Engineered Arresting Systems Corporation v. Runway Safe LLC et al
Filing
101
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION. Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (dm)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXA SEP 19 PM
:
00
AUSTIN DIVISION
CIERK.U.S. O!STRCT COURT
WESTERN
ENGINEERED ARRESTING SYSTEMS
CORPORATION,
PLAINTIFF,
DISTRIS
DEPUTY CLERK
CAUSE NO. 1:15-CV-546-LY
V.
RUNWAY SAFE LLC AND RUNWAY
SAFE INC.,
DEFENDANTS.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING
CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
Before the court in the above-styled and numbered cause are Plaintiff's Opening Claim
Construction Brief filed March 9, 2016 (Clerk's Doc. No. 70); Runway Safe LLC's And Runway
Safe Inc.'s Opening Claim Construction Brief filed March 9, 2016 (Clerk's Doc. No. 72);
Runway Safe LLC's And Runway Safe Inc.'s Responsive Claim Construction Brief filed March
30, 2016 (Clerk's Doc. No. 77); Plaintiffs Responsive Claim Construction Brief filed March 30,
2016 (Clerk's Doc. No. 75); the Parties' Amended Joint Claim Construction Statement filed
April 5, 2016 (Clerk's Doc. No. 82); and the claim-construction presentations of both parties.
The court held a claim-construction hearing on April 13, 2016.
See Markman
v.
WesMew Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370
(1996). After considering the patent and its prosecution history, the parties' claim-construction
briefs, the claim-construction presentations of both parties, and the applicable law regarding
claim construction, the court now renders the following order with regard to claim construction.
1
Introduction
I.
An engineered materials arrestor system ("EMAS") is a product installed at the end of
an airport runway to safely bring to a stop, by absorbing the energy of the aircraft, an aircraft
that fails to halt before the end of the runway.
For over 15 years, Plaintiff Engineered
Arresting Systems Corporation ("ESCO") was the only EMAS supplier to airports in the
United States. In 2014, Defendants Runway Safe LLC and Runway Safe Inc. (collectively
"Runway Safe") began marketing in the United States the EMAS technology of a Norwegian
company.
In November 2014, Runway Safe installed an EMAS at Chicago Midway
International Airport.
ESCO brings this action against Runway Safe, alleging direct and indirect infringement
of United States Patent No. 7,597,502 (the "502 Patent"). The court renders this memorandum
opinion and order to construe the claims of '502 Patent.
II.
Legal Principles of Claim Construction
Determining infringement is a two-step process. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 976 ("[There
are] two elements
of a simple patent case, construing the patent and determining whether
infringement occurred....").
ascertained.
Id.
First, the meaning and scope of the relevant claims must be
Second, the properly construed claims must be compared to the accused
device. Id. Step one, claim construction, is the current issue before the court.
The court construes patent claims without the aid of a jury. See Markinan, 52 F.3d at
979.
The "words of a claim 'are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning."
Phillips v. AJ'VH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (enbanc) (quoting Vitronics Corp
v.
Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). The ordinary and customary
meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill
in the art in question at the time
of the invention. Id. at 1313. The person of ordinary skill in
the art is deemed to have read the claim term in the context of the entire patent. Id. Therefore,
to ascertain the meaning
of a claim, a court must look to the claim, the specification, and the
patent's prosecution history. Id. at 1314-17; Markinan, 52 F.3d at 979. Claim language guides
the court's construction of a claim term. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. In some cases, "the
ordinary meaning of claim language. . .may be readily apparent even to lay judges, and claim
construction in such cases involves little more than the application of the widely accepted
meaning of commonly understood words." Id.; see also Brown
v.
3M, 265 F.3d 1349, 1352
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (concluding that claims did "not require elaborate interpretation"). A
determination that a claim term "needs no construction" or has the "plain and ordinary
meaning" may be inadequate when a term has more than one "ordinary" meaning or when
reliance on a term's "ordinary" meaning does not resolve the parties' dispute. 02 Micro Int'l
Ltd.
v.
Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
"[T]he context in which a term is used in the asserted claim can be highly instructive."
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314.
Other claims, asserted and unasserted, can provide additional
instruction because "terms are normally used consistently throughout the patent."
Id.
Differences among claims, such as additional limitations in dependent claims, can provide
further guidance. Id.
Claims must also be read "in view of the specification, of which they are a part."
Markman, 52 F.3d at 979.
