Eure v. The Sage Corporation

Filing 30

ORDER GRANTING 21 Motion for Summary Judgment; GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART 27 Motion to Strike. Signed by Judge David A. Ezra. (aej)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SAN ANTONIO DIVISION

LORETTA EURE, individually,

§
§
Plaintiff,
§
§
vs.
§
§
THE SAGE CORPORATION,
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§
Defendant.
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________________________________ §

CV. NO. 5:12-CV-1119-DAE

ORDER (1) GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT; (2) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by
Defendant The Sage Corporation (“Sage” or “Defendant”). (“Mot.,” Dkt. # 21.)
The Court held a hearing on Defendant’s Motion on November 6, 2014. At the
hearing, Glenn D. Levy, Esq., represented Plaintiff Loretta Eure (“Eure” or
“Plaintiff”); John T. Hawkins, Esq., represented Defendant. Upon careful
consideration of the arguments asserted in the supporting and opposing
memoranda, as well as the arguments presented at the hearing, the Court
GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. In conjunction with this
ruling, the Court also GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendant’s
Motion to Strike (Dkt. # 27).

1

BACKGROUND
Defendant owns and operates truck driving schools, including a
school in San Antonio. (Mot., Ex. 1 ¶ 2.) In December 2010, Eure, who was
assigned female at birth and presents as male, began working as a truck-driving
instructor at Defendant’s San Antonio location. (“Resp.,” Dkt. # 26, “Eure Decl.,”
Ex. 1 ¶ 2.) During her 1 tenure, Eure reported to San Antonio School Director
Margie Brandon (“Brandon”), Western Regional Director Barbara Blake
(“Blake”), and President Gregg Aversa (“Aversa”) as her supervisors. (Mot., Ex. 1
¶ 3.)
At the beginning of her employment with Defendant, Eure attests that
she received insufficient training because her trainer, Noel Smith (“Smith”) only
permitted her to shadow him for twenty-four hours. (Eure Decl. ¶ 3.) Eure also
attests that Smith subjected her to “sarcasm and innuendos,” in which Smith
complained about having to instruct Eure and expressed his desire to work in
Brandon’s supervisory role. (“Eure Dep.,” Mot., Ex. 4 at 43:1–6.) Eure reported
these comments to her supervisor, Brandon. (Id. at 41:10–11, 20–22.)
In March 2011, Carmela Campanian (“Campanian”), a National
Project Director for Sage, arrived at the San Antonio campus to conduct
specialized training. (Mot., Ex. 3 ¶ 2.) Brandon alleges that, early that day,
1

In Eure’s papers, Eure refers to herself as “she” and this Court will do the same.
2

Campanian saw Eure with a student and asked Brandon, “What is that and who
hired that?” (Id. ¶ 3.) Brandon alleges that Campanian then said, “Please don’t tell
me that is a Sage instructor” and informed Brandon that Sage did not hire “cross
genders.” (Id.) After Brandon told Campanian that she hired Eure because Eure
was qualified and filled the school’s need for a bilingual instructor, Brandon
alleges that Campanian told her, “We will deal with you seriously for hiring that.”
(Id.) Brandon further alleges that Campanian indicated she would discuss the
matter with Sage’s President, Gregg Aversa (“Aversa”) and discuss appropriate
punishment for Brandon. (Id.)
On that day or the following day, Brandon alleges that she reviewed
the instructor schedule that Campanian had reworked. (Id. ¶ 6.) Brandon alleges
that when she told Campanian that Eure had been omitted from the schedule,
Campanian indicated that the omission was purposeful and asked Brandon if she
understood the severity of the consequences for hiring a transgender instructor.
(Id.)
That same day, Campanian informed Eure that Eure could not use a
particular truck with her student and Eure proceeded with the student’s lesson in a
different truck. (Eure Dep. 49:10–21.) After Eure returned from the lesson,
Brandon’s assistant, Maria Solis (“Solis”), informed Eure that Campanian had
called her to the office. (Id. at 50:22–24.)

