Texas v. Travis County, Texas et al

Filing 74

ORDER MOOTING 19 Motion to Dismiss ; MOOTING 24 Motion to Consolidate Cases; GRANTING 26 Motion to Dismiss ; GRANTING 27 Motion to Dismiss ; MOOTING 35 Motion to Consolidate Cases; MOOTING 60 Motion to Dismiss ; GRANTING 62 Motion to Dismiss ; GRANTING 64 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; GRANTING 65 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction ; MOOTING 16 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction ; MOOTING 17 Motion to Consolidate Cases; MOOTING 18 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction ; MOOTING 18 Motion to Expedite. Signed by Judge Sam Sparks. (dm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AUSTIN DIVISION

17
CLEFc.

9

fl:

Plaintiffs,

6

COURT
TEXAS

TEXAS and KEN PAXTON, in his
official capacity as Texas Attorney

General,

1

CAUSE NO.:

A-i 7-CA-00425-SS

-vs-

TRAVIS COUNTY et al.,
Defendants.

ORDER
BE IT REMEMBERED on the 29th day of June 2017, the Court held a hearing in the

above-styled cause, and the parties appeared by and through counsel. Before the Court are

Defendant Travis County's Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint [#26], Plaintiffs State

of Texas and Ken Paxton (collectively, the State)' s Response [#30] in opposition, and Travis
County's Reply [#33] in support; Defendant the City of Austin's Amended Motion to Dismiss
[#27], the State's Response [#30] in opposition, and City of Austin's Reply [#36] in support;

Defendant Texas Organizing Project Education Fund's Motion to Dismiss [#62], the State's

Response [#7 1] in opposition, and Texas Organizing Project Education Fund's Reply [#72] in
support; Defendant El Paso County's Motion to Dismiss [#64] and the State's Response [#71] in
opposition; Defendant the City of El Cenizo's Amended Motion to Dismiss [#65] and the State's

Response [#7 1] in opposition; as well as the State's Motions to Consolidate Cases [##17, 24, 35],

Defendants' Response [##21, 22, 39, 40, 48] in opposition, and the State's Reply [#52] in

support.' Having reviewed the documents, the governing law, the arguments of the parties at the
hearing, and the file as a whole, the Court now enters the following opinion and orders.

Background
The State filed this action seeking a declaration Senate Bill 4 (SB 4) is constitutional. On
May 7, 2017, Governor Abbott signed SB 4 into law. SB 4 prohibits municipalities and their
employees and officials from adopting, enforcing, or endorsing any policy that would "materially

limit" local police or other officials from enforcing "immigration laws." Am. Compi. [#1] Ex.

1

(SB 4) at 48-49. Specifically, the law requires local law enforcement agencies to cooperate with

federal immigration authorities; prohibits these agencies from maintaining policies barring
officers from inquiring into an individual's immigration status; requires these agencies to comply

with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainers; and in some cases, requires
these agencies to transfer an individual from a Texas correctional facility to federal authorities.
Id. The State explains it enacted SB 4 "to prevent localities from forming a patchwork

of

inconsistent policies of federal cooperation across Texas." State's Resp. [#7 1] at 7. "By ending
local policies that block the federal government's ability to enforce immigration law, SB 4 aims
to ensure that suspected and convicted criminals are not released back onto the streets and that

the respect for the rule of law continues to preserve the safety of citizens throughout the State."
Id.

Though SB 4 was signed into law on May 7, 2017, the law does not go into effect until
September 1, 2017. SB 4 at 59, 60.

The Court DISMISSES AS MOOT the City of Austin's Motion to Dismiss [#16] the State's original
complaint, Travis County's Motion to Dismiss [#18] and Amended Motion to Dismiss [#19] the State's original
complaint, and the El Cenizo's first Motion to Dismiss [#60].
1

2

I.

Austin Proceedings
This lawsuit (the Austin case) was filed on May 7, 2017, just hours SB 4 was signed. In

its complaint, the State seeks only declaratory relief that SB 4 is constitutional under both the

federal and state constitutions. Compi. [#1]; Am. Compl. [#23] ¶J 322-329 (adding claim that
SB 4 does not violate the Texas Constitution). The State argues it was justified in bringing this

action because, "[l]eading up to the passage of SB 4, numerous local officials vowed legal fights
over the legislation, claiming that it was unconstitutional for the State to regulate their varying
local policies of noncooperation." State's Resp. [#3 0] at 2. According to the State, the fact that

Defendants' policies remain in place today, together with the fact that Defendants have
challenged the constitutionality of SB 4 in the San Antonio case, reveal Defendants "intent to
violate SB 4 once it takes effect[.]" Id. at 7.

