Doss et al v. Young et al
Filing
254
ORDER GRANTING 236 Motion for Entry of Judgment under Rule 54(b) Signed by Judge David A. Ezra. (wg)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SAN ANTONIO DIVISION
LOUIS V. DOSS and CAROLYN
DOSS, individually and d/b/a
MULLIGAN’S PUB,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
SGT. MARTIN MORRIS,
OFFICER HARRY HOLT, and
TABC AGENT SCOTT
HELPENSTELL,
Defendants.
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
No. SA:11–CV–116–DAE
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS SGT. MARTIN MORRIS AND OFFICER
HARRY HOLT’S MOTION FOR FINAL JUDGMENT
Before the Court is a Motion for Final Judgment Under Rule 54(b)
filed by Defendants Sgt. Martin Morris (“Morris”) and Officer Harry Holt (“Holt”)
(collectively, “Defendants”). (Dkt. # 236.) Pursuant to Local Rule CV-7(h), the
Court finds this matter suitable for disposition without a hearing. After reviewing
the Motion and the opposing memorandum, for the reasons that follow, the Court
GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Final Judgment (Dkt. # 236).
BACKGROUND
On February 9, 2011, Plaintiffs Louis V. Doss and Carolyn Doss
(collectively, “Plaintiffs”), individually and doing business as Mulligan’s Pub,
1
instituted this lawsuit against the City of Kerrville, numerous Kerrville police
officers, Administrator Alan Steen of the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission
(“TABC”), and TABC Agent Scott Helpenstell (“Helpenstell”) under 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981 and 1983 for violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Dkt.
# 1.) Plaintiffs brought a substantive due process claim against Morris and Holt of
the Kerrville Police Department for deprivation of Plaintiffs’ liberty interest under
the Fourteenth Amendment in pursuing their chosen occupation. (Dkt. # 76 ¶ 58.)
This claim was based on allegations that Defendants implemented a plan to shut
down Plaintiffs’ business, Mulligan’s Pub, by instituting a campaign to harass
customers with the specific intent to discourage patronage of the business. (Id.)
On November 30, 2012, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment based on the defense of qualified immunity. (Dkt. # 138.) On May 15,
2013, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants as to all of
Plaintiffs’ claims against them. (Dkt. # 167.) The Court subsequently denied
Plaintiffs’ Motions for Reconsideration of the Court’s Order Granting Summary
Judgment. (Dkts. ## 172, 175.) On December 9, 2014, United States Magistrate
Judge John W. Primomo granted Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion to Stay Deadlines
in light of Louis Doss’s serious health issues. (Dkt. # 235.)
On December 19, 2014, Defendants filed the instant Motion for Final
Judgment Under Rule 54(b). (Dkt. # 236.) On December 29, 2014, Plaintiffs filed
2
Objections and a Motion to Strike Defendants’ Motion, citing in part the stay order
entered by Judge Primomo. (Dkt. # 237.) On December 30, 2014, Defendants
filed a Response to Plaintiffs’ Objections, noting their non-opposition to the Court
granting Plaintiffs’ motion to stay the deadline to respond to Defendants’ Motion
for Final Judgment until further notice. After several extensions, the stay in this
case was finally lifted on July 20, 2015. (See Dkt. # 248.) On August 3, 2015,
Plaintiffs filed a Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Final
Judgment. (Dkt. # 252.) On August 10, 2015, Defendants filed a Reply. (Dkt.
# 253.)
LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that,
where an action involves multiple parties or claims, the district court may direct
entry of a final judgment as to one or more—though not all—parties or claims
“only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 54(b). In evaluating a motion made under Rule 54(b), a court must
make two determinations. First, the court must determine that it is dealing with a
“final judgment”—in other words, “a decision upon a cognizable claim for
relief . . . that is an ultimate disposition of an individual claim entered in the course
of a multiple claims action.” Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 8
(1980) (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, the court must “determine
3
whether there is any just reason for delay.” Id. Rule 54(b) motions should not be
granted routinely, Brown v. Miss. Valley State Univ., 311 F.3d 238, 332 (5th Cir.
2002), and “[a] district court should grant certification only when there exists some
danger of hardship or injustice through delay which would be alleviated by
immediate appeal.” PYCA Indus., Inc. v. Harrison Cnty. Waste Water Mgmt.
Dist., 81 F.3d 1412, 1421 (5th Cir. 1996).
DISCUSSION
Defendants ask the Court to enter final judgment in their favor
pursuant to Rule 54(b) because (1) there are no outstanding claims against Morris
or Holt; (2) the claims dismissed against Morris and Holt are completely separable
from the remaining claims against the sole remaining defendant, TABC Agent
Scott Helpenstell, and as a result, no appellate court would have to decide the same
issues more than once; and (3) lack of final judgment has resulted in hardship and
injustice to Morris and Holt. (Dkt. # 236 at 3–4.) Plaintiffs respond that this is not
an “exceptional case” warranting certification of final judgment under Rule 54(b),
and add that forcing Plaintiffs to litigate an appeal at this time would cause them
substantial prejudice. (Dkt. # 252 at 4, 10.)
The first step in the Court’s analysis is to determine whether it is
dealing with a “final judgment,” or an “ultimate disposition of an individual claim
entered in the course of a multiple claims action.” Curtiss-Wright Corp., 446 U.S.
