Williams v. Pearce

Filing 6

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, The Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the District Court DENY 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Franklin L. Williams. Signed by Judge Andrew W. Austin. (dm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AUSTIN DIVISION
FRANKLIN L. WILLIAMS,
Petitioner,
V.
MIKE PEARCE,1 WARDEN,
FCI BASTROP,
Respondent
FRANKLIN L. WILLIAMS,
Petitioner,
V.
MIKE PEARCE, WARDEN,
FCI BASTROP,
Respondent
FRANKLIN L. WILLIAMS,
Petitioner,
V.
MIKE PEARCE, WARDEN,
FCI BASTROP,
Respondent

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A-12-CA-368 SS

A-12-CA-506 SS

A-12-CA-936 SS

CONSOLIDATED REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
TO:

THE HONORABLE SAM SPARKS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Now before the Court are three cases filed by Franklin L. Williams, likely one of the most

abusive writ filers currently incarcerated in the Bureau of Prisons. As is seen in what follows, all
three of the cases are patently meritless. In this Report and Recommendation the undersigned
1

When Williams filed the first of these cases, Claude Maye was the warden for FCI-Bastrop.
The warden has since changed to Mike Pearce, and the style is changed to reflect this.

recommends not only that each of the cases be dismissed, but also recommends that sanctions be
imposed against Williams to end his abuse of the Courts of the United States.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Petitioner Franklin L. Williams (“Williams”), Reg. No. 12952-021, is currently a federal
prisoner incarcerated in the Bureau of Prisons pursuant to a judgment and sentence in Criminal Case
No. 5:06-CR-00014 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia. Clerk’s
Doc. No. 1. Williams is serving time after a jury found him guilty of one count of distribution of
more than five grams of cocaine base and one count of distribution of more than fifty grams of
cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). See United States v. Williams, No. 5:06-CR-014WTM-JEG, ECF No. 49-1. Williams was sentenced on June 20, 2007, to 292 months of
imprisonment on each count, to be served concurrently with his revoked state parole term for a 1997
state conviction in Georgia for possession of cocaine. Id., ECF No. 62 at 2. Williams’s convictions
and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. United States v. Williams, 262 F. App’x 165 (11th Cir.
2008). Since 2007, Williams has been transferred to a number of different federal correctional
institutions, including FCI-Bastrop, where he is currently serving his sentence.
To say that Williams is a frequent or abusive filer would be a massive understatement. In
the Georgia federal courts alone, Williams has filed 44 separate proceedings since 2007.2 In the
2

Fourteen of these were filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983:

Williams v. Eaves, No. 5:12-CV-00024-LGW-JEG (S.D. Ga. filed Apr. 3, 2012);
Williams v. Darden, No. 4:11-CV-00213-BAE-GRS (S.D. Ga. filed Aug. 15, 2011);
Williams v. US Marshal Serv., No. 1:11-CV-02356-CC-JFK (N.D. Ga. filed July 18, 2011);
Williams v. Eaves et al., No. 5:09-CV-00102-LGW-JEG (S.D. Ga. filed Dec. 11, 2009);
Williams v. Currie et al., No. 5:09-CV-00099-LGW-JEG (S.D. Ga. filed Nov. 24, 2009);
Williams v. Fiveash, No. 5:09-CV-00002-LGW-JEG (S.D. Ga. filed Jan. 8, 2009);
Williams v. McQuaig, No. 5:08-CV-00078-LGW-JEG (S.D. Ga. filed Oct. 29, 2008);
2

