Troutman v. Williamson County and its Sheriff's Department

Filing 40

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS re 21 Motion for Summary Judgment, filed by Williamson County and its Sheriff's Department. The undersigned RECOMMENDS that the District Judge GRANT Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 21) and dismiss Plaintiff Walter Chad Troutmans case with prejudice. Signed by Judge Andrew W. Austin. (dm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AUSTIN DIVISION
WALTER CHAD TROUTMAN,
V.
WILLIAMSON COUNTY AND ITS
SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT

§
§
§
§
§
§

A-14-CV-986-DAE

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
TO:

THE HONORABLE DAVID EZRA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the Court is Defendant Williamson County and its Sheriff’s Department’s Motion for

Summary Judgment, Dkt. No. 21, Plaintiff Walter Chad Troutman’s Response, Dkt. No. 35, and the
County’s Reply, Dkt. No. 37. The undersigned submits this Report and Recommendation to the
United States District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 1(h) of Appendix C of the Local
Court Rules of the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.
I. BACKGROUND
In this case, Plaintiff WalterTroutman, a former Williamson County Sheriff’s Deputy, sues
his former employer, alleging that he was terminated both for having a disability and as retaliation
for his participation in a co-worker’s discrimination suit, in violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and Texas Labor Code § 21.051, et.seq. The County has moved for
summary judgment, arguing that Troutman was terminated for non-discriminatory and non-retaliatory
reasons. Dkt. No. 21 at 1. Specifically, the County argues that Troutman had a 15 year “history of
substandard performance, culminating in Troutman’s admitted lie to a supervisor (relating to a false
request for leave to care for an ailing mother—which Troutman admits was untrue) in order to obtain

a paid day off.” Id. at 1-2. The County further argues that Troutman was not disabled, was not
regarded as disabled, and had no record of disability. Id. at 2. The County filed its motion on July
20, 2015. Troutman subsequently filed several motions seeking an extension of time to file a
response to the County’s motion, purportedly to gather evidence. Dkt. Nos. 25, 26, 27, 31.
Troutman finally filed his response to the County’s motion on November 30, 2015. Dkt. No. 32. The
County filed a reply to Troutman’s response. Dkt. No. 33.
II. STANDARD
Summary judgment shall be rendered when the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure
materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–25 (1986); Washburn v. Harvey, 504 F.3d 505, 508 (5th Cir. 2007).
A dispute regarding a material fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court is required to view all inferences
drawn from the factual record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Washburn, 504 F.3d at 508. Further, a court
“may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence” in ruling on a motion for summary
judgment. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000); Anderson, 477 U.S.
at 254–55.
Once the moving party has made an initial showing that there is no evidence to support the
nonmoving party’s case, the party opposing the motion must come forward with competent summary
judgment evidence of the existence of a genuine fact issue. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. Mere
2

conclusory allegations are not competent summary judgment evidence, and thus are insufficient to
defeat a motion for summary judgment. Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 343
(5th Cir. 2007). Unsubstantiated assertions, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation are
not competent summary judgment evidence. Id. The party opposing summary judgment is required
to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate the precise manner in which that evidence
supports his claim. Adams v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Conn., 465 F.3d 156, 164 (5th Cir. 2006). Rule
56 does not impose a duty on the court to “sift through the record in search of evidence” to support
the nonmovant's opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Id. “Only disputes over facts that
might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing laws will properly preclude the entry of
summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Disputed fact issues which are “irrelevant and
unnecessary” will not be considered by a court in ruling on a summary judgment motion. Id. If the
nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential
to its case and on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment must be granted.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23.
III. ANALYSIS
A.