3

When Eure met with Campanian, Eure alleges that Campanian said
“I’ve never had to deal with something like this.” (Id. at 51:12–13.) In response,
Eure asked, “What do you mean? Because I’m gay?” (Id. at 51:13–14.) Eure
alleges that Campanian paused and then said that Eure was insubordinate. (Id. at
51:14–15.) Eure alleges that Campanian then received a phone call and dismissed
Eure from her office. (Id. at 51:23–52:4.) Eure immediately reported this incident
to Brandon. (Id. at 52:20–23.) Later that evening, Eure called Brandon again to
discuss the incident. (Id. at 53:22–54:3.) At the same time, she attempted to report
the incident to Aversa, but she obtained Aversa’s contact information through a
search engine and mistakenly emailed the incorrect Aversa. (Id. at 54:4–10.)
When the incorrect recipient informed her of the mistake, she redirected the
complaint to Aversa on March 31, 2011. (Id.; id. at 56:17–20.)
Because Aversa was out of town, Blake responded to the complaint on
behalf of Aversa on April 1, 2011. (Id. at 59:8–16; Mot., Ex. 2, Ex. E at 2.) Blake
asked that Eure call Sage’s Vice President and General Counsel Chris Thropp
sometime that day to discuss the matter over the phone. (Mot., Ex. 2, Ex. E at 2.)
On April 4, 2011, Eure submitted a charge of discrimination with the
EEOC, which alleged discrimination based on sex against Defendant. (Eure Dep.
67:8–23.) That same day, Aversa returned from his trip and spoke with Eure.
(Mot., Ex. 1 ¶ 4; Eure Dep. 59:20.) Aversa asked Eure to consider returning to

4

work and assured Eure that he planned to investigate the incident further. (Eure
Dep. 60:2–18.) On April 5, 2011, Aversa replied to Eure’s email, expressing his
apologies for the events that unfolded, his intention to address the matter with
Campanian, and his support for Eure’s return to work. (Mot., Ex. 1, Ex. H.) He
also stated that “[t]he reports from [Brandon] on your teaching skills and your
overall performance were very positive and encouraging to Barb Blake and to me.”
(Id.) On April 6, 2011, Eure replied that she would need additional information
about the hours that she would be able to work and whether Brandon and Solis
would be returning before she agreed to return to work. (Mot., Ex. 1, Ex. I.) Eure
never returned to work. (Eure Dep. 64:17–19.)
On November 29, 2012, Eure filed a complaint in this Court, naming
Sage as the sole defendant. She asserts claims of gender discrimination under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the Texas
Commission on Human Rights Act (“TCHRA”), Texas Labor Code § 21.051;
wrongful termination and retaliation under Title VII and § 1981; and negligent
hiring, supervision, training, and retention. (“Compl.,” Dkt. # 1 ¶¶ 14–23.) Eure
seeks past and future wages and benefits, noneconomic damages, punitive
damages, and attorney’s fees. (Id. at 5–6.)
On July 31, 2014, Defendant filed the instant Motion for Summary
Judgment. (Dkt. # 21.) Plaintiff filed her Response to the Motion for Summary

5

Judgment on September 22, 2014. (Dkt. # 26.) On September 29, 2014,
Defendant filed a Motion to Strike various portions of Eure’s declaration, which
was submitted in support of Plaintiff’s Response. (Dkt. # 27.) On the same day,
Defendant submitted its Reply to Plaintiff’s Response to the Motion for Summary
Judgment. (Dkt. # 28.)
LEGAL STANDARD
A movant is entitled to summary judgment upon showing that “there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also
Meadaa v. K.A.P. Enters., L.L.C., 756 F.3d 875, 880 (5th Cir. 2014). A dispute is
only genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986).
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the
absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986). If the moving party meets this burden, the nonmoving party must
come forward with specific facts that establish the existence of a genuine issue for
trial. Distribuidora Mari Jose, S.A. de C.V. v. Transmaritime, Inc., 738 F.3d 703,
706 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Allen v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 204 F.3d 619, 621
(5th Cir. 2000)). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier
of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’”

6

Hillman v. Loga, 697 F.3d 299, 302 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).
In deciding whether a fact issue has been created, “the court must
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not
make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Kevin M. Ehringer
Enters. v. McData Servs. Corp., 646 F.3d 321, 326 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Reeves
v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000)). However,
“[u]nsubstantiated assertions, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation
are not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.” United States v.
Renda Marine, Inc., 667 F.3d 651, 655 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Brown v. City of
Hous., 337 F.3d 539, 541 (5th Cir. 2003)).
DISCUSSION
I.