Williams v. Fiveash et al., No. 5:08-CV-00076-LGW-JEG (S.D. Ga. filed Oct. 24, 2008);
Williams v. Boggs et al., No. 5:07-CV-00039-WTM-JEG (S.D. Ga. filed May 10, 2007);
Williams v. Hardin, No. 5:07-CV-00031-WTM-JEG (S.D. Ga. filed Apr. 4, 2007);
Williams v. Fiveash, No. 5:07-CV-00025-WTM-JEG (S.D. Ga. filed Mar. 7, 2007);
Williams v. Currie et al., No. 5:07-CV-00026-WTM-JEG (S.D. Ga. filed Mar. 2, 2007);
Williams v. Currie et al., No. 5:07-CV-00022-WTM-JEG (S.D. Ga. filed Feb. 8, 2007);
Williams v. Currie et al., No. 2:07-CV-00018-AAA-JEG (S.D. Ga. filed Feb. 8, 2007).
Eight were 28 U.S.C. § 2254 actions attacking his state criminal conviction:
Williams v. Pearce et al., No. 5:12-CV-00117-LGW-JEG (S.D. Ga. filed Oct. 18, 2012);
Williams v. Pearce et al., No. 5:12-CV-00064-LGW-JEG (S.D. Ga. filed July 11, 2012);
Williams v. Maye et al., No. 5:12-CV-00032-LGW-JEG (S.D. Ga. filed Apr. 25, 2012);
Williams v. Tamez et al., No. 5:11-CV-00083-LGW-JEG (S.D. Ga. filed Aug. 15, 2011);
Williams v. Tamez, No. 5:11-CV-00048-LGW-JEG (S.D. Ga. filed May 20, 2011);
Williams v. Edenfield et al., No. 5:10-CV-00056-LGW-JEG (S.D. Ga. filed June 7, 2010);
Williams v. Chase et al., No. 5:09-CV-00020-LGW-JEG (S.D. Ga. filed Apr. 3, 2009);
Williams v. Hart, No. 5:07-CV-00101-LGW-JEG (S.D. Ga. filed Dec. 19, 2007).
Ten of the cases were § 2255 petitions:
Williams v. United States, No. 5:12-CV-00079-WTM-JEG (S.D. Ga. filed Aug. 16, 2012);
Williams v. United States, No. 5:12-CV-00071-WTM-JEG (S.D. Ga. filed Aug. 2, 2012);
Williams v. United States, No. 5:12-CV-00043-WTM-JEG (S.D. Ga. filed June 4, 2012);
Williams v. United States, No. 5:12-CV-00040-WTM-JEG (S.D. Ga. filed May 24, 2012);
Williams v. United States, No. 5:12-CV-00025-WTM-JEG (S.D. Ga. filed Apr. 3, 2012);
Williams v. United States, No. 5:11-CV-00077-WTM-JEG (S.D. Ga. filed Aug. 1, 2011);
Williams v. United States, No. 5:11-CV-00073-WTM-JEG (S.D. Ga. filed July 20, 2011);
Williams v. United States, No. 5:11-CV-00019-WTM-JEG (S.D. Ga. filed Mar. 4, 2011);
Williams v. United States, No. 5:09-CV-00104-WTM-JEG (S.D. Ga. filed Dec. 21, 2009);
Williams v. United States, No. 5:08-CV-00034-WTM-JEG (S.D. Ga. filed May 2, 2008).
Williams has also filed seven § 2241 writs:
Williams v. Pearson, No. 5:12-CV-00072-LGW-JEG (S.D. Ga. filed Aug. 3, 2012);
Williams v. Tamez et al., 5:11-CV-00118-JRH-JEG (S.D. Ga. filed Dec. 19, 2011);
Williams v. Tamez, No. 5:11-CV-00036-LGW-JEG (S.D. Ga. filed Apr. 26, 2011);
Williams v. United States, No. 5:11-CV-00031-WTM-JEG (S.D. Ga. filed Apr. 4, 2011);
Williams v. Tamez, No. 5:11-CV-00018-WTM-JEG (S.D. Ga. filed Feb. 23, 2011);
Williams v. Tamez et al., No. 5:10-CV-00110-LGW-JEG (S.D. Ga. filed Nov. 5, 2010);
Williams v. Edenfield, No. 5:10-CV-00077-LGW-JEG (S.D. Ga. filed Aug. 3, 2010).
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courts of this Circuit in the past two years, Williams has filed twelve habeas corpus petitions
(including the instant petition), four § 1983 suits, and one “Application for Writ of Replevin.”3 The
Fifth Circuit has warned Williams twice against “frivolous, repetitive, or otherwise abusive filings,”

