v. Contreras et al

Filing 34

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER. Signed by Judge Harry Lee Hudspeth. (tm)

FUED
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

RAYMOND A. CONTRERAS,

UCT,-.i ZOt

'

§

§
§

Plaintiff.
v.

AT&T SERVICES, INC. AND
AT&T PENSION BENEFIT PLAN,
Defendants.

fr!rERK

BY

§
§
§
§
§
§
§

No.

4srcu

SA-1O--CA-846-H

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This is a civil action under the Employee Retirement Income

Security Act of 1974

(ERISA), 29 U.S.C.

§

Both parties have

1132.

filed motions for summary judgment. Having reviewed the motions and
the

responses,

Court finds that Defendants

the

judgment in their favor as
I.

a

are entitled to

matter of law.

INTRODUCTION

The following facts are established by the administrative
record:

Plaintiff

was

employed

by

Southwestern

Bell

Telephone

Company (SWBT) from July 25, 1982 until June 24, 1988. He was then
employed by Pac Bell Directory

October 11,

1994.

(Pac Bell)

from July

6,

1988 until

SWBT and Pac Bell were covered by a Mandatory

Portability Agreement (MPT) that allowed for mutual recognition of
pension benefits among eligible employees of companies formed as a
result of the break up of American Telephone
Pursuant to the MPT,
Bell's pension plan

&

Telegraph in 1984.

Plaintiff ported his service with SWBT to Pac
the Pacific Telesis Group Pension Plan

-1-

(Pac

Bell Plan)

When his employment with Pac Bell ended, he received a

.

Pac Bell

from the

lump-sum distribution

Plan

in

amount

the

of

$32, 464. 12.

On January

Bell Yellow

received

1996 Plaintiff went to work for Southwestern

2,

Pages)

(Yellow

Pages

.

Four months

Plaintiff

later,

letter from Yellow Pages' plan administrator,

a

to port

indicating that he was eligible

Investments,

Fidelity
his prior

service under the Pac Bell Plan into the Yellow Pages' plan,

had an option to waive portability if he desired

ATTPBP

16)

letter

the

Attached to

.

was

an

(Def.

but
B at

Ex.

explanation of

his

portability options. After reviewing the letter, Plaintiff declined
to waive portability (Def.

Plaintiff

benefits

requested

and

2006

October,

in

B at

Ex.

ATTPBP 19)

received

and

estimates

December,

2006.

of

his pension

Both

estimates

calculated his benefit estimate using his initial hire date with
SWBT

July 25,

entitled to

a

1982 and both estimates

stated that he would be

lump-sum distribution of over $500,000 (Def. Ex. B at

ATTPBP 185-86,

191-92)

.

January,

In

Yellow Pages and requested

a

2007 Plaintiff retired with

lump-sum distribution of his pension

benefits.
On March 14,

from

the

plan

2007,

Contreras claims that he received

administrator

notifying

him

that

the

a

call

final

calculation of his lump-sum pension payment was $219,808.60 (Def.
Ex.

B at

ATTPBP 46)

.

This amount was calculated using his initial

-2-

employment date with Yellow Pages

-

January

1996

2,

rather than

his initial employment date with SWBT.

Plaintiff initiated
24,

2008.

Ex.

(Def.

a

formal claim with Fidelity on January

B at ATTPBP

43-46)

.

he requested that

In it,

his pension benefit be calculated using his initial hire date with

SWBT

Ex.

(Def.

argued,

B

at

ATTPBP 46)

His

.

should be accounted for by subtracting the amount of the

payout from his pension benefit for 24 years of service
B at

he

lump-sum payout,

1995

ATTPBP 46)

.

at ATTPBP 49-53).

Pension Benefit

His claim was denied on July

3,

(Def.

2008 (Def.

Ex.
B

Ex.

In the denial, citing Section 8.2.3(c) of the SBC

Bargained Program

Plan

(the

Plan),

Fidelity

concluded that Plaintiff was not entitled to credit for his service
before 1996 because he had received a lump-sum payout and had not

returned it, as is required by the plan (DeL Ex. B at ATTPBP 50)
Plaintiff appealed the decision to the Benefit Plan Committee
on August

8,

his appeal

2008

(Def.

Ex.

on March 25,

B at

ATTPBP 1-4)

.

The Committee denied

concluding that repayment

2009,

of his

distribution under the Pac Bell Plan was required if he desired to
have

his

prior

Pac

Bell

service

calculating his pension benefit

recognized

(Def.

