Jones v. Berryhill
Filing
19
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER. Signed by Judge Andrew W. Austin. (dl)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AUSTIN DIVISION
TRENECE NICOLE JONES
§
§
V.
§
§
NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
§
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF THE
§
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION. §
A-17-CV-623 AWA
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of Claim (Dkt. No. 16) and Defendant’s
Brief in Support of the Commissioner’s Decision (Dkt. No. 18). Also before the Court is the Social
Security record filed in this case (Cited as “Tr.”).
I. General Background
Plaintiff Trenece Nicole Jones was born on May 25, 1974, making her 41 years old at the
time of the ALJ’s decision in this case. On October 17, 2013, Jones, who has a GED, filed an
application for supplemental security income alleging disability beginning on January 1, 1996, due
to seizures, migraine headaches, and various mental conditions. After her application was denied
initially, and then again on reconsideration, Jones requested a hearing before an administrative law
judge (“ALJ”) which was held on December 17, 2015. After reviewing the evidence and testimony,
the ALJ issued his decision finding that Jones was not disabled within the meaning of the Social
Security Act. The Appeals Council denied Jones’ request to review the ALJ’s decision thereby
making it the Commissioners’s final decision for purposes of judicial review under 42 U.S.C. §
405(g).
On June 28, 2017, Jones filed the instant lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) requesting that
the Court reverse the Commissioner’s decision in this case. Specifically, Jones argues that the ALJ’s
finding that her mental impairment did not meet Listing 12.04 and/or 12.06 is erroneous.
II. Legal Standards
The Social Security Act defines “disability” as an “inability to engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment . . . which
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(d)(1)(A). To determine if a claimant is disabled the Commissioner uses a five-step analysis:
1.
a claimant who is working, engaging in a substantial gainful activity, will not be
found to be disabled no matter what the medical findings are;
2.
a claimant will not be found to be disabled unless he has a “severe impairment”;
3.
a claimant whose impairment meets or is equivalent to an impairment listed in
Appendix 1 of the regulations will be considered disabled without the need to
consider vocational factors;
4.
a claimant who is capable of performing work that he has done in the past must be
found “not disabled”; and
5.
if the claimant is unable to perform his previous work as a result of his impairment,
then factors such as his age, education, past work experience, and residual functional
capacity must be considered to determine whether he can do other work.
Bowling v. Shalala, 36 F.3d 431, 435 (5th Cir. 1994); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. A finding of
disability or no disability at any step “is conclusive and terminates the analysis.” Lovelace v. Bowen,
813 F.2d 55, 58 (5th Cir. 1987). The claimant has the burden of proof for the first four steps;
however, at step five, the burden initially shifts to the Commissioner to identify other work the
applicant is capable of performing. Selders v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 614, 618 (5th Cir. 1990). If the
Commissioner “fulfills his burden of pointing out potential alternative employment, the burden then
2
shifts back to the claimant to prove that he is unable to perform the alternate work.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision under the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. § 405(g), is limited to two inquiries: (1) whether substantial evidence supports the
Commissioner’s decision, and (2) whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards.
Kinash v. Callahan, 129 F.3d 736, 738 (5th Cir. 1997). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla
of evidence but less than a preponderance—in other words, “such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Martinez v. Chater, 64 F.3d 172, 173 (5th
Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court considers “four elements of proof when
determining whether there is substantial evidence of disability: (1) objective medical facts; (2)
diagnoses and opinions of treating and examining physicians; (3) the claimant’s subjective evidence
of pain and disability; and (4) [the claimant’s] age, education, and work history.” Id. at 174.
However, a reviewing court “may not reweigh the evidence, try the issues de novo, or substitute [its]
judgment for that of the [Commissioner].” Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir. 1994).
If the Court finds substantial evidence to support the decision, the Court must uphold the decision.
