Holcomb v. Largent

Filing 10

OPINION. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 9/6/2016. (tf, n.m.) [Transferred from New Jersey on 9/6/2016.]

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

[Docket No. 7]

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE

MARGOT HOLCOMB,
Plaintiff,

Civil No. 16-4082 (RMB/AMD)
OPINION

v.
DOLORES DIANE LARGENT,
Defendant.

APPEARANCES:
Margot Holcomb
Pro Se Plaintiff
Robert J. McGuirl
Law Offices of Robert J. McGuirl, LLC
295 Spring Valley Road
Park Ridge, NJ 07656
Attorney for Defendant Dolores Diane Largent

BUMB, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
This matter comes before the Court upon its own Order to
Show Cause as to why this matter should not be transferred to
the United States District Court for the Western District of
Texas.

On July 7, 2016, pro se Plaintiff Margot Holcomb (the

“Plaintiff”) brought this action against Defendant Dolores Diane
Largent (the “Defendant”).

On August 11, 2016, the Court gave

the parties notice and issued an Order to Show Cause why this
action should not be transferred to the United States District

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Court for the Western District of Texas pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a) [Docket No. 7].

The Court has reviewed the parties’

submissions and, for the reasons set forth herein, the Court
will transfer this action.
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, a New Jersey resident, brought this action

against the Defendant, a Texas resident, alleging that the
Defendant unduly influenced Plaintiff’s daughter to sign a will
making Defendant the beneficiary of her estate and that the
Defendant thereafter caused the wrongful death of Plaintiff’s
daughter.
No. 1].

Complaint (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 2, 4, 6, 12, 15 [Docket

Plaintiff also alleges that the Defendant is “unjustly

enriching herself” with Plaintiff’s daughter’s home and a
commercial building, both located in Austin, Texas, as well as
other assets belonging to Plaintiff’s daughter, including a car,
stocks, jewelry, and bank accounts.

Compl. ¶ 13.

Plaintiff

seeks an order directing Defendant to vacate her deceased
daughter’s home in Austin, Texas and to turn over Plaintiff’s
daughter’s belongings, and damages.
On August 4, 2016, Defendant submitted a letter, pursuant
to Rule I.A. of this Court’s Individual Rules and Procedures,
setting forth her intention to file a motion to dismiss the
Plaintiff’s action for lack of personal jurisdiction [Docket
No. 4].

In her letter, Defendant explains that she is a

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resident of Texas and has no ties to New Jersey.

She has never

resided or done business in New Jersey and she notes that
Plaintiff does not allege any tortious acts that occurred in New
Jersey.

Based on the Plaintiff’s allegations and the

Defendant’s letter, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause why
the matter should not be transferred to the United States
District Court for the Western District of New Jersey, where
Austin, Texas is located, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
II.

LEGAL ANALYSIS
Section 1404(a) of Title 28 of the United States Code

provides that: “For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in
the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil
action to any other district or division where it might have
been brought.”

The parties apparently do not dispute that this

action could have been filed in the Western District of Texas,
where the Defendant resides and where the property at issue in
the dispute is located.
“If the proposed alternative forum is appropriate,” as it
is here, “it is then within the Court’s discretion to transfer
the action.”

Taylor v. Global Credit & Collection Corp., 2010

WL 2521758, at *1 (D.N.J. June 14, 2010) (citing Jumara v. State
Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 883 (3d Cir. 1995)).

Indeed,

“Section 1404(a) is intended to place discretion in the district
court to adjudicate motions for transfer according to an

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‘individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and
fairness.’”

Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29

(1988) (quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622 (1964)).
“A determination that transfer to another jurisdiction is
appropriate represents an ‘exercise . . . of structured
discretion by trial judges appraising the practical
inconveniences posed to the litigants and the court should a
particular action be litigated in one forum rather than
another.’”

Lawrence v. Xerox Corp., 56 F. Supp. 2d 442, 450

(D.N.J. 1999) (quoting Ricoh Co. v. Honeywell, Inc., 817 F.
Supp. 473, 479 (D.N.J. 1993) (quoting Liny v. E.I. Du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 886 F.2d 628, 632 (3d Cir. 1989))).

Thus, the

district court “is vested with a large discretion” to determine
when transfer should be ordered “for the convenience of parties
and witnesses, in the interest of justice,” pursuant to Section
1404(a).

Solomon v. Continental Am. Life Ins. Co., 472 F.2d

1043, 1045 (3d Cir. 1973).
In deciding whether to transfer an action under Section
1404(a), courts in the Third Circuit consider both private and
public interests, as delineated in Jumara v. State Farm
Insurance, 55 F.3d 873, 880 (3d Cir. 1995).

