Quinonez v. Moore et al
Filing
35
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER. IT IS ORDERED that Quifionez's petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (ECF No. 1) is DENIED, and his cause is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Quinonez is DENIED a certificate of appealability. IT IS ALSO ORDERED that all pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT. IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that the Clerk shall CLOSE this case.. Signed by Judge Frank Montalvo. (st)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
EL PASO DIVISION
DAVID QUIISONEZ,
TDCJ # 1865830,
C
§
§
Petitioner,
§
§
v.
EP-14-CV-73-FM
§
§
WILLIAM STEPHENS,
Director, Texas Department of
Criminal Justice, Correctional
Institutions Division,
Respondent.
§
§
§
§
§
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner David Quiflonez's petition for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§
2254 (ECF No. 1).' In his petition, Quii'ionez, a state
prisoner at the Bill Clements Unit in Amarillo, Texas, with a projected release date of February
18, 2051, challenges Respondent William Stephens's custody over him based on a conviction in
the 171St Judicial District Court of El Paso County, Texas, for murder.2 Quiflonez asserts his
counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance "by not bringing forward" exculpatory
witnesses or addressing his mental
fail and be denied as without
"incompetence."3
merit."4
Stephens contends Quinonez' s "claim must
Quiflonez replies, "[un a nutshell.
. .
his plea of guilty.
"ECF No." in this context refers to the Electronic Case Filing number for documents
docketed in this case. Where a discrepancy exists between page numbers on filed documents and
page numbers assigned by the ECF system, the Court will use the latter page numbers.
2
State
11,2013).
v.
Quiñonez,
Cause No. 201 10D02123 (171st Dist. Ct. El Paso Cnty., Tex. June
Pet'r's Pet. 7, ECF No.
1, Feb. 3, 2014.
Resp't's Answer 19, ECF No. 24, July 28, 2014.
was not voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently [entered] due to the ineffective assistance of
counsel."5
After carefully reviewing the record and for the reasons discussed below, the Court
finds Quinonez is not entitled to
§
2254 relief. The Court will accordingly deny Quiflonez's
petition and decline to certify his issues for appeal.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
According to local newspaper accounts, on February 18, 2011, Quinonez shot Jimmy
Romero four times with a firearm as they sat with Rosie Rodriguez in a red Dodge Neon stopped
at the entrance to the short-term parking lot on the east side of the El Paso International Airport
in El Paso, Texas. After the shooting, witnesses saw Quiflonez throw a gun into nearby bushes,
run into the airport's long-term parking lot, and flee in a shuttle bus to the airport terminal.
Police officers eventually arrested him on the west side of the airport. Romero's autopsy report
revealed two lethal shots, including one which traveled through his heart, caused him to bleed to
death. A state grand jury returned an indictment charging Quiflonez with murder. The
indictment contained a sentencing enhancement based on Quiflonez's prior felony conviction in
Chaves County, New Mexico, for aggravated fleeing of a law enforcement
officer.6
Quinonez
pleaded not guilty and proceeded to trial. After hearing the evidence and three hours of jury
deliberations on a verdict, Quinonez told his attorneys that he would accept the State's plea
agreement offering him a 40-year prison sentence in exchange for his guilty plea. Meanwhile,
the jury apparently determined that Quiuionez was guilty as charged. On June 11, 2013, the court
accepted Quiflonez's plea and sentenced him to the recommended forty-years in prison.
Quiflonez did not appeal.
Pet'r's Reply 3, ECF No. 31, Aug. 27, 2014.
6
State Writ. R. 22, Ex parte Quiflonez, WR-80,688-01.
-2-
Quinonez did file a state application for writ of habeas corpus collaterally attacking the
conviction. In his state writ, Quifionez asserted his counsel provided ineffective assistance when
they failed to (1) investigate the case and interview witnesses; (2) advise the court that he was
taking medications, withdrawing from methamphetamine, and suffering from a learning
disability; and (3) call as witnesses during his trial Rosie Rodriguez, who would have told the
jury that the victim had threatened him, and Eddie Cummings, who would have testified that
Romero's brother had told him that Romero had plotted to kill
Quiflonez.7
On January 8, 2014,
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied the writ application without written order.8 This
proceeding followed on January 28, 2014.
