Kujawa v. Colvin
Filing
26
OPINION. Signed by Judge Miguel A. Torres. (mn)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
EL PASO DIVISION
FILED
2E JUL16
T:
DAWN C. KUJAWA,
US.
L4:5Ø
ST!CT C0LJT
lT1CI O
§
DEPU
§
Plaintiff
§
§
v.
NO. EP-16-CV-8 1-MAT
§
§
NANCY A. BERRYHILL,'
§
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF THE
§
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION §
§
Defendant
§
OPINION
This is a civil action seeking judicial review of an administrative decision pursuant to 42
U.S.C.
§
405(g). Plaintiff Dawn C. Kujawa appeals from the decision of the Commissioner of the
Social Security Administration ("Commissioner") denying her claims for Disability Insurance
Benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act ("the Act") and Supplemental Security
Income ("SSI") under Title XVI of the Act. The parties consented to the transfer of the case to
this Court for determination and entry of judgment.
See
28 U.S.C.
§
636(c); Local Court Rule
CV-72. For the reasons set forth below, the Commissioner's decision will be AFFIRMED.
I.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Kujawa was forty-two years old at the time of her hearing before the Administrative Law
Judge
("AL').
(R. 44)2 She graduated from high school and obtained a Certified Nursing
Assistant License, and she worked as a certified nurse assistant, quality control employee at a
printing business, assistant manager at Storage USA, salesperson at a mall kiosk, and assistant
'Nancy A. Berryhill is now the Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration. Pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Nancy A. Berryhill is substituted for Acting Commissioner Carolyn W. Colvin as the
defendant in this case.
2
Reference to the record of administrative proceedings is designated by (R. [page number(s)]).
1
TEXAS
manager at Blue Eagle Book Shop. (R. 44, 46-48). Kujawa filed an application for DIB on July
23, 2012, and an application for SSI on July 27, 2012, in which she alleged disability beginning
on August 9, 2011, due to fibromyalgia, chronic pain, lumbar and cervical spine pain, bipolar
disorder, depression, anxiety/panic disorder, irritable bowel syndrome, severe dyslexia, and
migraine headaches. (R. 149-56, 191). Afier her applications were denied initially and upon
reconsideration, Kujawa requested a hearing. (R. 76-83, 88-93, 95-97). On May 23, 2014, a
hearing was conducted before the AU. (R. 38-68). On August 15, 2014, the AU issued a written
decision denying benefits on the ground that Kujawa was capable of performing jobs that exist in
significant number in that national economy. (R. 13-23). On January 21, 2016, the Appeals
Council denied Kujawa's request for review, thereby making the AU's decision the
Commissioner's fmal administrative decision. (R. 1-3).
In her written decision, the AU
found that Kujawa had the following severe
impairments: Degenerative Disc Disease of the Lumbar Spine; Fibromyalgia; Migraine
Headaches; Sleep Apnea; Bipolar Disorder; Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder; and Borderline
Personality Disorder. (R. 15). The AU determined that Kujawa had the residual functional
capacity ("RFC") to:
perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except the
claimant can occasionally climb stairs and ramps, balance, stoop, crouch, kneel,
and crawl; the claimant should never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; the
claimant must avoid frequent exposure to temperature extremes; and the claimant
should avoid unprotected heights. The claimant is limited to understanding,
remembering, and carrying out only simple instructions; she is able to maintain
attention and concentration to perform only simple tasks for two hours at a time
without requiring redirection to task; and she can have only superficial
interactions with co-workers.
(R. 18). Kujawa argues that the AU
failed to (1) give good cause for rejecting a treating
physician's opinions and (2) consider the Newton factors when rejecting those opinions.
2
II.
DISCUSSION
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court's review is limited to a determination of whether the Commissioner's fmal
decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole, and whether the
Commissioner applied the proper legal standards in evaluating the evidence. Myers
F.3d 617, 619 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Greenspan
v.
v.
Apfel, 238
Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir. 1994)).
Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance, and is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion. Ripley
v.
Chater, 67 F.3d
552, 555 (5th Cir. 1995). A fmding of"no substantial evidence" will be made only where there is
a "conspicuous absence
of credible choices" or
"no contrary medical evidence." Abshire v.
Bowen, 848 F.2d 638, 640 (5th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted).
In determining whether there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the
Commissioner, the Court must carefully examine the entire record, but may not reweigh the
evidence or try the issues de novo. Newton
v.
Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2000). The
Court may not substitute its own judgment "even if the evidence preponderates against the
[Commissioner's] decision" because substantial evidence is less than a preponderance. Harrell v.
Bowen, 862 F.2d 471, 475 (5th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). Conflicts in the evidence are for the
Commissioner and not the courts to resolve. Speliman
v.
Shalala,
1
F.3d 357, 360 (5th Cir. 1993)
(citation omitted). If the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards and the findings are
supported by substantial evidence, they are conclusive and must be affirmed. Id.
B. THE AU DID NOT ERR Th HER TREATh4ENT OF THE RECORDS AT ISSUE
Kujawa argues that the AU erred in (1) affording findings by Raj Marwah, M.D., little
weight without good cause and (2) failing to analyze the Newton factors. (Pl.'s Br., ECF No. 19,
at 10-13). The records at issue are an Application for Persons with Disabilities Parking Placard
and/or License Plate ("disability parking placard") (R. 393-94) completed by Dr. Marwah, and
prescriptions issued by Dr. Marwah for bathtub handrails (R. 848) and a walker (R. 849).
Kujawa asserts that these records are medical opinions and that their findings are incompatible
with the AU's RFC determination.
