Mora v. Albertson's LLC. et al

Filing 24

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART 12 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Signed by Judge Frank Montalvo. (st)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
EL PASO DIVISION
MARIA DIAZ MORA,
Plaintiff,
v.
ALBERTSON’S, L.L.C.;
ALBERTSON’S, L.L.C. TEXAS
WORKPLACE INJURY BENEFIT
PLAN; and SEDGWICK CLAIMS
MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC.,
Defendants.

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EP-15-CV-00071-FM

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
On this day, the court considered “Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss” (“Motion”) [ECF No.
12], filed April 8, 2015 by Defendants Albertson’s, L.L.C. (“Albertson’s”); Albertson’s, L.L.C.
Texas Workplace Injury Benefit Plan (the “Plan”); and Sedgwick Claims Management Services,
Inc. (“Sedgwick” and collectively, “Defendants”); “Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 12]” (“Response”) [ECF No. 19], filed April 30, 2015 by
Plaintiff Maria Diaz Mora (“Plaintiff”); and Defendants’ “Reply in Support of Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss” (“Reply”) [ECF No. 20], filed May 7, 2015.
After considering the Motion, Response, Reply, and applicable law, Defendants’ Motion
is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
I.

BACKGROUND
A.

Procedural Background

Plaintiff is a resident of El Paso County, Texas and, at the time of the events giving rise to

this case, was an Albertson’s employee.1 Because of her employment, Plaintiff was enrolled in
the Plan, a self-funded employee welfare benefit plan governed by the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”).2
On March 4, 2013, Plaintiff was injured while in the course and scope of her employment
with Albertson’s.3 Plaintiff asserts she was entitled to receive benefits from the Plan due to her
injury.4 However, Defendants allegedly “failed and refused to pay Plaintiff’s benefits to which
she was entitled . . . under the . . . Plan.”5 Consequently, Plaintiff filed her Complaint in the
Western District of Texas on March 13, 2015. Plaintiff’s Complaint advances four claims
against Defendants: (1) denial of benefits under ERISA, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)
(“section 1132(a)(1)(B)”); (2) breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §
1109(a) (“section 1109(a)”) and section 1132(a)(3); (3) statutory violations of ERISA for failing
to provide Plaintiff with various information, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 1022(a) (“section
1022(a)”), 1024(b) (“section 1024(b)”), and 1132(a) (“section 1132(a)”); and (4) federal common
law estoppel pursuant to ERISA.6 Plaintiff seeks a wide range of legal and equitable relief,

1

“Plaintiff’s Original ERISA Complaint and Jury Demand” (“Complaint”), at 1–2 ¶¶ 1, 6–7,
ECF No. 1, filed Mar. 13, 2015.
2

Id. at 3 ¶ 9; Mot. 2.

3

Compl. 2 ¶ 7.

4

Id. at 4 ¶ 13.

5

Id. ¶ 15.

6

Id. at 5–10 ¶¶ 23–39.

2

including extracontractual7 and punitive damages.8
On April 8, 2015, Defendants filed their Motion, seeking to dismiss all of Plaintiff’s
claims and denying Plaintiff’s eligibility for extracontractual and punitive damages under
ERISA. After an extension of time,9 Plaintiff responded to the Motion on April 30, 2015.
Defendants replied in support of their Motion on May 7, 2015.
B.

Parties’ Arguments

Defendants aver Plaintiff’s claim for denial of ERISA benefits is facially deficient, as her
Complaint fails to identify any Plan term entitling her to benefits. As ERISA permits recovery of
benefits “due . . . under the terms of [a] plan,”10 Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claim fails
because she has not specified applicable Plan terms.11 Defendants further assert Plaintiff’s
claims for breach of fiduciary duty and ERISA estoppel are duplicative of her claim for denial of
benefits, and are consequently precluded.12 Regarding Plaintiff’s section 1132(c) claim for
failing to provide information, Defendants argue Plaintiff has failed to allege: (1) what
information she requested, and (2) what information Defendants failed to produce on request,