Defendant’s Motion to Strike
Defendant objects to various portions of Eure’s declaration, submitted

in support of Plaintiff’s Response, on the basis that particular statements
(a) constitute inadmissible hearsay and (b) contain speculation and conclusory
statements. (Dkt. # 27 at 2–4.) Defendant also argues that the entire affidavit
should be stricken as a sham affidavit because it conflicts with Eure’s deposition
testimony. (Id. at 4–5.)

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A.

Sham Affidavit
“It is well settled that this court does not allow a party to defeat a

motion for summary judgment using an affidavit that impeaches, without
explanation, sworn testimony.” S.W.S. Erectors, Inc. v. Infax, Inc., 72 F.3d 489,
495 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Thurman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 952 F.2d 128, 137
n.23 (5th Cir. 1992)). This circuit recognizes the “sham-affidavit rule,” which
prohibits a non-moving party from “manufactur[ing] a genuine issue of material
fact by submitting an affidavit that impeaches prior testimony without
explanation.” Guerrero v. Total Renal Care, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 2d 769, 776 (W.D.
Tex. 2013). The “sham-affidavit rule ‘is applied sparingly’ and may be invoked
only where there is ‘some inherent inconsistency between an affidavit and a
deposition.’” Axxiom Mfg., Inc. v. McCoy Invs., Inc., 846 F. Supp. 2d 732,
749–50 (S.D. Tex. 2012).
Defendant argues that Eure’s declaration attests to the fact that
Defendant discriminated against her or had a position against transgender
employees, but that Eure testified that the only incidents supporting Defendant’s
bias was the incident in which Campanian would not allow Eure to use a truck and
Campanian’s comments that Eure was insubordinate. (Dkt. # 27 at 4–5.)
Defendant argues that the deposition testimony directly conflicts with the
declaration and, accordingly, the Court should strike Eure’s declaration in its

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entirety. (Id. at 5.)
The fact that Defendant does not agree with Eure that these incidents
amount to a showing of gender discrimination or a policy against transgender
employees does not render the statements inconsistent. The court finds no direct
conflict between the affidavit and deposition testimony indicating bad faith, and
therefore DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Strike Eure’s declaration in its entirety
on the basis that the declaration constitutes a sham affidavit.
B.

Hearsay and Conclusory Statements
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 56(c)(4), a “declaration used to

support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that
would be admissible in evidence, and show that that the . . . declarant is competent
to testify on the matters stated.”2 Any statements in a declaration that violate this
rule are not considered for summary judgment purposes; any portions of the
declarations that are not struck remain part of the summary judgment record. See
Mayfield v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 529 F.3d 599, 607 (5th Cir. 2008)
(citing Akin v. Q–L Invs., Inc., 959 F.2d 521, 531 (5th Cir. 1992)); Williamson v.
2

Although Eure’s declaration is unsworn, it is nevertheless entitled to
consideration because it falls within the statutory exception permitting
consideration of unsworn oaths. 28 U.S.C. § 1746; Nissho-Iwai Am. Corp. v.
Kline, 845 F.2d 1300, 1305–06 (5th Cir. 1988)) (finding that, to be competent for
summary judgment purposes, an affidavit must be sworn or its contents must be
stated to be true and correct under penalty of perjury).

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U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 815 F.2d 368, 383 (5th Cir. 1987).
1.

Conclusory Statements

Defendant argues that the following statements in Eure’s declaration
are conclusory or speculative: (1) “I believe it was Mr. Noel’s way of letting me
know that my gender was an issue with him”; (2) “I learned my gender was an
issue with management”; (3) “I later came to learn that Ms. Campanian was angry
that Margie Brandon, the school director, had hired me because I was a gender
non-conforming female instructor”; (4) “an environment where an owner and an
executive had bigotry and hate as a motivator.” (Dkt. # 27 at 3–4.)
The Court agrees that the statements are of a conclusory nature, since
they are Eure’s speculative conclusions about the beliefs of others. Accordingly,
the statements are inadmissible, and the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to
Strike on that basis.
2.

