Casterline v. Owens et al

Filing 19

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS as MODIFIED 6 Report and Recommendations. FURTHER ORDERED that any and all pending motions be DISMISSED. FURTHER ORDERED that all claims brought by Plaintiff Deamus TroyCasterline in the above-styled cau se are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to refiling once the conditions of Heck v. Humphrey are satisfied, as the claims are frivolous. FURTHER ORDERED that Casterline is warned filing or pursuing any further frivolous lawsuits may result in sanctions. Signed by Judge Sam Sparks. (td)

FILED
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT20
AUG 29 AM 8:57
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
C1ER
AUSTIN DIVISION
NESTEN

DiRj1T

DEAMUS TROY CASTERLINE #399472,

Plaintiff,
Case No. A-14-CA-467-SS

-vs-

RISSIE L. OWENS,
WILLIAM STEPHENS,
and JUANITA GONZALEZ,
Defendants.

ORDER
BE IT REMEMBERED on this day the Court reviewed the file in the above-styled cause, and
specifically Plaintiff Deamus Troy Casterline's

1983 Complaint [#1], the Report and

§

Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge [#6], Casterline's Motion to Proceed In
Forma Pauperis [#8], Objections [#13], Declaration in Support

of Objections [#14], Motion for

Preliminary Injunction [#16], and Supplemental Objections [#18]. Having reviewed the documents,
the governing law, and the file as a whole, the Court now enters the following opinion and orders
ACCEPTiNG the recommendation as modified and DISMISSING Casterline's claims.
All matters in this case were referred to United States Magistrate Judge Andrew W. Austin
for report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§

636(b) and Rule 1(f) of Appendix C of the

Local Court Rules of the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Local Rules
for the Assignment of Duties to United States Magistrate Judges. Casterline is entitled to de novo

review of the portions of the Magistrate Judge's report to which he filed specific objections.

I

28 U.S.C.

§

636(b)(1). All other review is for plain error. Douglass

v.

United Servs. Auto. Ass 'n,

79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th cir. 1996) (en bane). Nevertheless, this Court has reviewed the entire

file de novo, and agrees with the Magistrate Judge's recommendation as modified.

Background
Pro se Plaintiff Deamus Troy Casterline was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to
life imprisonment for a crime committed on December 8, 1984. Casterline argues at the time he

committed his offense he was eligible for mandatory supervision. However, in 1987, Casterline
asserts the law was amended to exclude offenders convicted of capital murder from being eligible
for mandatory supervision.

Casterline indicates his next parole review is scheduled for October 2014 and he has
accumulated 86 years,

3

months, and 9 days in mandatory supervision time credits. Casterline

requests a declaration that the acts complained of by Casterline violate the Constitution and laws of

the United States and seeks to enjoin the defendants' unconstitutional retroactive administration of
his upcoming parole hearing under the post-1987 substantive policy change. Casterline sues Rissie
L. Owens, Williams Stephens, and Juanita Gonzalez.

Analysis
Casterline paid the full filing fee for this case. Because Casterline was a prisoner at the time
he filed his complaint, the Magistrate Judge screened his complaint to determine if it is "frivolous
or malicious," or "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C.

§

1915A. The

Court must construe Caseterline' s complaint liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).

Casterline' s pro se status, however, does not create an "impenetrable shield, for one acting pro se
has no license to harass others, clog the judicial machinery with meritless litigation, and abuse
-2-

already overloaded court dockets." Farguson v. MBankHouston., NA., 808 F.2d 358, 359 (5th Cir.
1986).

The Magistrate Judge recommended dismissing Casterline' s claims as frivolous. The

Magistrate Judge detailed all of Casterline's unsuccessful attempts at obtaining habeas corpus relief
with regard to his claims. The Magistrate Judge further explained Casterline's assertions concerning
his eligibility for mandatory supervision are foreclosed by the Fifth Circuit's decision in Arnold v.

