Clopton et al v. Animal Health International, Inc.

Filing 44

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS re 29 Motion for Summary Judgment, filed by Animal Health International, Inc., the Magistrate Court RECOMMENDS that the District Court GRANT Defendants Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment Against Plaintiff Dawn M. McGury. Signed by Judge Andrew W. Austin. (dm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AUSTIN DIVISION
SUANN CLOPTON and
DAWN M. McGURY,
v.
ANIMAL HEALTH INTERNATIONAL,
INC. f/k/a/ LEXTRON.

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A-13-CV-205-LY

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
TO:

THE HONORABLE LEE YEAKEL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the Court are: Defendant’s Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment Against Plaintiff

Dawn M. McGury (Dkt. No. 29). Plaintiff has failed to file a Response, despite the Court granting
McGury’s motion for additional time to file a response (Dkt. No. 32). The undersigned submits this
Report and Recommendation to the United States District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and
Rule 1(h) of Appendix C of the Local Court Rules of the United States District Court for the
Western District of Texas.
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND
This is a sexual harassment and gender discrimination case. Plaintiffs Suanne Clopton
(“Clopton”) and Dawn McGury (“McGury”) are former employees of Defendant Animal Health
International (“Animal Health”).

The present motion related solely to the claims brought by

McGury. Animal Health is a distributor of animal health products, and McGury worked as a
purchasing manager in Animal Health’s Lago Vista, Texas office from July 7, 2007, until she
resigned on March 11, 2011. McGury alleges that she was sexually harassed while employed at
Animal Health and that she reported this harassment to various managers, but nothing was done.
McGury alleges she ultimately resigned from Animal Health because of the ongoing harassment.

McGury brings her claims pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e,
et seq. She alleges she was constructively discharged due to sexual harassment.
Animal Health has submitted undisputed summary judgment evidence that it entered into a
Release and Waiver Agreement (“Release”) with McGury in exchange for $1,612.00, validly
releasing all the claims McGury now brings in the instant suit. McGury has submitted no evidence
in response.
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
When a party moves for summary judgment, the reviewing court shall grant the motion “if
the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” FED.R.CIV.P. 56(a). A dispute about a material fact is genuine “if
the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). All reasonable doubts on questions of fact must
be resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment. See Evans v. City of Houston, 246
F.3d 344, 348 (5th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
By not filing a response, McGury has failed to “go beyond the pleadings and designate
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Stults v. Conoco, Inc., 76 F.3d 651, 656
(5th Cir. 1996). Notwithstanding a party’s failure to respond, summary judgment should not be
automatically granted in favor of the movant. John v. Louisiana, 757 F.2d 698, 709 (5th Cir. 1985).
The burden still rests with the movant to establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
III. RELEASE OF CLAIMS
Animal Health moves for summary judgment on McGury’s claims based on the release
between the parties. Federal law governs the release of federal claims. See Ingram Corp. v. J. Ray
McDermott & Co., 698 F.2d 1295, 1316 n. 27 (5th Cir. 1983) (construing a release of antitrust and
RICO claims); Kessell v. Mega Life & Health Ins. Co., No. 3:03–CV–2788N, 2005 WL 383700

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(N.D. Tex. Feb.15, 2005). A release of claims under Title VII ordinarily does not violate public
policy and can be enforced if it is made knowingly and voluntarily. Smith v. Amedisys Inc., 298 F.3d
434, 441 (5th Cir. 2002). To enforce such a release, an employer bears the burden of demonstrating
that its former employee signed a release addressing the claims at issue, received adequate
consideration, and subsequently breached the release. Id. (citing Williams v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,
23 F.3d 930, 935 (5th Cir.1994)). The burden then shifts to the employee to show that the release
was invalid due to fraud, duress, material mistake, or some other defense. Smith, 298 F.3d at 441.
The Release signed by McGury states in relevant part:
Section C - Release of Lextron and Covenant Not To Sue. In consideration for the
payment set out in Section B above, you agree to forever, unequivocally and
unconditionally release from and covenant not to sue or assert against Lextron any
and all causes of action, whether at law or in equity, pertaining to or arising from
the employment relationship of the parties and the termination of such
employment relationship based in whole or in part upon any act or omission
occurring on or before the date of this Agreement, whether negligent or intentional
without regard to your present actual knowledge of the act or omission. The Release
does not affect your right to file a charge with or participate before the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission. However you agree that in the event you
bring a claim covered by the foregoing release in which you seek damages or other
remedies against Lextron or in the event you seek to recover against Lextron in any
claim brought by a government agency on your behalf, this agreement shall serve as
a complete defense to such claims and that you are expressly waiving the right to
recover damages and attorney’s fees from any such proceeding.
Dkt. No. 29-1 at Exh. M (emphasis added). Animal Health has further submitted summary judgment
evidence that McGury deposited a check for $1,402.46 (reflecting withheld taxes in the amount of
$209.54) on May 18, 2011. Id. at Exh. N. McGury has submitted no evidence of fraud, duress,
material mistake, or any other defense that would render the Release invalid.
The Release cited above unambiguously releases McGury’s Title VII claims against Animal
Health, and Animal Health has produced evidence that the Release was supported by adequate
consideration. McGury has failed to submit any evidence at all, let alone evidence undermining the

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validity of the Release. Accordingly, no genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether McGary
is barred from bringing this Title VII action. Summary judgment for Animal Health is appropriate.
See Okonkwo v. Schlumberger Technology Corp., 2013 WL 6248695 (S.D. Tex. 2013).
IV. RECOMMENDATION
Based upon the foregoing, the Magistrate Court RECOMMENDS that the District Court
GRANT Defendant’s Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment Against Plaintiff Dawn M. McGury
(Dkt. No. 29).
V. WARNINGS
The parties may file objections to this Report and Recommendation. A party filing
objections must specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which objections are
being made. The District Court need not consider frivolous, conclusive, or general objections. See
Battle v. United States Parole Comm’n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987).
A party's failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations
contained in this Report within fourteen (14) days after the party is served with a copy of the Report
shall bar that party from de novo review by the District Court of the proposed findings and
recommendations in the Report and, except upon grounds of plain error, shall bar the party from
appellate review of unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the
District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150-53, 106 S. Ct. 466,
472-74 (1985); Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en
banc).
To the extent that a party has not been served by the Clerk with this Report &
Recommendation electronically pursuant to the CM/ECF procedures of this District, the Clerk is
directed to mail such party a copy of this Report and Recommendation by certified mail, return
receipt requested.

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SIGNED this 13th day of November, 2014.

_____________________________________
ANDREW W. AUSTIN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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