Griffin v. Ford Motor Company

Filing 8

ORDER DENYING #4 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction ; DENYING #4 Motion to Transfer Case. Signed by Judge Sam Sparks. (jf)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AUSTIN DIVISION

1!

p

(f?:

MARIAH GRIFFIN,
Plaintiff,
-vs.

CAUSE NO.:

A-i 7-CA-00442-SS

FORD MOTOR COMPANY,
Defendant.

ORDER
BE IT REMEMBERED on this day the Court reviewed the file in the above-styled cause,

and specifically Defendant Ford Motor Company (Ford)'s Motion to Dismiss, and in the
Alternative, Motion to Transfer Venue [#4], Plaintiff Mariah Griffin's Response [#5] in

opposition, and Ford's Reply [#6] in support. Having reviewed the documents, the governing
law, the arguments of the parties at the hearing, and the file as a whole, the Court now enters the

following opinion and order.

Background
This case involves claims for negligence and products liability arising from a vehicle
accident involving a 2010 Ford Focus (the Vehicle). Plaintiff Mariah Griffin alleges that on
October 24, 2015, Jake Whitmore was driving the Vehicle in the eastbound lane on RM 1826 in
Hays County, Texas, when he drifted into oncoming traffic and struck another vehicle. Compi.
[#1] ¶ 3.01. Griffin, who owned the Vehicle, was riding in the front passenger seat. Id.

According to Griffin, she suffered "serious injuries to her face and body as a result of the

passenger side air bags failing to deploy." Id. ¶ 3.03. On May 11, 2017, Griffin filed this suit

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against Ford, asserting claims for negligence and strict liability
based on the allegedly defective
design, manufacture, and warnings of the Vehicle and its side air
bags. Id. ¶ 4.01.

Griffin resides in Travis County, Texas. Id.
¶ 1.01. Griffin generally alleges Ford

manufactures, promotes, and distributes its vehicles in Texas. Id. 1.02.
Ford is a Delaware
¶

corporation with its principal place of business in Michigan. Mot. Dismiss [#4-2]
Ex. A
(Krishnaswami Dee!.) ¶ 6. According to Ford, Ford made the primary decisions regarding
the

Vehicle's design and development in Michigan, and the Vehicle was assembled at Ford's
assembly plant in Wayne, Michigan. Id. ¶ 4. On August 31, 2009, Ford sold the Vehicle to Elder
Ford, an independently-owned dealership located in Troy, Michigan. Id.

¶fJ

5-6. Elder Ford then

sold or leased the Vehicle to a Michigan resident on September 25, 2009. Id. [#4-4] Ex. C

(Certified Vehicle Title History) at 15. Sometime in 2012, the Vehicle was sold to a used car

dealer located in Austin, Texas. Id.

Ford acknowledges the presence of Ford dealerships in Texas, but contends it "does not
directly engage in servicing Ford vehicles in Texas." Id. [#4-3] Ex. B (Michael DeYoung Deci.)

¶ 3. Rather, Ford maintains these dealerships are "independent entities" which must agree to
expressly disavow "the relationship of principal and agent between the Company [Ford] and the

Dealer" and agree that "under no circumstances shall the Dealer be considered to be an agent of
the company." Mot. Dismiss [#4] at 4; Michael DeYoung Dee!. ¶ 4.
On June 5, 2017, Ford moved to dismiss Griffin's suit for lack

of personal jurisdiction.

The parties fully briefed the motion and it is now ripe for the Court's consideration.

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Analysis
I.

Personal Jurisdiction
Ford moves to dismiss Griffin's complaint based on lack of
personal jurisdiction under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

1

2(b)(2). To determine whether a federal district court has

personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, the court considers
first whether exercising

jurisdiction over the defendant comports with due process. Religious Tech. Ctr.
F.3d 369, 373 (5th Cir. 2003).

v.

Liebreich, 339

If the requirements of due process are satisfied, the court then

determines whether the exercise of jurisdiction is authorized by the jurisdictional "long-arm"
statute of the state in which the court sits. Id. Because the Texas long-arm statute has been

interpreted as extending to the limit of due process, the two inquiries are the same for district
courts in Texas. Id.; see also TEx. Civ. PRAC.

