Williams v. United States of America

Filing 9

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION re: 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas filed by Franklin L. Williams. RECOMMENDS that the District Judge DISMISS with prejudice Franklin L. Williams's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. FURTHER RECOMMENDS the District Judge warn Williams that the filing of any future habeas petitions without approval may result in the imposition of additional sanctions. FURTHER RECOMMENDS the District Judge direct the Clerk's Office to send a c opy of the District Judges order in this case as well as the District Judge's prior order imposing sanctions upon Williams to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, Waycross Division, 601 Tebeau Street, Waycross, Georgia 31501. See Williams v. Pearce, No. 1:12-CV-00368-SS, slip op. (W.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2013) (Dkt. No. 28). Finally, the undersigned FURTHER RECOMMENDS the District Judge DISMISS AS MOOT Williamss remaining motions in this case (Dkt. Nos. 3, 7, 8). Signed by Judge Andrew W. Austin. (td)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AUSTIN DIVISION
FRANKLIN L. WILLIAMS,
Petitioner,

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V.
MIKE PEARCE, WARDEN,
FCI BASTROP,1
Respondent.

A-13-CV-267-SS-AWA

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
TO:

THE HONORABLE SAM SPARKS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the Court is Petitioner Franklin L. Williams’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Dkt. No. 1); Petitioner’s Motion to Supplement (Dkt. No. 3); and
Petitioner’s Motion for Leave to File Motion to Supplement (Dkt. No. 7). The Magistrate Judge
submits this Report and Recommendation to the United States District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§636(b) and Rule 1 of Appendix C of the Local Court Rules of the United States District Court for
the Western District of Texas, Local Rules for the Assignment of Duties to United States Magistrate
Judges.
I. BACKGROUND
Petitioner Franklin L. Williams (“Williams”), Reg. No. 12952-021, is currently a federal
prisoner incarcerated in the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) pursuant to a judgment and sentence in
Criminal Case No. 5:06-CR-00014 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of

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Williams initially named the United States of America as respondent. However, the
appropriate respondent for habeas corpus claims under § 2241 is the warden of the facility in which
the petitioner is being held. As such, the Court has changed the responding party accordingly.

Georgia. Clerk’s Doc. No. 1. Williams is serving time after a jury found him guilty of one count
of distribution of more than five grams of cocaine base and one count of distribution of more than
fifty grams of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). See United States v. Williams, No.
5:06-CR-00014 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 15, 2006), ECF No. 49-1. Williams was sentenced on June 20,
2007, to 292 months of imprisonment on each count, to be served concurrently with his revoked state
parole term for a 1997 state conviction in Georgia for possession of cocaine. Id., ECF No. 62 at 2.
Williams’s convictions and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. United States v. Williams, 262
Fed.Appx. 165 (11th Cir. 2008). Since 2007, Williams has been transferred to a number of different
federal correctional institutions, including FCI-Bastrop, where he is currently serving his sentence.
Williams is an abusive filer and has continuously flooded the federal courts with lawsuits,
none of which have been successful. Williams has also been warned twice by the Fifth Circuit
against “frivolous, repetitive, or otherwise abusive filings” and that continuing to do so could subject
him to the imposition of sanctions. See Williams v. Tamez, 476 Fed.Appx. 6 (5th Cir. 2012)
(unpublished); Williams v. Tamez, 466 Fed.Appx. 326 (5th Cir. 2012) (unpublished). This Court has
already detailed his extensive history of filing cases in the federal courts. See Consolidated Report
and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge, Dkt. No. 25 in 1:12-CV-368-SS; Dkt.
No. 14 in 1:12-CV-506-SS; and Dkt. No. 6 in 1:12-CV-936-SS. As a result of his continuous filing
of frivolous cases, Judge Sparks adopted the recommendations in these cases on February 13, 2013,
and imposed both monetary and filing sanctions. See Williams v. Pearce, No. 1:12-CV-00368-SS,
slip op. (W.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2013). Judge Sparks prohibited Williams from “filing any habeas
corpus case, proceeding, or motion in any district court of the United States without prior approval
from a presiding judge.” Id. at 11.
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Williams’s executed the instant petition for habeas corpus under § 2241 on February 14,
2013, one day following Judge Sparks’s imposition of sanctions. See Dkt. No. 1 at 1. The suit was
filed on February 20, 2013, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia.
Id. Because the appropriate venue for a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241
is the district in which the petitioner is incarcerated, Williams’s § 2241 petition was transferred to
the Western District of Texas on April 3, 2013. Pack v. Yusuff, 218 F.3d 448, 451 (5th Cir. 2000).
As it is unlikely that Williams had notice of the sanctions imposed against him in this case, the Court
will consider his claims in this § 2241 petition.
II. ANALYSIS
In the instant petition, Williams seeks credit against his federal sentence for the time he
served from August 3, 2006, until June 20, 2007.2 Dkt. No. 1 at 1. Williams argues that because
he was detained in a state holding facility under federal detention, he should be given credit for the
ten months he served prior to his federal sentencing on June 20, 2007. Dkt. No. 3 at 1. In addition,
Williams alleges that because his state and federal sentences were to run concurrently on June 20,
2007, he should be given credit for the ten months he served from August 3, 2006, to June 20, 2007.
Dkt. No. 1 at 1.
As an initial matter, the Court notes that petitioners seeking relief under § 2241 are required
to exhaust their administrative remedies prior to presenting their claims in federal court. Fuller v.
Rich, 11 F.3d 61, 62 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). “Exceptions to the exhaustion requirement apply

