Adams v. Colvin

Filing 18

ORDER ADOPTING Magistrate's 17 Report and Recommendations. ORDER REVERSING and REMANDING to the Commission of the Social Security for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. Signed by Judge Sam Sparks. (klw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AUSTIN DIVISION

''

/

LINDA A. ADAMS,
Plaintiff,
CAUSE NO.:

-vs-

A-i 5-CA-00893-SS

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ACTING
COMMSSIONER OF THE SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant.

BE IT REMEMBERED on this day the Court reviewed the file in the above-styled cause,

and specifically Plaintiff Linda Adams' Brief on Review of the Denial of Benefits by the

Commissioner of Social Security [#141, Defendant Carolyn Colvin, Acting Commissioner of the
Social Security Administration's Brief in Support of Commissioner's Decision [#15], Adams'

Reply Brief [#16], the Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Andrew

Austin [#17], and the Social Security Transcript (Tr.) [#12]. Having considered the documents,
the file as a whole, and the governing law, the Court now enters the following opinion and
orders, ACCEPTING the Report and Recommendation and REVERSING the decision of the

Commissioner.
All matters in this case were referred to United States Magistrate Judge Andrew Austin
for report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§

636(b) and Rule 1(f) of Appendix C of

the Local Court Rules of the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Local
Rules for the Assignment of Duties to United States Magistrate Judges. Adams is entitled to de
novo review of the portions of the Magistrate Judge's report to which she filed specific

objections. 28 U.S.C.

§

636(b)(l). All other review is for plain error. Douglass

v.

United Servs.

Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). Although Adams did not file any

objections, this Court has reviewed the entire file de novo, and agrees with the Magistrate

Judge's recommendation.

Background
This is an appeal from a denial of social security disability benefits. On February 24,
2013, Plaintiff Linda Adams filed her application for Supplemental Security Income (SSI)

benefits. Tr. 93-94. In her application, Adams claimed she has been disabled since February 1,
2007, due to eye problems, carpal tunnel syndrome, a head injury, high blood pressure, a

shoulder injury, depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Tr. 252. The

Commissioner denied Adams' initial application and request for reconsideration. Tr. 28. At
Adams' request, a hearing on the benefits denial was held before Administrative Law Judge

(AU) Mark Swayze on April 8, 2014. Tr. 28. Adams and her attorney, John Heard, attended the
administrative hearing. Tr. 28. On May 2, 2014, the AU issued a decision finding Adams was
not disabled under the Social Security Act. Tr. 37. The Appeals Council denied Adams' request
for review on September 4, 2014. Tr. 9-14. Adams has exhausted her administrative remedies

and now seeks judicial review of the AU's decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§

405(g).

Analysis
I.

Legal Standard
Judicial review of the

whether the

AU's decision

is limited. Specifically, this Court reviews: (1)

AU's decision was supported by substantial evidence, and

AU made any errors

of law in evaluating the evidence. Austin

(5th Cir. 1993).

2

v.

(2)

if so, whether the

Shalala, 994 F.2d 1170, 1174

Procedurally, the administrative process need not have been perfect, and this Court "will
not vacate a judgment unless the substantial rights of a party have been affected." Mays

v.

Bowen, 837 F.2d 1362, 1364 (5th Cir. 1988). Procedural errors are therefore a basis for remand

only if they "would cast into doubt the existence of substantial evidence to support the

decision." Morris

v.

AU's

Bowen, 864 F.2d 333, 334 (5th Cir. 1988).

"Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to
support the decision." Id. In making these determinations, the Court must "carefully scrutinize
the record" to determine if there is substantial evidence to support the

AU's conclusions, but the

Court can neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute its judgment for that of the AU. Hollis

v.

Bowen, 837 F.2d 1378, 1383 (5th Cir. 1988). If the Court finds substantial evidence to support

the

AU's decision, the Court must uphold the decision.

See Selders

v.

Sullivan, 914 F.2d 614,

617 (5th Cir. 1990). The Court considers four elements of proof when determining whether there
is substantial evidence

of a disability: (1) objective medical facts, (2) diagnoses and opinions of

treating and examining physicians, (3) the claimant's subjective evidence of pain and disability,
and (4) the claimant's age, education, and work history. Martinez

v.

