Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company v. Ace American Insurance Company et al

Filing 68

ORDER DENYING 62 Motion for Reconsideration re 61 Order on Motion for Summary Judgment, Order on Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Order on Motion for Protective Order. Signed by Judge Sam Sparks. (dm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AUSTIN DIVISION

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LU

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En

APR -Li

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WET.

LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

CAUSE NO.:
A-13-CA-00555-SS

-vs-

ACE AMERICAN INSURANCE
COMPANY and HCA INC.,
Defendants.

[sJ

Ji

BE IT REMEMBERED on this day the Court reviewed the file in the above-styled cause,
and specifically Defendant HCA Inc.'s Motion to Reconsider Order on Summary Judgments
[#62], Plaintiff Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company's Response [#66] thereto, and HCA's

Reply [#67] in support.

Having considered the documents, the case as a whole, and the

governing law, the Court now enters the following opinion and order DENYING HCA's motion.

Background
The stipulated facts and details of each party's position in the current lawsuit are set forth
in greater detail in the Court's Order entered on December 8, 2015. Order of Dec. 8, 2015 [#61].
In that order, the Court granted in part Liberty's motion for summary judgment, concluding the

ACE/HCA Policy provided primary coverage because HCA owned the shuttle bus at issue and
the Underlying Defendants constitute omnibus insureds under the ACE/HCA Policy.

HCA

argued the $1 million deductible was actually a self-insured retention (SIR) and therefore could
not constitute "other collectible insurance." HCA's Mot. Summ. J. [#39] at 3. The Court,
however, disagreed. Even assuming the "deductible" was actually a SIR, the Court reasoned, the

I

SIR constituted "other collectible insurance" because HCA assumed the duties of a liability

insurer by agreeing to pay all sums for the defense and indemnity that permissive users of the
vehicle became legally obligated to pay.
HCA now asks this Court to reconsider its decision for three primary reasons: (1) HCA's

large deductible is actually a self-insured retention (SIR) and therefore cannot qualify as "other

collectible insurance"; (2) HCA never agreed to insure or indemnify the Underlying Defendants;
and (3) even if HCA did agree to indemnify the Underlying Defendants, it did not agree to

indemnify the Underlying Defendants for their own negligence. The Court turns to the substance

of HCA's motion below.
Analysis
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

59(e),1

HCA moves for reconsideration of

the Court's order granting summary judgment in Liberty's favor.

Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 59(e) gives a party twenty-eight days after entry of a judgment to file a motion asking

the court to alter or amend that judgment.

FED.

R. Civ. P. 59(e). "Reconsideration of a judgment

after its entry is an extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly."

Templet

v.

HydroChem

Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 2004). "[S]uch a motion is not the proper vehicle for rehashing
evidence, legal theories, or arguments that could have been offered or raised before the entry of

judgment," but instead is intended to allow a court to correct manifest errors of law or fact, to
correct inadvertent clerical errors, or to present newly-discovered evidence. Id.

Indeed, the

"remedy is so extraordinary that the standard under Rule 59(e) 'favors denial of motions to alter

The Court construes HCA's motion for reconsideration as a Rule 59(e) motion, because it was filed
within twenty-eight days of the Court's Judgment. When a motion is filed within twenty-eight days of the judgment
of which the party complains, the motion is treated as a Rule 59(e) motion. See FED. R. Civ. P. 59(e) (permitting a
party to file a motion to alter or amend a judgment "no later than 28 days after the entry ofjudgment"); Shepherd V.
Int'l Paper Co., 372 F.3d 326, 327 n.1 (5th Cir. 2004) (stating this same rule but applying the ten-day period set
forth in Rule 59(e) prior to its amendment in 2009).

2

or amend a judgment." Sanders

v.

Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., No. 4:04-cv-254-Y, 2005 WL

6090228, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 25, 2005). Although the decision to grant a motion to reconsider
is within the discretion of the district court, the decision should be made in light of two

"important judicial imperatives": (1) the need to bring litigation to an end, and (2) the need to
render just decisions on the basis of all the facts. Id.
In its motion to reconsider, HCA merely reurges the same arguments it presented in its

summary judgment briefing. There, HCA expressly argued (1) Liberty's "position fails because
the ACE/HCA Policy's $1,000,000 'deductible' actually is a self-insured retention," HCA's Mot.

Summ. J. [#39] at 3; and (2) HCA never agreed to insure the Underlying Defendants, Resp. [#45]
at 3. Unfortunately for HCA, a Rule 59(e) motion is not the proper vehicle for relitigating "prior

matters

. . .

that simply have been resolved to the movant's

dissatisfaction."1

Sanders, 2005 WL

6090228, at *1. Likewise, although HCA did not previously argue that the express negligence

doctrine bars Liberty's recovery, its failure to offer this argument before entry of judgment does
not now entitle HCA to an amendment of the Court's Order. Id. Having carefully reviewed the
record in this case, the Court concludes there is no basis to amend its Order granting in part

Liberty's motion for summary judgment.

Conclusion
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that HCA's Motion to Reconsider Order on Summary

Judgments [#62] is DENIED.
In its motion, RCA correctly notes that the language the Court cited in defming "insureds" under the
ACE/HCA Policy originates from the ACE/ABM Policy, not the ACE/RCA Policy. Order of Dec. 8, 2015 [#611 at
10; Stipulated Facts [#38-71 C-i (ACE/ABM Policy) at 15. This does not, however, constitute a manifest error of
law or fact, because an identical definition appears in an endorsement to the ACE/HCA Policy. Id. [#38-6] Ex. B-S
(ACE/RCA Policy) at 24-25. Under that definition, the Underlying Defendants constitute omnibus insureds
because, as RCA has stipulated, the Underlying Defendants were using RCA's owned vehicle with RCA's
permission. Id. [#3 8] ¶ 7.
1

SIGNED this the

3

day of March 2016.

SA'?''

UNITED STATES15'ISTRICT JUDGE