The private

interest factors include:
1) the plaintiff’s forum preference; 2) the
defendant’s forum preference; 3) where the claim
arose; 4) the convenience of the parties as indicated

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by their relative physical and financial condition; 5)
the convenience of the witnesses, but only to the
extent they may be unavailable for trial in one of the
fora; and 6) the location of books and records
(similarly to the extent that they could not be
produced in the alternative forum).
Id. at 879 (internal citations omitted).
Additionally, the public interest factors to be considered
include:
1) the enforceability of the judgment; 2) practical
considerations that could make the trial easy,
expeditious, or inexpensive; 3) the relative
administrative difficulty in the two fora resulting
from court congestion; 4) the local interest in
deciding local controversies at home; 5) the public
policies of the fora; and 6) the familiarity of the
trial judge with the applicable state law in diversity
cases.
Id. at 879-80.
A.

The Court addresses these factors below.

Private Interest Factors

With regard to private interests, it is clear that the
Plaintiff prefers New Jersey and the Defendant prefers Texas.
Generally, a plaintiff’s choice of forum is “a paramount
consideration” to transfer determinations, Shutte v. Armco Steel
Corp., 431 F.2d 22, 25 (3d Cir. 1970), and “should not be
lightly disturbed.”

Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879.

Here, however,

Plaintiff’s choice of forum warrants less deference because
most, if not all, of the operative facts occurred in Texas, not
in New Jersey, as discussed below.

See, e.g., Goldstein v. MGM

Grand Hotel & Casino, 2015 WL 9918414, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov. 5,

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2015) (“the plaintiff’s choice of forum is discounted
significantly where ‘the case has little connection with the
chosen forum,’ and the nucleus of operative facts occurred
elsewhere.”) (quoting Job Haines Home for the Aged v. Young, 936
F. Supp. 223, 227-28 (D.N.J. 1996)); Newcomb v. Daniels, Saltz,
Mongeluzzi & Barrett, Ltd., 847 F. Supp. 1244, 1246 (D.N.J.
1994) (“courts assign the plaintiff’s choice of forum
significant weight unless the case has little connection with
the chosen forum.”) (citing Shutte, 431 F.2d at 25); Am. Tel. &
Tel. Co. v. MCI Commc’ns Corp., 736 F. Supp. 1294, 1306 (D.N.J.
1990) (“Where the operative facts of a lawsuit occur outside the
forum selected by the plaintiff, that choice is entitled to less
deference.”) (internal citations omitted).
The parties do not truly dispute that the Plaintiff’s
claims arose in Texas.

Indeed, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges

that the Defendant resides in Austin, Texas and that the
property at the heart of Plaintiff’s claims is located in Texas.
See Compl. ¶ 13.

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant “took

[her daughter’s] life, then dumped her body at the Heart of
Texas Crematorium.”

Compl. ¶ 19.

Likewise, Plaintiff’s

response to the Court’s Order to Show Cause does not dispute
that the claims arose in Texas.
Response [Docket No. 8].

See generally Plaintiff’s

The Court has reviewed the Plaintiff’s

Complaint and the parties’ submissions and finds that this

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factor -- where the events and claims occurred -- weighs
strongly in favor of transfer.
The convenience of the parties is neutral.

Plaintiff

resides in New Jersey, while Defendant resides in Texas.
Plaintiff claims that she is disabled, elderly, and unable to
fly.

On the other hand, according to Plaintiff, the Defendant

is able to travel in the United States at no cost because she
worked for an airline for many years.
[Docket No. 5].

See Plaintiff’s Letter

While those statements, if true, may weigh

against transfer, certainly the court in Texas is able to
provide necessary accommodations to the Plaintiff in light of
her health conditions and limited mobility, if it finds such
accommodations appropriate.

For example, court appearances may

be conducted via video conference, as is often done to cut down
on the need for travel.

In addition, it is possible that

Plaintiff’s deposition could be taken via video to alleviate the
travel burden on her.
Defendant, in turn, contends this Court does not even have
personal jurisdiction over her, given that she has never resided
or done business in New Jersey and that none of the alleged
tortious acts occurred in New Jersey.

It appears, at this

stage, that regardless of whether this action remains in this
District or is transferred to Texas, one of the parties will be

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inconvenienced.

The Court, therefore, finds this factor to be

neutral.
The Court next considers the convenience of the witnesses.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(c)(1):
A subpoena may command a person to attend a trial,
hearing, or deposition only as follows: (A) within 100
miles of where the person resides, is employed, or
regularly transacts business in person; or (B) within
the state where the person resides, is employed, or
regularly transacts business in person, if the person
(i) is a party or a party’s officer; or (ii) is
commanded to attend a trial and would not incur
substantial expense.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(1)(A)-(B).