The specification "is always highly relevant to the claim
construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a
3
disputed term." Teleflex. Inc.
(internal citations omitted).
v.
Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
In the specification, a patentee may defme a term to have a
meaning that differs from the meaning that the term would otherwise possess. Phillips, 415
F.3d at 1316. In such a case, the patentee's lexicography governs. Id. The specification may
also reveal a patentee's intent to disclaim or disavow claim scope. Id. Such intention is
dispositive of claim construction. Id. Although the specification may indicate that a certain
embodiment is preferred, a particular embodiment appearing in the specification will not be
read into the claim when the claim language is broader than the embodiment. Electro Med.
Sys., S.A. v. Cooper Life Scis., Inc., 34 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
The prosecution history is another tool to supply the proper context for claim
construction because it demonstrates how the inventor understood the invention. Phillips, 415
F.3d at 1317.
A patentee may define a disputed term in prosecuting a patent.
Diagnostics Inc.
v.
Home
LfeScan, Inc., 381 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Distinguishing the
claimed invention over the prior art during prosecution indicates what a claim does not cover.
Spectrum Int'l
v.
Sterilite Corp., 164 F.3d 1372, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The doctrine of
prosecution disclaimer precludes a patentee from recapturing a specific meaning that was
previously disclaimed during prosecution. Omega Eng 'g Inc.
1323 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Middleton Inc.
v.
v.
Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314,
A disclaimer of claim scope must be clear and unambiguous.
3MCo., 311 F.3d 1384, 1388 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Although, "less significant than the intrinsic record in detenmning the legally operative
meaning of claim language," the court may rely on extrinsic evidence to "shed useful light on
the relevant art." Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (quotation omitted). Technical dictionaries and
treatises may help the court understand the underlying technology and the manner in which one
skilled in the art might use a claim term, but such sources may also provide overly broad
definitions or may not be indicative of how a term is used in the patent. Id. at 1318. Similarly,
expert testimony may aid the court in determining the particular meaning of a term in the
pertinent field, but "conclusory, unsupported assertions by experts as to the definition of a
claim term are not useful." Id. Generally, extrinsic evidence is "less reliable than the patent
and its prosecution history in determining how to read claim terms." Id. Extrinsic evidence
may be useful when considered in the context of the intrinsic evidence, id. at 1319, but it
cannot "alter a claim construction dictated by a proper analysis of the intrinsic evidence," OnLine Techs., Inc.
III.
v.
BodenseewerkPerkin-Elmer GmbH, 386 F.3d 1133, 1139 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Discussion
The parties dispute the construction of 4 terms in claim one of the '502 Patent. The
following table summarizes the parties' proposed constructions of the disputed terms.
Term/Phrase
"vehicle arresting
unit"
1.
Plaintiff's
Proposed Construction
Defendant's
Proposed Construction
Preamble is not limiting.
"a discrete, prefabricated
section of an arresting bed
that can be positioned with
other prefabricated sections to
form the arresting bed."
In the alternative: plain and
ordinary meaning.
2. "ceramic foam"
Plain and ordinary meaning.
5
"a foam that is ceramic, not
glass."
Plaintiff's
Proposed Construction
Defendant's
Proposed Construction
3.
"having a breaking
strength to readily
break without
subverting the
arrestment
characteristics of the
compressible material"
Plain and ordinary meaning.
[Indefinite]
4. "sufficient to arrest
Plain and ordinary meaning.
[Indefinite]
Term/Phrase
travel of a vehicle
without catastrophically
damaging the vehicle"
1.
"vehicle arrestin2 unit"
The preamble to claim one of the '502 Patent contains the phrase "vehicle arresting
unit." ESCO argues that the preamble does not limit the claim, but contends that if the court
does find the preamble to be limiting, the term "vehicle arresting unit" should be given its plain
and ordinary meaning. Runway Safe argues that the phrase "vehicle arresting unit" in the
preamble is a claim limitation and that it means "a discrete, prefabricated section of an arresting
bed that can be positioned with other prefabricated sections to form the arresting bed."
In general, a preamble describing the use
of an invention "do[es] not limit the claims
because the patentability of apparatus or composition claims depends on the claimed structure,
not on the use or purpose of that structure." Catalina Mktg. Int'l, Inc.
v.
