White v. Texas State Techincal College
Filing
8
ORDER GRANTING 4 Motion to Dismiss; DISMISSING 5 Motion to Stay Discovery. Signed by Judge Sam Sparks. (td)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXASJ$.
AUSTIN DIVISION
ROBERT WHITE,
Plaintiff,
CAUSE NO.:
A-17-CV-00837-SS
-vs-
TEXAS STATE TECHNICAL
COLLEGE,
Defendant.
[IJIII1 *
1
BE IT REMEMBERED on this day the Court reviewed the file in the above-styled cause,
and specifically Defendant Texas State Technical College (TSTC)'s Motion to Dismiss [#4],
Plaintiff Robert White's Response [#6] in opposition, and TSTC's Reply [#7] thereto, as well as
TSTC's Motion to Stay Discovery [#5]. Having reviewed the documents, the relevant law, and
the file as a whole, the Court now enters the following opinion and orders.
Background
This case relates to White's termination from TSTC, after approximately 40 years of
employment with the school. White alleges TSTC improperly terminated him on June 6, 2016
on the basis of age discrimination. Compi. [#1] at ¶J7, 18, 19. Near the end of this employment,
White contends he was consistently overlooked for pay raises and given negative remarks on his
job performance. Id. at ¶J 8-10. According to White, he was terminated after drinking a
margarita off campus during lunch without notice, probation, or information regarding his right
to appeal the termination. Id. at
¶J
15, 16.
White further contends the TSTC has embarrassed
and harassed him since his termination. Id. at ¶ 17.
White filed this lawsuit on August 29, 2017, asserting claims for age discrimination and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at ¶J 18-21. TSTC has moved to dismiss this
case pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The motion is now ripe for
consideration.
Analysis
I.
Legal
StandardRule
12(b)(1)
A motion under Rule 12(b)(1) asks a court to dismiss a complaint for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.
FED.
R.
CIV. P.
12(b)(1). "A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the
case." Home Builders Ass 'n of Miss., Inc.
v.
City
of Madison, Miss.,
143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th
Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). A jurisdictional attack under Rule 1 2(b)( 1) should
be considered before addressing other challenges to the claims on the merits. See Ramming
v.
United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001).
"[T]he burden on a rule 12(b)(1) motion is on the party asserting jurisdiction." Castro v.
United States, 608 F.3d 266, 268 (5th Cir. 2010) (en banc). Under appropriate circumstances,
the Court may determine the issue of subject matter jurisdiction based upon "(1) the complaint
alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the
complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts."
Ballew
v.
Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 668 F.3d 777, 781 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Ramming v. United
States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001)).
II.
Application
TSTC argues dismissal of this case is warranted because the claims asserted are barred by
sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. Mot. Dismiss [#4] at 3-4. Specifically,
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TSTC contends it is entitled to sovereign immunity as a state agency, and the Eleventh
Amendment thus divests this Court of jurisdiction. Id. TSTC also asserts its immunity extends
to White's tort claims because the Texas Tort Claims Act does not waive a state's immunity for
intentional torts. Id. at 4-5.
The Court agrees it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims in this case. TSTC,
as a state agency, is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity absent Congressional abrogation
or voluntary waiver. See Sullivan
v. Univ. of Tex.
217 F. App'x 391, 392 (5th Cir. 2007).
Health Sd. Ctr. at Houston Dental Branch,
TSTC's immunity extends to claims for age
discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) as well as
claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See id. at 393 ("ADEA does not abrogate
Eleventh Amendment immunity"); See Ganther
v.
Ingle, 75 F.3d 207, 210 (5th Cir. 1996)
(affirming dismissal of intentional infliction of emotional distress claim on basis of Eleventh
Amendment immunity, noting "Section 101 .057 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code
provides that any waiver of sovereign immunity does not apply to claims arising out of
intentional torts").
White does not dispute TSTC's underlying entitlement to immunity, but instead contends
such immunity has been abrogated and/or waived.' Resp. [#6] at 2-5. First, White argues Texas
waived its immunity to age discrimination cases in Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code. Id. at 2.
The Fifth Circuit has rejected this argument as to age discrimination claims under the ADEA.
See Sullivan, 217 F. App'x at 394 (finding Texas did not waive immunity of ADEA claims in
passing the Texas Labor Code). Second, White asserts TSTC waived sovereign immunity by
receiving federal funds. Resp. [#6] at 2-3. This argument too has been foreclosed by the Fifth
White oniy challenges TSTC's Eleventh Amendment immunity arguments as to the age discrimination
claims, effectively conceding immunity bars the tort claim asserted here.
3
Circuit. See Sullivan, 217 F. App'x at 394 (finding no waiver under 42 U.S.C.
§
2000d-7(a)(1)
for state's acceptance of federal funding). Third, White suggests TSTC is not entitled to
immunity because there is no legitimate state interest for its discrimination. Resp. [#6] at 3-4
(citing Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. at 62 (2000)). White's reliance on Kimel is
misplaced, as the Supreme Court's reference to "legitimate state interest" was with respect to the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 83. The Equal Protection Clause
is not at issue here. More related to the issue of immunity at hand, the Kimel court held "in the
ADEA, Congress did not validly abrogate the States' sovereign immunity to suits by private
individuals." Id. at 91. Accordingly, White's arguments related to abrogation and waiver fail.
Finally, the Court addresses White's reference to the Age Discrimination Act of 1975
(ADA). White does not make the statutory basis of his age discrimination claim clear in the
complaint. See Compl. [#1] at ¶J 18, 19. TSTC treated White's age discrimination claim as
arising under the ADEA, and White did little to refute or clarify the same in response. To the
extent White relies on the ADA instead of the ADEA, such a claim would also be properly
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because White has failed to plead facts to
suggest he exhausted all administrative remedies before filing this lawsuit. See D.A. ex rel.
Latasha A.
v.
Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 629 F.3d 450, 455 (5th Cir. 2010) (affirming dismissal
of ADA claims, stating "plaintiff must exhaust his administrative remedies before filing an
action in the district court."); see also Parker v. Bd. of Supervisors Univ. of Louisiana-Lafayette,
270 Fed. Appx. 314, 317 (5th Cir. 2008) (listing administrative prerequisites for a "district
court's jurisdiction under the ADA").
For the forgoing reasons, the Court concludes it lacks jurisdiction of White's claims
asserted. Dismissal is therefore warranted under Rule 12. TSTC's motion to stay discovery is
moot in light of opinion.
Conclusion
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Texas State Technical College's Motion to
Dismiss [#4] is GRANTED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Texas State Technical College's
Motion to Stay Discovery [#5] is DISMISSED as moot; and
IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that all claims brought by Plaintiff Robert White in
the above-styled and numbered cause are DISMISSED without prejudice.
SIGNED this the
23
dayofFebruary2Ol8.
SAM SPARKS
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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