Jackson v. General Motors LLC

Filing 8

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS re 1 Complaint filed by Daniel Jackson. ([T]he undersigned Magistrate Court RECOMMENDS that the District Court DISMISS Daniel Jackson's lawsuit as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).). Signed by Judge Andrew W. Austin. (jk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AUSTIN DIVISION
DANIEL JACKSON #603261

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V.
GENERAL MOTORS LLC

A-14-CA-1059-SS

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
TO:

THE HONORABLE SAM SPARKS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the Court is Plaintiff Daniel Jackson’s Complaint, filed on November 21, 2014 (Dkt.

No. 1). The Court submits this Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b) and
Rule 1 of Appendix C of the Local Court Rules of the United States District Court for the Western
District of Texas.
On January 7, 2015, the Court granted Jackson’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. See
Order (Dkt. # 7). Because Jackson has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court
is required by standing order to review his Complaint under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B) to determine
whether the action is “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Dismissal of a claim as frivolous under Section 1915(e) is permissible where the claim lacks
an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A
complaint lacks an arguable basis in law if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.
Rogers v. Boatright, 709 F.3d 403, 407 (5th Cir. 2013). “A complaint lacks an arguable basis in fact

if, after providing the plaintiff the opportunity to present additional facts when necessary, the facts
alleged are clearly baseless.” Id.
A dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is reviewed under the same
standard of review applicable to dismissals made pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). DeMoss v.
Crain, 636 F.3d 145, 152 (5th Cir. 2011). A complaint will survive a motion to dismiss if it contains
“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). A plaintiff meets this standard when he “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. To avoid
dismissal for failure to state a claim, plaintiffs must allege facts sufficient to “raise the right to relief
above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Mere “labels and conclusions” nor “a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” suffice to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted. Id.
II.

ANALYSIS

Jackson is currently incarcerated in Green Bay Correctional Institution in Green Bay,
Wisconsin for various state law offenses. Notwithstanding this, Jackson has filed this federal lawsuit
against “General Motors LLC” (“General Motors”) here in Austin, Texas, purporting to allege claims
under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 23(d)(1). In addition to these federal claims, Jackson alleges state laws claims of strict liability,
fraud, unfair trade practices and breach of contract. Specifically, Jackson alleges that he is the owner
of a 2008 Chevy Impala Super Sport automobile which is currently under recall by General Motors