Mindful of Quiflonez' s pro se status,9 the Court understands him to now assert that his
counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance when they failed to (1) interview "Rosie
Rodriguez who would have testified as to.
. .
Romero threaten[ing] his life by telling [him], 'I'll
put you in the cemetery' ";'° (2) obtain a psychiatric evaluation of Quinonez, although he told
them he was "delusional.. . had difficulty reasoning.
. .
legally insane.. . paranoid... [and]
schizophrenic";" and (3) call an unnamed witness who would have testified that the victim had
threatened Quiflonez, call Eddie Cummings who would have testified that the victim's brother
State Writ R. 32-34, Exparte Quiionez, WR-80,688-01.
8
Id. at cover.
9See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (holding pro se pleadings to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers); see also Franklin v. Rose, 765
F.2d 82, 85 (6th Cir. 1985) (explaining liberal construction allows active interpretation of apro
se pleading to encompass any allegation which may raise a claim for federal relief).
10
Br. in Supp. 1, ECF No. 1-1, Feb. 3, 2014.
"Id. at3-4.
-3-
had told him that the victim had plotted to kill Quiflonez, or call another unnamed witnesses who
would have testified as to Quiftonez's character.'2 Quinonez claims,
"[as a result of these
deficiencies the defendant's plea of guilty was not a knowing, intelligent act done with sufficient
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences."13
APPLICABLE LAW
28 U.S.C. § 2254
A.
"{C]ollateral review is different from direct review,"14 and the writ of habeas corpus is
"an extraordinary remedy"5 reserved for those petitioners whom "society has grievously
It "is designed to guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice
wronged."6
system."7
It provides an important, but limited, examination of an inmate's conviction and
sentence.'8
Accordingly, the federal habeas courts' role in reviewing state prisoner petitions is
exceedingly narrow. "Indeed, federal courts do not sit as courts of appeal and error for state
court convictions."9 They must generally defer to state court decisions on the merits20 and on
12.)d
at 6-8.
'31d.
at2.
14
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633 (1993).
' Id.
'6Id at 634.
' Id. (citing Justice
Stevens's concurrence in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n.5
(1979)).
18
See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 131 S.Ct. 770, 787 (2011) ("[Sltate courts are
the principal forum for asserting constitutional challenges to state convictions.").
' Dillard v.
Blackburn, 780 F.2d 509, 513 (5th Cir. 1986).
20
Moore
v.
Cockrell, 313 F.3d 880, 881 (5th Cir. 2002).
procedural
grounds.21
They may not grant relief to correct errors of state constitutional, statutory,
or procedural law, unless a federal issue is also present.22
A federal court can only grant relief if "the state court's adjudication of the merits was
'contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,'
"23
or
"resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented in the State court proceeding."24 The focus of this well-developed
standard "is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination was incorrect but
whether that determination was unreasonablea substantially higher threshold."5
Moreover, the federal court's focus is on the state court's ultimate legal conclusion, not
whether the state court considered and discussed every angle of the
courts are presumed to know and follow the
law."27
evidence.26
Indeed, state
Factual findings, including credibility
choices, are entitled to the statutory presumption, so long as they are not unreasonable "in light of
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30 (1991); Muniz v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 214,
220 (5th Cir. 1998).
21
22
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); West v. Johnson, 92 F.3d 1385, 1404
(5th Cir. 1996).
23
24
25
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 378 (2010) (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§
2254(d)(l)).
2254(d)(2) (2012).
28 U.S.C.
§
Schriro
Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007).
v.
26
Neal v. Puckett, 286 F.3d 230, 246 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc); see also Catalan v.
Cockrell, 315 F.3d 491, 493 (5th Cir. 2002) ("we review only the state court's decision, not its
reasoning or written opinion").
