Huber et al v. Guadalupe County, Texas
Filing
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ORDER GRANTING 7 Motion to Remand to State Court. This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the federal takings claims are not ripe foradjudication. Therefore, removal is not proper. It is therefore ORDERED that this case be REMANDED to the 25th Judicial District Court of Guadalupe County, Texas. Signed by Judge Xavier Rodriguez. (rg)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SAN ANTONIO DIVISION
WOODLAKE PARTNERS, INC.;
WOODLAKE PARTNERS, L.P.; AND
LANCE A. HUBER, d/b/a HUBER
CUSTOM HOMES,
Plaintiffs,
v.
GUADALUPE COUNTY,
Defendant.
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CIVIL ACTION NO.
5:11-CV-00647-XR
ORDER
On this date, the Court considered Woodlake Partners, Inc., Woodlake Partners, L.P., and
Lance A. Huber’s (collectively “Plaintiffs”) “Motion to Remand” and “Plaintiff’s Response” along
with Guadalupe County’s (“Defendant”) “Response to Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand” and “Notice
of Removal.” After careful consideration of the relevant judicial and statutory authority, Plaintiffs’
motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
This case stems from a complaint alleging Defendant engaged in a “taking” of Plaintiffs’
property without just compensation or due process of law.1 On June 28, 2011, Plaintiffs originally
filed suit in the 25th Judicial District Court of Guadalupe County, Texas in a case styled: Woodlake
Partners, Inc. v. Guadalupe County, Cause No. 11-1270-CV.2 On July 29, 2011, Defendant timely
1
Plaintiff’s Complaint, p. 7.
2
Id. at p. 1.
1
removed the case to this Court based on federal question jurisdiction.3 Subsequently, Plaintiffs filed
their Motion to Remand on September 29, 2011.4
Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that Woodlake Partners owns certain lots of real property in
Guadalupe County, Texas.5 Prior to November 2, 2007, Huber Custom Homes was allowed to build
residential homes on these lots without obtaining flood or building permits, and they had plans to
continue building homes there.6 Plaintiffs claim that the Defendant approved these lots according
to existing guidelines and ordinances.7 However, on November 2, 2007, the County adopted
FEMA’s new Flood Insurance Rate Maps, which placed twenty-four of the Plaintiffs’ undeveloped
lots in either the floodplain or floodway.8 This adopted plan now requires Plaintiffs to meet certain
requirements before obtaining the proper building permits, which the Plaintiffs were informed they
would not be able to meet.9 Plaintiffs allege that adopting this plan is an intentional “taking” of the
Plaintiffs’ property without compensation and violates the United States and Texas Constitutions.10
LEGAL STANDARD
On a motion to remand, the court must consider whether removal was proper. Removal is
3
Defendant’s Notice of Removal, p. 2.
4
Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand, p. 1.
5
Plaintiff’s Complaint, p. 2.
6
Plaintiff’s Complaint, p. 4.
7
Id.
8
Id. at p. 5.
9
Id.
10
Id. at p. 7.
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proper where the suit originally could have been brought in federal court.11 Stated differently, a
district court has removal jurisdiction in any case in which it would have had original jurisdiction.12
“A matter must be ripe for a federal court to exercise jurisdiction under Article III of the United
States Constitution.”13 “Ripeness separates those matters that are premature because the injury is
speculative and may never occur from those that are appropriate for judicial review.”14
ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs’ cause of action arises under both the United States and Texas Constitutions. The
Defendant bases its removal on federal question jurisdiction because there is no diversity of
citizenship between the parties.15 There is no dispute whether a federal question exists. Thus, the
sole question before this Court is whether the federal question is “ripe” for judicial review in order
for removal to be proper.
The United States Supreme Court held in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission
v. Hamilton Bank that “a claim that the application of government regulations effects a taking of a
property interest is not ripe until the government entity charged with implementing the regulations
has reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property.”16 Further,
11
See Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).
12
See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
13
Milliken v. Town of Addison, No. 02-CV-1164-D, 2002 WL 31059802, at *2 (N.D. Tex.