Hearsay

Defendant argues that the following statements in Eure’s declaration
are hearsay: (1) Eure’s recounting of the interaction between Campanian and
Brandon, during which Campanian allegedly asked Brandon, upon seeing Eure,
“What is that,” and told Brandon that she would be punished for hiring “cross
genders” and (2) Eure’s statement that Brandon was instructed by Campanian to
significantly reduce Eure’s work schedule. (Dkt. # 27 at 2.)

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The Court agrees that, because Eure was not present for either of these
conversations, they constitute inadmissible hearsay. Accordingly, the Court
GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Strike on that basis.
II.

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
In its motion, Defendant contends that Eure’s claims fail because:

(1) she failed to establish a prima facie case on her claims of gender
discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment; (2) her constructive
discharge claim is insufficient as a matter of law; and (3) her negligent hiring,
supervision, training, and retention claim is both preempted and insufficient as
matter of law.3 (Mot. at 4–20.)

3

The Court agrees with Defendant that, although Eure’s complaint contains the
cursory statement that “Defendant’s employment practices had a disparate and
adverse impact on Plaintiff because of her gender (female)” (Compl. ¶ 18), Eure
has not alleged a disparate impact claim. As the Supreme Court has described:
[D]isparate treatment is the most easily understood type of
discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less
favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or
[other protected characteristic]. . . . By contrast, disparate-impact
claims involve employment practices that are facially neutral in their
treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one
group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity.
Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52 (2003) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citations omitted).
The facts alleged in Eure’s complaint do not identify any facially
neutral employment practices that disparately impact females. See McClain v.
Lufkin Indus., Inc., 519 F.3d 264, 275 (5th Cir. 2008) (“To establish a prima facie
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At the outset, the Court notes that sex discrimination claims are not
cognizable under § 1981. Daigle v. Gulf State Utils. Co., Local Union No. 2286,
794 F.2d 974, 980 (5th Cir. 1986); Bobo v. ITT, Cont’l Baking Co., 662 F.2d 340,
344–45 (5th Cir. 1981). Therefore, the Court analyzes the claims set forth only
under Title VII, the TCHRA, and state common law.
A.

Gender Discrimination and Hostile Work Environment Claims
Title VII 4 makes it “an unlawful practice for an employer . . . to

discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual’s . . . sex.” 42
U.S.C. § 20000e–2(a)(1). The “ultimate question” in every Title VII case is
whether the plaintiff has proven that the defendant intentionally discriminated
against her because of a protected characteristic. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks,
509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993).
case of discrimination under a disparate-impact theory, a plaintiff must show:
(1) an identifiable, facially neutral personnel policy or practice; (2) a disparate
effect on members of a protected class; and (3) a causal connection between the
two”); see also Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 587 (2009) (“a prima facie case
of disparate-impact liability [is] essentially, a threshold showing of a significant
statistical disparity, and nothing more” (citations omitted)). Because Eure’s
complaint does not set forth sufficient factual allegations to plead a disparate
impact claim, see Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), the Court
interprets Eure’s “gender discrimination” claim as a traditional disparate treatment
claim.
4

Although Eure makes claims under both Title VII and the TCHRA, the Court
only refers to Title VII because the TCHRA is interpreted accordance with federal
law. In re United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 307 S.W.3d 299, 308 (Tex. 2010).

12

It is well-established that “a plaintiff can satisfy Title VII’s
because-of-sex requirement with evidence of a plaintiff’s perceived failure to
conform to traditional gender stereotypes.”5 Boh Bros., 731 F.3d at 454. The
gender stereotyping theory comes out of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S.
228 (1989), a case in which a female senior manager challenged the rejection of
her bid for partnership as gender discrimination. Id. at 233. Hopkins presented
evidence that, during the review of her candidacy, the hiring partners referred to
her as “macho,” “a lady using foul language,” “a tough-talking somewhat
masculine hard-nosed manager,” and “overcompensated for being a woman.” Id.
at 235. The partners also suggested that she could improve her partnership chances
by “walk[ing] more femininely, talk[ing] more femininely, dress[ing] more
femininely, wear[ing] make-up, hav[ing] her hair styled, and wear[ing] jewelry.”
Id. The Court found that this evidence was evidence of sex stereotyping, which
was sufficient to satisfy Title VII’s “because of sex” requirement. Id. at 251. In so