Coolsavings.com, Inc.,
289 F.3d 801, 809 (Fed. Cir. 2002). "[A] preamble generally is not limiting when the claim
body describes a structurally complete invention such that deletion of the preamble phrase does
not affect the structure or steps of the claimed invention." Id. at 809. However, the preamble
may operate as a claim limitation if it is "necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality" to the
claim, id. at 808, or recites additional structure underscored as important by the specification,
Deere & Co.
v.
Bush Hog, LLC, 703 F.3d 1349, 1357-58 (Fed. Cir. 2012). A preamble phrase
that provides antecedent basis for a claim limitation generally limits the scope of the claim. Id.
at 1358 (concluding preamble is limiting where phrase appears only in preamble).
Claim one of the '502 Patent, read without the preamble, defines a structurally complete
invention within the body of the claim. The preamble does not provide an antecedent basis for
any term used in the body of the claim. Further, deletion of the preamble would not affect the
structure of the invention, because the body of the claim refers to vehicle arrestment multiple
times, indicating the purpose of the invention within the body of the claim. The preamble is
merely a statement of purpose or intended use not required to understand the structure of the
invention and is essentially redundant of the body of the claim.
Runway Safe argues that the phrase is limiting because ESCO stated during prosecution
of a related application, the application for United States Patent No. 6,971,817' (the "817
Application"), that the "preamble recitation of a 'vehicle arresting unit' must be given effect as
a structural limitation on the scope of the claim rather than a statement
of purpose."
"[C]lear reliance on the preamble during prosecution to distinguish the claimed
invention from the prior art transforms the preamble into a claim limitation because such
reliance indicates use of the preamble to defme, in part, the claimed invention." Catalina, 289
F.3d at 808-09. Further, an interpretation asserted in the prosecution of a parent application can
also affect continuation applications. Omega, 334 F.3d at 1333. "As long as the same claim
limitation is at issue, prosecution disclaimer made on the same limitation in an ancestor
application will attach."
Id.
However, "[e]very statement made by a patentee during
The '502 Patent is a divisional of United States Patent No. 7,261,490, which is a continuation
of the '817 Application.
1
7
prosecution to distinguish a prior art reference does not create a separate estoppel. Arguments
must be viewed in context." Read Corp.
v.
Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 824 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
In Omega, the court addressed construction of a claim limitation used in the prosecution
of an ancestor patent. 334 F.3d at 1333. Here, the question is not how to construe a claim
limitation, but whether the term is a claim limitation in the context of the specific claim.
During prosecution of the '817 Application, the United States Patent and Trademark Office
rejected a claim as anticipated by United States Patent No. 5,002,620 (the "620 Patent"). In
response, the applicants asserted that the preamble "vehicle arresting unit" in the '817
Application was a structural limitation on the scope of the claim that made the '817 Application
distinguishable from the '620 Patent because the '620 Patent discloses "elements selected and
combined for strength" and has "no apparent relationship to 'a vehicle arresting
unit." The
body of the claim in the '817 Application did not make clear that the invention was designed
for intentional structural failure incident to vehicle arrestment. The preamble "vehicle arresting
unit" therefore provided a structural limitation on the scope of the claim that was not apparent
from the language in the body of the claim.
In the '502 Patent, the body of claim one defmes a structurally-complete invention and
the fact that the invention is used for vehicle arrestment is apparent from the language of the
claim. The preamble is used only to state a purpose or intended use for the invention and could
be deleted without affecting the structure of the invention defined in claim one. See Catalina,
289 F.3d at 808-09.
The court concludes that the preamble to claim one is not a claim limitation.
2. "ceramic foam"
ESCO proposes that the term "ceramic foam" should be given its plain and ordinary
meaning and argues that a person having ordinary skill in the art would understand that "ceramic
foam" includes glass foam2. Runway Safe argues that the term should be construed as "a foam that
is ceramic, not glass."
The court first looks to the context in which the phrase is used in the claim.
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314.
See
Claim one mentions "ceramic foam" once, in the clause
comprising compressible material in the form of ceramic foam having top, bottom and side
surfaces and omitting phenolic foam and cellular concrete...." '502 Patent, 6:67-7:2. This
context suggests that the term "ceramic foam" is intended to encompass all types of ceramic
foam except for those specifically excepted: phenolic foam and cellular concrete.
The term "ceramic foam" is used but one other time in the '502 Patent, in the
specification.
See '502 Patent, 3:20-23 ("Block 12 may be cellular concrete fabricated in
accordance with the '068 patent or otherwise, or may be formed of phenolic foam, ceramic
foam, or other suitable material."). This reference to "ceramic foam" does not, and is not
meant to, provide additional guidance as to the meaning of the term.