7

Extracontractual damages are “[d]amages that would give a beneficiary more than he or she is
entitled to receive under the strict terms of the [ERISA] plan.” Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965
F.2d 1321, 1335 (5th Cir. 1992), abrogated by Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 (1993).
8

Plaintiff also requested a jury trial in her Complaint. Compl. 11 ¶ 47. Defendants’ Motion
opposed this request, and Plaintiff has conceded she is not entitled to a jury trial for her claims. Mot. 7;
Pl.’s Resp. 7 ¶ 13. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims will not be decided by a jury.
9

See “Order Granting Motion for Extension to Respond to Motion to Dismiss,” ECF No. 18,
entered Apr. 24, 2015.
10

29 U.S.C. ¶ 1132(a)(1)(B).

11

Mot. 4–5

12

Id. at 5–6.

3

thereby rendering her claim insufficient.13 In addition, Defendants dispute Plaintiff’s claim for
failure to provide information pursuant to sections 1022(a) and 1024(b), asserting the Western
District of Texas found a similar claim insufficient in Brown v. Aetna Life Insurance Co.14
Finally, Defendants assert Supreme Court precedent demonstrates Plaintiff is not entitled to
consequential or punitive damages for ERISA claims.15
Plaintiff argues she has sufficiently pleaded her claim for denial of benefits, as her
Complaint states she is seeking benefits under her plan’s terms, generally, and Defendant has
notice of the contours of her claim through the Plan’s administrative appeal process.16 Plaintiff
concedes she is unable to maintain a claim for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA, and she
agrees to withdraw the claim.17 Regarding her claim for failure to provide information, Plaintiff
avers her Complaint contains sufficiently detailed allegations to state a plausible claim for relief
under multiple statutory provisions.18 Plaintiff argues her ERISA estoppel claim is not
duplicative of her claim for denial of benefits, as conduct separate from the denial of benefits
supports the ERISA estoppel claim.19 Plaintiff contends she is not barred from receiving
13

Id. at 6.

14

975 F. Supp. 2d 610 (W.D. Tex. 2013); Defs.’ Reply 5–6.

15

Mot. 6–7. Defendants also assert Plaintiff’s Complaint concedes she is not entitled to such
damages. Id. at 6. Although Plaintiff’s Complaint expresses uncertainty about her entitlement, it does
not concede the point. See Compl. 11 ¶¶ 43–44 (requesting extracontractual and punitive damages “to
the extent such damages are allowed by law, and/or to preserve the issue for potential appellate review”
while citing potentially contrary Supreme Court authority).
16

Pl.’s Resp. 4–5 ¶ 8.

17

Id. at 5 ¶ 9.

18

Id. at 6 ¶ 11.

19

Id. at 5–6 ¶ 10.

4

extracontractual and punitive damages for her ERISA estoppel claim, though she agrees to
withdraw her requests for such damages in association with her other claims.20 To the extent
dismissal is proper, Plaintiff avers she should be permitted an opportunity to amend her
Complaint.21
II.

APPLICABLE LAW
Rule 12(b)(6) allows a complaint to be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted.”22 “The central issue is whether, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
the complaint states a valid claim for relief.”23 To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must
plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”24 “The plausibility
standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility
that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”25 “[F]acial plausibility” exists “when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.”26 Therefore, a complaint is not required to set out “detailed factual
allegations,” but does need to provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic

20

Id. at 6–7 ¶ 12.

21

Id. at 7 ¶ 14–15.

22

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

23

Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 313 (5th Cir.
2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495
F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007).
24

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

25

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

26

Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

5

recitation of the elements of a cause of action.”27 Although the court must accept well-pleaded
allegations in a complaint as true, it does not afford conclusory allegations similar treatment.28
III.

DISCUSSION
A.

