Valentine v. Jagodzinski et al

Filing 10

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS that the District Court DISMISS Valentine's 1 Complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, as well as the claims inhis Addendum for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. ORDER GRANTING Va lentine's 2 Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis. ORDER that Judge Austin will retain jurisidiction over Defendants' 3 MOTION for Sanctions and set it for Hearing on 8/18/2016 10:30 AM before Judge Andrew W. Austin. Parties Jagodzinski, Greene, and Valentine must appear for the hearing, but not the Honorable Eric Shepperd. Signed by Judge Andrew W. Austin. (klw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DIVISION OF TEXAS
AUSTIN DIVISION
RON VALENTINE,
Plaintiff
V.
JEREMY JAGODZINSKI,
CHRISTI GREENE, and
HON. ERIC SHEPPERD,
Defendants

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A-16-CV-442-LY

ORDER ON IN FORMA PAUPERIS STATUS AND
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON THE MERITS OF THE CLAIMS
TO:

THE HONORABLE LEE YEAKEL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the Court is Plaintiff Ron Valentine’s (“Valentine”) Application to Proceed In Forma

Pauperis (Dkt. No. 2). The District Court referred the above motion to the undersigned Magistrate
Judge for a determination pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 1(c) of Appendix C of the Local
Rules of the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Local Rules for the
Assignment of Duties to United States Magistrate Judges.
I. APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
After reviewing the financial information in Valentine’s in forma pauperis motion, the Court
finds that he is indigent. Accordingly, the Court HEREBY GRANTS Valentine in forma pauperis
status and ORDERS his Complaint be filed without pre-payment of fees or costs or giving security
therefor pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). This indigent status is granted subject to a later
determination the action should be dismissed if the allegation of poverty is untrue or the action is
found frivolous or malicious pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Valentine is further advised that
although he has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court may, in its discretion,

impose costs of court at the conclusion of this lawsuit, as in other cases. Moore v. McDonald, 30
F.3d 616, 621 (5th Cir. 1994).
As stated below, the undersigned has conducted a § 1915(e) review of the claims made in
Valentine’s Complaint and Valentine’s Addendum and is recommending that the claims be
dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Therefore, service upon Defendants should be withheld
pending the District Court’s review of the recommendations made in this report. If the District Court
declines to adopt the recommendations, then service should be issued at that time upon Defendants.
II. SECTION 1915(e)(2) FRIVOLOUSNESS REVIEW
Because Valentine has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court is required
by standing order to review his Complaint and its Addendum under § 1915(e)(2), which provides
in relevant part that “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the
action or appeal (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted;
or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2). “A complaint filed IFP may be dismissed as frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law
or fact,” Allison v. Kyle, 66 F.3d 71, 73 (5th Cir. 1995), and the claims “are of little or no weight,
value, or importance, not worthy of serious consideration or trivial.” Deutsch v. United States, 67
F.3d 1080, 1083 (3d Cir. 1995)
Pro se complaints are liberally construed in the plaintiff’s favor. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520-521 (1972). The court must “accept as true factual allegations in the complaint and all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom.” Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996);
see also Watts v. Graves, 720 F.2d 1416, 1419 (5th Cir. 1983). In deciding whether a complaint
states a claim, “[t]he court’s task is to determine whether the plaintiff has stated a legally cognizable
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claim that is plausible, not to evaluate the plaintiff’s likelihood of success.” Lone Star Fund V (U.S.),
L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010). “A claim has facial plausibility when
the [nonmovant] pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the [movant] is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “The
plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. However, the petitioner’s pro se status does
not offer him “an impenetrable shield, for one acting pro se has no license to harass others, clog the
judicial machinery with meritless litigation, and abuse already overloaded court dockets.” Farguson
v. Mbank Houston N.A., 808 F.2d 358, 359 (5th Cir. 1986).
A.