Sept. 13, 2002) (citing United Transp. Union v. Foster, 205 F.3d 851, 857 (5th Cir. 2000)).
14
Id.
15
Defendant’s Notice of Removal, p. 2.
16
Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186
(1985).
3
“if a State provides an adequate procedure for seeking just compensation, the property owner cannot
claim a violation of the Just Compensation Clause until it has used that procedure and been denied
just compensation.”17 Thus, “[a] takings claim is not ripe until (1) the relevant governmental unit
has reached a final decision as to what will be done with the property and (2) the plaintiff has sought
compensation through whatever adequate procedures the state provides.”18 The Fifth Circuit recently
has interpreted Williamson County’s ripeness requirements as being “merely prudential, not
jurisdictional[.]”19
The parties do not dispute that the first prong of the ripeness test has been met. The
Defendant has adopted FEMA’s Flood Insurance Rate Maps, and there is nothing indicating that this
decision was not final. The second part of the test requires that plaintiffs exhaust their remedies
through the state’s procedures.20 Here, the Plaintiffs are attempting to bring an inverse condemnation
suit in state court. Until that claim is resolved, no Fifth Amendment violation has occurred because
just compensation has not been denied. Thus, the federal takings and related due process claims are
not yet ripe for this Court to have subject matter jurisdiction.
Defendant argues that if the Plaintiffs’ federal claims are not ripe in this Court, then those
same claims cannot be ripe in Texas State Court, and should be dismissed.21 In support, Defendant
17
Id. at 195.
18
Sandy Creek Investors, LTD. v. City of Jonestown, 325 F.3d 623, 626 (5th Cir. 2003).
19
Rosedale Missionary Baptist Church v. New Orleans City, 641 F.3d 86, 88-90 (5th Cir.
20
See Sandy Creek Investors, 325 F.3d at 626.
21
Defendant’s Response to Motion in Remand, p. 2.
2011).
4
cites Standard Materials, Inc. v. City of Slidell, Nos. 92-2509, 93-3616, 1994 WL 285043, at *11
(E.D. La. June 20, 1994), which used the same reasoning to justify remanding a plaintiff’s state
claims and then dismissing without prejudice the federal takings claim.22 This Court does not
believe this is appropriate. In San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco,23 the
Supreme Court held that Williamson County’s requirement that an aggrieved property owner must
seek compensation through the procedures the State has provided for doing so “does not preclude
state courts from hearing simultaneously a plaintiff’s request for compensation under state law and
the claim that, in the alternative, the denial of compensation would violate the Fifth Amendment of
the Federal Constitution.”24 The Court continued: “Reading Williamson County to preclude plaintiffs
from raising such claims in the alternative would erroneously interpret our cases as requiring
property owners to ‘resort to piecemeal litigation or otherwise unfair procedures.’”25 Thus, San
Remo holds that state-law and federal-law takings claims may be pursued simultaneously even
though the federal takings claim is not ripe, if the federal claim is brought in the alternative to the
state-law takings claim.
Moreover, “under Texas law the mere fact that a cause of action is
contingent on the outcome of another suit does not prevent the two claims from being raised and
litigated simultaneously in the same suit.”26
22
See Standard Materials, Inc. v. City of Slidell, Nos. 92-2509, 93-3616, 1994 WL 285043,
at *11 (E.D. La. June 20, 1994).
23
545 U.S. 323, 331 & n.6 (2005)
24
Id. at 346.
25
Id.
26
Guetersloh v. State, 930 S.W.2d 284, 287 (Tex. App. – Austin 1996).
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CONCLUSION
For the above-stated reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion to remand (Docket No. 7) is GRANTED.
This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the federal takings claims are not ripe for
adjudication. Therefore, removal is not proper. It is therefore ORDERED that this case be
REMANDED to the 25th Judicial District Court of Guadalupe County, Texas.
It is so ORDERED.
SIGNED this 17th day of November, 2011.
_________________________________
XAVIER RODRIGUEZ
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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