Failure to Provide Benefits Pursuant to Section 1132(a)(1)(B)

Section 1132(a)(1)(B) permits an ERISA plan participant to bring a civil action “to
recover benefits due to [her] under the terms of [her] plan, to enforce [her] rights under the terms
of the plan, or to clarify [her] rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan.”29 As the
statute speaks of benefits and rights under the terms of ERISA plans, specific plan terms must be
considered to evaluate whether a plaintiff is entitled to relief pursuant to section 1132(a)(1)(B).30
Although Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges multiple grounds under which she was wrongfully
denied benefits under the terms of the Plan,31 it does not refer to Plan terms allegedly violated by
Defendants. Nevertheless, Plaintiff argues the following allegation in her Complaint sufficiently
pleads a violation of the Plan’s terms:
Plaintiff seeks to recover benefits due to her under the terms of the Plan, to enforce
her rights under the terms of the [P]lan, and to clarify her rights to future benefits
under the terms of the Plan.32

27

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

28

See Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050
(5th Cir. 1982) (citing Associated Builders, Inc. v. Ala. Power Co., 505 F.2d 97, 100 (5th Cir. 1974)).
29

29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).

30

Cf. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989) (“[T]he validity of a claim
to benefits under an ERISA plan is likely to turn on the interpretation of terms in the plan at issue.”).
31

See, e.g., Compl. 6 ¶ 25b (alleging Defendants “[w]rongfully terminat[ed] medical,
compensation and other benefits without reasonable reliance on any medical opinion”).
32

Id. at 5 ¶ 24; Pl.’s Resp. 4 ¶ 8.

6

This assertion mimics section 1132(a)(1)(B)’s enforcement provision33 and fails to indicate what
Plan terms were violated. Thus, the assertion does not adequately state a claim against
Defendants.34 Although Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges specific benefits she was denied, the
Complaint fails to indicate how she was entitled to those benefits under the Plan’s terms, making
the allegation inadequate to state a claim for denial of benefits.
Finally, Plaintiff contends Defendants have sufficient notice of her claim’s content
through Plaintiff’s exercise of administrative remedies. This argument is not persuasive, as
federal pleading standards require complaints to be facially sufficient. “To survive a motion to
dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.”35 When a complaint contains insufficient facts to state a
plausible claim to relief, it is irrelevant whether the parties have knowledge of unstated facts that
would cure the defect.36 Even if Defendants are aware of the basis of Plaintiff’s claim for denial
of benefits,37 Plaintiff is still required to plead sufficient facts to make the claim plausible.

33

Compare Compl. 5 ¶ 24 (“Plaintiff seeks to recover benefits due to her under the terms of the
Plan, to enforce her rights under the terms of the plan, and to clarify her rights to future benefits under
the terms of the Plan.”), with 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (“A civil action may be brought . . . by a
participant . . . to recover benefits due to [her] under the terms of [her] plan, to enforce [her] rights under
the terms of the plan, or to clarify [her] rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan.”).
34

See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
35

Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

36

See Lovelace v. Software Spectrum Inc., 78 F.3d 1015, 1017 (5th Cir. 1996) (“Normally, in
deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, courts must limit their inquiry to the facts stated
in the complaint and the documents either attached to or incorporated in the complaint.”).
37

As Plaintiff’s claim has been inadequately pled, it is unclear whether there are differences
between the claim Plaintiff presented administratively and the claim she is litigating.

7

Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to adequately plead a claim for denial of benefits
pursuant to section 1132(a)(1)(B).
B.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty Pursuant to Sections 1109(a) and 1132(a)(3)

In response to Defendants’ objection, Plaintiff has agreed to withdraw her claim for
breach of fiduciary duty. Therefore, this claim will be dismissed.
C.