5

The Court notes that Eure’s gender discrimination and hostile work environment
claims are brought under both Title VII and the TCHRA. Because the TCHRA
was modeled after federal civil rights law and is intended to coordinate state law
with federal law in employment discrimination cases, the Texas Supreme Court
interprets the TCHRA in light of federal law and the cases interpreting that law. In
re United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 307 S.W.3d at 308. Although Texas courts have not
directly addressed whether sex stereotyping claims can support a “because of sex”
claim under the TCHRA, the Court concludes that they can, since the TCHRA is
interpreted in light of federal law unless the Texas Supreme Court has held
otherwise.
13

holding, the Court noted that “we are beyond the day when an employer could
evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype
associated with their group, for ‘in forbidding employers to discriminate against
individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum
of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.’” Id. at
251 (alterations omitted) (quoting L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435
U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)).
Since Price Waterhouse, courts have relied on the sex stereotyping
doctrine in finding discrimination based on sex under Title VII. In so finding,
courts have generally required evidence of gendered statements or acts that target a
plaintiff’s conformance with traditional conceptions of masculinity or femininity.
See, e.g., Boh Bros., 731 F.3d at 454 (finding that evidence that the plaintiff’s
coworkers taunted him with “sex-based epithets” “directed at [his] masculinity,” as
well as physical acts of simulated anal sex, simulated male-on-male oral sex, and
genital exposure was sufficient to prevail on a gender-stereotyping theory);
Nichols v. Azteca Res. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding
that evidence that the male plaintiff was “attacked for walking and carrying his tray
‘like a woman’—i.e., for having feminine mannerisms,” that coworkers called the
plaintiff names “cast in female terms,” and that coworkers and supervisors referred
to him as “she” and “her” was sufficient to prevail on a sex stereotyping theory).

14

In some cases, the plaintiffs bringing successful sex stereotyping
claims are transgender people, arguing that the discrimination that they have
suffered is because their coworkers perceived their behavior or appearance as not
“masculine or feminine enough.” However, courts have been reluctant to extend
the sex stereotyping theory to cover circumstances where the plaintiff is
discriminated against because the plaintiff’s status as a transgender man or woman,
without any additional evidence related to gender stereotype non-conformity. 6
Etstitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1222 (10th Cir. 2007)
(“[D]iscrimination against a transsexual because she is a transsexual is not
‘discrimination because of sex.’ Therefore, transsexuals are not a protected class
under Title VII and [a plaintiff] cannot satisfy her prima facie burden on the basis
of her status as a transsexual.”); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201–02
(9th Cir. 2000) (finding that the judicial approach of barring all claims against
transgender persons, as held in Holloway, was overruled by the logic of Price
Waterhouse, but holding that “[w]hat matters, for the purpose of this part of the

6

Although the Ulane, Sommers, Holloway line of case law was, at one time, a
complete bar for transgender plaintiffs to seek recovery on any basis, “federal
courts have recognized with near-total uniformity” that complete bar was
eliminated when the Supreme Court upheld gender stereotyping as a valid
approach to show discrimination because of sex. Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d
1312, 1318 n.5 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 573
(6th Cir. 2004); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000); Rosa v.
Park W. Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213, 215 (1st Cir. 2000).
15

Price Waterhouse analysis, is that in the mind of the perpetrator the discrimination
is related to the sex of the victim: here, for example, the perpetrator’s actions stem
from the fact that he believed that the victim was a man who ‘failed to act like’
one”); Ulane v. E. Airlines, 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984) (“[W]e are
constrained to hold that Title VII does not protect transsexuals”); Sommers v.
Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982) (“Because Congress has not
shown an intention to protect transsexuals, we hold that discrimination based on
one’s transsexualism does not fall within the protective purview of [Title VII]”);
Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 304 (D.D.C. 2008) (“While I agreed
with the Sixth Circuit that transsexuality is not a bar to a sex stereotyping claim, I
took the position that ‘such a claim must actually arise from the employee’s
appearance or conduct and the employer’s stereotypical perceptions.’ In other
words, ‘a Price Waterhouse claim could not be supported by facts showing that [an
adverse employment action] resulted solely from [the plaintiff’s] disclosure of her
gender dysphoria’”) (citations and alterations omitted). But see Smith v. City of
Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 574–75 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[D]iscrimination against a plaintiff
who is a transsexual—and therefore fails to act and/or identify with this or her
gender—is no different from the discrimination directed against Ann Hopkins in
Price Waterhouse, who, in sex-stereotypical terms, did not act like a woman. Sex
stereotyping based on a person’s gender non-conforming behavior is impermissible