Chater, 64 F.3d 172, 173

(5th Cir. 1995).
The Social Security Act defines "disability" as an "inability to engage in any substantial

gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment

.

which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months."
42 U.S.C.

§

423(d)(1)(A). To determine if a claimant is able to engage in "substantial gainful

activity" (and therefore is not disabled), the Commissioner follows a five-step process:
1.

The hearing officer must first ascertain whether the claimant is engaged in
substantial gainful activity. A claimant who is working is not disabled
regardless of the medical findings.

3

2.

The hearing officer must then determine whether the claimed impairment
is "severe." A "severe impairment" must significantly limit the claimant's
physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. This determination
must be made solely on the basis of the medical evidence.

3.

The hearing officer must then determine if the impairment equals or
exceeds in severity certain impairments described in Appendix 1 of the
regulations. This determination is made using only medical evidence.

4.

If the claimant has a "severe impairment" covered by the regulations, the
hearing officer must determine whether the claimant can perform his past
work despite any limitations.

5.

If the claimant does not have the residual functional capacity (RFC) to
perform past work, the hearing officer must decide whether the claimant
can perform any other gainful and substantial work in the economy. This
determination is made on the basis of the claimant's age, education, work
experience, and residual functional capacity.

See Bowlingv. Shalala, 36 F.3d 431, 435 (5th Cir. 1994); 20 C.F.R.

§

404.1520.

A finding of disability or no disability at any step is conclusive and terminates the
analysis. Greenspan

v.

Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir. 1994). The claimant has the burden of

proof for the first four steps. Selders, 914 F.2d at 618. At step five, the burden initially shifts to
the Commissioner to identify other work the applicant is capable of performing. Id. If the

Commissioner "fulfills his burden of pointing out potential alternative employment, the burden
then shifts back to the claimant to prove that he is unable to perform the alternate work." Id.
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

II.

The

AU's Opinion

As described by the Magistrate Judge, the AU

employed the five-step sequential

evaluation process to determine whether Adams was disabled. See 20 C.F.R.

§

404.1520(a); Tr.

19-28. The AU found as follows. First, Adams had not been engaged in substantial gainful
activity since February 24, 2012. Tr. 30. Second, Adams suffers from severe impairments of
cervical degenerative disc disease, left humerus fracture status-post open reduction and internal
El

fixation (ORIF), hypertension, depression, anxiety, and a history of a substance abuse disorder.
Tr. 30. Third, none

of Adams' impairments, either alone or in combination, meet or medically

equal any of the impairments listed in Appendix

1

of the regulations; thus, Adams' impairments

are not presumptively disabling. Tr. 30-32.

Before reaching the fourth step, the AU determined Adams retains the RFC to perform
light work as defined in 20 C.F.R.

§

4 16.967(b). Tr. 32-33. Specifically, the AU determined

Adams' RFC has the ability to perform and sustain light work:
except frequent balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, crawling, and climbing
of ramps/stairs; no climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; frequent handling and
reaching in all directions on the left side; must avoid concentrated exposure to
extreme temperatures, noise, irritants (such as fumes, odors, dust, gases, and
poorly ventilated areas), and hazards (including dangerous machinery and
unprotected heights); and can understand and carry out, and remember detailed,
but not complex instructions, make decisions, attend and concentrate for extended
periods, interact adequately with coworkers and supervisors, and respond
appropriately to routine changes in the work setting.
Tr. 32-33.

Fourth, the AU determined Adams was capable of performing her past relevant work as
a sales clerk, housekeeper, and security guard. Tr. 37. Accordingly, the AU concluded Adams

was not disabled under the Social Security Act.

III.

Application
Adams argues the

AU's conclusion

she is not disabled is erroneous because the AU

(1) failed to properly account for the established limitations on Adams' ability to utilize her left

arm and shoulder, (2) failed to consider the functional limitations resulting from Adams' severe
mental impairments, and (3) improperly concluded Adams' past work as a sales clerk,

housekeeper, and security guard constituted relevant work. Because the Court agrees with

Adams' last contention, it REVERSES the AU's decision and REMANDS to the Commissioner
to determine whether Adams' past work qualifies as relevant work.
A.