27
Woodfordv. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002).
-5-
the evidence presented in the State court proceeding."28 Further, factual determinations made by
a state court enjoy a presumption of correctness which the petitioner can rebut only by clear and
convincing evidence.29 The presumption of correctness applies not only to express findings of
fact, but also to "unarticulated findings which are necessary to the state court's conclusions of
mixed law and fact."3°
In sum, the federal writ serves as a "guard against extreme malfunctions in the state
criminal justice systems," not as a vehicle for error correction.3' "If this standard is difficult to
meet, that is because it was meant to be."32
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
B.
To prove an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, a petitioner must satisfy both prongs
of the test announced in Strickland v. Washington33 by showing not only constitutionally
deficient performance by counsel, but also actual prejudice to his legal position.34 The Court
2828
U.S.C.
§
2254(d)(2).
2928 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see Clarkv. Quarterman, 457 F.3d 441, 444 (5th Cir. 2006)
(noting that a state court's determination under § 2254(d)(2) is a question of fact).
30
31
Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941, 948 n.l 1 (5th Cir. 2001).
Harrington
v.
Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 131 S.C. 770, 786 (2011) (citation omitted)
(emphasis added).
32
Id.
Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689-94 (1984).
Motley v. Collins, 18 F.3d 1223, 1226 (5th Cir. 1994) (summarizing the Strickland
standard of review).
need not address both components if the petitioner makes an insufficient showing on one.35 To
demonstrate deficiency, a petitioner must show that "counsel made errors so serious that counsel
was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment."36 A
court considering such a claim "must apply a 'strong presumption' that counsel's representation
was within the 'wide range' of reasonable professional assistance."37 To demonstrate prejudice,
a petitioner must show "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different."38
A mere
allegation of prejudice is not sufficient to satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland.39 The
probability "of a different result must be substantial, not just
conceivable."0
Thus, counsel's
performance is entitled to "a heavy measure of deference" by a reviewing court.4'
Moreover, the Court must review a petitioner's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim
"through the deferential lens of [28 U.S.C.]
§ 2254(d),"42
and consider not only whether the state
court's determination was incorrect, but also "whether that determination was unreasonablea
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
361d.
at 687.
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 131 S. Ct. 770, 787 (2011) (citation omitted).
38
Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 38-39 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
39Armsteadv. Scott, 37 F.3d 202, 206 (5th Cir. 1994).
40Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 792.
41
Cullen v. Pinhoister, 131 S .Ct. 1388, 1408 (2011) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
421d at 1403.
-7-
substantially higher threshold."43 Thus, in light of the deference accorded by § 2254(d), "[t]he
pivotal question is whether the state court's application of the Strickland standard was
unreasonable":44
The standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both highly deferential,
and when the two apply in tandem, review is doubly so. The Strickland
standard is a general one, so the range of reasonable applications is
substantial. Federal habeas courts must guard against the danger of equating
unreasonableness under Strickland with unreasonableness under § 2254(d).
When § 2254(d) applies, the question is not whether counsel's actions were
reasonable. The question is whether there is any reasonable argument that
counsel satisfied Strickland's deferential standard.45
ANALYSIS
A.
Failure to Interview Witnesses (Claims One and Three)
Quiflonez asserts his counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance when they
failed to interview "Rosie Rodriguez who would have testified as to.
life by telling [him],
'I'll put you in the cemetery.'
"46
. .
Romero threaten[ing] his
He further asserts they erred when they
failed to call an unnamed witness who would have testified that Romero had threatened
Quiflonez, call Eddie Cummings who would have testified that Romero's brother told him that
Romero had plotted to kill Quiñonez, or call another unnamed witnesses who would have
Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009) (citing Schriro v. Landrigan, 550
U.S. 465, 473 (2007)).
44Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 785.
451d.
46
at 788.
Br. in Supp. 1, ECF No. 1-1, Feb. 3, 2014.