Failing to Provide Information Pursuant to Sections 1022(a), 1024(b), and
1132(c)

Plaintiff’s failure to provide information claim has two variants. First, Plaintiff alleges
Defendants failed to comply with requests for Plan information in violation of section 1132(c).38
Second, Plaintiff alleges Defendants failed to provide her with summary plan descriptions and
summaries of material modifications in violation of sections 1022(a) and 1024(b).39 Defendants’
objections to these allegations will be analyzed in turn.
1.

Section 1132(c)

Pursuant to section 1132(c), “[a]ny administrator . . . who fails or refuses to comply with
a request for any information which such administrator is required by [ERISA] to furnish to a
participant or beneficiary [without reasonable excuse] within 30 days after such request” may be
liable for statutory damages.40
Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges “Defendants failed and refused to comply with Plaintiff’s
requests for information relative to the ERISA Plan, which Defend[ants] were required to furnish

38

Compl. 7 ¶ 30.

39

Id. ¶ 31.

40

29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1).

8

to Plaintiff under applicable law, and Defendants continued to fail to [and] refuse to provide such
information as requested.”41 Although this claim does evince a failure to provide requested
information, there is no indication requested information was withheld for more than 30 days.42
As Plaintiff must prove this element to be entitled to relief and, furthermore, Plaintiff’s
Complaint does not address this element, Plaintiff has failed to adequately support her section
1132(c) claim.
2.

Sections 1022(a) and 1024(b)

Section 1022(a) requires “[a] summary plan description [and summary of any material
modifications] of any employee benefit plan [to] be furnished to participants and beneficiaries.”43
Summary plan descriptions “shall be written in a manner calculated to be understood by the
average plan participant, and shall be sufficiently accurate and comprehensive to reasonably
apprise . . . participants . . . of their rights and obligations under the plan.”44 Summaries of any
material modifications to plan terms “shall be written in a manner calculated to be understood by
the average plan participant.”45 Section 1024(b) sets forth timing requirements for publishing
and furnishing summary plan descriptions and all material modifications and changes.46

41

Compl. 7 ¶ 30.

42

See Brown, 975 F. Supp. 2d at 620 (“Without an approximation of the dates of Plaintiff’s
request(s), the approximate dates or any allegations whatsoever of Defendants’ eventual compliance, or
even the temporal relationship between the request and the compliance, the Court is unable to evaluate
whether Plaintiff can satisfy every element of his § 1132(c)(1) claim, including the thirty day deadline.”).
43

29 U.S.C. § 1022(a).

44

Id. § 1022(a).

45

Id.

46

Id. § 1024(b)

9

Defendants’ Motion is silent regarding Plaintiff’s claim pursuant to sections 1022(a) and
1024(b). Rather, Defendants’ objection to the claim was raised for the first time in their Reply.
Although the court may decline to consider the argument as untimely raised,47 Defendants’
objection has been considered in the interest of justice.
Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges Defendants were required to provide her with summary plan
descriptions and summaries of material modifications fulfilling the requirements of sections
1022(a) and 1024(b), but did not provide such documents.48 Defendants’ sole argument is that
the Western District of Texas rejected similar allegations pursuant to sections 1022(a) and
1024(b) in Brown v. Aetna Life Insurance Co. On the contrary, the Brown court upheld
pleadings based on allegations that defendants failed to provide documents in compliance with
sections 1022(a) and 1024(b).49 Furthermore, the Brown court’s description of allegations it
found sufficient aligns with the allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint.50 Accordingly, Defendants’
description of Brown as supporting their Motion is not persuasive.
Because Defendants have failed to show how Plaintiff’s sections 1022(a) and 1024(b)

47

See Gillaspy v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 278 F. App’x 307, 315 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam)
(unpublished) (“It is the practice of this court and the district courts to refuse to consider arguments
raised for the first time in reply briefs.”).
48

Compl. 7 ¶ 31.