Ex.

B

at

for

purposes

ATTPBP 1-4)

.

of

The

committee concluded that, although the mistaken estimates did not
alter the benefit plan, Plaintiff should be given the option to reinstate his employment (Def. Ex. B at ATTPBP

4)

the offer. This completed the appeal process.

-3-

.

Plaintiff declined

APPLICABLE LAW

II.

When

a

plan grants an administrator discretion to construe the

terms of the plan,

required to apply an abuse

Court is

the

of

discretion standard. Sanders v. Unum Life Ins. Co. Of Am., 553 F.3d
925

922,

(5th

Cir. 2008)

Here, the plan delegates authority to the

.

Fidelity Services Center to determine initial claims and to the
Benefit Plan Committee to decide appeals so the abuse of discretion
at

standard applies (SBC Pension Benefit Plan, Def. Ex. C

9)

The Court employs a two-step approach in determining whether
an

administrator's

Gosselink v. American Tel.
2001)

was

interpretation

an

abuse

of

discretion.
(5th

Tel., Inc., 272 F.3d 722, 726

&

Cir.

Under this approach, the Court must first determine whether

.

the administrator's interpretation of the plan was legally correct.
Id.

In determining whether the interpretation is legally correct,

the Court must consider

plan

a

uniform

(1)

whether the administrator has given the

construction;

interpretation is consistent with
(3)

any

whether

(2)

interpretations of the plan.

from

resulting
If the

Id.

administrator's

fair reading of the plan; and

a

costs

unanticipated

the

different

Court concludes

that the

administrator's interpretation is not legally correct, it must then
determine whether the administrator abused its discretion. Id. In

determining abuse of discretion, the court must consider
internal

consistency

interpretation;

(2)

of

any

the

plan

relevant
-4-

under

the

regulations

(1)

the

administrator's

formulated by the

appropriate administrative agencies; and

the factual background

(3)

of the determination and any inference of lack of good faith.

underlying

findings

Factual

claim

a

decision

are

Id.

always

reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Love v. Dell Inc.,
(5th

551 F.3d 333, 336

Cir. 2008)

.

The abuse of discretion standard

requires the Court to determine whether the administrator's factual
findings were "arbitrary and capricious." Id. An administrator's

findings of fact are arbitrary and capricious when there is not

a

"rational connection between the known facts and the decision or

between the found facts and the evidence." Bellaire Gen. Hosp. v.
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich.,
An

administrator's

decision

to

97

F.3d 822,

(5th

828

must

deny benefits

Cir.

1996).

based on

be

evidence that clearly supports the basis for denial. Vega v. Nat'l

Life Ins. Servs., Inc.,

188 F.3d 287,

(5th

299

1999).

Cir.

III. ANALYSIS

Because

discretion
findings

the

Plan

vests

determining

in

using

an

abuse

in

coverage,
of

Benefit

the

the

Court

will

standard.

discretion

Committee

Plan

review
The

its

parties

disagree primarily about whether the Plan requires that an employee
who was previously employed by an MPA Interchange Company, and who

received

lump-sum

a

employment,

return

service prior

to

his
the

distribution

upon

distribution

in

distribution to

calculation.
-5-

termination

order
count

for

toward

his

his

of

years

his
of

pension

Section 8.2.3(a)

of the Plan provides:

If a Covered Employee receives a lump sum distribution under
Subsection 6.14 or Paragraph 10.4.8 of the SBCPBP-Nonbargained
Program and is subsequently employed by an MPA Interchange

Company, such Covered Employee may repay to the Pension Fund
within one year after the date he begins such MPA Interchange
Company employment, the total amount of the lump sum
distribution, plus interest.
Ex.

(Def.

C at 83)

.

Section 8.2.3

(c)

provides:

any Covered Employee is employed by an SBC MPA Company
after terminating employment with an MPA Interchange Company
and subsequent to receipt of a lump sum distribution of his
accumulated benefit under such MPA Interchange Company's
Pension Plan, the portion of such Covered Employee's Pension
Service Credit constituting benefit accrual service shall not
be recognized under the Plan unless and until such Covered
Employee repays such lump sum distribution to such MPA
Interchange Company Pension Plan in accordance with the terms
and conditions of and within the time period provided in such
plan and not until the assets associated with such repayment
have been transferred to the SBCPBP and the Pension Fund.
If

Ex.

(Def.

C at 83)

.