Neither party has identified

any witnesses that would be unavailable for trial in either New
Jersey or Texas.

The Court notes, however, that, pursuant to

Rule 45(c), any witnesses who live and work in Texas or over one
hundred miles from Camden, New Jersey would likely be beyond the
subpoena power of this Court.

These witnesses would presumably

include, for example, representatives from the Heart of Texas
Crematorium and the hospital at which Plaintiff’s daughter was
treated.

See Compl. ¶¶ 6, 19.

Under Rule 45(c)(1)(B)(i), even

the Defendant can only be compelled to attend trial in Texas.
This factor weighs strongly in favor of transfer to Texas.
It is unclear what books and records would be relevant to
the prosecution of this action.

The Court notes, however, that

the disputed property appears to all be located in Texas.

This

property includes real property, such as the house in which the

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Defendant resides and a commercial building, both in Austin,
Texas, and other personal property, such as a car and jewelry,
which may not be easily transported.

This factor weighs in

favor of transfer to Texas.
B.

Public Interest Factors

As to the enforceability of any judgment against the
Defendant, a judgment against Defendant would be routine in
Texas, where Defendant resides and where the disputed property
is located.

A judgment against Defendant in this District,

however, would likely be more difficult to enforce given that
Defendant has vigorously contended that she is not subject to
personal jurisdiction in New Jersey.

Since there is no dispute

as to personal jurisdiction over the Defendant in Texas and
because the property at issue in this matter is located in
Texas, this factor favors transfer.
In addition, the practical considerations weigh in favor of
transfer.

The Defendant has contested the issue of personal

jurisdiction before this Court and intends to file a motion to
dismiss the matter for lack of personal jurisdiction in the
event the Court does not transfer the case to Texas.
would be no such dispute in Texas.

There

If the Court were to

transfer the action to Texas, the case would be able to proceed
more expeditiously without being bogged down by a motion to
dismiss and the possibility of further delay by jurisdictional

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discovery, if appropriate.

Accordingly, this factor weighs in

favor of transfer.
Neither of the parties has submitted any statistics or made
any arguments regarding the relative administrative difficulty
in the two fora resulting from court congestion.

While this

Court is available to afford the parties their day in court as
expeditiously as possible, the Court nonetheless notes that,
according to the Federal Court Management Statistics Profile for
the District of New Jersey, the median time from filing to
disposition of civil matters is 8.0 months and the median time
from filing to trial in civil matters is 47.8 months, as of June
30, 2016.1

According to the same source, in the Western District

of Texas, the median time from filing to disposition of civil
matters is 6.1 months and the median time from filing to trial
in civil matters is 20.4 months.

This, in addition to the delay

caused by Defendant’s challenge to personal jurisdiction in this
District, indicates that the administrative difficulty factor
weighs in favor of transfer to the Western District of Texas.
The Court also considers the local interest in deciding
local controversies at home.

The only connection this matter

has to this District is that the Plaintiff resides in New

1

The Federal Court Management Statistics Profiles as of
June 30, 2016 are available on the United States Courts’
website: http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/na/federalcourt-management-statistics/2016/06/30-1.
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Jersey.

All other aspects of the action are rooted in Texas,

including the alleged conduct underlying Plaintiff’s claims, the
disputed property, and the residence of the Defendant.

Clearly,

Texas has a strong interest in regulating the conduct of its
residents and the disposition of property within its borders.
The Court finds that this matter revolves largely around
interests based in Texas and, accordingly, that Texas has a
greater interest in deciding this dispute.

This factor weighs

in favor of transfer.
Neither party has provided the Court with arguments
regarding the public policies of either fora.

As the Court sees

no reason why the relevant public policies of this District or
the Western District of Texas would differ as to this matter,
the Court considers this factor neutral.
Finally, the Court addresses the familiarity of the trial
judge with the applicable state law in diversity cases.

As a

preliminary matter, this Court notes that federal courts are
generally well-equipped to apply the laws of other states and
frequently do so in diversity cases.

That being said, a federal

court judge in Texas would almost certainly be more familiar
with the Texas state laws that would likely govern Plaintiff’s
allegations regarding wrongful death and tortious interference
with a will.

Accordingly, this factor also weighs in favor of

transfer.

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III. CONCLUSION
In sum, the private and public factors, as described above,
weigh in favor of transfer and, thus, on balance, the Court
finds it appropriate to transfer this action the United States
District Court for the Western District of Texas, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a).
s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: September 6, 2016

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