As an initial matter, the Court notes that Kujawa has failed to provide any statute,
regulation, or case law establishing that the disability parking placard qualifies as an opinion that
must be afforded any weight. See Halsell
Astrue, 357 F. App'x 717, 722 (7th Cir. 2009) ("[The
v.
claimant] argues that the AU should have given weight to her successful application for a
disability parking placard [which was completed by her primary physician], but the placard
proves nothing unless the disability standard is the same."); Wilson
v.
Colvin, No. 13-CV-113-
FHM, 2014 WL 357052, at *3 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 31, 2014) ("To be clear, the court does not
consider the handicapped parking application to be opinion evidence that the AU
necessarily required to discuss in detail,
.
.
was
."); Bryant v. Astrue, No. 09-4159-RDR, 2010 WL
4628721, at *7 (D. Kan. Nov. 8, 2010) ("In this instance, the court does not believe [the treating
physician's comment on the application for a disability parking placard] is so probative as to
require discussion."); Livingston
v.
Astrue, No. 09-14202-CIV, 2010 WL 5851124, at *8 (S.D.
Fla. Feb. 26, 2010) ("[D]isabled parking permits are generally
of little relevance to a formal
disability analysis."). Kujawa's attorney performs a thorough job of distinguishing Kujawa's
circumstances with those of the claimants in the aforementioned cases. (Reply, ECF No. 22).
Nonetheless, the fact remains that no authority has been presented which directly provides that
the disability parking placard is a medical opinion that the AU is required to afford weight.
Similarly, the prescriptions for bathtub handrails and a walker hold no apparent probative
ru
value. Kujawa does not explain what medical evidence and criteria Dr. Marwah evaluated in
deciding to issue those prescriptions. Furthermore, the prognosis of any such medical conditions
is unknown. The legal requirements for articulating impairments forming the basis of a claim for
disability are much more exacting than what is described here by Kujawa. See Graves
v.
Colvin,
837 F.3d 589, 592 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Bowling v. Shalala, 36 F.3d 431, 435 (5th Cir. 1994))
("A claimant is not entitled to disability benefits unless she is unable to engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of [a] medically determinable physical or mental impairment.. . which
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.")
(internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). Thus, the Court concludes that in this case,
the disability parking placard and the prescriptions for bathtub handrails and a walker did not
require a thorough analysis by the AU.
Even if the disability parking placard and the prescriptions are considered medical
opinions that required in-depth analysis, the AU had good cause to afford those records little
weight and did not err in omitting a discussion of the Newton
factors.3
When a treating
physician's opinion about the nature and severity of a claimant's impairment is well-supported
and consistent with other substantial evidence, an AU must afford it controlling weight. Newton,
209 F.3d at 455 (citation omitted). An AU has good cause, however, "to discount the weight of
a treating physician relative to other experts where the treating physician's evidence is
conclusory, is unsupported by medically acceptable clinical, laboratory, or diagnostic techniques,
or is otherwise unsupported by the evidence." Id. at 456.
On March 27, 2017, the Social Security Administration rescinded Social Security Ruling 96-2p, which discusses
giving controlling weight to treating source medical opinions, as well as two other related rulings. Rescission of
Social Security Rulings 96-2p, 96-5p, and O6-3p, 82 Fed. Reg. 15263-01 (Mar. 27, 2017). Under the new rules,
"adjudicators will not assign a weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion for claims filed on or
after March 27, 2017." Id This analysis is still required, however, because Kujawa filed her claims on July 23 and
July27 of2012.
5
Generally, when an AU
determines that there is good cause to afford a treating
physician's opinion with less than controlling weight, the AU must assess what weight the
opinion should be given based on factors enumerated in the regulations. Id. These factors need
not be analyzed when there is "competing first-hand medical evidence and the AU finds as a
factual matter that one doctor's opinion is more well-founded than another," or when "the AU
weighs the treating physician's opinion on disability against the medical opinion of other
physicians who have treated or examined the claimant and have specific medical bases for a
contrary opinion." Id. at 458; see also Jones
v.
Colvin, 638 F. App'x 300, 304 (5th Cir. 2016)
("Furthermore, this Court has also held that ALJs are not required to consider the
§
404.1527(c)
factors before dismissing a treating physician's opinion if there is competing first-hand medical
evidence contradicting that opinion."). "The Newton court limited its holding to cases where the
AU rejects the sole relevant medical opinion before it." Quails v. Astrue, 339 F. App'x 461, 467
(5th Cir. 2009).
There is competing first-hand medical evidence contradicting Kujawa's position that the
disability parking placard and prescriptions show her mobility was substantially impaired beyond
the limitations in the RFC. Medical statements from Dr. Marwah himself subsequent to the
disability parking placard indicate that Kujawa's gait was "unremarkable." (R. 401, 411, 632).
See Gonzalez
v.
Co/yin, No. SA-16-CA-00659-ESC, 2017 WL 2538595, at *5 (W.D. Tex. June
12, 2017) (finding AU did not err in affording a treating physician opinion limited weight and
omitting a factor-by-factor analysis in part because the treating physician's own progress notes
were inconsistent with the medical opinion at issue). Moreover, in a September 27, 2012,
consultative examination, Enrique Porras, M.D., noted that Kujawa's "[g]ait: was normal,
without limping or imbalance. Tandem walking was performed normally. Toe walking was
within normal limits." (R. 691). Thus, the Court concludes that the
AU's decision is supported
by substantial evidence in the record.
III.
CONCLUSION
IT IS ORDERED that the decision oft e Commissioner will be AFFIRMED.
SIGNED and ENTERED
thisI
day of July, 2018.
ATRRES
MIGU
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?