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From Williams’s petition, it is unclear whether he is seeking credit against his state or
federal sentence. However, the documentation shows that he is seeking a reduction in sentence from
292 months to 225 months. See Dkt. No. 1, Attachment 1. As Williams’s federal sentence was
originally 292 months, the Court presumes that he is seeking credit against his federal sentence.
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only in extraordinary circumstances and [Williams] bears the burden of demonstrating the futility
of administrative review.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
Here, Williams has not presented any evidence to suggest that he has exhausted his remedies
with the BOP. The only evidence Williams presents is a copy of his Sentence Monitoring
Computation Data as of June 18, 2012, which shows that his sentence is for 235 months, beginning
on June 20, 2007. See Dkt. No. 1, Attachment 1. The document also shows Williams’s projected
satisfaction date as well as the total amount of good credit time he has earned. Id. However, this
document does not show that Williams has exhausted his claims with the BOP. There is no evidence
that the BOP has considered or issued a decision on Williams’s contention that he has not been
credited the proper time towards his sentence. As such, Williams’s instant § 2241 petition has not
been properly brought and his instant petition should be dismissed.
Aside from Williams’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to seeking relief
from this Court, Williams’s contention that he is entitled to credit against his federal sentence for
time period between August 3, 2006, and June 20, 2007, appears to lack merit. As a general matter,
the BOP “determines what credit, if any, will be awarded to prisoners for time spent in custody prior
to the commencement of their federal sentences.” Leal v. Tombone, 341 F.3d 427, 428 (5th Cir.
2003) (internal citations omitted). Offenses committed after November 1, 1987, are governed by 18
U.S.C. § 3585(b), which provides in relevant part:
A defendant shall be given credit toward the service of a term of imprisonment for
any time he has spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence
commences—
(1)

as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed; or

(2)

