Crawford v. San Marcos Consolidated Independent School District et al

Filing 12

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS re 4 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by San Marcos Consolidated Independent School District. The Magistrate Court RECOMMENDS that the District Court GRANT the Motion. Signed by Judge Andrew W. Austin. (dm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AUSTIN DIVISION
RACHEL CRAWFORD
V.
SAN MARCOS CONSOLIDATED
INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT
AND WALLY GONZALEZ

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Cause No. A-13-CV-206 LY

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
TO:

THE HONORABLE LEE YEAKEL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the Court are: Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 4), Plaintiff’s

Response (Dkt. No. 9); and Defendant’s Reply (Dkt. No. 11). The undersigned submits this Report
and Recommendation to the United States District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule
1(h) of Appendix C of the Local Court Rules of the United States District Court for the Western
District of Texas.
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND
Rachel Crawford (“Rachel”) is a former high school student at San Marcos High School, in
the San Marcos Consolidated Independent School District (“the District”), in San Marcos, Texas.
Rachel, who has Asperger’s Syndrome and received special education services because of this
disability, alleges that on August 24, 2006, she suffered a head injury when school employees
restrained her on the floor of the girl’s bathroom (“August 2006 Restraint Incident”). Rachel’s
mother, Phyllis Crawford (“Phyllis”), requested mediation with the Texas Education Agency
(“TEA”) with regard to the August 2006 Restraint Incident and the special education services Rachel
was receiving from the District. Before any lawsuit was filed, Phyllis, acting on behalf of her

daughter, entered into a Settlement Agreement with the District on June 21, 2007, in which she
agreed to:
a.

Withdraw all complaints with federal, state and local agencies
stemming from the provision of Special Education services and the
restraint of Rachel C. on or about August 24, 2006, or against the
District, its employees, Trustees, or agents. The withdrawals shall be
filed by 5:00 p.m., Tuesday, June 26, 2007.

b.

Release, acquit, and discharge the District, its Trustees, official agents
and employees, from all obligations, demands, claims, causes of
action and liability of whatever nature, including legal fees, court
costs, and expenses which were raised or could have been raised
against them arising out of the provision of Special Education
services to Rachel C, and the restraint of Rachel C, that occurred on
or about August 24, 2006, or any other act or omission by the District,
its employees, Trustees, or agents.

June 21, 2007 Settlement Agreement, Exh. B to Defendant’s MSJ.
In the summer of 2007 and after the Settlement Agreement was entered, Rachel was
diagnosed with Chiari Malformation and learned that she required surgery. Following her surgery,
Rachel received home-bound services for much of the spring semester of the 2006-2007 school year.
On January 8, 2008, after she returned to school, Rachel became emotionally distraught and climbed
up on a rail on the second floor of the high school. School staff became concerned that she might
jump and injure herself and thus assisted her down. Following this incident, Rachel was admitted
to a psychiatric hospital with an emergency health commitment, received involuntary mental health
care, and was released a few days later whwen it was determined that she was not a danger to herself
or others. Rachel complains that after she returned to school in the Spring of 2008, the District
placed her in a small room in the school library, where she was separated from other students and

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threatened with suspension if she acted outside her strict schedule. Rachel further complains that
she was denied the opportunity to take part in certain classes.
On February 2, 2009, Phillis, on Rachel’s behalf, filed a Complaint with the Texas Education
Agency (“TEA”) raising eighteen (18) issues alleging, among other things: a failure to provide a free
appropriate public education; failure to provide an appropriate Individualized Education Program
(“IEP”); failure to follow her IEPs and Behavioral Intervention Plans (“BIP”); failure to provide
appropriate psychological services; failure to provide appropriate psychological services; failure to
provide appropriate instructional support; and denial to Plaintiff’s parent of meaningful participation
in Plaintiff’s education. On June 2, 2009, the Special Education Hearing Officer (“SEHO”) granted
partial relief in favor of Rachel on two of the eighteen issues. The SEHO ordered that any teacher
or other staff member who would work directly with Rachel during her senior year receive
mandatory training on Rachel’s IEP and BIP requirements pertaining to safe places, pass procedures,
and protocols for Rachel’s entry and exit in classes and classrooms.
On August 28, 2009, Phyllis, on behalf of her daughter (who was still a minor at the time),
filed the first of three lawsuits against the District based upon the 2006 Restraint Incident and her
placement in the isolated classroom during Spring 2008. See Crawford v. San Marcos Consol.
Indep. Sch. Dist., A-09-CA-649-LY (“First Suit”). The First Suit alleged that the District committed
numerous violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(i)(2) (“IDEA”), during the 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 school years. On July 9, 2012, the
Parties settled this lawsuit and Phyllis, on behalf of her daughter,1 and the District entered into a