49

See Brown, 975 F. Supp. 2d at 620 (“The Amended Complaint alleges that Energy Defendants
never provided an accurate, comprehensive, and comprehensible summary of the [ERISA plan]. That is
all Plaintiff needs to allege to survive a motion to dismiss.”) (internal citations omitted).
50

Compare id. (stating the plaintiff “alleges that Energy Defendants never provided an accurate,
comprehensive, and comprehensible summary of the [ERISA plan]”), with Compl. 7 ¶ 31 (alleging
Defendants never provided “summary plan descriptions and . . . summaries of material modifications . . .
that are sufficiently accurate and comprehensive to reasonably apprise participants . . . of their rights and
obligations under the plan”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

10

allegations are deficient, their Motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim pursuant to sections 1022(a)
and 1024(b) is denied.
D.

ERISA Estoppel

Although Defendants do not dispute the factual sufficiency of Plaintiff’s ERISA estoppel
claim, they contend it must be dismissed as duplicative of Plaintiff’s claim for denial of benefits
pursuant to section 1132(a)(1)(B).51
In making this argument, Defendants describe ERISA estoppel as a claim pursuant to 29
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (“section 1132(a)(3)”), which permits civil actions “by a participant . . . to
obtain other appropriate equitable relief” under ERISA.52 In recognizing an ERISA estoppel
cause of action, the Fifth Circuit noted the duty for courts “to develop a ‘federal common law of
rights and obligations under ERISA-regulated plans,’” but did not mention section 1132(a)(3).53
As the Fifth Circuit has implied ERISA estoppel claims are based on common law rather than
pursuant to section 1132(a)(3), an analysis under section 1132(a)(3) is not warranted.
An ERISA estoppel claim has three elements: “(1) a material misrepresentation; (2)
reasonable and detrimental reliance upon the representation; and (3) extraordinary
circumstances.”54 In comparing these elements to section 1132(a)(1)(B), it is clear the two
claims cover different conduct. To prevail on a section 1132(a)(1)(B) claim, Plaintiff must prove
she is entitled to benefits under the terms of the Plan. By contrast, no element of Plaintiff’s
51

Mot. 5–6.

52

29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3); Mot. 5.

53

Mello v. Sara Lee Corp., 431 F.3d 440, 444 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co., 489 U.S. at 110).
54

Id.

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ERISA estoppel claim requires proof of an entitlement to benefits under the Plan’s terms.
Furthermore, Plaintiff’s Complaint states the ERISA estoppel claim is based on “material
misrepresentations,”55 indicating it does not depend on an entitlement under the Plan’s terms.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s ERISA estoppel claim is not duplicative of her section
1132(a)(1)(B) claim. Defendants’ Motion to dismiss the ERISA estoppel claim is denied.
E.

Extracontractual and Punitive Damages

Defendant disputes Plaintiff’s requests for extracontractual and punitive damages on the
basis that Plaintiff is not entitled to recover such damages for ERISA claims. Although Plaintiff
disputes this argument regarding her ERISA estoppel claim, she has agreed to withdraw her
requests in connection with all her other claims. To the extent Plaintiff seeks to withdraw
requests to extracontractual and punitive damages, those requests will be dismissed without
further discussion. It remains necessary to analyze whether extracontractual and punitive
damages are available for an ERISA estoppel claim.
Neither party has presented binding authority directly addressing whether ERISA estoppel
claims are eligible for extracontractual and punitive damages. Furthermore, the Western District
of Texas has acknowledged that, “[b]ecause courts in the Fifth Circuit have so far had few
occasions to apply the doctrine, the contours of the newly recognized ERISA-estoppel remedy
are murky.”56
Defendants cite Massachusetts Mut. Life Insurance Co. v. Russell57 and Mertens v. Hewitt

55

Compl. 8 ¶ 33.

56

Brown, 975 F. Supp. 2d at 628 (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted).