See Selders, 914 F.2d at 617 (“If the . . . findings are supported by substantial evidence, they are
conclusive and must be affirmed.”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
III. The ALJ’s Opinion
The ALJ employed the regulations’ five-step sequential evaluation process to determine
whether Jones was disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). See Tr. 19-28. At the first step, the ALJ
determined that Jones had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 17, 2013. At the
second step, the ALJ found that Jones suffers from the severe impairments of affective disorders.
3
At step three, the ALJ found that, considered separately and in combination, Jones’ impairments did
not meet or medically equal the severity criteria for any of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Pt.
404, Subpt. P, App. 1, and thus her impairments were not presumptively disabling. After
considering the entire record, the ALJ determined that Jones:
...has the residual functional capacity to perform the full range of semi-skilled work
(work which requires understanding, remembering, and carrying out some detailed
skills, but does not require doing more complex work duties) where interpersonal
contact with supervisors and coworkers is incidental to the work involved; she can
attend and concentrate for extended periods . . . with normal work breaks; and she
can handle occasional work place changes but should have only occasional contact
with the public.
Tr. at 217.
At step four, the ALJ determined that Jones has no past relevant work. At step 5, the ALJ
found that Jones had the residual functional capacity based on her age, education and work
experience, to perform the unskilled jobs of laundry worker and inspector packer. Accordingly, the
ALJ found that Jones was not disabled as defined in the Social Security Act.
IV. Analysis
The sole issue Jones presents for review is whether the ALJ erred at Step 3 of his findings
in determining that Jones’ mental impairment did not meet or equal the criteria set forth in Listing
12.04 and/or 12.06 of the Social Security Administration’s Listing of Impairments.
At Step 3 of the ALJ’s analysis, the ALJ applies the Social Security Administration’s Listing
of Impairments, which “describes for each of the major body systems impairments that [the SSA]
consider[s] to be severe enough to prevent an individual from doing any gainful activity, regardless
of his or her age, education, or work experience.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1525(a). A claimant whose
impairment (or combination of impairments) meets or equals the criteria of a Listing is disabled and
4
entitled to benefits. For that reason, the criteria in the Listings are “demanding and stringent.” Falco
v. Shalala, 27 F.3d 160, 162 (5th Cir. 1994). At step 3, the burden remains on the plaintiff to
establish that her impairment or combination of impairments meets an impairment enumerated in
the Listing. Muse v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 785, 789 (5th Cir. 1991).
A.
The Listings
Listing 12.04 pertains to affective disorders and is “[c]haracterized by a disturbance of mood,
accompanied by a full or partial manic or depressive syndrome.” See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P,
app. 1, § 12.04. To meet Listing 12.04, the claimant must satisfy the requirements listed in both
paragraphs A and B of the regulation, or paragraph C. See id. In this case, Jones contends that she
has met paragraphs A and B of Listing 12.04. Paragraph A requires medical documentation of either
depressive disorder or bipolor disorder:
1. Depressive disorder, characterized by five or more of the following:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
Depressed mood;
Diminished interest in almost all activities;
Appetite disturbance with change in weight;
Sleep disturbance;
Observable psychomotor agitation or retardation;
Decreased energy;
Feelings of guilt or worthlessness;
Difficulty concentrating or thinking; or
Thoughts of death or suicide.
2. Bipolar disorder, characterized by three or more of the following:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
Pressured speech;
Flight of ideas;
Inflated self-esteem;
Decreased need for sleep;
Distractibility;
Involvement in activities that have a high probability of
painful consequences that are not recognized; or
5
g.
Increase in goal-directed activity or psychomotor agitation.
Id. Paragraph B in turn requires “[e]xtreme limitation of one, or marked limitation of two, of the
following areas of mental functioning:”
1.
2.
3.
4.
Understand, remember, or apply information
Interact with others
Concentrate, persist, or maintain pace
Adapt or manage oneself.
Id.