4
at 8. Because the entry of summary judgment constitutes a final judgment for the
purposes of Rule 54(b), the Court moves to the second step of the analysis:
whether just reason exists for delay in the entry of final judgment. See id. at 7;
Accident Ins. Co. v. Classic Bldg. Design, LLC, No. 2:11cv33KS-MTP, 2012 WL
4799174, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Oct. 9, 2012) (holding that a summary judgment order
was an “ultimate disposition” allowing for the entry of final judgment under Rule
54(b)).
In determining whether just reason exists for delay, the court must
strike a balance between the “inconvenience and costs of piecemeal [appellate]
review” and “the danger of denying justice by delay.” Road Sprinkler Fitters
Local Union v. Cont’l Sprinkler Co., 967 F.2d 145, 148 (5th Cir. 1992). In doing
so, courts should take into consideration “whether the claims under review [a]re
separable from the others remaining to be adjudicated and whether the nature of
the claims already determined [i]s such that no appellate court would have to
decide the same issues more than once even if there were subsequent appeals.”
Curtiss-Wright Corp., 446 U.S. at 8.
Plaintiffs brought a substantive due process claim against Morris and
Holt, alleging that Defendants deprived Plaintiffs of their liberty interest under the
Fourteenth Amendment in pursuing their chosen occupation. (Dkt. # 76 ¶ 58.)
Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants implemented a plan to shut down
5
Plaintiffs’ business by harassing customers with the specific intent to discourage
patronage of the business. (Id.) The sole remaining claim in this case, against
Helpenstell, concerns alleged violations of Plaintiffs’ right to be free from
excessive force under the Fourth Amendment. (See Dkt. # 219.) This claim arises
from Helpenstell’s interaction with Louis Doss in a parking lot in Kerrville, Texas
on January 30, 2011, during which Plaintiffs allege that Helpenstell subjected
Louis Doss to excessive force by drawing a firearm and commencing a “violent
brutal attack . . . [including] punches to [his] face and strikes to [his] head with a
pistol.” (See Dkt. # 232 at 2–5.)
Thus, the facts necessary to adjudicate the claims against Morris and
Holt are distinct from the facts underlying Plaintiffs’ remaining claim against
Helpenstell. Under these circumstances, an appellate court would not likely have
to decide the same issues more than once should there be separate appeals of the
claims in this case. See Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 8; United States v.
Whisenhunt, No. 3:12-CV-0614-B, 2014 WL 3610792, at *4 (N.D. Tex. July 21,
2014) (finding little risk that an appellate court would have to decide the same
issues more than once where the facts underlying a remaining live claim were
separate from those underlying the court’s prior rulings). Furthermore, the Court
notes that Helpenstell has already appealed the Court’s Order Denying in Part
Helpenstell’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs’ excessive force
6
claim. (Dkt. # 233.) Even if the facts underlying the claims against Morris and
Holt overlapped with those underlying the claims against Helpenstell, the Fifth
Circuit is already faced with the prospect of separate appeals.
However, the Court must also consider whether “there exists some
danger of hardship or injustice through delay which would be alleviated by
immediate appeal.” PYCA Indus., Inc., 81 F.3d at 1421. Defendants argue that
although the Court has dismissed Morris and Holt as individually-named
defendants, they are unable to represent to third parties that a final judgment exists
in their favor, thereby hampering Morris’s ability to obtain financing, refinancing,
or credit. (Dkt. # 236 at 4.)
Where there is little danger of piecemeal appeals, courts have found
that “[a]ny further delay of final judgment could present a hardship” to the party
moving for a final judgment. Orrill v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., No.
06-10012, 2012 WL 10558, at *2 (E.D. La. Jan. 3, 2012). In this instance, the
Court notes that this case has proceeded at an unfortunately slow pace, through no
fault of Defendants, and because of Helpenstell’s current appeal before the Fifth
Circuit, the Court is unable to set a trial date at this time. Because there is little
risk that an appellate court would need to decide the same issues more than once,
and because it is unlikely that a final judgment in this matter will be rendered in
7
the near future, the Court finds that the entry of final judgment under Rule 54(b) is
appropriate under the circumstances.
Finally, the Court is unpersuaded by Plaintiffs’ arguments against the
entry of judgment. First, Plaintiffs attempt to re-argue the merits of their claims
against Morris and Holt, suggesting that despite the Court’s previous rulings,
Defendants have not actually been exonerated. (Dkt. # 252 at 2–4.) The Court has
already fully and carefully considered each of Plaintiffs’ arguments in its Order
Granting Summary Judgment and its two Orders Denying Plaintiffs’ Motions for
Reconsideration. (Dkts. ## 167, 172, 175.) A response to a Motion for Final
Judgment is not the appropriate vehicle for rehashing the merits of Plaintiffs’
claims.
Second, Plaintiffs claim that forcing them to litigate an appeal at this
time would divide their financial and administrative resources and would cause
them prejudice in both the jury trial and the appeal. (Dkt. # 252 at 4.) The Court
notes that it has been very accommodating of Plaintiffs’ pro se status and limited
resources in the past, having granted several extensions of the stay order at
Plaintiffs’ request. (Dkts. ## 235, 244, 248.) In the interest of the orderly and
timely administration of this Court’s docket, the Court cannot schedule the
procession of this case at Plaintiffs’ convenience.
8
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants’
Motion for Final Judgment (Dkt. # 236).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: San Antonio, Texas, August 11, 2015.
_____________________________________
David Alan Ezra
Senior United States Distict Judge
9
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?