Greathouse v. State Prosecutors Office of Travis County et al

Filing 14

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS for 7 Report and Recommendations.. Signed by Judge Sam Sparks. (dm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AUSTIN DIVISION

20150EC-8

AM 9:23

WALTER GREATHOUSE (Travis Co. #1509616),

Plaintiff,
Case No. A-15-CA-626-SS

-vs-

STATE PROSECUTORS OFFICE OF TRAVIS
COUNTY, STATE OF TEXAS, TRAVIS
COUNTY, and TRAVIS COUNTY CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATORS,
Defendants.

ORDER
BE IT REMEMBERED on this day the Court reviewed the file in the above-styled cause, and
specifically Plaintiff Walter Greathouse's 42 U.S.C.

1983 complaint [#1] and the Report and

§

Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge [#7]. No objections were filed. Having

reviewed the documents, the governing law, and the file as a whole, the Court now enters the
following opinion and orders.
All matters in this case were referred to United States Magistrate Judge Andrew W. Austin

for report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§

636(b) and Rule

1

of Appendix C of the

Local Court Rules of the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Local Rules

for the Assignment of Duties to United States Magistrate Judges. Plaintiff is entitled to de novo

review of the portions of the Magistrate Judge's report to which he filed specific objections. 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). All other review is for plain error.

Starns

v.

Andrews,

524 F.3d 612, 617 (5th

Cir. 2008). Nevertheless, this Court has reviewed the entire file de novo, and agrees with the

Magistrate Judge's recommendation.

Background
At the time he filed his

§

1983 complaint, Plaintiff was incarcerated in the Travis County

Correctional Complex in Del Valle, Texas. As of October 5, 2015, Plaintiff was confined in the

Texas Correctional Institutions DivisionHolliday Transfer Facility in Huntsville, Texas.

See

Notice [#1 1]. Plaintiff brings suit against the State of Texas, Travis County, the "State Prosecutors
Office of Travis County," and "Travis County Criminal Investigators," alleging violations ofhis due
process rights and an unspecified form of discrimination.

Plaintiff's arrest began with a domestic incident: according to Plaintiff, he was taken into
custody following a "spirited dispute with his wife." Plaintiff claims that during the incident, the

police "conducted an unreasonable search and seizure of the premises" during which they discovered
an "old dysfunctional firearm." According to Plaintiff, the police collected the firearm as evidence

"with the malicious and sadistic intent of incriminating" him.

Plaintiff states he and his wife thereafter mended fences and his wife submitted a nonprosecution affidavit to the prosecuting attorney's office, which was rejected. Plaintiff claims the
prosecution launched "a concerted program of malicious prosecution, threat and intimidation, and
persecution" against him. Plaintiff further alleges the prosecutor(s) are "deliberately restricting" his
communication with his wife, "thwarting reconciliation efforts," and "interfering" with the couple's
mail and telephone conversations. Plaintiff alleges these actions violate his due process rights and

"federal civil rights in regards to the federal prohibition on discriminatory practices of law
enforcement."
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Additionally, Plaintiff attaches a lengthy and largely incomprehensible memorandum to his
§ 1983

complaint which appears to argue the Texas Speedy Trial Act should be invalidated on

separation of powers grounds, violates his civil rights, and is preempted by federal law. Plaintiff
does not explain how these additional claims arise from any operative events.

Analysis
As Plaintiff is proceeding informa pauperis, his complaint maybe dismissed at any time if

it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary

relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(i)(ii); Green
v.

McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1119 (5th Cir. 1986). Pro se complaints are liberally construed.

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). However,pro se status does not afford the complainant "an
impenetrable shield, for one acting pro se has no license to harass others, clog the judicial machinery

with meritless litigation and abuse already overloaded court dockets." Farguson v. MBankHous.,

NA., 808 F.2d 358, 359 (5th Cir. 1986).
The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that dismissal of this suit is appropriate. First,

Plaintiffs claims against the State of Texas are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g.,
Aguilar v. Tex. Dep 't of Criminal Justice, 160 F.3d 1052, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998) ("The Eleventh
Amendment bars claims against a state brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§

1983."). Second, as the

Magistrate Judge explained, to the extent Plaintiff sues individual state prosecutors of the "State
Prosecutors Office of Travis County," those prosecutors are protected by absolute prosecutorial
immunity, as Plaintiffs allegations concern actions the prosecutors allegedly took in the course and
scope of representing the State in Plaintiffs criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman,

-3-

424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976) ("[I]n initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's case, the

prosecutor is immune from a civil suit for damages under

§

1983.")

Third, to the extent Plaintiff seeks recovery of damages for alleged constitutional violations

related to his conviction and imprisonment or for other harm caused by unlawful actions allegedly

rendering his conviction or sentence invalid, his claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.
477 (1994). To recover on such claims, "a

§

1983 plaintiff must prove that [his] conviction or

sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state
tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance

of a writ of habeas corpus." Id, at 486-87. Plaintiff's claims the investigators assigned to his case
wrongfully incriminated him fall within the ambit of Heck, as if proved, they would call Plaintiff's

conviction into question, and Plaintiff has made no showing his conviction or sentence has been
reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question.
Finally, to the extent Plaintiff "seeks either immediate release from.. . confinement or the

shortening of its duration," a habeas petition, not a

§

1983 action, is the appropriate vehicle for his

challenge. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490 (1973) ("[H]abeas corpus is the appropriate

remedy for state prisoners attacking the validity of the fact or length of their confinement, and that
specific determination must override the general terms of

§

1983."). A habeas petitioner must

further exhaust his state remedies, and the question whether Plaintiff has done so is not clear from
the record.

Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that dismissal of

Plaintiff's claims is appropriate.

El

Accordingly:
IT IS ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation of the United States

Magistrate Judge [#7] is ACCEPTED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Walter Greathouse's claims against the

State of Texas are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, as the State of Texas is immune

from suit under the Eleventh Amendment;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's claims against the prosecutors of Travis

County in their individual capacities, to the extent raised, are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs remaining claims are DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE to his right to re-file once the conditions of Heck are met; and
IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that Plaintiffs habeas claims, to the extent raised, are

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
SIGNED this the

"7day of December 2015.

SAM SPARKS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

626 nokba.fim

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