Lee v. Mission Chevrolet, LTD. et al
Filing
14
ORDER DENYING #11 Defendant's Motion for Leave to File Amended Answer. Signed by Judge David C Guaderrama. (mc4)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
EL PASO DIVISION
MARIA C. LEE,
§
§
§
Plaintiff,
v.
§
EP-16-CV-00034-DCG
§
MISSION CHEVROLET, LTD., and
JERRY SLAUGHTER,
Defendants.
§
§
§
§
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED ANSWER
Presently before the Court is Defendants Mission Chevrolet, Ltd. ("Mission") and Jerry
Slaughter's ("Slaughter") (collectively "Defendants") "Motion for Leave to File [Their]
Amended Answer" (ECF No. 11) ("Motion") filed on September 8, 2016, nearly four months
after the Scheduling Order's (ECF No.8) deadline to amend pleadings. Therein, Defendants
request leave to amend their Answer (ECF No.6) to add affirmative defenses of laches and
wavier in addition to and/or in the alternative to their statute of limitations defense, which they
pleaded in their Answer. Plaintiff Marcia C. Lee ("Plaintiff') filed a Response (ECF No. 12) in
opposition on September 19. Having considered the parties' arguments, in light of the applicable
law, the Court DENIES the Motion for the reasons that follow.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
On August 21, 2015, Plaintiff filed her Original Petition in Texas state court, asserting
claims of sex, race, and national origin discrimination, retaliation, and equal pay under Chapter
21 of the Texas Labor Code against Defendant Mission, and common law claims of assault and
battery against Defendant Slaughter. Notice ofRemoval, Ex. A, at 1, 4-5, ECF No. 1-1. 1
Thereafter, Defendants filed their Original Answer and two amended answers. !d. at 11, 13, 16.
On September 16, Defendants filed a plea to jurisdiction, seeking dismissal of Plaintiff's Chapter
21 claims. !d. at 19. Therein, Defendants argued that the state court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over those claims because she failed to timely file her Charge of Discrimination with
the Texas Workforce Commission. ld at 21 (citing Tex. Lab. Code§ 21.202 (providing that a
charge of discrimination "must be filed not later than 180th day after the date the alleged
unlawful employment practice occurred")). On January 25, 2016, Plaintiff amended her statecourt petition to add claims of race discrimination and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. !d. at
53. On January 29, Defendants removed the case to this Court on the basis of federal question
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, premised upon Plaintiff's § 1981 claims. Notice of
Removal ~ 5, ECF No. 1.
Upon removal, on February 25, 2016, Plaintiff moved for leave to amend her pleadings to
add, for the first time, claims of sex, race, and national origin discrimination, retaliation, and
equal pay under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and claims of equal pay under the Equal
Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). Pl.'s Mot. for Leave to Amend Compl. ~ 5, ECF No.3. She
argued that after removal, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply; her new claims are based
on the same core facts alleged in her state-court Original Petition in support of her Chapter 21
claims; and therefore, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(l), the new claims relate back
to the Original Petition filed on August 21, 2015. !d.~~ 7, 11, 12. Defendants did not oppose.
Id ~ 14. On February 29,2016, the Court granted Plaintiff's motion for leave, and Plaintiff's
"Second Amended Petition" (ECF No.4) ("Amended Complaint") was docketed.
1
All citations to Exhibit A refer to the Electronic Case Filing (ECF) page numbers imprinted on the pages
of the exhibit.
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On March 3, 2016, Defendants filed their Answer to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint.
Defs.' Answer, ECF No. 6. Therein, Defendants asserted, inter alia, a statute of limitations
defense, alleging that Plaintiff's Title VII claims are time-barred because she failed to assert
these claims within 90 days of receiving her Notice of Right to Sue from the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission. !d.
~
54.
On March 17, the Court entered a Scheduling Order providing that the parties shall file
motions to amend their pleadings by no later than May 13,2016. Scheduling Ord. ~ 3, ECF No.
8. The Order also sets the deadline for completing discovery on September 9 and the deadline
for filing dispositive motions on November 18. !d. ~~ 8, 10. The case is set for a jury trial on
April3, 2017.
On September 8, 2016, nearly four months after the deadline for motions to amend
pleadings passed, Defendants filed the instant ~otion, seeking leave to amend their Answer to
add the affirmative defenses of laches and waiver against Plaintiffs Title VII claims. Defs.'
Mot. for Leave to File First Am. Ans. ~ 6 [hereinafter "Defs.' Mot."], ECF No. 11. Therein,
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's "manipulative delay" in asserting her Title VII claims warrants
dismissal under the doctrines of laches and/or waiver:
Plaintiff's [sic] deliberately waived her right to file suit under Title VII and
instead chose to file an untimely lawsuit in state court under Chapter 21 where
subject-matter jurisdiction was lacking. By doing so, Plaintiff permitted the
statute of limitations on her Title VII claims to expire. . . . Then, only when the
case was pending in federal court, Plaintiff amended her pleadings to assert her
untimely Title VII based on the literal interpretation of the relation-back doctrine
under Rule 16(c).