-8-
testified as to Quiflonez' s character.47
An adequate investigation is a requisite of effective assistance.48 To establish a
constitutional violation, however, a defendant must show both a failure to investigate adequately
and prejudice arising from that failure.49 Thus, for a petitioner to prevail, he must allege, with
specificity, what the investigation would have revealed and how it would have altered the
outcome of the
trial.50
Furthermore, "[c]laims that counsel failed to call witnesses are not
favored on federal habeas review."5' "[The presentation of witnesses is generally a matter of
trial strategy and speculation about what witnesses would have said on the stand is too
uncertain."52
Accordingly, a petitioner seeking to show ineffective assistance of counsel by
failing to investigate a witness must "name the witness, demonstrate that the witness was
available to testify and would have done so, set out the content of the witness's proposed
testimony, and show that the testimony would have been favorable to a particular defense."53
Additionally, in the context of a guilty plea, the defendant must not only show that counsel
provided ineffective assistance, but also show that, absent counsel's errors, the defendant would
471d.
48
at 6-8.
Gray v. Lucas, 677 F.2d 1086, 1093 (5th Cir.1982).
Id.
50
United States
51
Woodfox v. Cain, 609 F.3d 774, 808 (5th Cir. 2010).
52
Id.
v.
Green, 882 F.2d 999, 1003 (5th Cir.1989).
Day v. Quarterman, 566 F.3d 527, 538 (5th Cir.2009).
not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.54 Mere allegations from a
petitioner that he would have demanded a trial if counsel's advice had been different are
insufficient to establish a reasonable probability that he would have actually done
so.55
If the
petitioner claims that counsel erred by failing to investigate or discover certain exculpatory
evidence, the prejudice determination will depend upon whether the discovery of such evidence
would have influenced counsel to change his advice regarding the guilty
plea.56
It is clear that the evidence against Quiflonez was overwhelming and that he faced a
potential sentence of life in prison.57 It is not clear, however, that Rosie Rodriguez, Eddie
Cummings, and the unnamed witnesses were both available for trial and would have testified in a
manner favorable to Quiflonez' s defense. In these difficult circumstances, Quiflonez' s counsel
successfully negotiated a plea agreement with the State which included a recommendation that
the Court impose a forty-year
sentence.58
Moreover, they convinced the State to accept the
agreement while the jury deliberated Quinonez's guilt. Thus, Quinonez received substantial
benefit from his plea bargain. Quiflonez has not shown, through his conclusory assertions, that
the results of an investigationand the experience of the
trialwould have caused his counsel to
change their advice with regard to the guilty plea. Moreover, he has not shown that, had his
counsel conducted a more thorough investigation and had called the witnesses to testify, he
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985); Joseph v. Butler, 838 F.2d 786, 791 (5th Cir.
1988).
55Joseph, 838 F.2d at 791.
56
Mangum
v.
Hargett, 67 F.3d 80, 83 (5th Cir.1995).
State Writ R. 24, Exparte Quthonez, WR-80,688-01.
581d at 29.
-10-
would not have pleaded guilty, but would have insisted on continuing with the trial. Quiflonez
has, therefore, not overcome the strong presumption that his counsels' representation was within
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance or shown that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for his counsel's purported errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.
Furthermore, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals implicitly applied the law discussed
above to Quinonez' s claims when it denied his state writ application.59 Again, it "is not the
province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law
questions," but rather, "to decid[e] whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United
States."6°
Quifionez has not met his burden of showing, by clear and
convincing evidence, that "the state court's adjudication of the merits was 'contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,'
"M
or "resulted in a
decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding."62
Quiflonez is not entitled to
B.
§
2254 relief on these claims.
Failure to Obtain a Psychiatric Evaluation (Claim Two)
Quifionez also avers his counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance when
they failed to obtain a psychiatric evaluation, although he claims he told them he was "delusional
Id. at cover.
McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991).
60
Estelle
61
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 378 (2010) (quoting 28 U.S.C.
62
v.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).