1

Because Rachel was a minor, her mother had legal authority to bind Rachel to the Settlement
and release all of her potential claims. See Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 151.001(a)(7) & (10).
3

Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice. The Stipulation of Dismissal stated, in relevant part, the
following:
Plaintiff Rachel Crawford stipulates to the dismissal with prejudice of all claims and
causes of action that were or could have been brought in this case against [the
District] and all current and former employees, agents, and representatives of [the
District]. . .based on the factual allegations made in this case.
Plaintiff further stipulates to the dismissal of any cause of action that could have been
based in whole or in part on any transactions, dealings or agreements between or
among Plaintiff, [the District], and all current and former Trustees, representatives,
agents, insurers, and employees of [the District], all in both their official and
unofficial capacities, which have occurred at any time up to the signing of this
Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice.
Plaintiff stipulates to the dismissal with prejudice of all causes of action that were
raised or could have been raised in this case based on the events which have occurred
at any time up to the signing of this Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice. The
Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice does not effect either party’s claims,
defenses, or entitlements in the case styled Rachel Crawford v. San Marcos
Consolidated Independent School District, et al, Civil Action No. 1:11-CV-415-LY,
. . .unless the Court finds claims asserted in Civil Action No. 1:11-CV-415-LY
should or could have been asserted in this case (Civil Action No. A-09-CA-649-LY).
This Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice does not affect Defendant’s assertions
that the claims in Civil Action No. 1:11-CV-415-LY were released in a settlement
agreement between the parties dated on or about June 21, 2007.
Dkt. No. 102 in 1:09-CV-649 LY. Pursuant to the Stipulation of Dismissal, on July 10, 2012, the
District Court entered a Final Judgment in the case. Id. at Dkt No. 104.
Before the First Suit was settled, Rachel filed her second lawsuit, this time on her own behalf,
on May 19, 2011, against the District and District employee Wally Gonzalez based upon the August
2006 Restraint Incident, her assignment to an isolated classroom in the Spring of 2008 and
educational services she received during this time period. See Crawford v. San Marcos Consol.
Indep. Sch. Dist., Et Al., 1:11-CV-415-LY (the “Second Suit”). Rachel’s Original Complaint in the
Second Suit alleged claims under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794a,
and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and a Fourteenth Amendment claim. After
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Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss and a Motion for Summary Judgment, Rachel amended her
Complaint and dropped the individual defendant and constitutional claim from her lawsuit. Dkt. No.
14 in 1:11-CV-415-LY. The District filed an Amended Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary
Judgment, arguing that Rachel’s claims were barred by the 2007 Settlement Agreement, the statute
of limitations, and for failure to exhaust. On November 26, 2012, the District Court ruled on the
motions and found that
[b]y the explicit terms of the Settlement Agreement, Crawford, through her mother,
released the District from all claims regarding the August 24, 2006 restraint incident
and provision of special education services, which were raised or could have been
raised against the District as well as any other act or omission by the District, its
employees, Trustees, or agents with regard to those issues.
Id. at Dkt. No. 26. The District Court held that “as a matter of law the Settlement Agreement
forecloses all of Crawford’s claims in this action that arose up to the execution of the agreement [on
June 21, 2007].” Id. at 9. With regard to Plaintiff’s claims that arose after June 21, 2007,
“specifically, that the District discriminated against her on the basis of her disability and wrongfully
placed her on a strict school schedule,” along with “complaints about her educational program, her
classroom management, and the District’s failure to supervise staff,” the Court found that Crawford
had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies under the IDEA with regard to those claims and
dismissed those claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at Dkt. No. 27. Though Crawford
appealed, on April 16, 2013, the Fifth Circuit dismissed that appeal at Crawford’s request. Id. at Dkt.
No. 29.
After her case was dismissed, and in an attempt to exhaust her administrative proceedings,
Plaintiff filed a proceeding with the Texas Education Agency Hearing Officer. However, the
Hearing Officer dismissed her claim, finding that it was filed outside the one-year statute of
limitations under 19 T.A.C. § 89.1151(c).
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On March 13, 2013, Rachel filed her third lawsuit (“Current Suit”) against the District, once
again complaining of the events which occurred between 2006 and 2008, and the allegedly deficient
educational services she received in the spring of 2008. The Current Suit again alleges claims under
the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA, state-created dangers and duties, Fourteenth Amendment claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It requests that the District Court remand her IDEA claim to the Texas
Education Hearing Officer, arguing that the Officer erred in her statute of limitations ruling.
The District has now filed a Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56, arguing that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata, the previous
settlement agreements, and statutes of limitations.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment shall be rendered when the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure
materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–25 (1986); Washburn v. Harvey, 504 F.3d 505, 508 (5th Cir.2007). A
dispute regarding a material fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court is required to view all inferences
drawn from the factual record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Washburn, 504 F.3d at 508. Further, a court
“may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence” in ruling on a motion for summary
judgment. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000); Anderson, 477
U.S. at 254–55.