The State's original complaint named as defendants Travis County, Austin, officials from
Travis County and

Austin,2

and the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund

(MALDEF).3 On May 31, 2017, the State amended its complaint to add as defendants El Paso

County, Texas and the Sheriff of El Paso County in his official capacity (together, El Paso); the

City of El Cenizo, Texas, the Mayor of El Cenizo, Texas, Maverick County, Texas, the Sheriff of

Maverick County, and Constable Pct. 3-1 of Maverick County (together, El Cenizo); the Texas
Organizing Project Education Fund (TOPEF); and the League of United Latin American Citizens
(LULAC).

2

Sally Hemandez was sued in her official capacity as the Sheriff of Travis County. The State also sued
Austin City Council Members Ora Houston, Delia Garza, Sabino Renteria, Gregorio Casar, Ann Kitchen, Jimmy
Flaimigan, Leslie Pool, Ellen Troxclair, Kathie Tovo, and Alison Alter; Austin's Mayor, Steve Adler; and Austin's
Interim City Manager, Elaine Hart.

The State voluntarily dismissed its claims against MALDEF on June 16, 2017.
Dismissal [#53].

3

See

Notice Voluntary

II.

San Antonio Proceedings
Following SB 4's passage and the State's near contemporaneous filing of the Austin case,

three cases were filed in the San Antonio Division challenging the constitutionality of SB 4. In
the first case filed in San Antonio on May 8, 2017, El Cenizo, together with other plaintiffs, filed
an action against the State, seeking a declaration that SB 4 is unconstitutional and an injunction

prohibiting the State from enforcing SB 4. See City of El Cenizo

v.

Texas, No. 5:17-CV-404-

OLG (W.D. Tex. May 8, 2017). On June 6, 2017, Judge Garcia consolidated the El Cenizo case

with two other cases pending in that division after finding these cases involved the same issues

of law and most of the named defendants are the same (collectively, the San Antonio case). See
Id.; El Paso Cty. v. Texas, No. No. 5:17-CV-459-OLG (W.D. Tex. May 22, 2017); City of San

Antonio

v.

Texas, No. 5:17-CV-489-OLG (W.D. Tex. June 1, 2017). Judge Garcia subsequently

permitted several parties to intervene, including the cities of Dallas, Houston, and Austin and
Travis County. The plaintiffs in the now-consolidated San Antonio case filed applications for a

preliminary injunction. On June 26, 2017, Judge Garcia held a preliminary injunction hearing
where the parties submitted evidence and presented arguments as to SB 4's constitutionality.
Meanwhile, Defendants in the Austin
Antonio

casemany of whom are the plaintiffs in the

San

casefiled motions to dismiss the State's claims, arguing, among other things, the State

has not alleged an injury sufficient to confer standing and the State seeks an impermissible

advisory opinion. In response to these motions, the State contends its action is proper under the

Declaratory Judgment Act, as the State has standing to assert these claims and the matter is ripe
for judicial determination. The State also filed three motions to consolidate this case with the San

Antonio case, arguing these cases involve the same legal issues and the first-to-file rule counsels
in favor of consolidating the cases in the Austin Division.

ri

These motions have been fully briefed by the parties and are now ripe for consideration.

Analysis
I.

Legal Standard
A motion under Rule 12(b)(1) asks a court to dismiss a complaint for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction.

FED.

R.

CIV. P.

12(b)(l). "A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the

case." Home Builders Ass 'n of Miss., Inc.

v.

City of Madison, Miss., 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th

Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). Motions to dismiss under Rule 1 2(b)( 1) challenge
a court's "very power to hear the case," and the court may therefore "weigh the evidence and

satisfy itself' subject matter jurisdiction exists. MDPhysicians & Assocs., Inc.

v.

State Bd. of Ins.,

957 F.2d 178, 181 (5th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).

This case was brought pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, which provides, "[i]n a
case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction

. .

.

any court of the United States

.

. .

may

declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration,

whether or not further relief is or could be sought." 28 U.S.C.

§

220 1(a). The Supreme Court has

held that "the phrase 'case of actual controversy' in the Act refers to the type of 'Cases' and

'Controversies' that are justiciable under Article III." Medimmune, Inc.

v.

Genentech, Inc., 549

U.S. 118, 127 (2007). For the Court to exercise jurisdiction over this case, then, it must meet the

"cases and controversies" requirement set forth under Article III of the Constitution. US. Parole
Comm 'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 395 (1980).

To meet the standing requirement under Article III, the party invoking federal jurisdiction

must show (1) she has suffered an "injury in fact" that is (a) concrete and particularized and
(b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the

challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the

injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Friends of the Earth, Inc.
Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000); Consol. Cos., Inc.