& REM. CODE

§

17.001.093.

The Due Process Clause requires a nonresident defendant be properly subject to the
personal jurisdiction of the court in which the defendant is sued. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v.

Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980). The Supreme Court has articulated a two-pronged test to

determine whether a federal court may properly exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant: (1) the nonresident must have minimum contacts with the forum state, and
(2) subjecting the nonresident to jurisdiction must be consistent with "traditional notions of fair

play and substantial justice." Int'l Shoe Co.

v.

Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945);

Freudensprung v. Offshore Tech. Servs., Inc., 379 F.3d 327, 343 (5th Cir. 2004).
A defendant's "minimum contacts" may give rise to either general personal jurisdiction

or specific personal jurisdiction, depending on the nature of the suit and the defendant's

relationship to the forum state. Freudensprung, 379 F.3 d at 343. A court exercises general

jurisdiction over the defendant if the defendant has "continuous and systematic contacts" with

3

the forum, regardless of whether those contacts are related
to the cause of action asserted in the
case. Id. Specific jurisdiction, by contrast, is based on the
proposition "that 'the commission of

some single or occasional acts of the [defendant] in a state' may
sometimes be enough to subject

the [defendant] to jurisdiction in that State's tribunals with respect to
suits relating to that in-state
activity." Daimler AG

v.

Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 754 (2014) (quoting Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at

318).

The plaintiff has the burden of making a prima facie case showing that a defendant
has
sufficient "minimum contacts" with the forum state to justify the state's exercise of either

specific or general jurisdiction. Freudensprung, 379 F.3d at 343.

If the plaintiff does

so, the

burden shifts to the defendant to show such an exercise offends due process because it is not
consistent with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Id. On a Rule 12(b)(2)

motion to dismiss, the Court may consider the "contents of the record before the court at the time

of the motion, including 'affidavits, interrogatories, depositions, oral testimony, or any
combination of the recognized methods of discovery." Quick Techs., Inc.
F.3d 338, 344 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Thompson
1165 (5th Cir. 1985)). The Court "must accept the

v.

v.

Sage Grp. PLC, 313

Chrysler Motors Corp., 755 F.2d 1162,

plaintiffs uncontroverted allegations, and

resolve in [her] favor all conflicts between the facts contained in the parties' affidavits and other

documentation." Monkton Ins. Servs., Ltd.

v.

Ritter, 768 F.3d 429, 431 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting

Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 2002)). However, the Court is not required to accept
as true conclusory allegations, even if they are uncontroverted.

Potomac Elec. Power Co., 253 F.3d 865, 869 (5th Cir. 2001).

Panda Brandywine Corp.

v.

II.

Application
Griffin argues Ford has sufficient "minimum contacts" with Texas
to justify the Court's

exercise of specificrather than

generaljurisdiction.1

See Resp. [#5] at 2. In the Fifth Circuit,

courts generally look to three factors in analyzing specific
jurisdiction: "(1) whether the

defendant has minimum contacts with the forum state, i.e., whether it
purposely directed its
activities toward the forum state or purposefully availed itself of the privileges of
conducting

activities there; (2) whether the plaintiffs cause of action arises out of or results from
the

defendant's forum-related contacts; and (3) whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is fair
and reasonable." McFadin

v.

Gerber, 587 F.3d 753, 759 (5th Cir. 2009).

A court may exercise

specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who

"purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." Electrosource, Inc.

v.

Horizon Battery

Techns., Ltd., 176 F.3d 867, 871 (5th Cir. 1999) (internal citation omitted). The purposeful

availment requirement "ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a

result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts, or of the 'unilateral activity of another party
or a third person." Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted).

Griffin maintains Ford purposely availed itself of the privileges of conducting business in

Texas by placing its products in the "stream of commerce" with the expectation its goods will be
purchased by consumers in Texas. Under this "stream-of-commerce" theory, a court may

Griffin argues in the alternative that "whether the defendant has minimum contacts.

.