Fidelity, in its claim denial, and the Benefit

Plan Committee, in its appeal denial, relied on these provisions to

conclude that Plaintiff was ineligible to use his pre-1994 service
in calculating his pension benefit because he had failed to repay

the lump sum distribution he received in 1995
0050)

.

The

administrator's
before

Court

must

B at 0004,

whether

was

it

whether

consider

first

interpretation of the

determining

Gosse].ink,

Ex.

contends that this conclusion was an abuse

Plaintiff

discretion.

(Def.

plan was
an

abuse

legally
of

of

the

correct

discretion.

272 F.3d at 726. Because Plaintiff does not claim that

the administrator's construction of the Plan is not uniform,

and

because unanticipated costs are not at issue, the Court will focus
S

solely on whether the administrator's interpretation is consistent

with

a

fair reading of the plan. Id.

The Plan

A.

Plaintiff first argues that the administrator erred by either

misinterpreting Plan provisions or failing to recognize ambiguities
in the Plan. He cites various sections governing claim distribution

that do not require repayment of lump sum distributions and argues
that

reading of

inconsistent with the administrator's

they are

Section

8.2.3.

Pension

Calculation

claims

also

He

Service

that

the

Plan's

(Calculation

definitions

Service)

of

Pension

and

Eligibility Service (Eligibility Service) are inconsistent with one
another and render the Plan ambiguous.
"Pension Calculation Service" is the period of employment used
to

determine

amount

the

of

Participant's

a

(Definitions and Rules for Crediting Service,

provides

2.63.4

Section

provision

of

Plan,"

the

Def.

Ex.

"[n]otwithstanding

that,

benefits

pension

D at

any

12)

other

Calculation Service does

Pension

not

include periods of employment with an Interchange Company "if the

Covered

pension benefit
lump

received

Employee has
.

.

.

lump

a

sum

distribution

of

his

and the Eligible Employee has not repaid the

sum distribution"

(Def.

Ex.

D

at

12)

.

"Pension Eligibility

Service" is the period of employment used to determine eligibility
for pension benefits (Def. Ex. D at 13)

provides

that

Pension

Eligibility

-7-

.

Section 2.64.1 of the Plan

Service

includes

periods

of

employment at

Interchange Company "notwithstanding the repayment

a

of any lump sum distribution made to such Covered Employee" (Def.
Ex.

D at 13)

create

a

Plaintiff argues that these definitions conflict and

.

substantial

ambiguity.

Plaintiff

does

not

produce

a

reason, and the Court can think of none, that two different terms

having different definitions

should be considered an ambiguity.

That Plaintiff's employment before 1994 is part of his Eligibility

Service

is

qualifies

not disputed.
as

What is in dispute is whether it also

Calculation

Service.

That

Eligibility

Service

inclusion does not require repayment of earlier payouts does not

make the definition of Calculation Service ambiguous.
Plaintiff also argues that the administrator's interpretation
of the plan was
3.5,

incorrect because it ignored Sections 3.2.3(b),

4.1.1 and 6.1.3(a), which he claims contradict Section 8.2.3

because they do not require repayment of lump sum pension payouts.
Section 3.2.3(b)

provides that "[n]otwithstanding any other

provision of this Section 3," an absence of over six months "shall
not be a break in his

Calculation

Service,

Pension Eligibility Service and Pension

or

Pension

Eligibility

Service

only,

as

applicable" if the employee works for five years after returning.
Plaintiff argues that because this "bridging" rule does not require
repayment of any pension benefits received during the absence, his

accrued Calculation Service was automatically "bridged" after five
years.

The administrator,

therefore,

:

incorrectly interpreted the

Plan when it determined that repayment was required for his prior

service to be included in Calculation Service. The Court finds this

argument unpersuasive. Section 2.63.4 defines Calculation Service
as excluding service for which a lump sum pension payment has been

received and not returned

(Def.

Ex.

D at 12)

.

While the bridging

rule does apply whether or not there has been an unreturned payout
(and,

in

fact,

undisputedly
the

Service),

Eligibility
include

has

applied

been

employment period

Plaintiff's

to

Plaintiff

seeks

to

Calculation Service is explicitly excluded from the

as

definition of Calculation Service by the Plan (Def. Ex. D at 12)
Section 3.5 prohibits reductions in determinations of pension

benefits over time (def. Ex. D at 24)
how

this

applies

provision

to

.