Listing 12.06 pertains to anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorders “characterized by
“excessive anxiety, worry, apprehension, and fear, or by avoidance of feelings, thoughts, activities,
objects, places, or people.” 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 12.06. To meet Listing 12.06, the
claimant must satisfy the requirements listed in both paragraphs A and B of the regulation, or
paragraph C. See id. In this case, Jones contends that she has met paragraphs A and B of Listing
12.06. Paragraph A requires medical documentation of one of the following:
1. Anxiety disorder, characterized by three or more of the following;
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
Restlessness;
Easily fatigued;
Difficulty concentrating;
Irritability;
Muscle tension; or
Sleep disturbance.
2. Panic disorder or agoraphobia, characterized by one or both:
a.
b.
Panic attacks followed by a persistent concern or worry about
additional panic attacks or their consequences; or
Disproportionate fear or anxiety about at least two different
situations (for example, using public transportation, being in
a crowd, being in a line, being outside of your home, being in
open spaces).
3. Obsessive-compulsive disorder, characterized by one or both:
6
a.
b.
Involuntary, time-consuming preoccupation with intrusive, unwanted
thoughts; or
Repetitive behaviors aimed at reducing anxiety.
Id. at 12.06. Paragraph B requires extreme limitation of one, or marked limitation of two, of the
following areas of mental functioning:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Understand, remember, or apply information
Interact with others
Concentrate, persist, or maintain pace
Adapt or manage oneself.
Id.
C.
Has Jones met her burden to prove she met the Listings?
As noted, at Step 3, the burden remains on the plaintiff to establish that her impairment or
combination of impairments meets an impairment enumerated in the Listing. Muse, 925 F.2d at 789.
“For a claimant to show that his impairment matches a listing, it must meet all of the specified
medical criteria.” Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530 (1990). An impairment that exhibits only
some of the criteria, no matter how severely, does not qualify. Id. at 529-32.
The Court finds that Jones has failed to meet her burden to establish that her impairment met
Listing 12.04 or 12.06 during the relevant time period of October 17, 2013, through January 12,
2016. Jones argues that “Paragraph A of both listings are satisfied by her persistent symptoms
related to ‘affective disorders,’ documented as major depressive disorder, bipolar I disorder, PTSD,
anxiety, psychosis, and schizophrenia.” Dkt. No. 16 at 4. However, subpart A of Listing 12.04
requires the claimant to show that they meet five specific symptoms to demonstrate depressive
disorder and three specific symptoms for bipolar disorder. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1,
§ 12.04. Jones has failed to explain in her briefing what specific elements of subpart A she has met
for either disorder. Subpart A of Listing 12.06 also requires the claimant to show that she has bet
7
three specific elements to show that she suffers from an anxiety disorder. Once again, Jones fails
to explain in her briefing how she has met subpart A of Listing 12.06. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P,
app. 1, § 12.06.
Jones also fails to demonstrate that she satisfied Paragraph B of either Listing. As noted,
Paragraph B of 12.04 and 12.06 require extreme limitation of one, or marked limitation of two, of
the following areas of mental functioning: (1) understand, remember, or apply information;
(2) Interact with others; (3) concentrate, persist, or maintain pace; or (4) adapt or manage oneself.
The ALJ found that Plaintiff only had moderate restrictions or difficulties with daily life, social
functioning, or ability to sustain focused attention and concentration for prolonged periods of time,
and that there was no evidence that Plaintiff has experienced any episodes of decompensation which
have been of extended duration. Tr. 215-216. Substantial evidence in the record supports the ALJ’s
findings. For example, while the evidence in the record shows that Jones was treated for depression
and posttraumatic stress disorder, the evidence in the record revealed that she was capable of
managing her personal care tasks (e.g., showering, dressing and combing her hair). Tr. 240, 517.
In addition, the evidence shows that she can operate a motor vehicle, perform household chores such
as cooking and is capable of managing her finances. Tr. 517.
The evidence further shows that she has not suffered any episodes of decompensation which
have been of extended duration. When Jones took her medication and attended therapy, she reported
relatively normal behavior in the subsection ‘B” criteria. Joones testified at the hearing that when
she takes her medication she sleeps well and it helps prevent her migraines. Tr. 244, 247. Conditions
controllable with treatment are not disabling. See Johnson v. Bowen, 864 F.2d 340, 346 (5th Cir.
