Evans v. Williamson County Government, Texas et al

Filing 10

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS for 4 Report and Recommendations,. ORDERED that Plaintiff Clarence E. Evans's Motion for Appointment of Counsel [#3] is DISMISSED as moot. Signed by Judge Sam Sparks. (dm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT

OUR,

FORT

FIj

EC

JUL 3

2:

AUSTIN DIVISION

CLARENCE E.

p y_

EVS,
Plaintiff,

-vs-

Case No. A-15-CA-436-SS

WILLIAMSON COUNTY GOVERNMENT,
TEXAS et al.,
Defendants.

ORDER
BE IT REMEMBERED on this day the Court reviewed the file in the above-styled cause, and

specifically Plaintiff Clarence E. Evans's Complaint, styled as "Petition to Vacate Lower Court
Order, Grant Request for a New Trial, and Change of Jurisdiction" [#1], Plaintiff's Motion for

Appointment of Counsel [#3], the Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate
Judge [#4], and Plaintiffs Objections [#9] thereto. Having reviewed the documents, the governing
law, and the file as a whole, the Court now enters the following opinion and orders.

All matters in this case were referred to United States Magistrate Judge Mark Lane for report
and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§

636(b) and Rule

1

of Appendix C of the Local Court

Rules of the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Local Rules for the

Assignment of Duties to United States Magistrate Judges. Evans is entitled to de novo review of the
portions of the Magistrate Judge's report to which he filed specific objections.
§

636(b)(l). All other review is for plain error.

Douglass

v.

United Servs. Auto. Ass

28 U.S.C.
'n,

79 F.3d

/

1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en bane). Nevertheless, this Court has reviewed the entire file de

novo, and agrees with the Magistrate Judge's recommendation.

Background
Plaintiff Clarence E. Evans makes the following allegations. In September2007, Evans filed
a child custody suit in Texas Family Court Number 4, Williamson County, Texas (Family Court).

The judge granted Evans's request to change his child's name and ordered Evans to pay $450 per

month in child support and $91 per month in medical support. In November 2008, the mother of

Evans's child allegedly filed two motions for default judgment, which Evans complains were never
served upon him, and instead were served only upon his attorney. Evans alleges this failure of
personal service denied him the right to paternity testing and appeal of the default judgment
apparently entered against him.
In November 2010, Evans filed a request to modify his child support payments and a request

for paternity testing of the child with the Office of the Attorney General Child Support Unit. Evans

thereafter allegedly received a letter from the OAG indicating the amount of child support he was
then paying was "inappropriate" and should be reduced. At a settlement hearing which took place
in February 2011, it became apparent that through a clerical error, Evans was being charged $182

per month in medical support for the child, rather than the $91 ordered by the court. This error
caused Evans's account to be placed in arrearage, which triggered an additional fee of $50 per
month.
In May2011, a second settlement hearing was held, and all parties involved allegedly agreed

Evans's monthly child support obligation would be limited to the original amount ordered by the
court, and all arrearages would be voided. The mother of Evans's child, however, allegedly refused

-2-

to sign the settlement paperwork. It is not clear what occurred following the second settlement

hearing. Evans alleges he sought legal aid in January 2014 and filed a suit to modify the parent-child

relationship in March 2014. The court entered a default judgment against Evans in that suit on April
22, 2015.

Evans claims his child support obligations caused him to experience "extreme financial

hardships," including homelessness, difficulty purchasing basic necessities, and consequences
associated with defaulting on his credit obligations. Evans asks this Court to vacate the Family

Court's order, grant Evans a new trial, transfer the case to Travis County Family Court, and order
the defendants to pay him (sic throughout) "$3.18 million dollars in monetary damages plus 2

million dollars in punitive damages and $ 2 hundred thousand dollars in restitution." Compi. [#1]
at 8-9.

Analysis
This Court shall dismiss a case brought informapauperis if the Court determines the action
(1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (3) seeks

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief 28 U.S.C.
district court may dismiss under

§

§

1915(e)(2). "A

1915 for failure to state a claim if it is 'patently obvious' that the

plaintiff could not prevail on the facts alleged, and allowing him an opportunity to amend his
complaint would be futile." Trujillo

v.

Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1224 (10th Cir. 2006). Such a

dismissal may occur at anytime, before or after service ofprocess and before or after the defendant's
answer. Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1119 (5th Cir. 1986).

This Court lacks jurisdiction to hear Evans's claims under the Rooker-Feidman doctrine. As

the Fifth Circuit has explained:
-3-

The Supreme Court has definitively established, in what has become known as the
Rooker-Feidman doctrine, that federal district courts, as courts of original
jurisdiction, lack appellate jurisdiction to review, modify, or nullify final orders of
state courts. If a state court errs the judgment is not void, it is to be reviewed and
corrected by the appropriate state appellate court. Thereafter, recourse at the federal
level is limited solely to an application for writ of certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court.
Weekly v. Morrow, 204 F.3d 613, 615 (5th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations and footnotes omitted).

Federal courts frequently apply the doctrine to bar federal jurisdiction over family law matters such
as child support. See, e.g., Gorzelanczyk v. Baldassone, 29 F. App'x 402, 403-04 (7th Cir. 2002)

(unpublished) (finding suit challenging contempt order enforcing child support order barred by

Rooker-Feldman); Laskowski

v.

Attorney Gen. of Tex., No. CIVA H-05-1428, 2006 WL 2479101,

at *2 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 25,2006) (finding suit challenging child support arrearages barred byRooker-

Feldman).

Evans is challenging a state court judgment ordering him to pay child support.

Consequently, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain Evans's
claim. See Exxon Mobil Corp.

v,

Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (stating the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to "cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries
caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and
invoking district court review and rejection ofthosejudgments"). As there is no basis for this Court
to assert jurisdiction, dismissal is warranted.

Alternatively, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that this case is subject to dismissal

under the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction. Pursuant to the exception, federal
courts have traditionally refused to adjudicate cases involving marital status or child custody. Rykers
v.

Alford, 832 F.2d 895, 899 (5th Cir. 1987). The courts have reasoned that (1) state courts have

greater expertise and interest in domestic matters; (2) domestic matters often require ongoing

El

supervision, a task for which federal courts are unsuited; (3) piecemeal adjudication of domestic

matters increases the chance of different courts handing down incompatible decrees; and
(4) domestic matters serve no particular federal interest, while crowding the federal docket. Id. at

899-900 (citing Jagiella v. Jagiella, 647 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1981); WRiGHT, MILLER, & COOPER,
1

3E FED. PRAC. & PROC. Jums.

must determine.

. .

§

3609 (3d ed.)). If, in order to resolve the case, "the federal court

how much child support should be paid and under what conditions, or whether

a previous court's determination on these matters should be modified, then the court should dismiss

the case." Id. As Evans asks this Court to vacate the Family Court's determination, his suit is

alternatively subject to dismissal under the exception.

Conclusion
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation of the United States

Magistrate Judge [#4] is ACCEPTED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Clarence E. Evans's Objections [#9] are

OVERRULED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Clarence E. Evans's Complaint [#1] is

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for want of jurisdiction; and
IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that Plaintiff Clarence E. Evans's Motion for

Appointment of Counsel [#3] is DISMISSED as moot.
SIGNED this the 3)

day of July 2015.

/4p2/
SAM SPARKS
LI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

436rrokba.frrn

-5-