Factual Allegations and Claims
Valentine brings this cause of action against Defendants Jared Jagodzinski (“Jagodzinski”),

Christi Greene (“Greene”), and the Honorable Eric Shepperd (“Shepperd”). Dkt. No. 1. Valentine
alleges that the Texas Third Court of Appeals improperly affirmed the trial court’s denial of his
motion to proceed in forma pauperis, thereby depriving him of his rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 1. Valentine further alleges,
in an Addendum to his Complaint, that the permanent injunction entered against him by the Travis
County Court as the result of his defeat in a nuisance lawsuit against Jagodzinski and Greene
impermissibly deprived him of his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Dkt. No. 6.
Valentine requests the Court reject the Third Court of Appeals’s affirmation of the trial court’s
indigency determination, and further requests that the Court enjoin officials from enforcing the
injunctions entered against him in county court.
Valentine’s claims have their genesis in a nuisance suit between him and his neighbors,
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Jagodzinski and Greene, in early 2013. Dkt. No. 1 at 1. This suit resulted in monetary damages,
including punitive damages, against Valentine as well as a series of permanent injunctions. Dkt. No.
3 at 5. The injunction prohibited Valentine from, inter alia, recording visual images that included
Jagodzinski’s and Greene’s property; playing music through outdoor speakers; and playing a single
song more than one time in any four-hour period. Dkt. No. 3-3 at 3-4. Because Valentine has
allegedly failed to adhere to these prohibitions, he is currently the defendant in a contempt of court
action brought by Jagodzinski and Greene in county court. Dkt. No. 8 at 1.
Valentine sought review of the judgment from the Texas Third Court of Appeals and filed
an affidavit of indigency with the trial court seeking permission to proceed on appeal in forma
pauperis. Dkt. No. 1 at 1. This affidavit of indigency was contested by Jagodzinski and Greene, and
an indigency hearing was set to be heard by Shepperd. Id. at 1-2. Valentine, concerned by his past
dealings with Shepperd, moved to disqualify him from presiding over the hearing. Id. at 2.
Apparently, Shepperd acted on Valentine’s motion by referring the indigency hearing to another
county court judge; at the subsequent hearing, Valentine was denied leave to proceed in forma
pauperis. Id. at 2-3. The trial court’s determination on Valentine’s indigency was based primarily
on the judge’s belief that Valentine’s homesteaded property, in which he had more than $200,000
in equity, disqualified him from claiming indigency. Id. at 2-3; Dkt. No. 6 at 33. This determination
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Id. at 1.
Valentine argues that, because his motion to disqualify Judge Shepperd was not properly
disposed of prior to the indigency hearing, the indigency hearing itself was improper. Id. at 7.
Because the hearing was improper, its findings are void, and Valentine therefore should have been
permitted to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis. Id. Moreover, Valentine claims the trial court
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erred by improperly including his homesteaded property in its indigency determination on appeal
when it failed to do so at trial. Id. at 7-8. In so erring, Valentine claims the court created an improper
distinction between classes of litigants—i.e. a party proceeding as a plaintiff at trial and a party
proceeding on appeal—and, by holding him to a more stringent standard of indigence on appeal visà-vis the standard at trial, deprived him of his rights to equal protection. Id. at 8. This error also
prevented Valentine from freely accessing the courts, thereby violating his right to due process. Id.
Valentine’s other set of claims, appearing in his Addendum, is that the permanent injunction
entered against him is unconstitutional. Dkt. No. 6 at 1. Valentine first argues that the directives
prohibiting him from using his outdoor speakers or from repeating a song more than once every four
hours violate his First Amendment right to freely exercise his religion. Dkt. No. 6 at 1. Additionally,
he claims that the court’s prohibitions on photographing or videotaping Jagodzinski and Greene
violate his First Amendment right to freedom of expression. Id. at 19. Because of these deficiencies,
Valentine argues he should not be subject to the injunction, and should therefore not be liable to any
contempt of court proceeding. See id. at 21-22.
B.

Merits of Valentine’s Claims
Upon review of Valentine’s Complaint and Addendum, and for the reasons set forth below,

the undersigned recommends Valentine’s claims be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B).
1.