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Once the moving party has made an initial showing that there is no evidence to support the
nonmoving party's case, the party opposing the motion must come forward with competent summary
judgment evidence of the existence of a genuine fact issue. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. Mere
conclusory allegations are not competent summary judgment evidence, and thus are insufficient to
defeat a motion for summary judgment. Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 343
(5th Cir. 2007). Unsubstantiated assertions, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation are
not competent summary judgment evidence. Id. The party opposing summary judgment is required
to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate the precise manner in which that evidence
supports his claim. Adams v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Conn., 465 F.3d 156, 164 (5th Cir. 2006).
Rule 56 does not impose a duty on the court to “sift through the record in search of evidence” to
support the nonmovant's opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Id. “Only disputes over
facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing laws will properly preclude the
entry of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Disputed fact issues that are “irrelevant
and unnecessary” will not be considered by a court in ruling on a summary judgment motion. Id.
If the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to its case and on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment must
be granted. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23.
III. ANALYSIS
A.

Res Judicata
The District argues that Rachel’s First Suit bars all of Rachel’s claims in the Current Suit.

Despite the Parties’ lengthy and often confusing briefing on this issue,2 the application of the

2

As Defendant points out, Plaintiff’s counsel even confuses the doctrines of res judicata and
collateral estoppel.
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doctrine of res judicata in this case is quite simple and straight forward. “The doctrine of res
judicata, or claim preclusion, forecloses relitigation of claims that were or could have been raised
in a prior action.” Davis v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 383 F.3d 309, 312-13 (5th Cir. 2004). There
are four elements that must be met for a claim to be barred by res judicata: (1) the parties in both the
prior suit and current suit must be identical or in privity; (2) the judgment in the prior action was
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the prior action was concluded to a final judgment
on the merits; and (4) the same claim or cause of action was involved in both actions. Petro–Hunt,
L.L.C. v. United States, 365 F.3d 385, 395 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1034 (2004).
While the parties do not dispute that the first element has been met, the Court will briefly
address this factor since Rachel’s mother filed the First Suit. While Rachel’s mother initiated the
First Suit, she pursued that action on behalf of Rachel who was a minor when the suit was filed.
Rachel attained the age of majority during the case’s pendency and acted on her own behalf when
she stipulated to the dismissal of the First Suit. Thus, there is clearly privity between Rachel and her
mother in this case. See Muwwakkil v. Housing Authority of the City of Houston, 1998 WL 385401,
at * 3 (Tex. App.– Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no writ) (holding that parents were in privity of children
who they represented in first lawsuit).
The second and third factors are also met in this case. The Court, clearly a court of
competent jurisdiction, issued a Final Judgment in the First Suit after the parties entered into the
Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice. In the Stipulation of Dismissal, quoted from at length
above, Rachel stipulated “to the dismissal with prejudice of all causes of action that were raised or
could have been raised in this case based on the events which have occurred at any time up to the
signing of this Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice.” Dkt. No. 102 in 1:09-CV-649 LY at. 2.