Four of the actions sought to remove state cases to federal court:
Williams v. Lockey, Jr., No. 5:08-CV-00097-LGW-JEG (S.D. Ga. filed Dec. 17, 2008);
Williams v. McQuaig, No. 5:08-CV-00096-LGW-JEG (S.D. Ga. filed Dec. 17, 2008);
Williams v. Eaves, No. 5:08-CV- 00071-LGW-JEG (S.D. Ga. filed Sept. 24, 2008);
Williams v. Ware Cnty. Jury Comm’rs, No. 5:08-CV-00070-LGW-JEG (S.D. Ga. filed Sept.
22, 2008).
Finally, Williams has filed one case seeking the return of his property:
Williams v. US Marshal Serv., No. 1:11-CV-01842-CC (N.D. Ga. filed June 3, 2011).
3

Of the cases filed in the Fifth Circuit courts, the § 2241 cases are:

Williams v. Pearce, No. 1:12-CV-00936-SS (W.D. Tex. filed Oct. 10, 2012)
Williams v. Pearce, No. 1:12-CV-00506-SS (W.D. Tex. filed June 11, 2012);
Williams v. Maye, No. 1:12-CV-00368-SS (W.D. Tex. filed Apr. 24, 2012);
Williams v. Tamez, No. 4:11-CV-00577-Y (N.D. Tex. filed Aug. 18, 2011);
Williams v. Tamez, No. 4:11-CV-00216-A (N.D. Tex. filed Apr. 5, 2011);
Williams v. Tamez, No. 4:11-CV-00110-A (N.D. Tex. filed Feb. 23, 2011);
Williams v. Tamez, No. 4:11-CV-00061-A (N.D. Tex. filed Jan. 20, 2011);
Williams v. Tamez, No. 4:10-CV-00957-Y (N.D. Tex. filed Oct. 21, 2010);
Williams v. Edenfield, No. 4:10-CV-00520-A (N.D. Tex. filed June 22, 2010);
Williams v. Edenfield, No. 1:10-CV-00124-C (N.D. Tex. filed June 15, 2010);
Williams v. Edenfield, No. 1:10-CV-00119-C (N.D. Tex. filed June 8, 2010);
Williams v. Edenfield, No. 1:10-CV-00113-C (N.D. Tex. filed June 4, 2010).
The 1983 cases are:
Williams v. Pearson et al., No. 1:12-CV-01034-SS (W.D. Tex. filed Nov. 8, 2012);
Williams v. Mayes et al., No. 1:12-CV-01002-SS (W.D. Tex. filed Oct. 30, 2012);
Williams v. Maye et al., No. 1:12-CV-00310-SS (W.D. Tex. filed Apr. 6, 2012); and
Williams v. Edenfield, No. 1:10-CV-00120-C (N.D. Tex. filed June 11, 2010).
Williams’s one remaining case sought monetary damages for his alleged lost property:
Williams v. Tamez, No. 4:11-CV-00309-Y (N.D. Tex. filed May 5, 2011).
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and admonished him that continuing to do so could subject him to the imposition of sanctions. See
Williams v. Tamez, 476 Fed.Appx. 6 (5th Cir. 2012); Williams v. Tamez, 466 Fed.Appx. 326 (5th Cir.
2012). He is not, however, currently under any prohibitions from filing suits in this Court. After
setting out principles applicable to all three cases, the Court addresses each of the captioned cases
separately. In the last section, the Court recommends the imposition of sanctions against Williams
for his frivolous and abusive filings.
II. GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES
Each of these cases is filed pro se. “‘[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must
be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”’ Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)); Bledsue v. Johnson, 188 F.3d
250, 255 (5th Cir. 1999). Thus, pro se pleadings are entitled to a liberal construction that includes
all reasonable inferences which can be drawn from them. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972) (holding pro se pleadings to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers); United States v. Pena, 122 F.3d 3, 4 (5th Cir. 1997); see Franklin v. Rose, 765 F.2d 82,
85 (6th Cir. 1985) (explaining liberal construction allows active interpretation of a pro se pleading
to encompass any allegation which may raise a claim for federal relief). Nevertheless, pro se
litigants are still required to provide sufficient facts in support of their claims. United States v.
Pineda, 988 F.2d 22, 23 (5th Cir. 1993).
A petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 “attacks the manner in which
a sentence is carried out or the prison authorities’ determination of its duration, and must be filed in
the same district where the prisoner is incarcerated.” Pack v. Yusuff, 218 F.3d 448, 451 (5th Cir.
2000); see also Tolliver v. Dobre, 211 F.3d 876, 877 (5th Cir. 2000). A writ under 28 U.S.C. § 2241
5