Errors in State Court In Forma Pauperis Proceedings

Valentine alleges that the trial court erred in his in forma pauperis hearing in two ways.
First, the trial court held an indigency hearing before disposing of Valentine’s motion to disqualify
Judge Shepperd. Dkt. No. 1 at 2-3. Valentine claims this error rendered the subsequent indigency
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hearing void, as well as the findings of the court regarding Valentine’s indigency. Id. at 3. Second,
Valentine alleges that the trial court incorrectly included the value of the equity in his homesteaded
property when determining that he did not qualify for indigent status. Id. at 7.
The Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over both of these claims. District courts have
been charged with having original jurisdiction over all civil actions arising under the Constitution
or federal law. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331. If a court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction over a cause of action, it must dismiss that cause of action. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(h)(3).
Therefore, even if subject-matter jurisdiction is not raised by the parties, a court must consider
questions of subject-matter jurisdiction sua sponte. See id.; Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d
912, 919 (5th Cir. 2001).
In this case, Valentine requests that a federal district court review and reject the indigency
determinations made by a state court. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, however, precludes such
actions. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); Dist. Of Columbia Ct. App. v.
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). This doctrine prevents state-court losers complaining of injuries
caused by state-court judgments from inviting a district court’s review and rejection of those
judgments. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). Valentine’s
Complaint asks the Court to act in a way it is expressly intended to eschew: as a court of appellate,
and not original, jurisdiction. See id. at 283-284. As the Court lacks jurisdiction over Valentine’s
Complaint, the claims made therein should be dismissed.
II.

Relief From Previous Injunctions Against Valentine

Valentine further alleges in his Addendum that the permanent injunction entered against him
by the Travis County Court violates his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Dkt. No.
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6 at 1. He therefore requests the Court enjoin enforcement of these injunctions. Id. at 22. Although
the scope of the requested injunction is unclear, it appears that Valentine would at least have the
Court prevent the continuation of the contempt of court proceedings brought against him in county
court by Jagodzinski and Greene. See id. at 21-22.
Valentine’s claims in his Addendum are collateral attacks on the judgment issued by the
Travis County Court. Such attacks are generally impermissible, as they “seriously [undercut] the
orderly process of the law.” Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 313 (1995). Collateral attacks
brought in federal court on the basis of a state-court ruling should be particularly avoided, as federal
intervention in state-court judgments are likely to threaten principles of federalism, comity, and state
sovereignty. See Duke v. State of Tex., 477 F.2d 244, 248 (5th Cir. 1973). This is especially true
when the party bringing the attacks has not attempted to present its federal claims in related statecourt proceedings. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 15 (1987). Because Valentine
proceeded directly to collateral attacks in federal court before bringing his constitutional claims in
a state-court proceeding, his presence before the Court is premature. See Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S.
327, 337.
Furthermore, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 mandates that “[a] court of the United States may not grant
an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by an Act of
Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.” 28
U.S.C. § 2283. Because the injunction Valentine seeks would stay the contempt of court
proceedings currently pending in Travis County Court, and because such an injunction would not
fall within the three statutory exceptions, the Court is unable to grant the relief sought. See, e.g.,
Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 630 (1977) (holding that the Anti-Injunction Act is
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an absolute prohibition against any injunction in state-court proceedings except where one of the
three exceptions apply, and that any doubts should be resolved in favor of allowing state courts to
continue). Thus, Valentine fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and his claims
should be dismissed as frivolous. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
III. ORDERS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In accordance with the foregoing discussion, the Court HEREBY GRANTS Valentine in
forma pauperis status (Dkt. No. 1). Service upon Defendants should be withheld pending the
District Court’s review of the recommendations made in this report. The undersigned FURTHER
RECOMMENDS that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the District Court DISMISS
Valentine’s claims in his Complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, as well as the claims in
his Addendum for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
The Court will retain jurisdiction over Defendants Jeremy Jagodzinski and Christi Greene’s
Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, Including Order Determining Plaintiff a
Vexatious Litigant and Entry of a Prefiling Order.

Dkt. No. 3.

The parties to that

motion–Jagodzinski, Greene, and Valentine, but not the Honorable Eric Shepperd–are HEREBY
ORDERED to appear at 10:30 a.m. on Thursday, August 18, 2016 in Courtroom No. 3, United
States Courthouse, 501 West 5th Street, Austin, Texas for a hearing on the motion.
IV. WARNINGS
The parties may file objections to this Report and Recommendation. A party filing
objections must specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which objections are
being made. The District Court need not consider frivolous, conclusive, or general objections. See
Battle v. United States Parole Comm’n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987).
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A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations
contained in this Report within fourteen (14) days after the party is served with a copy of the Report
shall bar that party from de novo review by the District Court of the proposed findings and
recommendations in the Report and, except upon grounds of plain error, shall bar the party from
appellate review of unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the
District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150-153 (1985);
Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-1429 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
SIGNED this 1 day of August, 2016.

_____________________________________
ANDREW W. AUSTIN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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