-11-
§
2254(d)(1)).
had difficulty reasoning.
entered his guilty
plea.63
. .
legally insane.. . paranoid... [and] schizophrenic" before he
Quinonez does not, however, present evidence to substantiate his claim
of mental illness at the time he entered his plea.
A valid "guilty plea must be knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered. The
defendant must be shown to understand the nature of the charges and the consequences of the
plea."64
Understanding the consequences of a plea requires only that the petitioner know the
maximum prison term and fine for the charged
offense.65
Quinonez signed detailed, written plea papers which contained information regarding the
range of potential punishment attached to the charged offense as well as the consequences of the
plea before entering his plea.66 By signing these paperswhich included waivers,
acknowledgments, and a judicial confessionQuinonez acknowledged that he understood the
admonishments, that he was aware of the consequences of his plea, that he was mentally
competent to enter his plea, and that he was knowingly, freely, and voluntarily entering his
plea.67
Moreover, both trial counsel and the trial court signed the plea papers as well,
demonstrating that they reviewed these admonishments and waivers with
Quiflonez.68
More
63
Br. in Supp. 3-4, ECF No. 1-1, Feb. 3, 2014.
64
Grabowski v. Jackson Cnty. Public Defenders Office, 47 F.3d 1386, 1389 (5th Cir.
1995).
65
James v. Cain, 56 F.3d 662, 666-67 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Spinelli v. Collins, 992 F.2d
559, 561 (5th Cir. 1993)).
66
State Writ R. 23-30, Exparte Quiñonez, WR-80,688-01.
67
Id. at 26 (emphasis added).
Id. at 28.
-12-
specifically, they certified to the trial court that Quiflonez was "competent to stand trial and able
to communicate with" them and assist "in the preparation of a defense."69 Finally, the trial court
entered its own findings, approval, and order in which it further confirmed that Quiflonez was
"aware of the nature of the charges" against him, "mentally competent to enter a plea of guilty,"
and capable of "freely and voluntarily" entering his plea.7°
Official state court records are entitled to a presumption of regularity as well as a
presumption of correctness on federal habeas review.7' Moreover, formal declarations in open
court carry a strong presumption of truth.72 Here, the trial court's record makes it clear that
Quinonez' s was mentally competent at the time he voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently
entered his guilty plea.
"Absent evidence in the record, a court cannot consider a habeas petitioner's bald
assertions on a critical issue in his pro se petition (in state and federal court), unsupported and
unsubstantiated by anything else contained in the record, to be of probative evidentiary value."73
"The subsequent presentation of conclusory allegations which are unsupported by specifics is
subject to summary
69
dismissal."74
Id.
701d at 30.
Carter v. Collins, 918 F.2d 1198, 1202 n.4 (5th Cir. 1990); Hobbs
F.2d 1079, 108 1-82 (5th Cir. 1985).
71
72
Blackledge
v.
v.
Blackburn, 752
Allison, 431 U.s. 63, 74 (1977).
Ross v. Estelle, 694 F.2d 1008, 1011-12 and n.2 (5th Cir. 1983); Koch
F.2d 524, 530 (5th Cir.1990).
Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 74.
-13-
v.
Puckett, 907
Quinonez's bald assertions, unsupported by any evidence, lack probative evidentiary
value and thus cannot support a claim for habeas corpus relief. Quiflonez has not, therefore,
overcome the strong presumption that his counsels' representation was within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance or shown that there is a reasonable probability that, but for his
counsel's purported errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
Moreover, in denying relief on state habeas review, the state court necessarily found that
Quiflonez's guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered. Both the implicit and explicit
factual findings and credibility determinations of the Texas courts are entitled to a presumption
of correctness.75 Since Quinonez has failed to rebut this presumption with clear and convincing
evidence, the Court must presume these findings are correct and reject his contentions to the
contrary.76
Accordingly, the Court finds that Quifionez has failed to demonstrate that the Texas
courts decisions resulted from an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law or
an unreasonable application of the facts in light of the evidence presented.