499 F.3d 382, 385 (5th Cir. 2007); Fla. Dep 't
924, 929 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Lujan

v.

ofIns.

v.

v.

v.

Laidlaw Envtl.

Union PacfIc R.R. Co.,

Chase Bank of Tex. Nat'l Ass 'n, 274 F.3d

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)).

"Standing to seek declaratory judgment is subject to these same requirements." BroadStar Wind
Sys. Grp. Ltd. Liab. Co. v. Stephens, 459 F.

App'x 351, 356 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Bennett

v.

Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997)).
The general rule is that "standing is to be determined as of the commencement of the

suit." Lujan, 504 U.S. at 571-72. Though a plaintiff may later amend her complaint, post-filing
events generally cannot cure a jurisdictional defect that existed at the time the original complaint

was filed. Camsofi Data Sys., Inc.

also Arena
§

v.

v. S.

Elec. Supply, Inc., 756 F.3d 327, 337 (5th Cir. 2014); see

Graybar Elec. Co., Inc., 669 F.3d 214, 218 (5th Cir. 2012) ("Although 28 U.S.C.

1653 and [Rule] 15(a) allow amendments to cure defective jurisdictional allegations, these

rules do not permit the creation of jurisdiction when none existed at the time the original
complaint was filed[.]").

II.

Application
The State seeks a declaratory judgment as to the constitutionality of a statute prior to the

law taking effect. Because Defendants move to dismiss this lawsuit for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction, the Court does not reach the merits of the State's claim, but instead only examines

whether the claim, based on the record before the Court, can

proceed.4

Because the Court finds

the State lacks standing to bring this claim, the Court GRANTS Defendants' motions to dismiss.
The State asserts two primary arguments in an attempt to establish standing: first, because

Defendants have standing to challenge the constitutionality of SB 4 in the San Antonio case, the
State has standing to bring this declaratory judgment action; and second, the State has shown the

existence of imminent injury sufficient to confer standing based on Defendants' alleged intent
"to follow a pattern and practice of failing to cooperate with federal immigration officials" after
the law goes into effect on September 1, 2017. Am. Compi. [#23] ¶ 239.
In support of its first argument, the State cites a Fifth Circuit case for the proposition that:
Since it is the underlying cause of action of the defendant against the plaintiff that
is actually litigated in a declaratory judgment action, a party bringing a
declaratory judgment action must have been a proper party had the defendant
brought suit on the underlying cause of action.

State's Resp. [#71] at 6 (quoting Collin Cly., Tex.

v.

Homeowners Ass 'nfor Values Essential to

Neighborhoods, 915 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1990) (HAVEN)). From this passage, the State
extrapolates its position that "the proper inquiry is whether [Defendants] have standing to sue

Texas," not whether the State has standing to bring this declaratory judgment action. Id.
But simply because the declaratory judgment plaintiff is the proper defendant in another

suit does not mean it is exempt from Article III's standing requirements in a declaratory

judgment action. While the Declaratory Judgment Act "enlarged the range of remedies available
in federal courts," it "did not extend their jurisdiction." Skelly Oil v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339

U.S. 667, 671 (1950). Indeed, the Fifth Circuit has expressly held that a plaintiff in a declaratory

judgment action must satisfy the standing requirements of Article III. See, e.g., BroadStar Wind

Though the Court does not reach the merits of the State's claim today, it notes that the federal government
has the exclusive power to enforce immigration laws, and regardless of its intent, no state or local entity can
interfere with the enforcement of these laws.

7

Sys. Grp. Ltd. Liab. Co.,

459 F. App'x at 356. Thus, the State cannot sidestep these standing

requirements by fashioning a new rule in the pre-enforcement declaratory judgment context
where the Court simply asks whether the defendant has standing to sue the plaintiff in a different

lawsuit.
The State's second standing argument likewise fails, because the State has not shown the
existence of actual or imminent injury. The State alleges it has standing to sue Defendants to
ensure SB 4 is enforced once the law takes

effect.5

As evidence of Defendants' impending

violation of SB 4, the State cites, among other things, Travis County's written policy that advises

officers not to cooperate with federal immigration officials under certain circumstances.
According to the State, this policy was issued on February

1,

2017, "well after SB 4 was

introduced in the Texas Legislature," and remains in place today. Am. Compl. [#23] ¶J 203, 206.
The State's own argument underscores its deficiencies. Because SB 4 does not take effect
until September 1, 2017, it is impossible for Defendants to take any action that would violate the

not-yet-effective law. The mere fact that a municipal policy was instituted before a law was
signed, or that it remains in place prior to the law taking effect, does not equate to a violation of

the law.