as a result of any other charge for which the defendant was arrested
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after the commission of the offense for which the sentence was imposed;
that has not been credited against another sentence.
18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) (emphasis added). Accordingly, federal inmates may not “double count” time
spent in pre-sentence custody against both their state and federal sentences.
In this case, Williams cannot receive credit against his federal sentence for the time period
between August 3, 2006, and June 20, 2007, because the time was credited to his state sentence. The
judgment issued by District Judge William T. Moore imposing Williams’s federal sentence expressly
indicates that the sentence is to run “concurrently with the revoked state parole term [Williams] is
presently serving.” Judgment, United States v. Williams, No. 5:06-CR-00014 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 15,
2006), ECF No. 62 at 2 (emphasis added). Williams does not present any evidence suggesting that
this time was not credited toward his state sentence. Thus, Williams is not entitled to “double count”
the time period from August 3, 2006, through June 20, 2007, against his federal sentence.
Additionally, to the extent Williams seek to rely on the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Willis v.
United States, 438 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam), to obtain credit against his federal
sentence, such reliance is misplaced. In Willis, the Fifth Circuit considered how to determine presentence custody credit where unrelated state and federal sentences were ordered by the State to run
concurrently, and the defendant sought federal credit for time spent in state custody before he was
transferred to federal prison. See id. at 925. In Willis, the defendant was arrested on a federal charge
first and, while out on bail, was arrested on an unrelated state charge and taken into state custody.
Id. He remained in state custody through, first, his federal sentencing and, then, his state sentencing.
Id. His state sentence was ordered to run concurrently with his federal sentence. Id. He remained
in state custody for approximately three weeks after his state sentence was imposed, and then was
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transferred to federal custody to finish both sentences. Id. He sought federal credit for all of the time
he spent in state custody. Id. The Fifth Circuit decided that the defendant was not entitled to federal
credit for the time actually spent serving his unrelated state sentence after his state sentence was
imposed, but remanded for an evidentiary hearing for the district court to determine whether he was
entitled to credit for any other pre-federal-custody time. The court’s concern was that the defendant
initially spent time in state custody subject to a federal detainer, and he should get federal credit for
that time. The court did not actually decide whether the defendant was entitled to more federal
credit.
Here, the Court finds any reliance upon Willis to be unpersuasive. According to the BOP’s
interpretation of Willis, “[p]rior custody credits shall be given for any time spent in non-federal
presentence custody that begins on or after the date of the federal offense up to the date that the first
sentence begins to run, federal or non-federal.” FEDERAL BUREAU

OF

PRISONS, PROGRAM

STATEMENT 5880.28, SENTENCE COMPUTATION MANUAL 1–22 (July 20, 1999), available at
http://www.bop.gov/DataSource/execute/dsPolicyLoc (emphasis added). In this case, Williams’s
state sentence derives from his 1997 conviction for cocaine possession. The Sentence Monitoring
Computation Data supplied by Williams specifically states that he is not entitled to Willis credit
because his state sentence was a parole revocation. In other words, Williams’s state sentence had
already begun to run when he was indicted in 2006 for violations of federal law. As such, Willis
does not apply to Williams’s case and he is not entitled to credit against his federal sentence for the
time period between August 3, 2006, and June 20, 2007.
III. RECOMMENDATION
In light of the foregoing discussion, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the District
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Judge DISMISS with prejudice Franklin L. Williams’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Dkt. No. 1). Because Williams executed the instant petition one day after the
District Court imposed sanctions, it is unlikely that Williams had notice of the sanctions. As such,
it would not be appropriate to impose any additional sanctions on Williams at this time. However,
the undersigned FURTHER RECOMMENDS the District Judge warn Williams that the filing of
any future habeas petitions without approval may result in the imposition of additional sanctions.
In addition, the undersigned FURTHER RECOMMENDS the District Judge direct the
Clerk’s Office to send a copy of the District Judge’s order in this case as well as the District Judge’s
prior order imposing sanctions upon Williams to the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Georgia, Waycross Division, 601 Tebeau Street, Waycross, Georgia 31501. See Williams
v. Pearce, No. 1:12-CV-00368-SS, slip op. (W.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2013) (Dkt. No. 28).
Finally, the undersigned FURTHER RECOMMENDS the District Judge DISMISS AS
MOOT Williams’s remaining motions in this case (Dkt. Nos. 3, 7, 8).
IV. WARNINGS
The parties may file objections to this Report and Recommendation. A party filing
objections must specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which objections are
being made. The District Court need not consider frivolous, conclusive, or general objections. See
Battle v. United States Parole Comm'n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987).
A party's failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations
contained in this Report within fourteen (14) days after the party is served with a copy of the Report
shall bar that party from de novo review by the District Court of the proposed findings and
recommendations in the Report and, except upon grounds of plain error, shall bar the party from

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appellate review of unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the
District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150-53 (1985);
Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
To the extent that a party has not been served by the Clerk with this Report &
Recommendation electronically pursuant to the CM/ECF procedures of this District, the Clerk is
directed to mail such party a copy of this Report and Recommendation by certified mail, return
receipt requested.
SIGNED this 18th day of April, 2013.

_____________________________________
ANDREW W. AUSTIN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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