1988) (holding that substantial evidence supported finding that claimant was not disabled where
8
medical records showed that claimant responded to antidepressant medication and treatment); Epps
v. Harris, 624 F.2d 1267, 1270 (5th Cir. 1980) (conditions controlled or controllable by treatment are
not disabling).
The consultative psychological evaluation of Jones also showed that she did not meet the
Listing 12.04 or 12.06. Jones underwent a consultative psychological examination performed by Dr.
Ronnette Ballard on January 27, 2014. Tr. 515-519. Dr. Ballard commented that overall personal
hygiene and grooming was adequate and that she was cooperative, attentive and interested
throughout the evaluation. Tr. 515. Dr. Ballard noted her appearance, behavior and speech were all
normal. Tr. 518. He further noted that there was no evidence of loose associations regarding her
thought processes and her concentration, memory and judgment were adequate. Tr. 518-19. While
Dr. Ballard diagnosed Jones with Bipolar I Disorder and episodes of PTSD, he determined that her
prognosis is fair and that she would likely benefit from weekly psychotherapy. Tr. 519.
Jones also reported to Dr. Ballard that she had a history of abusive relationships which she
felt contributed to her mental health problems. Tr. 516. In addition, Jones reported that she feels
anxiety regarding her disabled adult son and that she experiences situational difficulties with family
members. Situational depression that is not due to a mental impairment is insufficient to establish
a disability. See Mayes v. Astrue, 2008 WL 5069750, *3 (5th Cir. 2008) (depression as consequence
of anxiety regarding joblessness and health, indicating condition is likely situational and not
psychological); Jones v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 524, 526 (5th Cir. 1987) (reports of emotional distress and
depression due to inability to work are insufficient to meet the burden of proving non-exertional
mental impairment); Fraga v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1296, 1305 (5th Cir. 1987) (“Mere sensitivity about
loss of ability to perform certain chores, however, does not even approach the level of a mental or
9
emotional impairment as defined by SSA regulations.”); McGehee v. Chater, 1996 WL 197435 at
*2 (5th Cir. 1996) (examples of situational depression are poor health, financial problems and
marital discord).
In support of her claim that she met Listing 12.04 and 12.06, Jones relies on evidence after
the relevant time period from October 17, 2013, through January 12, 2016. Evidence of medical
conditions that became medically determinable after the date last insured must not be considered,
and evidence establishing the degeneration of a condition after the expiration of a claimant’s insured
status is not relevant to the Commissioner's disability analysis. See Dominguez v. Astrue, 286 F.
App’x 182, 185 (5th Cir. 2008); Torres v. Shalala, 48 F.3d 887, 894 n. 12 (5th Cir. 1995); Fontenot
v. U.S. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 2017 WL 4084065, at *10 (W.D. La. Aug. 14, 2017). If Jones
believes that evidence outside the relevant time period shows a deterioration of her condition she is
free to reapply for disability benefits on the basis of this new evidence. See Johnson v. Heckler, 767
F.2d 180, 183 (5th Cir. 1985).
Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that Jones has failed to meet her burden to
establish that her impairment met Listing 12.04 or 12.06 during the relevant time period of October
17, 2013 through January 12, 2016. The Court further notes that courts cannot “reweigh the
evidence or substitute our judgment” for that of the ALJ. Whitehead v. Colvin, 820 F.3d 776, 782
(5th Cir. 2016). Because substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision and Jones failed to satisfy
her step-three burden, the Court AFFIRMS the ALJ’s decision in this case.
IV. Conclusion
In summary, the Court finds that the ALJ applied the proper legal standards to Jones’ case,
and that her findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. The decision of the
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration is therefore AFFIRMED.
10
SIGNED this 12th day of September, 2018.
_____________________________________
ANDREW W. AUSTIN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
11
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?