Quinonez is not entitled to
§
2254 relief on this claim.
EVIDENTIARY HEARING
A court will hold an evidentiary hearing on a
§
2254 petition only when the petitioner
shows either (1) the claim relies on a new, retroactive rule of constitutional law that was
previously unavailable or (2) a factual basis that could not have been previously discovered by
the exercise of due diligence and the facts underlying the claim show by clear and convincing
28 U.S.C. § 2254(e).
76
Id.; Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 433 (1983) (applying presumption of
correctness to implicit finding against the defendant's credibility, where that finding was
necessarily part of the court's rejection of the defendant's claim).
-14-
evidence that, but for the constitutional error, no reasonable jury would have convicted the
petitioner. Quinonez does not assert that either prerequisite for a hearing exists in his case. The
record is adequate to dispose fully and fairly of Quinonez' s claims. The Court need inquire no
further on collateral review and an evidentiary hearing is not necessary.
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
A petitioner may not appeal a final order in a habeas corpus proceeding "[u]nless a circuit
justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability."77 Further, appellate review of a habeas
petition is limited to the issues on which a certificate of appealability is granted.78 In other
words, a certificate of appealability is granted or denied on an issue-by-issue basis, thereby
limiting appellate review solely to those issues on which a certificate of appealability is granted.79
Although Quiflonez has not yet filed a notice of appeal, this Court nonetheless must address
whether he is entitled to a certificate of appealability.80
28 U.S.C.
§
2253(c)(l)(B) (2012).
78
See Lackey v. Johnson, 116 F.3d 149, 151 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that, in regard to the
denial of relief in habeas corpus actions, the scope of appellate review is limited to the issues on
which a certificate of appealability is granted).
See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3) (setting forth the narrow scope of appellate review in
habeas corpus matters); see also Lackey, 116 F.3d at 151 (holding that a certificate of
appealability is granted on an issue-by-issue basis, thereby limiting appellate review to those
issues); but see United States v. Kimler, 150 F.3d 429, 431 n.1 (5th Cir. 1998) ("We have
decided, however, that the monolithic nature of [Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure] Rule
22(b) in conjunction with Congress's mandate for issue specificity on collateral review embodied
in 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3) requires a more express request. In order to obtain appellate review of
the issues the district court refused to certify, the petitioner must first make the threshold
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. See 28 U.S.C. 2253(c)(2). Only after
clearing this hurdle may the petitioner proceed to brief and we review the merits of the rejected
issues.").
80
See 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2255 Rule 11(a) ("The district court must issue or deny a
certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.").
-15-
A certificate of appealability "may issue.
. .
only if the applicant has made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right."8' In cases where a district court rejects a
petitioner's constitutional claims on the merits, "[tihe petitioner must demonstrate that
reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable
or wrong."82 To warrant a grant of the certificate as to claims that the district court rejects solely
on procedural grounds, the petitioner must show both that "jurists of reason would find it
debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that
jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural
ruling."83
Here, Quifionez is not entitled to a certificate of appealability because reasonable
jurists would not find debatable the Court's conclusions that he has not made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Accordingly, the Court finds that it should deny
Quinonez a certificate of appealability.
CONCLUSION AND ORDERS
The Court concludes that Quiflonez is not entitled to
§
2254 relief The Court further
concludes that Quifionez is not entitled to a certificate of appealability. Accordingly, the Court
enters the following orders:
IT IS ORDERED that Quifionez's petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C.
§
81
2254 (ECF No. 1) is DENIED, and his cause is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
82
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see also United States v. Jones, 287 F.3d
325, 329 (5th Cir. 2002) (applying Slack to a certificate of appealability determination in the
context of § 2255 proceedings).
83
Slack, 529 U.S. at 484.
!f1
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Quinonez is DENIED a certificate of appealability.
IT IS ALSO ORDERED that all pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT.
IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that the Clerk shall CLOSE this case.
SO ORDERED.
SIGNED this
4
day of June 2015.
kIO
R'LC
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
-17-
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