The reference is a
description of the types of compressible material that have been used in previous vehiclearresting blocks, beds, and methods. The word "glass" is not used in the claim or specification
of the '502 Patent.
Runway Safe argues that the absence of reference to "foam glass" in the '502 Patent
indicates an intentional omission because "foam glass" is included in the specification of a
The parties use the phrases "glass foam," "foam glass," and "foam that is glass"
throughout the briefing in this cause and do not note a distinction among the three. The court
assumes no different and will use the term "glass foam" except when directly quoting a source.
2
related patent cited during prosecution of the '502 Patent, United States Patent No. 8,021,074
(the
"074 Patent"), in
a sentence parallel to a sentence used in the specification
of the '502
Patent. The '502 Patent states that a block "may be formed of phenolic foam, ceramic foam, or
other suitable material." '502 Patent, 3:22-23. The '074 Patent states that a block "may be
formed of phenolic, ceramic, foam glass or other suitable material" (emphasis added). '074
Patent, 4:7-8. Runway Safe posits that the omission of the phrase "foam glass" suggests that
the term "ceramic foam" does not encompass glass foam.
"[F]or prosecution disclaimer to attach, our precedent requires that the alleged
disavowing actions or statements made during prosecution be both clear and unmistakable."
Omega, 334 F.3d at 1325-26. Runway Safe relies on Microsoft to assert that the court should
construe the term in the '502 Patent in light of the language in the '074 Patent. See Microsoft
Corp.
v.
Multi-Tech Sys., Inc., 357 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004). In Microsoft, the patentee
"expressly," "explicitly," and "unambiguously" limited its invention in the prosecution history
of a related patent, and the specification of the related patent was identical to the patent at issue.
Id. at 1349.
Here, Runway Safe asks the court to infer a limitation from ESCO's inclusion of
"foam glass" in a list with the word "ceramic" in the specification of the '074 Patent. The '074
Patent does not contain an explicit or unambiguous limitation of the term "ceramic foam."
Further, the specification of the '074 Patent is not identical to the specification of the '502
Patent. The court concludes that inclusion in the '074 Patent and omission in the '502 Patent of
the term "foam glass" does not impose a disclaimer or limitation with regard to the term
"ceramic foam" in the '502 Patent.
Runway Safe also argues that the term "ceramic foam" does not encompass glass foam
because United States Patent No. 4,007,917 (the
10
"917 Patent") cited as prior
art
in the '502
Patent, refers to ceramic foams and glass foams separately. "[P]rior art cited in a patent or
cited in the prosecution history of the patent constitutes intrinsic evidence." V-Formation, Inc.
v.
Benetton Grp. SpA, 401 F.3d 1307, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2005). "[W]hen prior art that sheds light
on the meaning of a term is cited by the patentee, it can have particular value as a guide to the
proper construction of the term, because it may indicate not only the meaning of the term to
persons skilled in the art, but also that the patentee intended to adopt that meaning." Id.
In V-Formation, the court relied on statements from a patent cited as prior art to the
patents at issue to construe the term "releasably attaching" to exclude rivets. 401 F.3d at 1311.
The court reasoned that the prior-art patent used language "strikingly similar" to the patents at
issue. Id. Further, the prior-art patent contained statements that made explicit that rivets were
not releasable, such as "permanently attached ... through the use of rivets" and "a more
permanent fastener such as a rivet." Id. at 1311-12. Finally, the prior-art patent was issued in
1996, and the patents at issue were issued in 1998 and 2000. Id. at 1308, 1311.
Here, the prior
artthe
'917 Patentrefers in its specification to "ceramic foam or
glass foam" and describes separate tests for determining the energy absorption capacity of each.
The '917 Patent consistently refers to ceramic foam and glass foam as two separate materials.
The '917 Patent does not contain a clear statement distinguishing ceramic foam and glass foam.
Id. at 1311-12. Runway Safe asks the court to base its claim construction on the implication of
treating ceramic foam and glass foam differently in the '917 Patent. "[S]tatements made in the
prosecution history.. .regarding the prior art. . .require[] clear and unmistakable statements of
disavowal" to effect a disclaimer of claim scope. Cordis Corp.
F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
v.
Medtronic A VE, Inc., 339
Moreover, the application for the '917 Patent was filed in
1975, more than three decades before the application for the '502 Patent was filed in 2007.