16

discrimination, irrespective of the cause of that behavior; a label, such as
“transsexual,” is not fatal to a sex discrimination claim where the victim has
suffered discrimination because of his or her gender non-conformity.”).
All of the testimony that Eure has presented related to Campanian’s
animus couches Campanian’s alleged discrimination in terms specifically related to
Eure’s status as a transgender person, not in terms related to her conformance with
gender stereotypes. 7 Eure presents two pieces of evidence to show discrimination
based on sex: (1) Brandon’s testimony that, upon seeing Eure, Campanian asked
Brandon, “What is that and who hired that? . . . Please do not tell me that is a Sage
instructor . . . . We will deal with you seriously for hiring that,” (Brandon Decl.
¶ 3.), and (2) Brandon’s testimony that, upon reviewing the changes Campanian
made to the calendar, Brandon told Campanian that Campanian had failed to place
Eure on the schedule, at which point “[Campanian] looked at [Brandon] and asked
[her] if [she] was serious. . . . She then asked [Brandon] if she understood the
severity and the consequences that was [sic] on the horizon for [her] for having the
audacity to hire a cross gender” (Brandon Decl. ¶ 6).
This is a difficult case because, although Price Waterhouse provides a
7

The Court notes that, although neither party has made argument on whether
Eure’s claims were properly made “because of sex,” the Court cannot engage in
meaningful analysis of the contested arguments, including whether there is direct
evidence of discrimination—as Plaintiff’s counsel argued at the hearing—without
first determining whether the discrimination at issue is covered by Title VII.
17

vehicle for transgender persons to seek recovery under Title VII, neither the
Supreme Court nor the Fifth Circuit have held that discrimination based on
transgender status is per se gender stereotyping actionable under Title VII.
Without any briefing from the parties on the issue, this Court declines to hold
otherwise. Because Eure has failed to present evidence showing that the
discrimination was motivated by her failure to act as a stereotypical woman
would,8 Eure has not presented a cognizable gender stereotyping claim and cannot
succeed in showing that the discrimination or hostile work environment claim that
she presents is “because of sex,” as Title VII requires. 9 Therefore, the Court
GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the discrimination and
8

The Court notes that similar rationale supported the Second Circuit’s conclusion
in Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble:
In sum, in contrast to the plaintiff in Price Waterhouse, who proffered
evidence that her promotion to partnership depended upon her
changing her behavior to better conform to gender stereotypes, or the
plaintiff in Back, who demonstrated a triable issue of fact as to
whether her superiors felt that her continued employment violated
gender stereotypes, Dawson has produced no substantial evidence
from which we may plausibly infer that her alleged failure to conform
her appearance to feminine stereotypes resulted in her suffering any
adverse employment action at the hands of Bumble & Bumble. Thus,
her Title VII claim based upon a gender stereotyping theory must fail.
398 F.3d 211, 222–23 (2d Cir. 2005).
9

Because Eure has not established that the alleged discrimination was the sort of
discrimination prohibited by Title VII, the Court does not reach the parties’
arguments about whether she has otherwise established her prima facie case.
18

hostile work environment claims.
B.

Retaliation
Defendant also contends that summary judgment on Eure’s retaliation

claim is warranted because Brandon failed to present sufficient evidence on any
elements of her prima facie case. (Mot. at 8–10.) At the hearing, Plaintiff’s
counsel indicated that he believes that direct evidence supports the retaliation
claim.
Like in discrimination claim, a plaintiff can prove retaliation either
through direct or circumstantial evidence. See Fierros v. Tex. Dep’t of Health, 274
F.3d 187, 195 (5th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and internal alteration
omitted), overruled on other grounds by Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90,
92 (2003). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff
must show “(1) he engaged in an activity protected by Title VII; (2) he was
subjected to an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link exists between
the protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Willis v. Cleco Corp.,
749 F.3d 314, 317 (5th Cir. 2014). In a direct evidence case, the causal link will
amount to evidence that, if believed, proves the fact of intentional retaliation
without inference or presumption. Fierros v. Tex. Dep’t of Health, 274 F.3d at
195.
Once the plaintiff presents his prima facie case, the burden shifts to

19

the defendant to proffer a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the underlying
employment action. Id. at 317–18. If a defendant makes this showing, the burden
shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the proffered reason is, in fact, a pretext for
discrimination. Id. at 318.
1.

