Court finds that Hadhazi’s testimony regarding State
Farm’s alleged bad-faith practices should be excluded. First, Hadhazi’s deposition
testimony reveals that he is not qualified to opine on this topic. (See Dkt. # 36-2.)
His failure to be able to coherently define good or bad faith is troubling; the Court
60

also finds that although Hadhazi’s report lists some “classic examples of bad
faith,” his deposition testimony makes clear that Hadhazi does not have any
expertise in what constitutes good or bad faith. (Dkt. # 36-1 at 5.) When asked to
define good faith Hadhazi states:
Well, I mean, I think it’s just to act – act appropriately towards an
insured, you know, to kind of do unto them, as you’d want them to do
unto you, as it were. I mean, just to – just to treat them honestly and
fairly and to – you know, just to deal fairly with the insured after a
loss.
(Dkt. # 28-2 at 46:1–6.) When asked to define bad faith, Hadhazi replied, he
could “look it up if you like.” (Id. at 46:13.) Part of the requirement for expert
testimony is that it be helpful to the jury. See Fed. R. Evid. 702. Here, if all
Hadhazi can contribute regarding bad faith is reading the definition from the Texas
Insurance Code, his opinion is irrelevant and not helpful. A jury is just as
competent to read a statutory definition as Hadhazi is.
Moreover, Hadhazi’s method of determining that State Farm engaged
in bad-faith practices is unreliable. Whether State Farm acted in bad faith depends
in part upon the facts available to State Farm when it acted. Higginbotham v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 103 F.3d 456, 460 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that an
insurer has not acted in bad faith “if there was any reasonable basis for denial of
that coverage.”). Hadhazi never spoke with anyone at State Farm regarding the
Falcon case (Dkt. # 28-2 at 15:2–4); never reviewed State Farm’s claim file for the
61

Falcons (id. at 6:16–19); never reviewed any of the depositions taken in the case
(id. at 6:20–7:3); and never reviewed the Service Master cleaning estimate (id. at
7:4–13). Without examining these items, Hadhazi can have no basis for
understanding the facts available to State Farm when it acted on the Falcons’
claims. And the Court therefore excludes his testimony regarding whether State
Farm acted in bad faith.
IV.

Defendant’s Expert: Stephen Waide
The Falcons contend that Stephen Waide is not qualified to render an

expert opinion on the sampling methods employed by Fields and the testing and
analysis performed by Armstrong Labs. (Dkt. # 43 at 2.) The Falcons argue that
Waide lacks experience with smoke particulates and proper sampling and analysis
techniques. (Id. at 2–3.) In support of these contentions, the Falcons point to the
fact that Waide’s experience is focused in mold and water damage; the Falcons
claim that Waide’s discussion regarding the shape of soot particulate is incorrect,
and the Falcons argue that Waide misunderstands the sampling method used by
Armstrong Labs. (Id. at 3–5.)
In response, State Farm first asserts that the Falcons’ objections to
Waide’s expert testimony are untimely, and therefore their motion must be denied.
(Dkt. # 44 at 1.) State Farm submits the Court’s scheduling order that states that

62

State Farm had to serve its expert designations by November 1, 2013. (Dkt. # 18
¶ 3.) The scheduling order provides that
An objection to the reliability of an expert’s proposed testimony under
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 shall be made by motion, specifically
stating the basis for the objection and identifying the objectionable
testimony, not later than 14 days of receipt of the written report of the
expert’s proposed testimony or not later than 14 days of the expert’s
deposition, if a deposition is taken, whichever is later. The failure to
strictly comply with this paragraph will be deemed a waiver of
any objection that could have been made pursuant to Federal
Rule of Evidence 702.
(Id. ¶ 6.) State Farm asserts it gave the Falcons notice that Waide would be
testifying as an expert on numerous occasions; however, the Falcons never sought
to depose Waide. (Dkt. # 44 at 2.) Because the Falcons never deposed Waide,
State Farm contends that their deadline to object to his testimony was fourteen
days after the Falcons were served with his written report and affidavit. (Id.)
State Farm retained Waide as an expert during its underlying
investigation of the Falcons’ claims. (Id.) Waide’s report is dated May 3, 2012,
and he later submitted an affidavit dated October 9, 2013. (Id.)
State Farm listed Waide on its initial disclosures to the Falcons, dated
September 20, 2012, and included a copy of his report at that time. (Id. at 3.) State
Farm supplemented its disclosures on January 1, 2013, and again listed Waide as
an expert witness. (Id.) On October 11, 2013, State Farm filed a motion to strike
the testimony of Marion Armstrong based upon Waide’s opinions of Armstrong’s
63