11
"T]he ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would
have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention,
i.e.,
as of the
effective filing date of the patent application." Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313. The court concludes
that the '914 Patent's discussion of ceramic foam and glass foam as separate materials does not
impose a limitation with regard to the term "ceramic foam" in the '502 Patent.
Each side provides references to dictionaries and textbooks to support its position.
"[E]xtrinsic evidence can help educate the court regarding the field of the invention and can
help the court determine what a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand claim terms
to mean. Id. at 1319. However, "there is a virtually unbounded universe of potential extrinsic
evidence of some marginal relevance that could be brought to bear on any claim construction
question." Id. at 1318. "[E]ach party will naturally choose the pieces of extrinsic evidence
most favorable to its cause, leaving the court with the considerable task of filtering the useful
extrinsic evidence from the fluff" Id.
Runway Safe proposes several examples of glass foams and ceramic foams being
presented separately in textbooks, dictionaries, and other extrinsic sources naming distinct
purposes for each. However, Runway Safe presents no unequivocal authority for the notion
that glass foam is not a type of ceramic foam.
ESCO directs the court to dictionaries,
textbooks, and statements by experts that expressly include glass within the definition of
ceramics.
See, e.g.,
Hawley's Condensed Chemical Dictionary (15th Ed.) (defining "glass" as
"[a] ceramic material..."). The court acknowledges Runway Safe's argument that although
glass is a ceramic, glass foam is not a ceramic foam; however, in the absence of intrinsic or
extrinsic evidence on which the court may rely to incorporate that concept into its claim
12
construction, the court concludes that the extrinsic evidence supports the proposition that
"ceramic foam" as used in the '502 Patent encompasses glass foam.
Therefore, the court concludes that a person of ordinary skill in the art would
understand "ceramic foam" to have its plain and ordinary meaning, which encompasses glass
foam.
strength to readily break without subverting the arrestment
characteristics of the compressible material"
3. "having a breaking
Runway Safe argues that the term "having a breaking strength to readily break without
subverting the arrestment characteristics of the compressible material" is indefinite. ESCO
argues that the term is not indefinite and proposes that the court construe the term to have its
plain and ordinary meaning.
"[A' patent is invalid for indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the specification
delineating the patent, and the prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable certainty,
those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention." Nautilus, Inc.
v.
Biosig Instruments,
Inc., 134 5. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014). The definiteness requirement "mandates clarity, while
recognizing that absolute precision is unattainable." id. at 2129. "The claims.. .must provide
objective boundaries for those of skill in the art." Interval Licensing LLC
v.
AOL, Inc., 766
F.3d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014). "Claim language employing terms of degree has long been
found definite where it provided enough certainty to one of skill in the art when read in the
context of the invention. Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 766 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (citing Eibel Process Co.
v.
Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45, 65-66 (1923)
(finding 'substantial pitch' sufficiently definite because one skilled in the art 'had no difficulty
in determining what was the substantial pitch needed' to practice the invention)). Thus,
13
when a term of degree is used in the claim, the examiner should determine whether the
specification provides some standard for measuring that degree. Hearing Components, Inc.
v.
Shure Inc., 600 F.3d 1357, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2010). A term of degree is not indefinite if the
specification provides examples or teachings that can be used to measure a degree even without
a precise numerical measurement. See Interval Licensing, 766 F.3d at 1371-72.
Here, the term "having a breaking strength to readily break without subverting the
arrestment characteristics of the compressible material" describes the degree of strength of the
"frangible material positioned above the top surface" of the arresting unit. '502 Patent, 7:4-9.
The abstract expounds on the claim language, stating that the frangible material "provides a
stronger, more damage resistant surface, while still readily fracturing in an arresting incident."
The specification further explains that the frangible material "provides increased resistance" to
the deleterious effects of jet-blast phenomena and other external forces and specifies that "[t]he
word 'frangible' is used in its ordinary dictionary sense of being breakable or shatterable
without necessarily implying weakness or delicacy."
'502 Patent, 3:38-43, 3:55-57.
The
specification also provides an example of a suitable material and thickness for the frangible
layer: "top sheet [of frangible material] may comprise a section of cement board or other
suitable material. Typically, if commercially available cement board is used for top sheet, it
may have a thickness of up to about one-half inch, with a five-sixteenths inch thickness used in
a currently preferred embodiment." '502 Patent, 6:2-7.