Left Arm and Shoulder Injury
Adams argues the AU erred by failing to properly account for the functional limitations

on Adams' ability to use her left arm and shoulder. The AU concluded Adams had the RFC for

"frequently handling and reaching in all directions on the left side." Tr. 32. According to Adams,
this finding contradicts the medical opinions of the examining physician and the state agency
medical examiner, who concluded Adams should be limited to only occasional reaching and

handling with the left hand, arm, and shoulder.
Under step four of the evaluation analysis, the AU must determine the claimant's RFC.
RFC is the most a claimant can still do despite her limitations. 20 C.F.R.

§

404.1545(a)(l). This

assessment is based on reports from treating physicians and medical consultants about the

claimant's ability to sit, stand, walk, lift, carry, and perform other work-related activities. Id.
§

404.1513(b)(6), 414.1513(c)(1). The AU must consider the limiting effects of a claimant's

impairments, even those that are nonsevere, and any related symptoms. See 20 C.F.R.
404.1529, 404.1545. The relative weight given to the evidence, however, is within the
discretion. See Chambliss

v.

§

AU's

Massanari, 269 F.3d 520, 523 n.l (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Johnson

v.

Bowen, 864 F.2d 340, 347 (5th Cir. 1988)). The AU is not required to incorporate limitations in

the RFC that he did not find to be supported in the record. See Morris

v.

Bowen, 864 F.2d 333,

336 (5th Cir. 1988). In reviewing these findings, the Court must defer to the

AU's conclusions,

because "[t]he evaluation of a claimant's subjective symptoms is a task particularly within the
province of the AU who has had an opportunity to observe whether the person seems to be

disabled." Elzy

v.

Railroad Retirement Bd., 782 F.2d 1223, 1225 (5th Cir. 1986).

Adams fractured her left shoulder on May 10, 2011, after she fell off a wheeled-ottoman
at her house. Tr. 335. Adams further injured her shoulder on May 17, 2011 when she fell again.
Tr. 343. On May 21, 2011, Adams underwent surgery on her left shoulder to repair the fracture.
Tr. 374. Following the surgery, Adams was ordered to keep her arm in a sling and attend

physical therapy. Tr. 378. Adams attended physical therapy one time, on June 1, 2011.

According to Julie Johnson, the physical therapist, Adams had "minimal to no complaints of left
shoulder pain" and no complaints of left upper extremity numbness or tingling. Tr. 384.

Nevertheless, Ms. Johnson concluded Adams "would benefit from physical therapy services to
restore left shoulder A/PROM, joint mobility, increased left shoulder strength, static and

dynamic stabilization, normalize scapulohumeral rhythm, and decreased pain." Tr. 385. Ms.

Johnson further recommended Adams attend two months of physical therapy and perform home
exercises to increase her strength and range of motion (ROM). Tr. 385. Despite this advice,
Adams did not return to physical therapy. Tr. 387.
One year later, on June 21, 2012, Dr. Phu Thai Vo examined Adams. Adams told Vo she
did not have any function in her left arm and shoulder. Tr. 421. Based largely on Adams'

subjective complaints, Dr. Vo diagnosed Adams with chronic cervical pain, "residual

weakness/atrophy LA, restricted ROM left shoulder with poor functional status LA, [and]
chronic paresthesia LA/left hand." Tr. 423. On July 2, 2012, Dr. Michael Douglas, the state
agency medical consultant, concluded Adams should be limited to only occasional reaching and
handling with the left hand, arm, and shoulder. Tr. 431.
In concluding Adams had the RFC for "frequent handling and reaching in all directions

on the left side," the AU considered the opinions of Drs. Vo and Douglas, but nevertheless

concluded the overwhelming evidence in the record indicated the impairments to her left

7

shoulder and arm did not preclude her from working. Tr. 34, 36. The AU pointed to medical
records from Dr. Jared Vorachard, who saw Adams on September 26, 2012, several months after
Dr. Vo's diagnosis. Tr. 34. Dr. Vorachard noted a "[flu11 range

of motion all joints." Tr. 596.

Moreover, during a primary care visit on July 18, 2013, Chellyanne Hinds, a physician assistant,
stated Adams had a "[n]ormal range of motion, muscle strength, and stability in all extremities

with no pain on inspection." Tr. 645.
The AU also took notice of Adams' failure to follow her physician's recommendation

and attend physical therapy beyond her initial assessment, as well as her failure to take pain

medication. Tr. 34. Adams' failure to follow the treatment regime prescribed by her physician

reflects poorly on her credibility in determining the seriousness of her impairments. See Johnson
v.