Undisputed Facts
The facts are basically undisputed. Troutman suffers from sleep apnea, a respiratory disorder

which makes it so difficult to breathe that he experiences many a restless night. Dkt. No. 35 at 25-26
(Troutman’s deposition). As a result, Troutman is fatigued throughout the day, causing him to have
difficulty staying awake and remaining focused on the tasks before him. Id. In 2005, on a doctor’s
advice, Troutman asked his supervisor whether he could take Ritalin, an amphetamine-based
medication used to treat sleep apnea. Id. at 35. His supervisor denied him permission to take Ritalin.
3

Id. The record reflects that this is the sole time that Troutman made any request that could be
construed as seeking an accommodation for his sleep apnea. Notably, he testified in his deposition
that he later was taking a medication that is “just like Ritalin.” Id.
In early 2012, Kevin Jones, another former Sheriff’s Deputy, filed suit against the County,
asserting disability, retaliation, and wrongful termination claims. Dkt. No. 21-17. Troutman explains
his retaliation claim as follows: “ I felt that they [the County] opposed why—they opposed me
talking to him [Jones] and I—providing information that was in conflict, I’m assuming, with the
County’s position in his lawsuit.” Dkt. No. 35 at 35. Though he at times referred loosely in his
deposition to being retaliated against because the County thought he was speaking with “Jones and
attorneys and investigators,” he testified unequivocally that he only ever spoke with Jones, and never
met with Jones’ attorneys or investigators. Id. at 36. Troutman alleges that after he supported Jones’
suit, he began suffering discrimination, harassment, and retaliation by the County. Specifically,
Troutman alleges that after Sergeant Kelli Bomer became his supervisor in October 2012 he received
formal disciplinary write ups for minor infractions, was denied the opportunity for training that would
have advanced his career, and was placed on a Personal Improvement Program for substandard work
performance. Dkt. No. 35 at 38, 33; Dkt. No. 21-2 at 72. Ultimately, a Disciplinary Review Board
recommended Troutman’s termination because it found that, while he was under the improvement
plan, he had lied to his supervisor in order to get a paid day off, and Troutman was terminated.
B.

Disability Discrimination Claim
Because Troutman relies solely on circumstantial evidence to show discrimination, the Court

analyzes the claim using the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis. See McInnis v. Alamo
Cmty. Coll. Dist., 207 F.3d 276, 279 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
4

U.S. 792 (1973)). Under that rubric, the Court first determines if the plaintiff can establish a prima
facie case of discrimination. If the plaintiff makes that showing, the burden then shifts to the
employer to articulate a “legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.”
Id. at 280. If the employer articulates such a reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to establish
by a preponderance of the evidence that the articulated reason was merely “a pretext for unlawful
discrimination.” Id. (citation omitted). The County argues both that Troutman has failed to make out
a prima facie case of discrimination, and that it had legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for firing
him.
As noted, Troutman claims that he was fired was because he suffers from sleep apnea, which
he contends renders him disabled under the ADA. To make a prima facie case, Troutman must
establish that: (1) he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA, (2) he is qualified and able to
perform the essential functions of his job, and (3) his employer fired him because of his disability.
Kemp v. Holder, 610 F.3d 231, 235 (5th Cir. 2010). The County argues that Troutman has failed to
demonstrate he was a “qualified individual with a disability,” or that he was fired “because of his
disability.”1
The ADA defines a disability as “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such impairment; or (C) being
regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). Major life activities include “caring
for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting,

1

The County’s evidence in support of its argument that Troutman has failed to show that he
was fired “because of his disability” is essentially the argument that he was fired for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons. Rather than repeat itself, the Court will address the causation argument and
the “legitimate non-discriminatory reasons” argument together, infra.
5

bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and
working.” Id. § 12102(2)(A). Troutman stated that his sleep apnea causes him to have difficulty
sleeping, and therefore difficulty staying alert during the day. Dkt. No. 35 at 25-26. He has sought
treatment for his sleep apnea from several doctors over the course of nearly two decades. Id. This
is sufficient to show that Troutman has made out at least a prima facie case that he is a person with
a disability for the purposes of this suit.
The County argues that Troutman was terminated not because of his disability but because
his performance was substandard. In support, it points to several instances where Troutman was
disciplined at work. In 2005, Troutman was disciplined for falling asleep behind the wheel of a
moving vehicle. Dkt. No. 21-2 at 50-51. That same year he was ordered to appear before a County
Disciplinary Review Board for using his wife’s prescription medication. Id. at 51-52. In 2006, he
was disciplined for making frequent stops at his own residence while on patrol. Id. at 52. In 2011,
he was disciplined for driving a vehicle into a gate, damaging it. Id. at 52-53.
Troutman’s real trouble, however, began when Sergeant Kelly Bomer began supervising him
in October 2012. That month, Bomer sent a memorandum to her new subordinates, outlining her
expectations. Dkt. No. 21-5. Among other things, Bomer set out that “show up is at 0545;” “if you
must call in sick I expect a phone call not a text;” an officer’s “uniform will be clean, wrinkle free
and . . . have shined boots;” officers will “stay in district until 1800;” officers will “use the chain of
command;” an officer will be a “proactive Deputy by doing futher investigations on reports, increase
traffic contacts, searches, warrant services, community projects, etc.;” and that mediocrity “is not
acceptable.” Id. Bomer found Troutman’s work unacceptable, and she disciplined him five times that
spring. Specifically, he was written up for the following behaviors:
6

1.

March 14, 2013:

Failing to report a felony offense on February 25, 2013. Dkt.
No. 21-6.

2.

April 22, 2013:

Failing to properly document a “hold” placed on a vehicle on
April 13, 2013. Dkt. No. 21-7.

3.

May 6, 2013:

Two instances of mishandling evidence: contaminating and
failing to turn in evidence from an April 13, 2013 investigation
until May 1, 2013, and failing to turn in evidence from an
April 8, 2013 investigation until May 1, 2013. No. 21-8 at 1.
The evidence had been in the trunk of Troutman’s car. Dkt.
No. 21-9 at 1.

4.

May 6, 2013:

Failing to fill out his time sheet and lying to Bomer about it on
April 26, 2013. Id. at 2.

5.

May 6, 2013:

Being late for work due to oversleeping and arriving with an
unclean, unpressed uniform without his required identifying
badge or name plate on May 6, 2013. The write up stated that
this had “happened at least 3 times in the past several months.”
Id. at 3.

Also on May 6, 2013, Lieutenant Tony Carter sent a memorandum to Captain Mike Gleason laying
out why he believed Troutman’s performance was unsatisfactory, stating, among other things, that
Troutman “continues to not comply with simple rules and procedures of this organization” and had
“become a burden to supervise.” Dkt. No. 21-9. Carter’s memorandum also mentioned that
Troutman had been “verbally counseled in the past” for “oversleeping to where he would have to be
called in the morning to come to work.” Id.
On May 10, 2013, Troutman met with his supervisors and waived an Internal Affairs
investigation into his conduct, instead agreeing to certain disciplinary measures, among them
mandatory time off without pay, a prohibition on off-duty work, and Troutman’s placement on a
Personal Improvement Program to be conducted by Bomer. Dkt. No. 21-10 at 1-3. On June 18, 2013,
Bomer submitted her first evaluation of Troutman’s Personal Improvement Program. Dkt. No. 217

11 at 1. She stated that Troutman had made some improvements, such as correcting his uniform and
being more willing to assist his fellow officers. Id. However, she also found that Troutman still had
a tendency to loaf, to avoid substantive work and instead did “busy work” and made “noise on the
radio to appear that he had enhanced his activity.” Id. Bomer also rated on a ten point scale
Troutman’s performance under certain criteria, such as Awareness, Communication, Analysis,
Initiative, and Timeliness. Id. at 3-5. Bomer gave Troutman ratings of 3-5 in most categories,
signifying that Troutman was either satisfactory or needed improvement. On “Timeliness,” defined
as “arrives at work on time and in adherence to departmental policy; keeps commitments for Court
appearances,” Bomer rated Troutman at 7, signifying “highly effective.” Id. at 4.
On July 5, 2013, Bomer filed another complaint, alleging that Troutman had been “dishonest
regarding his need for sick leave.” Dkt. No. 21-12 at 1. As part of her complaint, Bomer had
Troutman write a memorandum to her, detailing his dishonesty. Id. at 4-5. In it, Troutman explained
that on June 26, 2013, he called Sergeant Randy Batton and
explained to him that I needed the following day off to take my mother to a scheduled
doctor’s visit. However, this was not the case. In truth, my mother does have the
condition I gave. She does require regular follow ups but I was not taking her. The
actual reason I took off was because I was tired from lack of sleep and heavy stress
brought on mainly by the very real likelihood my house would be foreclosed on as
well as several other factors.
Id. at 4. When Bomer asked Troutman “why he was not honest from the beginning, he said that he
was afraid that this information would make him appear weak.” Id. at 2. Bomer concluded that
Troutman may have violated Williamson County Rules of Conduct by lying to his supervisors, and
recommended that Internal Affairs investigate the incident. Id. Troutman’s poor performance
continued even while under investigation. In Bomer’s second evaluation of Troutman’s Personal

8

Improvement Program, dated August 17, 2013, she noted that Troutman had failed to properly follow
up with a victim in a domestic violence incident on July 25, 2013, and had failed to fill in his time
card on August 16, 2013. Dkt. No. 21-13.
Internal Affairs later issued a report regarding Troutman’s dishonesty about taking sick leave.
Dkt. No. 21-15. The investigator, Detective James Knutson, stated that when he met with Troutman
about the incident Troutman once again admitted to lying about why he was out of work. Id. at 2.
Troutman stated that the reason he had been feeling ill was stress related to his finances. Id. After
reviewing the other allegations against Troutman, Knutson sustained the accusations that Troutman
had violated the County’s Rules of Conduct by having an unsatisfactory performance, a violation of
#200-001-5 C, and untruthfulness, a violation of #200-001-37 C. Id. at 7-8. As a result of the
Internal Affairs investigation, a Disciplinary Review Board meeting was held at which Troutman was
present. Dkt. No. 21-2 at 78. The Board, made up of the entire chain of command, including Bomer,
voted unanimously that Troutman be terminated because of these violations. Dkt. No. 21-3 at 1.
Troutman does nothing to create a genuine dispute regarding these facts. The County’s
decision was made through a formal review process, including a Disciplinary Review Board and an
Internal Affairs investigation. At all stages Troutman was able to defend himself against any
accusations. The decision was made after Troutman had been put on a Personal Improvement
Program, and thereby given the chance to correct his substandard performance. Yet Troutman
continued to do unsatisfactory work, even when he was on notice that he needed to improve. And
while it is true that Troutman was reprimanded more frequently after Bomer became his supervisor,
Bomer laid out her expectations to her staff at the very beginning of her term, and Troutman has
presented no evidence and makes no argument that she treated him any differently than the other
9

deputies under her command. And while Troutman may question whether Bomer’s decision to write
him up for particular offenses was a good use of her discretion, the violations for which he was cited
were investigated by Internal Affairs and were found to be termination-worthy nonetheless.
Since the County has articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating
Troutman’s employment, the burden shifts to Troutman to establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that these stated reasons are merely a pretext for what was actually unlawful disability
discrimination. “Merely disputing [the County’s] assessment of his performance will not create an
issue of fact. The issue at the pretext stage is whether [the County’s] reason, even if incorrect, was
the real reason for [Troutman’s] termination.” Sandstad v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc. 309 F.3d 893, 899
(5th Cir. 2002) (internal citation omitted). Thus, Troutman must produce evidence that the County’s
motive for terminating him was disability-based animus or that the County’s explanation is false. See,
id. (applying pretextual analysis to age discrimination context).
Troutman completely fails to meet his burden. Indeed, he provided scant evidence that
connects his termination to the symptoms or effects of his sleep apnea. He even stated at his
deposition that he was unaware of any evidence that he was fired because of his disability. Dkt. No.
35 at 37. The only potentially relevant evidence he offers is his testimony that he told his supervisors
about his sleep apnea, including telling his Sergeant in 2006 that because of it he “had a tendency to
sleep very hard,” that it was hard for him to hear his alarm clock, thereby causing him to be late
sometimes. Dkt. No. 35 at 35. This is the full extent of Troutman’s evidence of “pretext,” and it is
plainly insufficient. He has failed to connect the sergeant with whom he discussed his sleep
apnea—in 2006—in any way with his termination. Moreover, the passage of seven years between
this discussion and his termination by itself precludes concluding there is any connection between the
10