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for various defects and contends that those alleged defects “increase the danger of collision that is
certain to result in death.” Dkt. No. 1 at 1.
The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case. An actual “case or controversy”
must exist before a federal court can properly exercise subject matter jurisdiction. U.S. CONST. Art.
III, § 2, cl. 1. Standing is an element of the “case or controversy” requirement, and lack of standing
deprives the district court of subject matter jurisdiction. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 560 (1992). The “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing” is comprised of three
requirements: (1) the plaintiff must suffer an injury in fact—“an invasion of a legally protected
interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical”; (2) the plaintiff's injury must be “fairly traceable to the challenged action of the
defendant”; and (3) “it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of
establishing these three requirements. Id.
Jackson cannot demonstrate standing in this case because he has not suffered an injury in
fact. Jackson alleges that his car’s defects may cause him injury in the future. “Allegations of
possible future injury do not satisfy the requirements of Art. III.” Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S.
149, 158 (1990). Accordingly, he has failed to demonstrate that he has standing to pursue this
federal lawsuit.
Even if Jackson had demonstrated standing, the Court would nevertheless dismiss his case
because he has failed to allege a viable claim for relief. For example, Jackson alleges that General
Motors has somehow violated § 1125(a) of the Lanham Act. However, this provision of the Lanham
Act creates a federal cause of action for unfair competition by prohibiting the use in interstate
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commerce of any “false designation of origin, or any false description or representation, including
words or other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the same.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). In
order to prevail on claim under this provision, a plaintiff has the burden of showing: (1) that he had
trademark rights in the mark or name at issue and (2) that a defendant adopted a mark or name that
was the same, or confusingly similar to its mark, such that consumers were likely to confuse the two.
Lott-Johnson v. Studio 620, 2011 WL 3468372, * 3 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 8, 2011). See also, Friederichs
v. Gorz, 624 F. Supp.2d 1058, 1063 (D. Minn. 2009) (holding that false advertising claims not
involving misuse of trademark are actionable under Lanham Act only when brought by competitors
of wrongdoer). Jackson’s unhappiness with General Motors due to the recall of his car is clearly
not the type of claim designed to be remedied by the Lanham Act. Jackson’s case does not involve
the misuse of a trademark by a competitor and thus fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted. Id.
Jackson also alleges a claim under the Magnuson–Moss Warranty Act. This Act provides
a civil claim for relief for consumers who are damaged by a supplier or warrantor’s failure to comply
with its obligations under a written or implied warranty or under the Act in issuing such a warranty.
15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1). In order to state a claim under the Act, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he
or she actually suffered an injury and, specifically, that (i) the item at issue was subject to a warranty;
(ii) the item did not conform to the warranty; (iii) the seller was given reasonable opportunity to cure
any defects; and (iv) the seller failed to cure the defects within a reasonable time or a reasonable
number of attempts. Temple v. Fleetwood Enters., Inc., 133 F. App’x 254, 268 (6th Cir. 2005);
Coghlan v. Aquasport Marine Corp., 73 F. Supp.2d 769, 773-74(S.D. Tex. 1999). In addition, the
plaintiff must show that the amount in controversy is at least $50,000.00. Scarlott v. Nissan North
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America, Inc., 771 F.3d 883, 887 (5th Cir. 2014). Jackson cannot demonstrate any of the aboveelements. Most detrimental to his claim is the fact that Jackson has failed to allege that he suffered
any actual injury in this case. Rather, he alleges that the alleged defects in his car put him at
increased risk of possible future injury. This is insufficient to state a valid claim under the
Magnuson–Moss Warranty Act. See Coghlan, 73 F. Supp.2d at 773-74 (holding that boat owners,
who discovered that the deck of their fishing boat was composed of plywood encased within
fiberglass rather than all fiberglass, could not maintain suit against manufacturer under
Magnuson–Moss Warranty Act since they failed to allege actual concrete and palpable injuries
required to state a claim for relief and merely complained of possible future injury). In addition,
Jackson fails to allege any of the specific elements listed above to allege a claim under the Act or
that the amount in controversy is at least $50,000.00. Accordingly, his claim under the
Magnuson–Moss Warranty Act also fails.
Jackson’s state law claims also fail because Texas law requires a plaintiff to show actual
injury to pursue a claim. See Martin v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 369 F. Supp.2d 887, 890 (W.D.
Tex. 2005) (citing Martin v. Ford Motor Co., 914 F. Supp. 1449, 1455 (S.D. Tex.1996) (Texas law
precludes a claim where there is no injury). As noted, Jackson does not contend that he has sustained
any actual physical injury in this case and thus his state law claims fail as a matter of law.
III. RECOMMENDATION
Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned Magistrate Court RECOMMENDS that the
District Court DISMISS Daniel Jackson’s lawsuit as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B).

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IV. WARNINGS
The parties may file objections to this Report and Recommendation. A party filing
objections must specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which objections are
being made. The District Court need not consider frivolous, conclusive, or general objections. See
Battle v. United States Parole Comm’n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987).
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations
contained in this Report within fourteen (14) days after the party is served with a copy of the Report
shall bar that party from de novo review by the District Court of the proposed findings and
recommendations in the Report and, except upon grounds of plain error, shall bar the party from
appellate review of unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the
District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150–53, 106 S. Ct. 466,
472-74 (1985); Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en
banc).
To the extent that a party has not been served by the Clerk with this Report &
Recommendation electronically pursuant to the CM/ECF procedures of this District, the Clerk is
directed to mail such party a copy of this Report and Recommendation by certified mail, return
receipt requested.
SIGNED this 5th day of March, 2015.

_____________________________________
ANDREW W. AUSTIN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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