Sullivan, 894 F.2d 683, 685 n.4 (5th Cir. 1990) ("Even if [the claimant] were found to be

disabled.

.

.

,he would still not be entitled to recover benefits inasmuch as he failed to follow the

treatment regime prescribed by his physicians); Epps

v.

Harris, 624 F.2d 1267 (5th Cir. 1980)

(concluding conditions "controlled or controllable by treatment" were not disabling).
Moreover, as the AU recognized, Adams' own testimony belies her claim that she
suffers from an impairment which precludes her from working. Tr. 36. At the hearing, Adams

testified she was able to drive, prepare meals, clean the house, shop, exercise daily, and be the
primary caregiver for her grandchildren during the day. Tr. 63, 264-65. Based on the

inconsistencies between Adams' testimony about her limitations and her daily activities, the AU
suggested Adams' statements concerning the impact of impairments on her ability to work were
not entirely credible. Tr. 36; see also Reyes

v.

Sullivan, 915 F.2d 151, 155 (5th Cir. 1990)

("[T]he inconsistencies between [the claimant's] testimony about his limitations and his daily
activities were quite relevant in evaluating his credibility.")

8

In light of the foregoing, the Court finds the

AU's determination that Adams had the

RFC to frequently handle and reach in all directions on the left side is supported by substantial

evidence and was not the result of legal error.
B.

Mental Impairments
Adams argues the AU erred by failing to account for functional limitations resulting

from Adams' mental impairments. The AU concluded under step two Adams had severe mental

impairments, including depression, anxiety, and a history of substance use disorder, but
nevertheless found Adams had the RFC to "understand, carry out, and remember detailed, but
not complex, instructions, make decisions, attend and concentrate for extended periods, interact
adequately with coworkers and supervisors, and respond appropriately to routine changes in the

work setting." Tr. 32-33.
Adams first argues that because the AU

concluded Adams had severe mental

impairments, the AU must necessarily conclude Adams' RFC is limited in some way by these
impairments. This argument is inapposite. A finding that certain conditions represent severe
impairments does not necessitate a finding of disability. Indeed, the severe impairment analysis

and the RFC determination are not coextensiverather, the RFC assessment asks what is the
most an individual can do, despite her limitations. See 20 C.F.R.

§

404.1545. Even a claimant

with acknowledged severe impairments must show functional limitations that prevent her from
engaging in substantial gainful activity before a finding of disability is proper. See Hames

v.

Heckler, 707 F.2d 162, 165 (5th Cir. 1983) ("The mere presence of some impairment is not

disabling per se. Plaintiff must show that she was so functionally impaired by her back trouble
that she was precluded from engaging in any substantial gainful activity."); Boothe

v.

Colvin, No.

3:12-CV-5127-D, 2013 WL 3809689, at *6 (N.D. Tex. July 23, 2013) (concluding "[t]here is no

inherent contradiction in finding that [the claimant's condition] is severe at step two and also
finding that he has no exertional limitations on working")

In support of her claim, Adams relies on a report from Dr. Amy Blackmon, the

psychologist who examined Adams on June 13, 2012, and diagnosed her with depression,
anxiety, alcohol dependence, and moderate chronic stressors (including mild social isolation,
lack of employment, financial distress, longstanding alcohol dependence, and reported history of

trauma). See Pl.'s Brief [#14] at 10; Tr. 398-402. Dr. Blackmon concluded Adams had a global

assessment of functioning (GAF) of 40-45, indicating serious impairments in social or
occupational functioning. Tr. 401. However, Dr. Blackmon also noted Adams maintained "good
eye contact"; she was "able to respond in a coherent and appropriate fashion"; her "[t]hought

processes appeared rational and goal-directed"; she was "fully oriented to person, place, date,
and situation"; her estimated level of intellectual functioning is average or below; and her

"concentration appeared fair." Tr. 400-01. Moreover, Dr. Blackmon noted there was no evidence

of delusions, obsessions, suicidal ideation, homicidal ideation, hallucinations, or other unusual
perceptual or sensory experiences. Tr. 400.
In considering Dr. Blackmon's report, the AU gave Adams' low GAF limited weight "as
it is not consistent with the overall exam findings and record as a whole." Tr. 35. This conclusion

was not erroneous, because additional medical reports suggest Adams' mental impairments were
not disabling. See Zimmerman

v.

