Miller v. MV Transportation, Inc.

Filing 26

ORDER GRANTING 12 Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint. Signed by Judge Robert Pitman. (td)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AUSTIN DIVISION
WAYNE MILLER, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff,
v.
MV TRANSPORTATION, INC.,
Defendant.

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1:18-CV-538-RP

ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Opposed Motion for Leave to File Amended Collective
Action Complaint. (Dkt.12). Having considered the parties’ arguments, the record, and the relevant
law, the Court finds that the motion should be granted.
I. BACKGROUND
This is a Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) action concerning overtime compensation for
employees of Defendant MV Transportation, Inc. (“MVTI”), which provides services to Austin’s
Capital Metro. (Compl., Dkt. 1, at 1). Plaintiff Wayne Miller (“Miller”) alleges that he and similarly
situated employees were denied overtime because MVTI shaved their time. (Id. at 4).
Miller filed his complaint on June 26, 2018. (Id.). MVTI answered on August 22, 2018, (Dkt.
6), after which Miller sought to amend his complaint by way of the instant motion on November 8,
2018, (Dkt. 12). Miller’s proposed amended complaint adds allegations that MVTI denied overtime
compensation by docking employees for time spent at lunch even when they worked through lunch.
(Prop. Am. Compl., Dkt. 12-1, at 4). Because of the timing of the proposed amendment and because
MVTI does not consent to the amendment, Miller must receive the Court’s leave. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a)(1), (2). Miller filed his motion for leave before the Court held the initial pretrial conference and
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entered a scheduling order. (Dkts. 20, 21). The deadline to file amended pleadings is April 30, 2019,
and the discovery deadline is September 30, 2019. (Dkt. 21). As of January 14, 2019, the parties had
not yet conducted a Rule 26(f) conference, and MVTI opposes doing so until the resolution of
Miller’s motion for leave. (Dkt. 24-1).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Where, as here, a party seeks leave to amend more than 21 days after serving its pleading,
service of a responsive pleading, or service of a motion under Rules 12(b), (e), or (f), it may do so
“only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1), (2).
“The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(2). Rule 15(a)
“requires the trial court to grant leave to amend freely, and the language of this rule evinces a bias in
favor of granting leave to amend.” Lyn–Lea Travel Corp. v. Am. Airlines, 283 F.3d 282, 286 (5th Cir.
2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “[A]bsent a ‘substantial reason’ such as undue
delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, repeated failures to cure deficiencies, or undue prejudice to the
opposing party, ‘the discretion of the district court is not broad enough to permit denial.’” Mayeaux
v. Louisiana Health Serv. & Indem. Co., 376 F.3d 420, 425 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Dussouy v. Gulf Coast
Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 598 (5th Cir. 1981)).
III. DISCUSSION
In opposing Miller’s motion for leave, MVTI argues that Miller should have known about
the alleged lunch-docking scheme when he filed his original complaint four months before seeking
leave to amend. (Resp. Mot. Leave, Dkt. 17, at 2). MVTI states that because Miller provides no
justification for the four-month delay in his motion for leave, the motion should be denied as
dilatory. (Id. at 3). MVTI says that it will be prejudiced by having to engage in additional discovery to
investigate these new allegations. (Id. at 4–5). Miller replies that he first learned about the alleged

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lunch docking after talking to a witness on October 30, 2018. (Reply Mot. Leave, Dkt. 18, at 2;
Welmaker Decl., Dkt. 18-1).
MVTI does not suggest that Miller’s delay was motivated by bad faith; its objections lie in
undue delay and prejudice. As the nonmoving party, MVTI has the burden to prove undue delay. See
Thomas as Tr. of Performance Products Inc. v. Hughes, 5:16-CV-951-DAE, 2018 WL 2996901, at *4 (W.D.
Tex. Feb. 22, 2018); Dussouy, 660 F.2d at 598 n.2. The Fifth Circuit cautions that the “mere passage
of time need not result in refusal of leave to amend,” and that amendment “can be appropriate as
late as trial or even after trial.” Dussouy, 660 F.2d at 598. When a party files a motion to amend
before the court-ordered deadline, there is a presumption of timeliness that the nonmovant must
rebut to show undue delay. Sabre, Inc. v. Lyn-Lea Travel Corp., CIV.A. 3:96-CV-2068R, 2003 WL
21339291, at *5 (N.D. Tex. June 5, 2003); see also Poly-Am., Inc. v. Serrot Intern. Inc., CIV. A. 3:00-CV1457, 2002 WL 206454, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 7, 2002) (“The court in entering its scheduling order
presumptively determined that a motion filed before the deadline for seeking amendments to
pleadings would not be deemed dilatory.”). MVTI has made no showing to overcome the
presumption of timeliness. Its only basis for deeming Miller’s motion dilatory is that he lacks any
justification at all for waiting several months to seek this amendment. (Resp. Mot. Leave, Dkt. 17, at
2–3). Miller’s reply provides an adequate justification. (Reply Mot. Leave, Dkt. 18, at 2; Welmaker
Decl., Dkt. 18-1).
Likewise, the Court finds that MVTI will not be unduly burdened by permitting amendment
at this early stage in the litigation. “A defendant is prejudiced if an added claim would require the
defendant to reopen discovery and prepare a defense for a claim different from the one that was
before the court.” Smith v. EMC Corp., 393 F.3d 590, 596 (5th Cir. 2004) (cleaned up). The parties
have not even yet begun discovery. The deadline for dispositive motions does not arrive until this

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December, and trial is more than a year away. (Dkt. 21). The Court does not find that the expense of
conducting additional discovery, when none has yet been done, is unduly prejudicial. Moroever,
Miller’s proposed amendment does not “fundamentally alter the nature” of this case; it advances an
alternative theory of recovery on similar and related facts. Mayeaux, 376 F.3d at 427. Amendments
are generally permitted in such circumstances. Id.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons given above, IT IS ORDERED that Miller’s Opposed Motion for Leave to
File Amended Collective Action Complaint, (Dkt.12), is GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court shall
docket the amended pleading attached as an exhibit to Miller’s motion. (Dkt. 12-1).
SIGNED on January 18, 2019.

_____________________________________
ROBERT PITMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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