analysis. (Id.) At this time, State Farm also provided a copy of Waide’s affidavit.
(Id. at 4.)
The Falcons did not move to strike Waide’s expert testimony until
November 21, 2013. (Dkt. # 43.) Even assuming the Falcons did not “receive the
written report” until they received a copy of Waide’s affidavit on October 11,
2013, their motion is still untimely.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b) authorizes courts to control the
progress of a case through a scheduling order and to enforce the deadlines of the
scheduling order to preserve its “integrity and purpose.” Hodges v. United States,
597 F.2d 1014, 1018 (5th Cir. 1979). This rule gives courts broad discretion
including authorizing the exclusion of evidence as a sanction for a party’s failure to
comply with a scheduling order. See Davis v. Duplantis, 448 F.2d 918, 921 (5th
Cir. 1971); Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f). Here, the Court finds that the Falcons’ failure to
comply with this case’s scheduling order, and failure to offer any explanation for
their actions, warrants denial of their motion to strike. (Dkt. # 43.)
However, the denial of the Falcons’ motion to strike does not relieve
this Court from its duty to act as a gatekeeper, and therefore, the Court shall
address the Falcons’ substantive objections regarding Waide’s expert testimony.

64

A.

Waide’s Qualifications
Stephen Waide obtained Bachelor of Science degrees from California

State University in School and Community Health in 1987 and in Occupational
Health and Safety in 1989. (Dkt. # 43-1 at 7.) Waide also holds a certification
from the American Board of Industrial Hygiene in Comprehensive Practice (CIH
# CP7005); a certification from the Board of Certified Safety Professionals in
Comprehensive Practice (CSP # 15352); a certification from the American Indoor
Air Quality Council as a Certified Indoor Environmental Consultant (CIEC
# 0611042); and he is certified as a Microbial Consultant (CMC # 0608087) by the
American Indoor Air Quality Council. (Id.)
Waide lists extensive professional experience in industrial hygiene;
however, nearly all of his project experience listed on his curriculum vitae pertains
to mold and water damage. (Id.) While this is not directly on point for the present
case, Waide does hold general certifications in industrial hygiene. Additionally,
Waide relies on operating procedures from various environmental consulting
laboratories across the country to support his conclusions. (Id. at 10.) During the
hearing, Waide indicated he has experience analyzing laboratory reports pertaining
to smoke contamination. (Tr.2 at 184:6–185:1.) The fact that Waide has more
experience analyzing mold does not disqualify him from testifying as an expert on

65

smoke particulates and chemical contaminants. See United States v. Wen Chyu
Liu, 716 F.3d 159, 168 (5th Cir. 2013).
An expert may be qualified based on knowledge, skill experience,
training or education. Fed. R. Civ. P. 702. Here, Waide’s general background in
industrial hygiene and his use of reliable materials to educate himself on the
particulars of smoke particulate analysis is sufficient to qualify Waide as an expert.
B.

Offered Opinions
The Falcons make much of Waide’s characterization of the shape of

smoke particulate particles. They argue that Waide’s characterization of them as
irregularly shaped is incorrect. However, this is something that can be challenged
through cross-examination and will go to the weight of Waide’s testimony rather
than its admissibility.
Additionally, the Falcons challenge Waide’s testimony criticizing the
sampling procedures used by Fields and the analysis by Armstrong. (Dkt. # 43 at
4–5.) However, as these samples have already been excluded, any opinions or
conclusions regarding these samples are now irrelevant, notwithstanding Waide’s
qualifications.
In conclusion, to the extent that Waide seeks to opine on matters
independent from the Fields samples, including Armstrong’s opinions that have not

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been excluded by the Court and the nature and behavior of wildfire smoke, the
Court finds Waide qualified.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons given above, the Court finds (1) Fields’ expert
testimony will be excluded and the samples he took, both those related to smoke
particulates and those related to air quality, are excluded; (2) to the extent that
Armstrong’s opinions rely on the Fields samples, they are excluded;
(3) Armstrong’s opinions based upon her extrapolation of workplace standards to
residential standards are excluded; (4) Armstrong’s opinions as to the cause of
Donna Falcon’s health conditions are excluded; (5) Armstrong’s opinions
regarding the general behavior of wildfire smoke are admissible; (6) Armstrong’s
critiques of the Exponent Report are admissible; (7) Hadhazi’s testimony and
opinions regarding smoke damage to the Falcon residence are excluded;
(8) Hadhazi’s opinions related to whether State Farm or its agents acted in bad
faith are excluded; and (9) Stephen Waide’s testimony is admissible to the extent it
does not rely on Fields’ samples.
The Court (1) GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Exclude Fields’
Testimony (Dkt. # 27); (2) GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART
Defendant’s Motion to Exclude Armstrong’s Testimony (Dkt. # 29); (3) GRANTS

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Defendant’s Motion to Exclude Hadhazi’s Testimony (Dkt. # 28); and
(4) DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion to Exclude the Waide’sTestimony (Dkt. # 43).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: Austin, Texas, June 16, 2014.

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