is a distinct mechanism from a “motion to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2255.” Pack, 218 F.3d at 451. Furthermore, if “a favorable determination . . . would not
automatically entitle [the prisoner] to accelerated release, the proper vehicle” to attack conditions
of confinement is a § 1983 suit, not a § 2241 habeas petition. Carson v. Johnson, 112 F.3d 818,
820–21 (5th Cir. 1997).
Petitioners seeking relief under § 2241 are required to exhaust their administrative remedies
prior to presenting their claims in federal court. Fuller v. Rich, 11 F.3d 61, 62 (5th Cir. 1994). The
Bureau of Prisons (BOP) has established an Administrative Remedy Program whereby inmates
confined in a BOP facility can “seek formal review of an issue which relates to any aspect of their
confinement.” 28 C.F.R. § 542.10. A prisoner must present his claim to the prison warden and
appeal any adverse decision to the BOP Regional Director and General Counsel. Id. § 542.15(a).
A prisoner does not have a constitutional right to be placed in the penal facility of his choice.
See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245 (1983) (“Just as an inmate has no justifiable expectation
that he will be incarcerated in any particular prison within a State, he has no justifiable expectation
that he will be incarcerated in any particular State.”); see also Tighe v. Wall, 100 F.3d 41, 42 (5th
Cir. 1996) (“A prisoner has no constitutionally protected interest in a particular facility.”).
Furthermore, the BOP is authorized to designate any available correction facility to house a prisoner,
whether maintained by the federal government or otherwise and whether the facility is within or
outside the judicial district in which the person was convicted. See 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (2006).

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III. A-12-CV-368 SS
The pending matters before the Court in this case are Williams’s Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Clerk’s Doc. No. 1) and Mike Pearce’s Response to Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Motion to Deny Williams’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and
Dismiss Case (Clerk’s Doc. No. 8). Additionally, the Court also has before it the following motions
and their associated responses, replies, and supplements:
(1)

Motion for Relief as to Extraordinary Circumstance (Clerk’s Doc. No. 2);

(2)

“Motion to Dismissal for Lack of Prosecution of Government Response” (Clerk’s
Doc. No. 10);

(3)

Williams’s Motion for Evidentiary Hearing (Clerk’s Doc. No. 14);

(4)

Williams’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Clerk’s Doc. No. 17);

(5)

Williams’s Motion to Join Parties to the Claim in Violation of Prison Condition and
Confinement (Clerk’s Doc. No. 20); and

(6)

Williams’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel (Clerk’s Doc. No. 24).

In this case, Williams brings his claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, asserting that he is unable
to diligently pursue his remedies because the BOP lost his property. Broadly construed, Williams
alleges: (1) that he cannot pursue his remedies due to the BOP’s loss of his property; (2) that he is
being denied due process and access to the courts resulting from the loss of his property; (3) that his
case represents an extraordinary circumstance; (4) that he is being denied his right to access the
grand jury transcript from November Term 1996 which provides evidence that he is being illegally
detained because he was not properly indicted by a grand jury; (5) that he is being denied access to
the courts resulting from an illegal injunction issued in Georgia state court; and (6) that he is actually
innocent of the charges against him. Respondent contends: (1) Williams’s claims may not be

7

brought as a habeas action; (2) to the extent the Court construes Williams’s claims under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255, the Court does not have jurisdiction over his claims; (3) to the extent Williams’s claims are
construed under the Federal Tort Claims Act, such claims are untimely or subject to the “detention
of goods exception”; (4) to the extent Williams’s claims are construed as a denial of access to courts,
he has failed to meet his burden; and (5) Williams has not exhausted his administrative remedies.
Clerk’s Doc. No. 8.
A.