.

in the forum state

is irrelevant" when the defendant has been served in the forum state through a registered agent. Resp. [#5] at 15-17.
But the existence of a registered agent, standing alone, is not sufficient to establish jurisdiction. See, e.g., Wenche
Siemer v. Learjet Acquisition Corp., 966 F.2d 179, 181 (5th Cir. 1992) ("The fact that service is proper does not
resolve the question as to 'whether Ethel plaintiff has demonstrated a sufficient basis for th[e] court's exercise of

personal jurisdiction." (quoting Applewhite v. Metro Aviation, Inc., 875 F.2d 491, 494 (5th Cir.1989)); see also
ADT, LLC v. Capital Connect, Inc., No. 3:15-CV-2252-G, 2015 WL 7352199, at * (N.D. Tex. Nov. 20,
2015)
("[T]he fact that [the defendant] registered with the Texas Secretary of State and designated a Texas agent to receive
process on its behalf is not sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction over the defendant.").
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exercise specific jurisdiction over a defendant as long as the defendant
"delivers its products into
the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will
be purchased by consumers in the
forum State." Se jferth

v.

Helicopteros Atuneros, Inc., 472 F.3d 266, 273 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting

World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298).

According to Griffin, Ford places its Ford Focus vehicles in the stream of
commerce,
advertises and markets its vehicles in Texas, distributes these vehicles in Texas
through a
network of Ford dealerships, and sells parts in Texas for the purpose of maintaining
and
servicing Ford vehicles purchased by Texas consumers. Griffin further alleges there are 273
Ford

dealers in Texas and points to evidence that Ford sold over 17,000 Ford Focus vehicles in the
United States in May 2017 alone. Resp. [#5-10] Ex. J (Ford May 2017 U.S. Sales). Ford does not
dispute it places Ford Focuses in the stream of commerce, or that it advertises and markets its
vehicles in Texas. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds Ford purposely availed itself of the
privileges of conducting business in Texas.
Griffin must also show, under the second prong of the specific jurisdiction inquiry, that

her claims "arise[] out of" or "relate[] to" Ford' Texas contacts. See Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A.

v.

Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 427 (1984); see also Irvin

v. S.

Snow Mfg., Inc., 517 F.

App'x 229, 232-33 (5th Cir. 2013) (reasoning the plaintiff's "stream-of-commerce" theory,
standing alone, was insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction). In determining whether a

plaintiff's claims "relate to" a defendant's contacts with the forum state, the volume of products
placed in the stream of commerce may be relevant. See Irvin, 517 F. App'x at 232 (citing Bean

Dredging Corp.
Oswalt

v.

v.

Dredge Tech. Corp., 744 F.2d 1081, 1085 (5th Cir. 1984)). For instance, in

Scripto, Inc., the Fifth Circuit upheld jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer of

lighters that delivered its lighters to a single distributor in the United States with the

understanding the distributor would sell the lighters to a
"nation-wide market, that is, in any or
all states." 616 F.2d 191, 199-200 (5th Cir. 1980).

In this case, Griffin produced evidence Ford introduced
thousands of Ford Focus vehicles
into the stream of commerce. See Ford May 2017 U.S. Sales.
Ford does not contend these

vehicles were not sold in Texas, just that the Vehicle at issue was originally
sold in Michigan and
therefore exited the stream of commerce before reaching Texas. But Ford does
not dispute it

directs marketing and advertising activities related to the Ford Focus vehicles in
Texas; it
distributes Ford Focus vehicles in Texas; or it sells part to maintain or service Ford Focus

vehicles purchased by Texas consumers. Where, as here, the Vehicle was owned by a Texas
resident, registered in Texas, and the defect surfaced in Texas, Ford cannot convincingly argue

Griffin's claimswhich are based on Ford's "promoting and/or distributing" of the Ford Focus
in

Texasdo not arise out of or relate to Ford's contacts with Texas.
Finally, Ford does not argue exercising jurisdiction in Texas would be unfair or

unreasonable. Based on the specific facts of this case, the Court finds the exercise of jurisdiction

comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Because the Court may

properly exercise specific jurisdiction over Ford, it declines to transfer this case to Michigan.

Ford's motion to dismiss or transfer venue is therefore DENIED.
Conclusion
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Ford Motor Company's Motion to Dismiss, and

in the Alternative, Motion to Transfer Venue [#4] is DENIED.

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SIGNED this the

9?day of August 2017.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE