Bogner e al v. Rio Equity, LLC et al

Filing 48

ORDER DENYING 30 Motion for Protective Order and Motion to Quash and Nonparties' Motion to Quash and Motion for Protective Order 32 are DENIED. Signed by Judge Andrew W. Austin. (td) Modified on 6/11/2014 to add text (td).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AUSTIN DIVISION
GABRIELA BOGNER, et al., individually
and on behalf of those similarly situated
V.
RIO EQUITY, LLC. et al.

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A-14-CV-189 LY

ORDER
Before the Court are Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order and Motion to Quash (Dkt.
No. 30); Nonparties’ Motion to Quash and Motion for Protective Order (Dkt. No. 32), as well as the
associated response and reply (Dkt. Nos. 39 & 42). The District Court referred the above motions
to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for resolution pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(A), FED. R.
CIV. P. 72, and Rule 1(c) of Appendix C of the Local Rules of this Court.
Defendants seek a Protective Order under Rule 26(c) and ask the Court to stay the deadlines
for Defendants to respond to pending discovery, pending the Court’s ruling on Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 11). In that motion, Defendants seek dismissal based on a Rule 68 offer of
judgment, contending that the offer of judgment moots Plaintiffs’ federal claims, and deprives the
Court of jurisdiction.
Additionally, Defendants seek an order quashing three nonparty subpoenas issued to Rio’s
current manager, its contract bookkeeper, and its former manager. Defendants assert that the
subpoena requests are duplicative of requests already served on Defendants and would allow
Plaintiffs to “enjoy an end-run around traditional discovery deadlines and the Confidentiality and
Protective Order.” Defendants also contend that the requests seek work product owned by Rio and
Rio’s sensitive financial information. James Brown, the current General Manager of Rio, and Scott
Hillen, Rio’s contract bookkeeper, have filed separate motions to quash, which adopt all of

Defendants’ arguments. Johanna Flink, a former manager, has not objected to the subpoena served
on her.
A district court may issue a protective order for good cause, in order to protect a party or
person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense. FED.R.CIV.P.
26(c). “A party seeking a Rule 26(c) protective order prohibiting . . . document production must
establish good cause and a specific need for protection.” Ferko v. National Ass'n for Stock Car Auto
Racing, Inc., 218 F.R.D. 125, 133 (E.D. Tex. 2003) (citing Landry v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, 901 F.2d
404, 435 (5th Cir. 1990)). Defendants have failed to provide the Court with legal grounds or good
cause to stay discovery until the motion to dismiss is resolved. In fact, Plaintiffs maintain that the
discovery they seek is intended for the express purpose of establishing the inadequacy of
Defendants’ offer of judgment, and therefore, to challenge the validity of Defendants’ contention
that the FLSA claims in this case are moot. Though the Court has not yet heard arguments on the
motion to dismiss, it tends to agree with Plaintiffs that discovery may be necessary to determine
whether in fact the offer of judgment is sufficient to moot the federal claims. Further, even if the
Court ultimately determines that the federal claims are moot, and if it further determines that it
should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims, it is clear that this
litigation will continue thereafter. Thus, whatever discovery may be conducted before the motion
to dismiss is decided will plainly still be pertinent, if not essential, to the case as it proceeds in
another forum, and thus the work on that discovery will not be wasted effort.
With regard to the three nonparty subpoenas, to the extent Defendants have already produced
the identical information requested, Defendants and the non-parties can rely on that production in
their response to the subpoenas, thereby avoiding any duplication of effort. Defendants’ argument

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that Plaintiffs are attempting to compress the discovery deadline is moot because Defendants’
responses were due on May 27, 2014, a date that has passed. Finally, Plaintiffs have agreed to
extend the terms of the Confidentiality and Protective Order to documents produced in response to
the nonparties’ subpoenas, thereby rendering any concerns about confidentiality moot as well.
ACCORDINGLY, it is ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order and
Motion to Quash (Dkt. No. 30) and Nonparties’ Motion to Quash and Motion for Protective Order
(Dkt. No. 32) are DENIED. Documents responsive to the respective subpoenas duces tecum shall
be produced to Plaintiffs on or before 5:00 p.m., June 13, 2014.
SIGNED this 11th day of June, 2014.

_____________________________________
ANDREW W. AUSTIN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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