Cockrell, 306 F.3d 277, 279 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding life-sentenced inmates are not eligible for
release to mandatory supervision under the 1977 version ofthe Texas mandatory supervision statute)

and the Fifth Circuit's decisions in Casterline's previously filed habeas corpus cases.
This Court agrees Casterline's claims are frivolous. However, the Court notes Casterline's

claims are frivolous, because they are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).
In Heck, the Supreme Court held:
[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render
a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or
sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared
invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into
question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

Later, in Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 8 1-82 (2005), the Supreme Court held the doctrine set

forth in Heck was applicable in a § 1983 lawsuit "no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable
relief), no matter the target of the prisoner's suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal

prison

proceedings) if success

in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of

confinement or its duration."

-3-

Casterline makes clear in his Objections, if he were granted relief in this case, he would be
entitled to an immediate release on mandatory supervision. Because a favorable judgment on

Casterline's claims would "necessarily imply the invalidity of [Casterline's] conviction or sentence,"
he cannot state a claim until his conviction has been "reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned
by the grant of a writ of habeas corpus." Id. (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 489); see also Wilkinson,
544 U.S. at 81 ("Heck specifies that a prisoner cannot use

§

1983 to obtain damages where success

would necessarily imply the unlawfulness ofa (not previously invalidated) conviction or sentence.").

However, Casterline does not allege his conviction has been reversed, expunged, invalidated, or
called into question by a federal court's issuance of writ of habeas corpus.
To the extent Casterline seeks an immediate release to mandatory supervision, he must seek

such relief in an application for habeas corpus relief. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488490 (1973) (the exclusive remedy for a prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his

confinement is habeas corpus relief). The Court declines to construe this action as a request for
habeas corpus relief Before Casterline may file a successive habeas corpus application, he must first

move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the
application. See 28 U.S.C.

§

2244(b)(3). Because Casterline has not obtained prior approval to file

a successive habeas corpus application, this Court would not have jurisdiction to consider his claims.

Conclusion
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff Deamus Troy Casterline's Objections [#13] and

Supplemental Objections [#18] are OVERRULED;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation of the United

States Magistrate Judge

[6] is ACCEPTED AS MODIFIED;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any and all pending motions be DISMISSED;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all claims brought by Plaintiff Deamus Troy

Casterline in the above-styled cause are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to refihing
once the conditions of Heck v. Humphrey are satisfied, as the claims are frivolous;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Casterline is warned filing or pursuing any further

frivolous lawsuits may result in (a) the imposition of court costs pursuant to Section 1915(f);
(b) the imposition of significant monetary sanctions pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11; (c) the

imposition of an order barring Casterline from filing any lawsuits in this Court without first
obtaining the permission from a District Judge of this Court or a Circuit Judge of the Fifth

Circuit; or (d) the imposition of an order imposing some combination of these sanctions;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Casterline is warned for causes of action which

accrue after June 8, 1995, the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, upon receipt of a final

order of a state or federal court that dismisses as frivolous or malicious a lawsuit brought by
an inmate while the inmate was in the custody of the Department or confined in county jail

awaiting transfer to the Department following conviction of a felony or revocation of

community supervision, parole, or mandatory supervision, is authorized to forfeit (1)60 days

of an inmate's accrued good conduct time, if the Department has previously received one
final order; (2) 120 days of an inmate's accrued good conduct time, if the Department has

previously received two final orders; or (3) 180 days of an inmate's accrued good conduct

-5-

time, if the Department has previously received three or more final orders.
CoDE ANN.

§

See TEX.

Gov'T

498.0045 (Vernon 1998);

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is warned, if Plaintiff files more than three

actions or appeals while he is a prisoner which are dismissed as frivolous or malicious or for
failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted, he will be prohibited from bringing
any other actions in forma pauperis unless he is in imminent danger of serious physical

injury.

See

28 U.S.C.

§ 19 15(g);

and

IT IS FINALLY ORDERED the Clerk is directed to e-mail a copy of the order and

judgment in this case to the TDCJ - Office of the General Counsel and the Pro Se Clerk for
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.
SIGNED this the

fday of August 2014.

SAM SPARKS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE