Hunter v. Price et al

Filing 6

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION GRANTING 2 Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis filed by Chase Carmen Hunter. IT IS RECOMMENDED that the District Court DISMISS with Prejudice 1 Complaint filed by Chase Carmen Hunter as and should DENY any further relief. Signed by Judge Andrew W. Austin. (klw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AUSTIN DIVISION
CHASE CARMEN HUNTER
V.
VELVA L. PRICE, INDIVIDUALLY, and
IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
CLERK OF THE TRAVIS COUNTY
DISTRICT COURT, and the TRAVIS
COUNTY DISTRICT COURT CLERK’S
OFFICE

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A-15-CV-405-LY

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
TO:

THE HONORABLE LEE YEAKEL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Dkt. No. 2), filed

on May 14, 2015; Motion for Appointment of Counsel (Dkt. No. 3); and Motion for Password for
Electronic Filing (Dkt. No. 4). The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to the United
States District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b) and Rule 1 of Appendix C of the Local Court
Rules of the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Local Rules for the
Assignment of Duties to United States Magistrate Judges.
I. ANALYSIS
A.

IFP Status
After considering Plaintiff Chase Carmen Hunter’s financial affidavit, the Court finds that

Hunter is indigent. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Hunter in forma pauperis status in the instant
case. Because Hunter has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court is required by
standing order to review the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2).

B.

Review under Section 1915
A district court “shall dismiss” a case brought in forma pauperis at any time if the court

determines the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). An action is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact,”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989), and the claims “are of little or no weight, value, or
importance, not worthy of serious consideration, or trivial.” Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080,
1083 (3d Cir. 1995).
Pro se complaints are liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520-521 (1972). The court must “accept as true factual allegations in the complaint and all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom.” Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996).
A pro se complaint can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim when “it appears ‘beyond doubt
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.’”
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–521 (1972). However, a petitioner’s pro se status does not
offer him “an impenetrable shield, for one acting pro se has no license to harass others, clog the
judicial machinery with meritless litigation, and abuse already overloaded court dockets.” Farguson
v. Mbank Houston N.A., 808 F.2d 358, 359 (5th Cir. 1986).
Plaintiff Chase Carmen Hunter (“Hunter”) alleges that employees of the Travis County
District Court Clerk’s Office, of which Velva Price (“Price”) is the Clerk, violated the Due Process
Clause of the United States Constitution and the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure by failing to file two
civil law suits Hunter attempted to file in Travis County in June of 2013 and subsequently “blocking”
Hunter from obtaining default judgments in these suits. Hunter also asserts violations of various

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federal criminal statutes, including extortion and wire fraud, for the failure to file these cases. Hunter
generally alleges a cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Hunter asserts that a Travis County District Court Clerk’s Office employee fraudulently stated
that she had spoken with Hunter and informed Hunter that she needed to pay the filing fees for these
cases.1 Hunter complains that Defendants failed to issue citations in these two cases as required and
that Price failed to perform her ministerial duties as Clerk. Hunter alleges that Defendants blocked
her access to the courts by not granting the motion to proceed in forma pauperis and failing to file
these cases. Additionally, Hunter alleges that she is entitled to default judgment in these cases and
that Clerk’s Office employees have refused to submit the motions for default judgment to a judge.
Hunter complains that she was informed by a Clerk’s Office employee that Hunter was required to
set the motions for hearing on the docket and announce ready the week before. Hunter complains
that her motions for default judgment were improperly placed on the contested instead of the
uncontested docket; and were improperly moved to the bottom of the docket because of a incorrectly
alleged failure to “announce ready.” Hunter also complains that one of her cases was improperly
dismissed for lack of prosecution because of these improper actions regarding setting the motion for
hearing by the Travis County Clerk’s Office. Hunter requests this Court to declare that Hunter is
entitled to default judgment in Travis County District Court cases D-1-GN-13-001957 and D-1-GN13-002576 and declare that Price’s actions unlawfully blocked Hunter from obtaining these default
judgments. Additionally, Hunter requests that the Court be enjoined from “refusing to provide an
accurate clerk record in TTCA cause 03-14-00373-CV.”

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Hunter asserts that she had filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Hunter seems
unaware that a grant of in forma pauperis status is not automatic, and that once such a motion is
denied, the litigant must pay the required filing fees.
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It is a well-settled rule that court clerks “‘have absolute immunity from actions for damages
arising from acts they are specifically required to do under court order or at a judge's discretion.’”
Clay v. Allen, 242 F.3d 679, 682 (5th Cir. 2001). This quasi-judicial immunity enures to a clerk of
court and deputy clerks of court when they act as “explicitly commanded by a court decree or by the
judge’s instructions.” Id. A local rule or rule of civil procedure is tantamount to a court order.
Jones v. Central Bank, 161 F.3d 311, 312–13 (5th Cir.1998); Walker v. City of Bogalusa, 168 F.3d
237, 239 (5th Cir. 1999). “Judicial immunity can be overcome only by showing that the actions
complained of were nonjudicial in nature or by showing that the actions were taken in the complete
absence of all jurisdiction.” Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d 279, 284 (5th Cir. 1994). When a clerk of
court files or refuses to file a document with the court, she is entitled to immunity, provided the acts
complained of are within her professional functions. See Mullis v. Bankr.Ct. for the Dist. of Nev.,
828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1040 (1988). Hunter has failed to
identify any actions by Defendants that fall outside the scope of the normal duties of the Travis
County Clerk’s Office in its function as an extension of the judiciary. Accordingly, to the extent it
alleges damages, Hunter’s complaint should be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous. Boyd, 31 F.3d
at 285.
Apart from Defendants’ quasi-judicial immunity from damages, Hunter requests declaratory
and injunctive relief. With regard to injunctive relief, the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996
(“FCIA”) amended Section 1983 to provide that “in any action brought against a judicial officer for
an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted
unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief is unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In
this case, Hunter has failed to plead that a declaratory decree has been violated and declaratory relief

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is unavailable. Additionally, “[a]lthough judicial immunity does not bar claims for injunctive or
declaratory relief in civil rights actions, [Plaintiff here] cannot obtain [any] requested [declaratory
or injunctive] relief because federal courts have no authority to direct state courts or their judicial
officers in the performance of their duties.” See LaBranche v. Becnel, 559 F. App'x 290, 291 (5th
Cir. 2014). Hunter’s complaint should be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous and Hunter should
be denied any further relief.
II. RECOMMENDATION
The Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the District Court DISMISS this case WITH
PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
III. WARNINGS
The parties may file objections to this Report and Recommendation. A party filing
objections must specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which objections are
being made. The District Court need not consider frivolous, conclusive, or general objections. See
Battle v. United States Parole Comm’n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987). A party’s failure to file
written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations contained in this Report within
fourteen (14) days after the party is served with a copy of the Report shall bar that party from de novo
review by the District Court of the proposed findings and recommendations in the Report and, except
upon grounds of plain error, shall bar the party from appellate review of unobjected-to proposed
factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C);
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150-53 (1985); Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415,
1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).

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To the extent that a party has not been served by the Clerk with this Report &
Recommendation electronically pursuant to the CM/ECF procedures of this District, the Clerk is
directed to mail such party a copy of this Report and Recommendation by certified mail, return
receipt requested.
SIGNED this 21st day of May, 2015.

_____________________________________
ANDREW W. AUSTIN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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