Plaintiff does not specify

him

why

or

application

its

contradicts the administrator's findings. At issue in this case is
whether the administrator miscalculated Plaintiff's pension amount
by failing to recognize prior years of service. Because there is no
that

indication

there

was

a

reduction

in

benefit

amount,

the

administrator's failure to apply Section 3.5 in Plaintiff's favor
was not inconsistent with a fair reading of the Plan.

Section 4.1.1 is a provision governing Eligibility Service and
"Years of Vesting Service" accrued prior to January
Ex.

D at 26)

arguments

.

1,

1984

(Def.

Nothing in the language of the Plan or in Plaintiff's

indicates

that

Section

4.1.1

applies

to

Calculation

Service. Neither Plaintiff's Eligibility Service nor his Years of

Vesting Service are at issue in this case. Not applying this rule
to

require

calculate

Defendant

Plaintiff's

use

to

pension benefit was not

his

service to

pre-payout

inconsistent with a fair

reading of the Plan.
Section

Agreement

Portability
Agreement
(Def.

Ex.

provides

6.1.2(a)

and

(MPA)

where

that,

the

D at 143)

the

Divestiture

could apply to an employee,

(DIA)

both

Mandatory

Interchange

the DIA will apply

Plaintiff does not argue that he is covered by

.

the DIA or present any evidence of how the DIA might change his

benefit calculation. The Court cannot conclude, based only on the
existence

this

of

administrator's

the

that

rule,

decision was

legally incorrect.
B.

ERISA

The Summary Plan Description

administrators

plan

requires

to

provide

their

participants with an accurate and comprehensive summary of their
benefit plan.
(SPD)

29

U.S.C.

§

1022(a).

The Summary Plan Description

is intended to simplify the language of a plan,

allowing the

average participant to understand his rights and duties. Fallo v.

Piccadilly Cafeterias,
Because it is merely
plan,

a

Inc.,

F.3d 580,

141

583

(5th

Cir.

1998).

summary and cannot contain every term of

a

omission of certain terms from the SPD will not alter the

governing plan. Id. at 584 n.20. If, however, the terms of the SPD
conflict

with

the

plan,

the

SPD

controls.

Id.

at

583-84.

Ambiguities in the SPD are resolved in favor of the participant.
-10-

Id.

at 584.

argues

Plaintiff

that

decision

administrator's

the

was

incorrect because the SPD and the Plan are inconsistent. The SPD
defines the term "Net Credited Service" as having the same meaning
as Pension Eligibility Service and Pension Calculation Service

it

any

SBC

employee's

"an

is

period

continuous

of

employment

in

Company while that company participates in this Plan" (Summary Plan
Description,

Def. Ex.

E at 22)

It states that the term "may also

.

include service with an Interchange Company"

Plaintiff

contends

that

the

(Def.

definition

SPD's

of

S at 22)

Ex.

Net

Credited

Service gives Pension Eligibility Service and Pension Calculation
Service the same meaning. Consequently, it conflicts with the Plan,

which gives Pension Eligibility Service and Pension Calculation
Service different definitions. Because of this conflict, Plaintiff
the SPD,

argues,

rather than the Plan, should govern his benefit

eligibility. The administrator's interpretation of the Plan was an
abuse

of

discretion,

Plaintiff

because

contends,

the

SPD

exclusively uses the term "Net Credited Service" when discussing
benefit calculations and defines Net Credited Service

to include

service at an Interchange Company.
The Court
and

the

Plan

finds this argument unpersuasive.

together

reveals

that

there

is

Reading the SPD
no

inconsistency

between the documents. While the SPD does omit the details of when
a

former Interchange Company employee's service will count toward

-11-

this omission does not alter the Plan. Fallo,

his pension amount,
141

F.3d at 584 n.20.

Importantly, the SPD never represents that

prior service at an Interchange Company will be included in Net

Credited Service.

Rather,

it

provides that Net Credited Service

includes periods of continuous employment with a SBC Company and

may include service with an Interchange Company
the

Furthermore,

SPD does

not provide

that

(Def. Ex.

E at 22)

Pension Eligibility

Service and Pension Calculation Service have the same meaning in
the Plan, but that the term "Net Credited Service" encompasses both

terms

(Def.

Ex.

E at

22)

.

section explaining transfer of

In the

benefits from an Interchange Company, the SPD urges employees to
contact the Benefit Organization "regarding special rules that may

apply to [them]"

(Def.

Ex.

Interchange Agreements,

E at 17).

the SPD

In discussing coverage under

indicates that

service

with an

Interchange Company "may be recognized as Net Credited Service
depending upon the agreement and your personal situation" (Def.
Ex.

E at

(emphasis added)

19)

While it is true that when an SPD conflicts with

a plan,

the

SPD will govern a participant's benefit eligibility, the same does
not apply when an SPD is silent. Fallo,

A summary,

by definition,

thing it summarizes.

will not

141 F.3d at

583,

84 N.20.

contain every detail of the

The SPD indicates that Net Credited Service

may include service at an Interchange Company, but that transfer of
such

service

is

governed by

special
-12-

rules

and

depends

on

the

participant's individual situation. While the SPD does not outline
the

governing

rules

transfer

pension

of

benefits

from

an

Interchange Company, none of its representations are inconsistent
with the Plan. Because there is no inconsistency between the SPD
and

the

Court

the

Plan,

finds

that

administrator's

the

interpretation was not legally incorrect.
C.

The Explanation of Waiver of Portability

Conflict with the Plan

i.

Plaintiff next claims that the administrator's interpretation
of

the

Plan

contrary

is

to

Explanation

the

of

Waiver

of

Portability, a document he claims to be an official plan document.
The Explanation of Waiver and Portability is a two-page document

Defendants sent to Plaintiff in 1996, informing him that he was

eligible

to

port

his

Pac

Bell

service

consequences of waiving portability.

explaining

and

the

Plaintiff claims that the

document contradicts the plan because it permits an offset of any
lump

sum

document,

pension

payout

the terms of

and,

because

this document

it

is

an

official

plan

should control wherever it

conflicts with the Plan. Defendants counter that the Explanation of

Waiver is not an official plan document, but rather an illustrative
document

meant

only

to

explain

portability

to

participants.

Plaintiff offers two arguments in support of his assertion that
this document is an official plan document.
First, he claims that Defendants conceded that it was a plan

-13-

Sullivan v.

document in

AT

&

T,

Inc.,

2010 WL 905567

(N.D.

Tex).

Nothing in

Sullivan

even indicates that the document at issue in

that

was

same

case

the

document discussed

in

document

Sullivan

issue

at

had

here.

different

a

In

fact,

"Special

title:

Notice Regarding Portability." Sullivan, 2010 WL 905567 at

district

court

only

references

the

Special

Notice

the

*3

The

Regarding

Portability in answering the plaintiff's charge that he had not
knowingly or voluntarily executed the waiver.

Id.

at *3

Nowhere

does the district court indicate that the document at issue was

official or binding on Defendants.
Plaintiff's only other argument that the Explanation of Waiver
is binding against Defendants

of

Waiver

of

Portability

Document,' Defendants

instructions"

(P1.

453
a

(5th

Cir.

2007),

a

may

not

be

an

should certain[ly]

Resp.,

proposition, he cites

"a]lthough the Explanation

is that

Doc.

30

at

actual

Summary

be bound by their

13).

In

Washington v. Murphy Oil

support

USA,

Inc.,

of

Plan
own
this

497 F.3d

case holding that an SPD is binding against

defendant when it contradicts the provisions in the benefit plan

(Doc.

30

at 13)

.

Plaintiff's argument is directly opposed to the

Fifth Circuit's holding in

Hicks

that,

"[hf

a

document is to be

Which it certainly is not. Hicks v. Fleming Co. Inc., 561
F.2d 537 held that a document qualifies as an SPD if it contains
all or substantially all categories of information required under
29 U.S.C. § 1022(b) and the Department of Labor's regulations at 29
C.F.R. § 2520.102-3. Hicks, 561 F.2d at 542. Plaintiff cannot in
good faith contend that this two-page document even approaches this
standard.
-14-

afforded the legal effects of an SPD, such as conferring benefits
when it is at variance with the plan itself, that document should
be

sufficient to constitute an SPD for filing and qualification

purposes." Hicks,

F.2d at 542.

961

Plaintiff asks this Court to

give a two-page explanatory document the same legal effect as an

Because

SPD.

Plaintiff

show

cannot

that

this

document

meets

substantially all of the requirements of an SPD, the Court finds
that the administrator's failure to give any alleged variance legal

effect was legally correct.
ii. ERISA-Estoppel

Plaintiff also claims that he detrimentally relied on the

representations in the Explanation of Waiver. The Explanation of
Waiver states that if

a

participant retains any lump sum payout for

prior service, that service will not be used in calculating pension
amount

(Def Ex.

B

at

ATTPBP 17)

.

employee terminates his employment

It

also explains

after bridging,

that,

17)

.