Astrue, 288 F. App'x 931, 936-37 (5th Cir. 2008) (concluding

the AU did not err by failing to give a claimant's low GAF controlling weight, because the score
was inconsistent with the testimony of a non-examining medical expert). Prior to Dr.

Blackmon's assessment, on September 28, 2010, Adams was seen by Christopher Stewart, a
primary physician care, who concluded Adams was "in no apparent distress, alert, oriented, and

10

pleasant." Tr. 311. During that visit, Adams told Dr. Stewart she had not used alcohol in

"months." Tr. 311. Several months later, Adams went back to see Dr. Stewart and informed him
she was drinking to help deal with the stress she feels as a "voluntary grandmother" caregiver for
all of her grandchildren. Tr. 312. Dr. Stewart noted Adams was "[d]oing okay on increased dose

of citalopram"medication prescribed for her depressionbut recommended Adams attend
counseling to deal with the alcohol abuse caused by situational stress. Tr. 313.
On July 19,

2012subsequent to

Dr. Blackmon's

assessmentAdams received

emergency psychiatric services. Tr. 440. Adams told Dr. Ghulam Khan, the examining
psychiatrist, that she had been homeless for one week and had not been taking her medication for
three months. Dr. Khan observed Adams had alcohol dependency but was two months sober and
was attending an outpatient rehabilitation center. Tr. 440. Dr. Khan released Adams and

recommended she take her medication and attend counseling. Tr. 442.
Soon after, on August 2, 2012, Adams visited Ms. Hinds, the physician assistant, who
noted Adams had been taking her medications, was "oriented in time, place, person and

situation," and demonstrated "appropriate mood and affect." Tr. 608. Ms. Hinds recommended

Adams continue taking her medication and attending counseling sessions. Tr. 608. Taken
together, the reports from Dr. Stewart, Dr. Khan, and Ms. Hinds reveal Adams' depression and
anxiety significantly improved with treatment and therefore support the

was not disabled.

See Johnson,

AU's conclusion Adams

864 F.2d at 346 (concluding substantial evidence supported the

AU's finding the claimant was not disabled where the claimant's depression improved with
treatment).
The AU also considered Adams' own report about her daily activities, in which Adams
states she is able to drive, prepare meals, clean the house, shop, exercise daily, and be the

11

primary caregiver for her grandchildren during the day. Tr. 63, 264-65. Adams also reported she
maintains some level of social functioning, as she spends time with others eating, talking, and
laughing. Tr. 267. Based on the inconsistencies between Adams' testimony about her limitations
and her daily activities, the AU

suggested Adams' statements concerning the impact of

impairments on her ability to work were not entirely credible. Tr. 36; see also Reyes v. Sullivan,
915 F.2d at 155.

The Court finds the

AU's conclusion that Adams' severe mental impairments were not

disabling is supported by substantial evidence and was not the result of legal error.
C.

Past Relevant Work
Adams contends the AU erred in determining she was not disabled because she was

capable of performing her past relevant work as a sales clerk, housekeeper, and security guard.
The Court agrees.

According to Adams, her past jobs as a sales clerk, housekeeper, and security cannot be
considered past relevant work, because she did not earn enough in a year to be engaged in

"substantial gainful activity." Past relevant work is defined as work that (1) was performed
within the last fifteen years, (2) lasted long enough for the claimant to learn to do it, and (3) was
substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R.

§

416.960(b)(1), 416.965(a); see also Copelandv. Co/yin,

771 F.3d 920, 924 (5th Cir. 2014). Substantial gainful activity is defined as:

work activity that is both substantial and gainful.
(a) Substantial work activity. Substantial work activity is work activity that
involves doing significant physical or mental activities. Your work may be
substantial even if it is done on a part-time basis or if you do less, get paid

less, or have less responsibility than when you worked before.
(b) Gainful work activity. Gainful work activity is work activity that you do for
pay or profit. Work activity is gainful if it is the kind of work usually done for
pay or profit, whether or not a profit is realized.
12

20 C.F.R.

§sS

404.1572, 404.1510.