two. And, more to the point, Troutman fails to dispute in any way the County’s stated reasons for
placing him on a Personal Improvement Program, or its subsequent finding that he violated the code
of conduct by his dishonesty.
The only other responsive argument Troutman makes is a weak assertion that the County
failed to engage in the interactive process of accommodating his sleep apnea. Dkt. No. 1 at 6.
Troutman states that in 2005—eight years before his termination—he asked his supervisor for
permission to take Ritalin, an amphetamine-based stimulant, at work, and that permission was denied.
Dkt. No. 35 at 35. Troutman contends that this amounted to a failure by the County to accommodate
his disability or to engage in an interactive discussion about accommodating it. However, Troutman
conceded that after this single discussion he never again mentioned a need to accommodate his sleep
apnea to any supervisors. Id. Setting aside whether or not permission to take a prescription
medication is an “accommodation” under the ADA,2 other than the one request in 2005, Troutman
appears to have failed to attempt to initiate any sort of process with the County regarding his
disability. This evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that the County failed to engage in an
interactive discussion regarding accommodating Troutman’s sleep apnea.
For all of these reasons, the Court recommends that the County’s motion be granted on tjis
claim, and Troutman’s ADA discrimination claim be dismissed.
B.

Whether Troutman’s Termination was Retaliatory
Troutman also contends that he was fired in retaliation for supporting Kevin Jones’

discrimination case against the County. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must
2

There is no evidence in the record of what precipitated Troutman requesting permission to
take a medication that he had been prescribed, why he believed he needed permission, or whether
any County rules required such permission.
11

establish that he (1) engaged in a protected activity; (2) was subject to an adverse employment action;
and (3) there is a causal link between the protected activity and his termination. Taylor v. United
Parcel Serv., Inc., 554 F.3d 510, 523 (5th Cir. 2008). If the plaintiff successfully presents a prima
facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to provide a “legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the
adverse employment action.” Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 304–05 (5th Cir. 1996) (citation
omitted). Upon answering this inquiry, the burden returns to the plaintiff to prove that the protected
conduct “was a ‘but for’ cause of the adverse employment decision.” Id. at 305 n.4 (citation omitted).
Troutman has failed to establish either the first or the third elements of a prima facie case of
retaliation. To begin, Troutman has failed to show that he engaged in a protected activity.
Troutman’s retaliation claim is founded on the assertions that he assisted Kevin Jones in a suit Jones
had filed against the County, and that the County terminated Troutman to retaliate against him for that
assistance. But there is no evidence that Troutman engaged in any activity relating to Jones’ case that
is protected. Although at times Troutman referred in his deposition to “speaking with” Jones’
attorneys, when asked specifically about that, Troutman conceded that he never had any contact with
Jones’ attorneys, but rather had only spoken to Jones about Troutman’s views regarding whether
Jones had handled a call properly. Dkt. No. 25 at 35-36. That call was apparently one of the items
of conduct at issue in Jones’ suit, and Troutman told Jones that he believed Jones had conducted
himself properly on that call. Id. However, Troutman never testified on behalf of Jones, did not
provide a statement, and was never interviewed or deposed by anyone, either in proceedings related
to Jones’ civil suit or the internal affairs investigations relating to Jones. Instead, the only evidence
before the Court is that Troutman spoke to Jones about the case.