Plaintiff

claims

that

he

relied

on

an

any lump-sum

payout will be offset against his pension benefit (Def. Ex.

ATTPBP

if

the

B at

paragraph

discussing offset in deciding not to waive portability. Because of
this,

he

claims,

Defendants should be bound by their purported

representations that an offset would be used to calculate pension
benefits.
To establish an ERISA-estoppel claim,
(1)

a

material misrepresentation;

-15-

(2)

a

plaintiff must show

reasonable and detrimental

reliance;

and

(3)

extraordinary circumstances. Mello v. Sara Lee
(5th

44445

431 F.3d 440,

Corp.,

Cir.

2005). Because Plaintiff has

failed to show that his reliance was reasonable or detrimental, his

claim fails and this Court need not address the other elements of
ERISA-estoppel.
As

preliminary

a

detrimental

Plaintiff

matter,

reliance.

He

only

argues

not

does

that

allege

even

relied

he

the

on

Explanation of Waiver in his decision to port his prior service
into the Plan
his

service

(P1.

Resp.,

resulted

Doc.

#

his

in

30

at 11).

prior

His decision to port

service

being

used

for

determining his eligibility for pension benefits. Had he decided
not to port his service, as he seems to indicate he would have done
if the Explanation of Waiver had not been misleading, he would have

been in no better position than he is now.

The only difference

would be that, in that situation, his prior service would not have
been

used to

determine

pension eligibility or

his

pension

his

amount.

Even

assuming

Plaintiff's

claim

that

he

would

could

fail

Explanation of Waiver would not

unambiguously

requires

return

detrimental

show

because

have been
of

any

reliance

any

reasonable.

lump-sum

reliance,
the

on

The Plan

payout

as

a

prerequisite for bridged service to be used for pension calculation
purposes.

Plaintiff

does

not

argue

that

he

relied

on

the

Explanation of Waiver to interpret an ambiguous provision in the

-16-

Rather,

Plan.

an

informal

ERISA's

document

policy

precludes

a

contradicted unambiguous

that

against

modification

informal

Plan

plan

of

terms.

terms

finding that any such reliance was reasonable.

Fifth

The

445.

he argues that it was reasonable for him to rely on

Circuit

has

held

that

reliance

on

an

Id.

at

informal

document in the face of unambiguous Plan terms is not reasonable.
Id.

at

because

447.

he

Consequently,
cannot

show

Plaintiff's ERISA-estoppel claim fails
that

reliance

his

was

reasonable

or

detrimental.
The Term of Employment Summary

D.

Plaintiff's

final

Summary sent to him
because

it

argument is
1996

in

contradicts

the

that

Plan,

Employment

official plan document and,

an

is

the Term of

is

binding on Defendants.

He

claims that the administrator abused its discretion when it found
that Plaintiff was notified of the effect of his failure to repay
the

1995 payout in
His

1996.

a

Term of Employment Summary sent to him in

notification

notification language
likely the result of

is

is

doubtful,

in mysterious

he

font

and,

the Court

no

therefore,

the
is

modification.

This argument is completely without merit.

offers

because

claims,

reason

why it

letter the same legal effect as

a

Plaintiff

First,

should afford this

one-page

Summary Plan Document. Second,

Plaintiff ignores that the administrator, in determining the facts,

considered

his

own

testimony

that

-17-

he

had

received

a

Term

of

4

Employment Summary containing the "mysterious" language notifying
him that his previous service would not be used to calculate his

pension amount

(Def.

Ex.

B

ATTPBP

at

58)

The

.

conclusion that

Plaintiff did receive the "mysterious" Term of Employment Summary
was

not

an

abuse

of

discretion

there

is

a

clear

rational

connection between the finding that he received the document and
his testimony that he had received it. See Bellaire Gen. Eosp.,

97

F.3d at 299.
IV. CONCLUSION

Because Plaintiff cannot show that the administrator abused
its discretion in declining to calculate his pension amount using

his bridged service,

summary judgment will be entered in favor of

Defendants.
It is therefore ORDERED that Plaintiff's claim for legal and

equitable relief pursuant to 29 U.S.C.
is hereby,
It

is

§

1132

(a) (1) (3)

and it

be,

DENIED.

further ORDERED that

ENTERED in favor of Defendant,

judgment be,

and it is

hereby,

and the Plaintiff take nothing by

his suit.

zk

SIGNED AND ENTERED THIS

day of October, 2011.

1

HALEE

HUDSPETH

SNIOR UN1TD STATES

(

DISTRIOtT JUDGE