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Regarding the final element, the Court must apply the “transactional test” to determine if
Rachel’s claims in the Current Suit are precluded by her claims in the First Suit. See Davis, 383 F.3d
at 313.
What grouping of facts constitutes a ‘transaction’ or a ‘series of transactions’ must
‘be determined pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as whether the
facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient
trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties’ expectations
or business understanding or usage.
Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24(2) (1982)). The critical issue is whether the
two actions “are based on the same nucleus of operative facts.” Id. (quoting Petro-Hunt, L.L.C., 365
F.3d at 396). Rachel’s claims in the Current Suit are clearly “based on the same nucleus of operative
facts” as her First Suit. Although the First Suit was brought pursuant to the IDEA, and the Current
Suit alleges claims under the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA and the Fourteenth Amendment, both suits
are based on identical facts occurring in the same time period, namely the 2006 Restraint Incident
and the educational services provided to Rachel in the 2007-2008 school year. Thus, the claims in
the Current Suit are part of the same transaction as the claims in the First Suit. See Steen v. Harvey,
247 F. App’x 511, 515 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that case was barred by res judicata where later suit
alleged claims based on the same facts and same time period). Because all of the facts were known
to Rachel and her mother when the First Suit was filed, Rachel could have brought the claims raised
in the Current Suit in her First Suit. See D–1 Enterprises, Inc. v. Commercial State Bank, 864 F.2d
36, 38 (5th Cir. 1989) (“Essential to the application of the doctrine of res judicata is the principle that
the previously unlitigated claim could or should have been brought in the earlier litigation.”).
The fact that Rachel may not have received a right to sue letter with regard to her ADA claim
at the time of the filing of the First Suit does not change the application of res judicata in this case.
See Murry v. General Services Admin., 553 F. App’x 362, 365-66 (5th Cir. 2014) (“The lack of right9

to-sue letter for Murry I does not affect the rules of res judicata”); Davis, 383 F.3d at 315-16
(holding that race discrimination claims were barred by res judicata even though employees had not
received right to sue letters since conduct underlying second action occurred before first action and
plaintiff could have requested a stay to receive right to sue letters); Jang v. United Technologies
Corp., 206 F.3d 1147 (11th Cir. 2000) (ADA claim was not exempt from res judicata where plaintiff
failed to obtain right-to-sue letter during pendency of previous litigation). Accordingly, all of
Rachel’s claims in this lawsuit are barred by res judicata. Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment should be granted on this basis.3
IV. RECOMMENDATION
Based upon the foregoing, the Magistrate Court RECOMMENDS that the District Court
GRANT San Marcos Consolidated Independent School District’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Dkt. No. 4).
V. WARNINGS
The parties may file objections to this Report and Recommendation. A party filing
objections must specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which objections are
being made. The District Court need not consider frivolous, conclusive, or general objections. See
Battle v. United States Parole Comm’n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987).
A party's failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations
contained in this Report within fourteen (14) days after the party is served with a copy of the Report
shall bar that party from de novo review by the District Court of the proposed findings and
recommendations in the Report and, except upon grounds of plain error, shall bar the party from

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Because all of the claims in this case are precluded by res judicata, the Court does not reach
Defendant’s alternative arguments for dismissal.
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appellate review of unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the
District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150-53, (1985);
Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
To the extent that a party has not been served by the Clerk with this Report &
Recommendation electronically pursuant to the CM/ECF procedures of this District, the Clerk is
directed to mail such party a copy of this Report and Recommendation by certified mail, return
receipt requested.
SIGNED this 15th day of January, 2015.

_____________________________________
ANDREW W. AUSTIN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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