Claims Involving Lost Property

Williams states multiple times that the BOP lost his property, and claims several grievances
based on this allegation: (1) that he cannot pursue his remedies due to the BOP’s loss of his property,
(2) that he is being denied due process and access to the courts resulting from the loss of his
property, and (3) that his lost property presents an extraordinary circumstance. Clerk’s Doc. No. 1.
The record shows that Williams submitted an inquiry about his lost property to the BOP on June 2,
2010, and has followed his initial inquiry with appeals to the BOP Regional Director and BOP
Central Office. As of the date of this Report and Recommendation, attempts to locate Williams’s
lost property have not been successful. Clerk’s Doc. No. 8.
These claims are not properly brought. As noted previously, if “a favorable determination
. . . would not automatically entitle [the prisoner] to accelerated release, the proper vehicle” to attack
conditions of confinement is a § 1983 suit, not a § 2241 habeas petition. Carson, 112 F.3d at
820–21. Williams has not demonstrated that obtaining his property would automatically entitle him
to accelerated release. The return of his property would not alter the length of Williams’s sentence.
Moreover, to the extent Williams seeks monetary damages for the loss of his property, he cannot
obtain such damages through a petition for habeas corpus. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 494

8

(1973) (“In the case of a damages claim, habeas corpus is not an appropriate or available federal
remedy.”). Because Williams’ claims regarding his lost property are not properly brought under a
§ 2241 petition for habeas corpus, his petition should be dismissed.
B.

Challenge to State Indictment

Williams also challenges his 1997 conviction in the Superior Court of Ware County in the
Waycross Judicial Circuit for the State of Georgia, arguing that his conviction is based on an
improper indictment. Williams requests a copy of the grand jury transcript from November Term
1996 and specifically asserts that he was not properly indicted by a grand jury in the Superior Court
of Ware County in Georgia. Clerk’s Doc. No. 1.
By contesting the legality of his indictment in state court, Williams essentially challenges his
1997 conviction and sentence in state court. This too is an improper claim in this case. To contest
a state court conviction Williams would have to file a habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
See Pleasant v. Texas, 134 F.3d 1256, 1258 n.3 (5th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that challenges to
convictions under state law are properly brought under § 2254); see also Heath v. Thomas, 34 Fed.
Appx. 962 (5th Cir. 2002). A petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 “attacks the
manner in which a sentence is carried out or the prison authorities’ determination of its duration.”
Pack, 218 F.3d at 451. In challenging the legality of his indictment in state court, Williams does not
seek review of the manner in which his sentence is being executed or the length of his sentence;
rather, he challenges the sentence itself. Consequently, his claims may not be properly brought under
§ 2241 and should be dismissed.

9

C.

Permanent Injunction Challenge

Williams further contends that the permanent injunction issued against him in the Superior
Court of Ware County in the Waycross Judicial Circuit for the State of Georgia in 2008 is illegal.
More specifically, Williams claims that the injunction denies him access to the courts. Clerk’s Doc.
No. 1. The challenge to the permanent injunction issued by the Georgia court, however, is not
properly brought as a habeas action. As mentioned above, a habeas action “attacks the manner in
which a sentence is carried out or the prison authorities’ determination of its duration.” Pack, 218
F.3d at 451. Challenging the permanent injunction issued in Georgia state court neither attacks the
manner in which Williams’s sentence is carried out nor the length of his sentence.
D.