57

473 U.S. 134 (1985).

12

Associates58 for the proposition that Plaintiff is not entitled to receive either extracontractual or
punitive damages under ERISA.59 Those cases examined whether such damages were available
pursuant to two ERISA provisions: 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(2) and 1132(a)(3).60 Accordingly, they
do not resolve whether extracontractual or punitive damages are available for ERISA estoppel
claims.
Before the Fifth Circuit recognized ERISA estoppel, it held that statutory ERISA claims
generally do not entitle plaintiffs to extracontractual or punitive damages.61 This holding is not
necessarily pertinent, as an ERISA estoppel claim appears to lack an express statutory basis. To
the extent ERISA estoppel claims arise outside of ERISA’s text, they might not be limited to
remedies expressly provided for by ERISA. However, Plaintiff has not indicated how ERISA’s
express remedies do not apply to her ERISA estoppel claim,62 and “where a statute expressly
provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading others into it.”63
Arguably, if Plaintiff cannot pursue extracontractual or punitive damages, some of her

58

508 U.S. 248 (1993).

59

Mot. 7.

60

Mertens, 508 U.S. at 253–55; Mass. Mut. Life Ins., 473 U.S. at 139–44.

61

See Rogers v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 167 F.3d 933, 944 (5th Cir. 1999)
(“Compensatory damages, whether extra-contractual or not, are not recoverable under ERISA.”); Medina
v. Anthem Life Ins. Co., 983 F.2d 29, 31 (5th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he express provisions of ERISA . . . include
no mechanism for awarding extracontractual or punitive damages.”).
62

The court acknowledges there may be inconsistency between an ERISA estoppel claim and
ERISA’s express remedies. For instance, while ERISA permits plan participants “to recover benefits due
to [her] under the terms of [her] plan,” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), an ERISA estoppel claim might be
valid even if a plan’s terms do not entitle a plaintiff to benefits.
63

Mass. Mut. Life Ins., 473 U.S. at 148 (quoting Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis,
444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979)).
13

losses might go uncompensated. But ERISA was not intended to compensate all losses for
eligible claims. As the Supreme Court has noted, “ERISA [is] an enormously complex and
detailed statute that resolved innumerable disputes between powerful competing interests — not
all in favor of potential plaintiffs.”64 Although Plaintiff might only be left with partial
compensation even if she proves her entire case, such an outcome would not conflict with
ERISA.
In light of authority disfavoring extracontractual or punitive damages for ERISA claims,
Plaintiff has failed to establish such damages are available for her ERISA estoppel claim.
However, the court acknowledges there does not appear to be Supreme Court or Fifth Circuit
authority directly addressing this issue.65 Although a dismissal is proper, Plaintiff will be
allowed to replead such damages and demonstrate they are available for her ERISA estoppel
claim. Therefore, Plaintiff’s request for extracontractual and punitive damages for her ERISA
estoppel claim will be dismissed without prejudice.
IV.

CONCLUSION
“Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss” [ECF No. 12] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED

IN PART. Accordingly,
1.

Plaintiff’s claim for denial of benefits pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) is
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE;

2.

64

Plaintiff’s claim for breach of fiduciary duty pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 1109(a) and

Mertens, 508 U.S. at 262.

65

See Brown, 975 F. Supp. 2d at 628 (“Because courts in the Fifth Circuit have so far had few
occasions to apply the doctrine, the contours of the newly recognized ERISA-estoppel remedy are
murky.”) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted).
14

1132(a)(3) is DISMISSED AS MOOT;
3.

Plaintiff’s claim for failure to provide information pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §
1132(a) is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE;

4.

Plaintiff’s requests for extracontractual and punitive damages are DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE in association with Plaintiff’s ERISA estoppel claim;

5.

Plaintiff’s requests for extracontractual and punitive damages are DISMISSED
AS MOOT in association with Plaintiff’s other claims;

6.

Defendants’ Motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for failure to provide information
pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 1022(a) and 1024(b) is DENIED; and

7.

Defendants’ Motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s ERISA estoppel claim is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
SIGNED this 28th day of May, 2015.

______________________________________
FRANK MONTALVO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

15