!d.
~
9. On September 19, Plaintiff filed a Response opposing the Motion. Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.'
Mot. at 7 [hereinafter "Pl.'s. Resp."], ECF No. 12. Defendants failed to file any reply.
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II.
DISCUSSION
Where, as here, the deadline for seeking leave to amend pleadings has passed,
amendments are governed by the more strict Rule 16 standard, rather than the liberal Rule 15
standard. See S&W Enters. v. Southtrust Bank ofAla., 315 F.3d 533,536 (5th Cir. 2003). Under
Rule 16, late amendments may be accepted "only for good cause and with the judge's consent."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). To satisfy the good cause standard, a party seeking a post-deadline
amendment must demonstrate that he could not reasonably have met the scheduling order
deadline despite exercising diligence. Squyres v. Heico Cos., 782 F.3d 224, 238 (5th Cir. 2015).
In determining good cause, courts generally consider four factors: "( 1) the explanation
for the failure to timely move for leave to amend; (2) the importance of the amendment; (3)
potential prejudice in allowing the amendment; and (4) the availability of a continuance to cure
such prejudice." Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. CityofEI Paso, 346 F.3d 541,546 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting
S&W Enters., 315 F.3d at 536). "No single factor is dispositive, nor must all the factors be
present." Sapp v. Mem 'I Hermann Healthcare Sys., 406 F. App'x 866, 869 (5th Cir. 2010) (per
curiam) (citing S&W Enters., 315 F.3d at 536-37). Applying the four factors here, the Court
finds that Defendants have failed to satisfy the good cause standard.
A.
Factor 1: The Explanation/or Defendants' Failure to Timely Move for Leave to Amend
Defendants explain that the laches and waiver defenses they now seek to add "are not
traditionally asserted in employment cases," and when they answered Plaintiffs Amended
Complaint, they believed that their limitations defense adequately addressed Plaintiffs Title VII
claims. Defs.' Mot.
~
10. Defendants only "realized that Plaintiffs conduct was subject to [the
laches and waiver defenses]," "in researching and preparing for their dispositive motion." !d.
Importantly, they state that these defenses are not premised on the underlying facts of the case,
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but on Plaintiff's "conduct in litigation" insofar as she asserted her Title VII claims not while the
case was pending before the state court, but upon removal to the federal court. See id.
The Court finds Defendants' explanation unsatisfactory. See 6A Charles Alan Wright &
Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure§ 1522.2 (3d ed.) ("Attorney neglect or
inadvertence will not constitute good cause supporting modification."); Nieves v. John Bean
Techs. Corp., Civ. A No. 3:13-CV-4059-D, 2014 WL 2587577, at *2 (N.D. Tex. June 10, 2014)
("Nieves' assertion that her counsel did not 'realize' EMR could be joined as a defendant until
after the deadline is not sufficient to demonstrate good cause."); Nourison Rug Corp. v.
Parvizian, 535 F.3d 295, 298 (4th Cir. 2008) (The movant's explanation that "[i]n responding to
the motion for summary judgment, [his] counsel ... noted that there was a defense available to
[him] that he had not raised in his Answer ... is far short of what is required to satisfy the good
cause standard."). Critically, Defendants were aware the same facts that allegedly form the basis
of the defenses they now seek to assert, when Plaintiff moved to add her Title VII claims-at
least three months before the Scheduling Order's deadline for amending pleadings. Therefore,
before the deadline, Defendants could have exercised diligence by conducting the same research
that subsequently led to their discovery of the applicability of the laches and waiver defenses and
timely moved to amend their Answer. Unfortunately, they waited nearly four months after the
deadline and six months after they filed their Answer, before seeking leave to add these defenses.
Accordingly, this factor weighs strongly against granting the Motion. See S&W Enters.,
315 F.3d at 536 (affirming district court's refusal to grant leave to amend, noting "The same
facts were known to [the movant] from the time of its original complaint to the time it moved for
leave to amend"); Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 346 F.3d at 547 (The movant "was aware of the contract that
forms the basis of its proposed amendment months in advance of the deadline and does not offer
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a satisfactory explanation for its delay in seeking leave to amend."); Lozano v. Ocwen Fed Bank,
FSB, 489 F.3d 636, 644 (5th Cir. 2007) (affirming the district court's denial of leave to amend
under Rule 15 because the plaintiffs "had been aware of the factual underpinnings of the [new]
fraud claim for some time, and ... they had not been diligent in pursuing the claim").
B.
Factor 2: The Importance oftlte Amendment
Defendants state that the laches and waiver defenses they propose to add are important
because the Court should "scrutin[ize] ... Plaintiffs ... unique abuse of the procedural rules,"
Mot.~
and "deter similar abuses in the future." Defs.'
10. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
they argue, "do not contemplate resurrection of untimely claims [i.e., Plaintifr s Title VII claims]
simply because a case was removed to federal court." Id They suggest that "mere change of
forum[] should not vest a plaintiff with substantive rights which did not exist in the former
forum." Id
Plaintiff responds that she did not assert any Title VII claims in the state court because
such claims would not have related back to her Original Petition under Texas law applicable in
that court. Pl.'s Resp. at 4-5. Plaintiff states that she was prepared to litigate her§ 1981 claims
in the state court, but Defendants "chose to remove the instant case to federal court." Id at 4
(emphasis in original). Once the case was removed to the federal court, Plaintiff continues, she
realized that her Title VII claims would relate back under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 and
therefore, moved to assert such claims. Id at 5.
Defendants' arguments, which are more pertinent to their statute of limitations defense,
do not squarely address the importance of the amendment. At most, Defendants seek to assert
the laches and waiver defenses as a fallback position to their limitations defense. Moreover, in
evaluating "the importance of the amendment" factor, courts typically conduct an abbreviated
analysis to assess whether the proposed amendment would be futile. See e.g., Filgueira v US
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Bank Nat'/ Ass'n, 734 F.3d 420,423 (5th Cir. 2013); Wardv. CNH Am., L.L.C., 534 F. App'x
240,242 n.1 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam); Morris v. McDonald, Civ. A. No. EP-14-CV-00139DCG, 2015 WL 1546436, at *2-3 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 5, 2015). The Court is unable to do so here,
as Defendants do not provide any analysis, but merely recite the elements, of the proposed
defenses. 2 See Defs.' Mot. ~ 8. However, out an abundance of caution, the Court concludes that
this factor favors granting the Motion.
C.
Factors 3: Potential Prejudice
Defendants insist that there is no potential prejudice if the Court grants their Motion to
amend. ld
~
10. Specifically, they argue that because the defenses they propose to seek are
premised on Plaintiff's litigation conduct, not the underlying facts of the case, discovery on these
defenses is not necessary; however, they would not oppose limited discovery beyond the
discovery deadline tailored to these defenses. !d. Plaintiff counters that any such discovery
would require expenditure of time and effort in responding to Defendants' arguments, thereby
prejudicing her. Pl.'s Resp. at 6.
It appears that little to no discovery may be needed, to the extent the proposed defenses
are predicated on Plaintifrs litigation conduct. However, to the extent Defendants also assert
that these defenses are not traditionally asserted in employment cases, Defs.' Mot. ~ 10, there is
likely a dearth of case law regarding the defenses in the context of Title VII claims and the facts
of this case. Consequently, allowing the amendment would no doubt require Plaintiff to expend
a significant amount of time and effort in preparing for these defenses. See Ward, 534 F. App'x
It is worth noting that in the lone case that Defendants cite regarding the laches elements, Defs.' Mot. ~
8 (citing Johnson v. Crown Enters., Inc., 398 F.3d 339, 344 (5th Cir. 2005)), the Fifth Circuit there
concluded that the defendant-appellee failed to carry its burden, stating "Appellees fail to present any
caselaw or detailed argument in support ofth[e] contention [that the plaintiff's § 1981 claim is barred by
laches]. All that they argue is that [the plaintiff] waited too long." Johnson, 398 F.3d at 344.
2
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at 242 (finding prejudice because the "proposed amended complaint likely invites additional
discovery and certainly additional motion practice"). Accordingly, this factor weighs against
granting the Motion.
D.
Factor 4: Availability of a Continuance
Defendants argue that there is no need for a continuance to prepare for these defenses, as
because this case is not set for trial until April 3, 2017. Defs.' Mot. ~ 10. Moreover, the parties'
motions for summary judgment are not due until November 18, 2016. Any continuance the
Court grants would therefore alleviate the prejudice suffered by Plaintiff. Accordingly, this
factor weighs in favor of granting the Motion.
E. Balancing tlte Factors
In sum, two factors weigh against and two factors weigh in favor of granting the Motion.
On balance, however, the Court concludes that Defendants have failed to demonstrate good
cause. The focus of the good cause inquiry is on the diligence of the party requesting the court to
modify the scheduling order. See S&W Enters., 315 F.3d at 535 (quoting 6A Charles Alan
Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1522.1 (2d ed. 1990)); Cole v.
Sandel Med Indus., L.L.C., 413 F. App'x 683, 690 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) ("But the focus
of the 16(b) inquiry is on the 'diligence of the party needing the extension."' (quoting Fahim v.
Marriott Hotel Servs., Inc., 551 F.3d 344, 348 (5th Cir. 2008))). As discussed above, Defendants
fail to satisfactorily explain why they could not exercise diligence and move to amend their
Answer by the Scheduling Order's deadline. Accordingly, the Court exercises its "broad
discretion to preserve the integrity and purpose of the pretrial order," Geiserman v. MacDonald,
893 F.2d 787, 790 (5th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted), and denies Defendants' Motion.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court enters the following orders:
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants Mission Chevrolet, Ltd. and Jerry
Slaughter's "Motion for Leave to File [Their] Amended Answer" (ECF No. 11) is DENIED.
So ORDERED and SIGNED this
k
.!1:_ day of November 2016.
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