Lack of Evidence and Actual Innocence

Finally, Williams claims that he is actually innocent of the charges for which he is being
incarcerated or, in the alternative, that there was not enough evidence to support his conviction.
From Williams’s petition, it is unclear whether he is challenging his state conviction and sentence
in 1997 or his federal conviction and sentence in 2007. Regardless of which conviction and sentence
Williams challenges, this claim is not properly brought. As mentioned previously, if Williams seeks
to contest his 1997 conviction and sentence in Georgia state court, the proper vehicle for doing so
is 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Pleasant, 134 F.3d at 1258 n.3 (recognizing that challenges to convictions
under Texas law are properly brought under § 2254). If Williams is challenging his 2007 federal
conviction and sentence, those claims must be brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See Padilla
v. United States, 416 F.3d 424, 425–26 (5th Cir. 2005). This case is filed under § 2241, which may
only be “used to attack the manner in which a sentence is executed.” See Tolliver, 211 F.3d at 877.

10

By claiming he is actually innocent, Williams does not attack the manner in which his sentence is
being carried out.
To the extent Williams seeks to bring his claims under the savings clause of § 2255, his
claims would also fail. As the Fifth Circuit has explained, the petitioner “bears the burden of
affirmatively showing that the § 2255 remedy is inadequate or ineffective.” Padilla, 416 F.3d at 426.
Furthermore,
the savings clause of § 2255 applies to a claim of actual innocence ‘(i) that is based
on a retroactively applicable Supreme Court decision which establishes that the
petitioner may have been convicted of a nonexistent offense and (ii) that was
foreclosed by circuit law at the time when the claim should have been raised in the
petitioner’s trial, appeal or first § 2255 motion.’
Id. (quoting Reyes-Requena v. United States, 243 F.3d 893, 904 (5th Cir. 2001)). Williams has not
shown that his remedies under § 2255 are ineffective or inadequate. Additionally, he does not assert
that he was convicted of a nonexistent offense based on a retroactively applicable Supreme Court
decision or that his claim was foreclosed by circuit law at the time when the claim should have been
raised. He merely states that he is actually innocent of the charges on which he has been convicted.
Therefore, Williams may not bring his claims under the savings clause of § 2255 and his petition for
writ of habeas corpus in this cause of action should be dismissed.
IV. A-12-CV-506 SS
Like the first case, Williams brings the second of his cases as a § 2241 petition. In this case,
he asserts that he has a right to be transferred to an institution closer to his family. Specifically, he
alleges: (1) he is being denied due process as by not being transferred to a facility closer to his
family; and (2) such denial constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. Clerk’s Doc. No. 1.
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Williams has also filed several additional motions in this case. In these motions, he reiterates
that he is being denied due process of law as to his right to be transferred to another facility after
eighteen months. Clerk’s Doc. No. 4 at 1. Furthermore, he argues that the denial of his request to
be transferred after maintaining good conduct and satisfying the eighteen-month requirement is a
violation of his constitutional rights under the First, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments. Clerk’s Doc.
No. 5 at 1. Respondent contends that Williams’s claims may not be brought as a habeas action and,
alternatively, that Williams has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing. Clerk’s
Doc. No. 11. In his Response in Opposition, Williams continues to argue that he is entitled to be
transferred to another facility and asserts that he has exhausted his remedies. Clerk’s Doc. No. 12.
Construing these claims broadly, Williams asserts he is being denied due process and his
rights under the First, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments by being denied a transfer to a facility closer
to his family. He argues that such denial subjects him to cruel and unusual punishment. Williams
has provided copies of his requests to be relocated to FCI-Jesup in Georgia. See, e.g., Clerk’s Doc.
No. 5. However, as mentioned above, Williams does not have a constitutional right to be placed in
a correctional facility of his choice. The BOP may choose to place Williams in any available
correctional facility. Alternatively, Williams’s allegations are not properly brought as a habeas
action. Even if the Court were to determine that Williams should be transferred to a federal
correctional institution in Georgia, this would not entitle him to accelerated release. A transfer to
another institution in Georgia would not alter the length of Williams’s sentence. Consequently,
Williams’s petition for writ of habeas corpus in this cause of action should be denied.