The regulations direct the Commissioner to "consider all of the medical and vocational

evidence in [the claimant's] file to decide whether or not [the claimant has] the ability to engage
in substantial gainful activity." 20 C.F.R.

§sS

404.1571, 416.971. "Generally, if [the claimant]

worked for substantial earnings, [the Commissioner] will find that [the claimant is] able to do
substantial gainful activity. However, the fact that [the claimant's] earnings were not substantial
will not necessarily show that [the claimant is] not able to do substantial gainful activity." 20

C.F.R.

§

404.1 574(a)(1), 41 6.974(a)(1).

Accordingly, if a claimant's monthly earnings exceed the amounts set forth in Section
404.1574(b)(2) and Section 416.974(b)(2), the claimant has engaged in substantial gainful
activity. 20 C.F.R.

§

404.1574(b)(2), 416.974(b)(2). If a claimant's monthly earnings fall below

these amounts, the claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity and the Commissioner
"will generally not consider other information in addition to
§

[]

earnings." 20 C.F.R.

404.1574(b)(3), 416.974(b)(3). The Commissioner will, however, consider information

beyond earnings "if there is evidence indicating that [the claimant] may be engaging in
substantial gainful activity or that [the claimant is] in a position to control when earnings are paid
to [the claimant] or the amount of wages paid to [the claimant]." Id.

Based on these regulations, the Fifth Circuit has concluded "a rebuttable presumption
against substantial gainful activity arises where a disabled claimant's earnings are below the

threshold" for substantial gainful activity set forth in Section 404.1574(b)(2) and Section
416.974(b)(2). Copeland, 771 F.3d at 925.

According to Adams, her average monthly earnings did not meet the substantial gainful
activity threshold, and as such, the AU erred in finding her past work constituted relevant work.
13

During the relevant time period, the threshold average monthly earnings set by the regulations
and Adams' average monthly earnings are as follows:

Threshold Average Monthly

Adams' Average Monthly

Earnings1

Earnings2

1999

$700

$44.98

2000

$700

$251.35

2001

$740

$453.85

2002

$780

2003

$800

2004

$810

2005

$830

$500.22

2006

$860

$75.86

Year

Based on the information alleged in Adams' brief, her average monthly earnings fell far

below the substantial gainful activity threshold. Yet, in his opinion, the AU did not make a
finding as to whether Adams' past earnings reached the threshold, nor did he
Copeland

applyas

requiresthe rebuttable presumption against substantial gainful activity where

Adams' earnings fell below the threshold. As a result, the AU erred at step four in concluding

Adams' past relevant work included her work as a sales clerk, housekeeper, and security guard.

Conclusion
The fourth sentence of 42 U.S.C.

§

405(g) provides that "[t]he [district] court shall have

power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying,
or reversing the decision of the commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the
These amounts are derived from the charts set forth in Section 404.1574(b)(2), Section 416.974(b)(2), and
at Substantial Gainful Activity, SOCIAL SECURITY, https://www. ssa. ov/OACT/COLA/sga.htmI.

2SeePI.'sBrief[#14] at 12-13.
14

cause for a rehearing." 42 U.S.C.

§

405(g). This provision gives the district court authority to

remand a case if it determines the commissioner incorrectly applied the law or made improper

findings of fact. Murkeldove

v.

Astrue, 635 F.3d 784, 793 (5th Cir.201 1) (citing Jackson

v.

Chater, 99 F.3d 1086, 1092 (11th Cir. 1996) for the proposition that a sentence four remand is
appropriate where the district court finds the commissioner (or the ALJ)'s decision is

unsupported by substantial evidence or the result of legal error). Because the court concludes the
AU erred in finding Adams' past work constitutes relevant work without considering whether

Adams' earnings reached the substantial gainful activity threshold, remand for further
proceedings is necessary in this case. On remand, if the AU determines Adams does not have
any past relevant work, he must determine under step five whether Adams is able to do other

work considering her age, education, work experience, and RFC.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation of the United States

Magistrate Judge [#17] is ACCEPTED; and
IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that the decision of the Social Security

Commissioner is REVERSED, and this case is REMANDED to the Commissioner of the
Social Security for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

SIGNED this the

/d day of August 2016.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

15