12

This evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that Troutman engaged in protected activity. The
activity protected by the anti-retaliation provisions of the ADA is “oppos[ing] any act or practice
made unlawful by [he ADA],” or “ma[king] a charge, testif[ying], assist[ing], or participat[ing] in any
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). Simply speaking to
someone else about facts relevant to that person’s claim is not engaging in “protected activity.” The
fact of this case are very similar to those in Bevill v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 753 F.Supp.2d 816
(S.D. Iowa 2009). There, the plaintiff was claiming retaliation based on being a friend of, and having
written a letter to, a coworker who was involved in discrimination litigation against their employer.
The court concluded this conduct did not amount to protected activity for purposes of a retaliation
claim under the ADA, as the letter did not reference discrimination and could not be construed as
opposing discrimination, and the employee never complained to anyone that the coworker was being
discriminated against. Id. The same is the case here, and Troutman has thus failed to establish the
first prong of a prima facie case of retaliation.
Even if Troutman could show that he engaged in protected activity, he has no evidence that
there is a causal link between his conversations with Jones and his termination. As detailed above,
the County has provided undisputed evidence of legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for terminating
Troutman’s employment: his substandard performance and violation of the County’s code of conduct.
The only countering evidence that Troutman offers—other than his speculation—is inadmissible
hearsay. First, he points to his deposition testimony that Sergeant David Denson, Troutman’s onetime supervisor, told him that Lieutenant Tony Carter, Denson’s supervisor, had warned Denson to
“watch what he said” to Troutman because Troutman was cooperating with Jones’ suit against the
County. Dkt. No. 35 at 36. The alleged statement by Lt. Carter-to-Denson-to-Troutman is plainly
13

hearsay, and is not admissible. Troutman testified that he not could recall any person in his chain of
command ever mentioning to him his support of Jones or speaking to him about Jones’ claims. Id.
And he did not attach to his response any evidence that anyone ever made mention to him that there
was knowledge, much less concern, in the department—official or otherwise—that Troutman was in
any way involved with Jones’ suit. Indeed, he stated at his deposition that he was unaware of any
evidence that links his termination to Jones’ claims. Id. at 37.
Next, Troutman claims that at a State Office of Administrative Hearings proceeding related
to his termination he heard Bomer testify that Carter told her to write Troutman up for every minor
infraction in order to retaliate against him for participating in Jones’s suit. Id. at 30. No transcript
of that SOAH hearing is in the record, however, and Troutman’s recollection of Bomer’s testimony
at the hearing—relating the alleged statements of yet another person (Lt. Carter)—is patent
inadmissible hearsay as well, and cannot support Troutman’s claim. The only “evidence” in the
record to support the claim that the County fired Troutman to retaliate against him is Troutman’s own
subjective belief. Id. at 39. That subjective belief, standing alone, is insufficient to support the claim
of a causal link between Troutman’s termination and his discussions with Jones. The third element
of a prima facie retaliation claim is thus also lacking here.
For these reasons, the Court recommends that summary judgment be granted on Troutman’s
retaliation claim as well.
III. RECOMMENDATION
At the end of the day, the Plaintiff’s evidence is sorely lacking. Troutman does not dispute
that he performed precisely as the County claims, nor does he dispute that he was dishonest with his
supervisors. The lack of any evidence to dispute the County’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons
14

for terminating Troutman dooms his discrimination claim. Similarly, he presents the Court with no
evidence connecting the County’s decision to terminate him with him discussing with Jones, Jones’
suit against the County. In fact, there is no admissible evidence before the Court that the County was
even aware of his conversations with Jones. Given the County’s undisputed evidence, and
Troutman’s complete lack of countering evidence, summary judgment in the County’s favor is
warranted. Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the District Judge
GRANT Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 21) and dismiss Plaintiff Walter Chad
Troutman’s case with prejudice.
IV. WARNINGS
The parties may file objections to this Report and Recommendation. A party filing objections
must specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which objections are being made.
The District Court need not consider frivolous, conclusive, or general objections. See Battle v. United
States Parole Comm’n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987).
A party's failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations
contained in this Report within fourteen (14) days after the party is served with a copy of the Report
shall bar that party from de novo review by the District Court of the proposed findings and
recommendations in the Report and, except upon grounds of plain error, shall bar the party from
appellate review of unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the
District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150-53, 106 S. Ct. 466,
472-74 (1985); Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en
banc).

15

To the extent that a party has not been served by the Clerk with this Report &
Recommendation electronically pursuant to the CM/ECF procedures of this District, the Clerk is
directed to mail such party a copy of this Report and Recommendation by certified mail, return receipt
requested.
SIGNED this 4th day of February, 2016.

_____________________________________
ANDREW W. AUSTIN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

16