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V. A-12-CV-936 SS
In the last case—also brought pursuant to § 2241—Williams makes several related claims
concerning the conditions associated with his work while in prison. Specifically, he alleges that
(1) he is being improperly denied pay for his work and (2) he has not received proper credit for his
general equivalency degree (GED).
Construing these claims broadly, Williams alleges that he has not been paid for his work in
prison despite having his GED. Williams states the BOP verified his GED, but that the BOP now
claims the records are false. The Court need not resolve this fact issue, however, because prisoners
do not have a constitutional right to be compensated for work while incarcerated. See Rochon v. La.
State Penitentiary Inmate Account, 880 F.2d 845, 846 (5th Cir. 1989); Wendt v. Lynaugh, 841 F.2d
619, 621 (5th Cir. 1988); see also Edwards v. Johnson, 209 F.3d 772, 779 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding
that the violation of prison regulations does not itself constitute a constitutional violation).
Consequently, Williams does not have a constitutional right to payment for his work while
incarcerated, regardless of whether or not he has exhausted his administrative remedies.
Alternatively, Williams’s allegations are not properly brought as a habeas action. Even if the Court
determined that Williams was entitled to payment for his work, it would not entitle him to
accelerated release or alter the length of Williams’s sentence. This petition should also be denied.
VI. CASE RECOMMENDATIONS
A.

A-12-CV-368 SS

In this case the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the District Judge DISMISS without
prejudice Franklin L. Williams’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241
(Clerk’s Doc. No. 1), and DENY AS MOOT all pending motions
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B.

A-12-CV-506 SS

In this case the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the District Judge DENY Franklin
L. Williams’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Clerk’s Doc. No.
1), and Petitioner Franklin L. Williams’s Motion for Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Clerk’s Doc.
No. 4), DENY AS MOOT Petitioner Franklin L. Williams’s Motion to Enter Evidence of Violation
of Due Process (Clerk’s Doc. No. 5), and GRANT Respondent’s Motion to Deny Petitioner’s
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Clerk’s Doc. No. 11).
C.

A-12-CV-936 SS

In this last case, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the District Judge DENY
Franklin L. Williams’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Clerk’s
Doc. No.1), and DENY AS MOOT all pending motions.
VII. SANCTIONS RECOMMENDATIONS
As noted at the outset, Williams is a prolific filer. He has likely filed more lawsuits in the
past five years than many lawyers file in their entire careers. His record of frivolous filings is beyond
parallel in the undersigned’s thirteen-plus year experience on the bench. It is well past time that the
filings be stopped. Filing frivolous lawsuits wastes government resources and harms the efficiency
of the judicial system. Williams has been warned repeatedly that the continued filing of frivolous
lawsuits could result in the imposition of sanctions, including monetary sanctions. See, e.g., See
Williams v. Tamez, 476 Fed.Appx. 6 (5th Cir. 2012); Williams v. Tamez, 466 Fed.Appx. 326 (5th Cir.
2012). These warnings have had seemingly little impact on Williams’ filings.
As the Fifth Circuit has noted, “Like any other pastime, recreational litigation has its price,”
and in appropriate cases a court may impose sanctions “for the very purpose of causing the . . . pro
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se prisoner litigant, with time on his hands and a disposition to retaliate against the system, to think
twice before cluttering our dockets with frivolous or philosophical litigation.” Gelabert v. Lynaugh,
894 F.2d 746, 748 (5th Cir. 1990). Federal courts have the inherent power to impose sanctions
against abusive and serial filers of frivolous litigation. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43
(1991). Simple warnings are clearly not enough in this instance, as Williams has been ignoring such
warnings for years. Although Williams is subject to the “three strikes” rule contained in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(g), that bar does not apply to petitions for a writ of habeas corpus. Williams routinely takes
advantage of this—as he had done in the three cases that are the subject of this order—by filing the
same arguments over and over, and denominating them petitions writs of habeas corpus. The right
to file suits in the federal courts is not an absolute right, and Williams’ unmitigated abuse of the right
cannot come without consequences, and without some limitations on his ability to take advantage
of his right. This Court alone has spent literally hundreds of hours dealing with Williams’ cases, to
the exclusion of matters that are supposed to be the focus of the courts’ work.
As noted earlier, Williams is in custody in connection with a federal conviction arising out
of Georgia. He has fully and completely exhausted all arguments—both in direct appeals and in
collateral proceedings—regarding the validity of that conviction, and has likewise fully litigated in
multiple proceedings the validity of a Georgia state court conviction that has been the focus of many
of his filings. Given Williams’ filing history, it is appropriate to bar him from filing any further
petitions for habeas corpus relief. While this may at first blush sound severe, it is not, and is
warranted by the circumstances. Williams has had more than an adequate and fair opportunity to
litigate these matters. And with regard to Williams’ right to litigate forward-looking issues, such
as the conditions of his confinement or the manner in which his time might be calculated, Williams’
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abuse of his right of access to the courts warrants the restriction of this right moving forward.
Moreover, he is not completely without a right of access to the courts because, as noted, although
he is subject to the three strikes bar of § 1915(g), that statute preserves Williams’ right to file suit
if he “is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” Thus, if Williams actually has a real and
true claim to present in the future, he has a vehicle to do so. Consistent with this, IT IS
RECOMMENDED that Franklin L. Williams be prohibited from filing any habeas corpus case,
proceeding, or motion in a district court of the United States. Should the Clerk of the Court receive
any filing within this description in the future, he is instructed to simply return it to Williams by U.S.
Mail, and not docket the matter as a proceeding.
Because Williams is also assisting other inmates with cases before this Court, and because,
frankly, Williams is impeding these inmates’ ability to present their cases by his repetitious and
frivolous allegations, IT IS ALSO RECOMMENDED that Williams be barred from assisting any
other inmates of the Bureau of Prisons with any litigation they are pursuing in the federal or state
courts, including continuing to assist Willard Hudson (in Cause No. A-12-CV-826 SS) or Graeme
Matthew Pierson (in Cause No. A-12-CV-1143 SS), both of whom are currently inmates at FCI
Bastrop.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a monetary sanction of $1,000.00 be imposed
against Williams for his continuing and systematic abuse of the judicial system, and that the Bureau
of Prisons be ordered to withdraw funds incrementally from Williams’ inmate trust account and
transmit those funds to the Clerk of this Court until these sanctions are paid in full. To accomplish
this, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the district judge’s order contain the following language:

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It is ORDERED that Franklin L. Williams, #12952021, is sanctioned $1,000.00, and
shall pay his sanctions in monthly installments from his inmate trust fund account.
It is further ORDERED that the Bureau of Prisons, or any other agency having
custody of Williams, shall deduct 20% of each deposit made to Williams’ inmate
trust account and forward payments to the Court on a regular basis provided the
account exceeds $10.00.
It is further ORDERED that the Clerk shall mail a certified copy of this Order to the
Warden of FCI Bastrop, as well as to the Finance division of FCI Bastrop. In the
event Williams is transferred to another facility, or is released from confinement, the
agency having custody at the time of transfer or release shall notify this office of a
forwarding address.
It is further ORDERED that the Clerk shall provide a copy of this Order to the
Financial Clerk in the Austin Division of the Western District of Texas, and shall
deliver a copy of his order to the District Clerk of each of the federal districts which
make up the United States Courts.
It is further ORDERED that the Clerk shall provide a copy of this Order to the Pro
Se Clerk for the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Tyler
Division, 211 West Ferguson, Tyler, Texas 75702.
VIII. WARNINGS
The parties may file objections to this Report and Recommendation. A party filing
objections must specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which objections are
being made. The District Court need not consider frivolous, conclusive, or general objections. See
Battle v. United States Parole Comm'n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987).
A party's failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations
contained in this Report within fourteen (14) days after the party is served with a copy of the Report
shall bar that party from de novo review by the District Court of the proposed findings and
recommendations in the Report and, except upon grounds of plain error, shall bar the party from
appellate review of unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the

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District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150-53 (1985);
Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
To the extent that a party has not been served by the Clerk with this Report &
Recommendation electronically pursuant to the CM/ECF procedures of this District, the Clerk is
directed to mail such party a copy of this Report and Recommendation by certified mail, return
receipt requested.
SIGNED this 23rd day of January, 2013.

_____________________________________
ANDREW W. AUSTIN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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