The court concludes that a person skilled in the art would be able to ascertain the
meaning of "having a breaking strength to readily break without subverting the arrestment
characteristics of the compressible material" given the context of the term in the claim and the
further explanation in the specification, including an example of a layer having the
14
characteristics specified in the term. Further, the specification does not support a construction
of this term in a way other than the plain and ordinary meaning of the words as they would be
understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art.
Each of the words in the disputed claim term is commonly understood. This court easily
understands the term. The court rejects the notion that one of skill in the art would be confused
by the term. "Breaking strength," "readily break," "subverting," "arrestment characteristics,"
and "compressible" have widely accepted meanings.
The court concludes that the term is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning with
no further construction required.
4.
"sufficient to arrest travel of a vehicle without catastrophically damaging the vehicle"
Runway Safe argues that the term "sufficient to arrest travel of a vehicle without
catastrophically damaging the vehicle" is indefinite because the scope of the limitation depends
upon the conditions in which the invention is used. Runway Safe asserts that the '502 Patent
does not identify the type of vehicle to be arrested or the conditions of arrestment. ESCO
argues that the term is not indefinite and proposes that the court construe the term to have its
plain and ordinary meaning.
The term "sufficient to arrest travel of a vehicle without catastrophically damaging the
vehicle" in claim one describes the term "deformable material." The specification expounds on
the word "travel" and identifies the "vehicle" contemplated by the term and the conditions in
which the vehicle is to be arrested in its statement that "[t]his invention relates to arresting the
forward motion of vehicles, such as aircraft overrunning a runway...." The term "aircraft" is
used numerous other times throughout the specification and no other vehicle is mentioned. The
specification illustrates what is included within "catastrophic[] damag[e]" by stating that the
15
"suitable arresting material characteristics are selected to enable aircraft travel to be arrested
within a desired distance, without causing passenger injury or aircraft damage such as landing
gear failure." This provides two examples of the damage the invention seeks to avoid: landing
gear failure and any damage to the aircraft that would cause injury to passengers. See Enzo
Biochem, Inc.
v.
Applera Corp., 599 F.3d 1325, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ("Because the intrinsic
evidence here provides 'a general guideline and examples sufficient to enable a person of
ordinary skill in the art to determine [the scope of the claims],' the claims are not
indefinite....") (quoting In re Marosi, 710 F.2d 799, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
Although, as Runway Safe points out, there are many variables affecting arrestment,
such as the type, size, and speed of the aircraft in question, the court concludes that a person
skilled in the art of aircraft arrestment would understand what would be "sufficient to arrest
travel of a vehicle without catastrophically damaging the vehicle" in light of the potentialities.
The court does not find the term difficult to understand, and concludes that a person of ordinary
skill in the art would be able to comprehend the term in the context of aircraft arrestment.
Finally, the specification does not support a construction of this term in a way other than the
plain and ordinary meaning of the words as they would be understood by a person of ordinary
skill in the art.
The court concludes that the term is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning with
no further construction required.
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IV.
Conclusion
It is common and accepted practice in arguing claim construction for the parties to
engage the court in the minutiae of scientific words and phrases to convince the court that
persons of skill in the art speak a totally different language than the person on the street, or in a
litigation context, the typical juror. Although this is sometimes true, it is not always true. The
construing court should not fall prey to the temptation to believe that every word or concept of
a term compels viewing the term through an extremely narrow prism utilized only by the
person of skill in the art. In this case, "having a breaking strength to readily break without
subverting the arrestment characteristics of the compressible material" and "sufficient to arrest
travel of a vehicle without catastrophically damaging the vehicle" are two such examples.
When evidence is presented and this case is argued, the jury will have no trouble grasping what
these terms commonly mean. Nor would one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the
invention.
The following table summarizes the court's adopted determinations and constructions of
the disputed terms.
Court's Adopted Construction
TernilPhrase
1.
"vehicle arresting unit"
Not a limiting term.
2. "ceramic foam"
Plain and ordinary meaning, encompassing
glass foam.
3. "having a breaking strength to readily
Plain and ordinary meaning, no further
construction necessary.
break without subverting the arrestment
characteristics of the compressible material"
of a vehicle
without catastrophically damaging the
vehicle"
Plain and ordinary meaning, no
construction necessary.
4. "sufficient to arrest travel
17
further
For the above reasons, the court construes the disputed claims as noted and so
ORDERS. No further claim terms require construction.
SIGNED
thi(
day of September, 2016.
ITED STA ES DISTRICT JUDGE
FI
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