The State argues, however, that it faces an imminent injury sufficient to confer standing
because Defendants have "no plans to change" their policies of non-cooperation with federal

immigration officials once SB 4 takes effect. Id. ¶J 17, 207. In support of this position, the State
cites Defendants' public statements of their intent to challenge the constitutionality of SB 4. For

Once SB 4 takes effect, the statute provides for a number of robust enforcement mechanisms, including
imposing a civil penalty between $1,000 and $1,500 for the first violation and a penalty of not less than $25,000 for
each additional violation (where each day constitutes a separate violation), as well as removing an elected or
appointed official from office. SB 4 at 50-52. In addition, a sheriff, chief of police, or constable who fails to comply
with an immigration detainer request faces potential criminal sanctions. Id. at 58.

[s1

instance, after the law was signed and the Austin case was filed, both Austin and El Paso County
voted to sue the State over the constitutionality of SB 4, and these entities did, in fact, sue the
State in the San Antonio case. Id. ¶J 211, 221. The State also cites public statements issued by

individual defendantsagain, after the law was signed and the Austin case was

filedsuch

as

the Sheriff of El Paso County, who allegedly said "SB 4 is pointless," and the Mayor of El
Cenizo, who purportedly stated "SB 4 is 'dangerous and discriminatory' and

[]it 'opens up the

door to racial profiling against Hispanics." Id. ¶J 220, 231.
But construing Defendants' statements that they intend to sue the State as evidence of

their intent to violate the law is untenable. Aside from raising important First Amendment
concerns, it does not give rise to an imminent

injury.6

legal consequences of some act that may or may not

The State's alleged injury turns on the

occurthat

is, Defendants' decision to

violate the law. The State has produced no evidence that at the time of filing suit, it was clear
Defendants planned to violate the law once it takes effect. Expressing public disagreement with a
law does not constitute a violation of the law, nor does articulating the desire to challenge the

constitutionality of the law equate to a violation of it. The general rule is that a plaintiff must

have standing at the commencement of a suit, see

Lujan,

504 U.S. at 571-72, and the State has

not shown an exception to this general rule applies here. Because the State has not shown it faced
an imminent injury sufficient to confer standing when it filed this declaratory judgment action,
the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear this case.

The Court's decision today is driven in large part by the well-established constitutional

ban on advisory opinions. This ban seeks to ensure that federal courts determine specific disputes
6

In this Order, the State's failure to establish an imminent injury is characterized as a defect in standing,
but the Court recognizes this element of the standing inquiry overlaps with the ripeness doctrine, which focuses on
whether a legally cognizable injury has yet to occur. Because the Court finds dismissal on standing grounds is
appropriate, it does not address the ripeness issue separately.

between parties, rather than hypothetical legal questions, and in doing so, conserve judicial
resources.7

As Austin points out in its reply brief, the State faces the same potential threat every

government agency at every level faces when it enacts a new

lawthe threat that someone may

challenge the constitutional validity of the law. That is not a justiciable injury. To hold otherwise
would be to "open a Pandora's box and invite every local government to seek a court's judicial

blessing" on a law prior to it taking effect. Villas at Parkside Partners

v.

City

of Farmers

Branch, 577 F. Supp. 2d 880, 884-85 (N.D. Tex. 2008). The ban on advisory opinions and the
related doctrine of standing were devised to prevent just that.

Conclusion
In light of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Defendants' motions to dismiss and

DISMISSES AS MOOT the State's motions to consolidate.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants Travis County's Motion to Dismiss First

Amended Complaint [#26], the City of Austin's Amended Motion to Dismiss [#27],
Texas Organizing Project Education Fund's Motion to Dismiss [#62], El Paso's Motion
to Dismiss [#64], and El Cenizo's Amended Motion to Dismiss [#65] are GRANTED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs Texas and Ken Paxton's Motions to

Consolidate Cases [##17, 24, 35] are DISMISSED AS MOOT;

As the Supreme Court explained in Flast v. Cohen,

[T]he implicit policies embodied in Article III, and not history alone, impose the rule against
advisory opinions[.] . . . [T]he rule against advisory opinions implements the separation of powers
prescribed by the Constitution . . . [and] also recognizes that such suits often "are not pressed
before the Court with that clear concreteness provided when a question emerges precisely framed
and necessary for decision from a clash of adversary argument exploring every aspect of a
multifaceted situation embracing conflicting and demanding interests."
392 U.S. 83, 96-97 (1968) (quoting United States v. Fruehauf 365 U.S. 146, 157 (1961)).

10

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants the City of Austin's Motion to

Dismiss [#16], Travis County's Motion to Dismiss [#18] and Amended Motion to
Dismiss [#19], and the El Cenizo's first Motion to Dismiss [#60] are DISMISSED AS
MOOT; and
IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that the above-styled cause is DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
SIGNED this the

day of August 2017.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

11