Protected Activity Under Title VII

An employee engages “in protected activity if she has ‘opposed any
practice made an unlawful employment practice under [42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a)].’”
Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 348 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a)). To show that the activity was protected, the employee
must have had “at least a reasonable belief that the practices she opposed were
unlawful.” Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 304 (5th Cir. 1996) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Although Eure does not specifically identify the factual basis of the
protected activity in her complaint, she filed an EEOC charge of discrimination on
April 4, 2011, which was a protected activity. (Eure Dep. 67:8–23.) Additionally,
Eure alleges that she reported the comments made by Smith and Campanian to her
supervisors, Brandon and Aversa. (Eure Dep. 41:10–11, 20–22.) Because Eure
could not have reasonably believed that Smith’s comments constituted an unlawful
employment practice in and of themselves—since the statements had no
relationship to Eure’s gender—Eure’s decision to report Smith’s comments cannot

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be a protected activity.
However, Eure could have reasonably believed that Campanian’s
alleged opposition to hiring transgendered persons and decision to remove Eure
from the schedule was in violation of Title VII. Although the contours of the sex
stereotyping doctrine that transgender persons can use as a basis for Title VII
discrimination claims are complex, the only issue here is whether Eure could have
reasonably believed that Campanian’s actions violated Title VII. Because there is
a potential basis of recovery under Title VII, Eure’s belief was reasonable.
Although neither the Supreme Court nor the Fifth Circuit 10 have ruled
definitively as to whether informal complaints can constitute opposition, the
majority of circuits find that informal complaints come within the opposition
clause’s requirements. Hertz v. Luzenac Am., Inc., 370 F.3d 1014, 1015 (10th Cir.
2004) (“Protected opposition can range from filing formal charges to voicing
informal complaints to superiors); Shannon v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 292
F.3d 712, 715 n.2 (11th Cir. 2002) (noting that Title VII protects those “who

10

Although not binding on this Court, the Fifth Circuit has stated in an
unpublished opinion that an employee need not submit a formal complaint or
charge of discrimination to meet the opposition requirement and that an informal
complaint to a supervisor is sufficient. Tureaud v. Grambling State Univ., 294 F.
App’x 909, 914–15 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding opposition when the plaintiff sought
assistance from fellow employees in rallying support for a job applicant that the
plaintiff believed was being discriminated against).

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informally voice complaints to their superiors or who use their employers’ internal
grievance procedures”); Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 580 (6th
Cir. 2000) (listing various activities that the EEOC identifies as opposing conduct);
Sunner v. U.S. Postal Serv., 899 F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir. 1990) (listing permissible
forms of opposition as including “making complaints to management”); Armstrong
v. Index Journal Co., 647 F.2d 441, 448 (4th Cir. 1981) (considering informal
complaints protected opposition); Sias v. City Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d
692, 694 (9th Cir. 1978) (“It should not be necessary for an employee to resort
immediately to the EEOC or similar State agencies in order to bring complaints of
discrimination to the attention of the employer with some measure of protection.
The resolution of such charges without government prodding should be
encouraged.”).
The Court agrees that informal opposition to a discriminatory practice
can constitute protected activity. Accordingly, there is a fact question as to
whether Eure’s report of her conversation with Campanian and of Campanian’s
decision to remove Eure from the schedule constituted a protected activity.
2.

Adverse Employment Action

Unlike in the Title VII discrimination context, an adverse employment
action in the retaliation context is not limited to ultimate employment decisions,
such as hiring, granting leave, discharge, promotion, and compensation. McCoy v.

22

City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 558 (5th Cir. 2007). Rather, the action can be
something that “a reasonable employee would have found . . . [to be] materially
adverse” or, in other words, would have “dissuaded a reasonable worker from
making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Aryain, 534 F.3d at 484
(quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 548 U.S. at 68).
Although Eure does not identify the specific basis for her adverse
employment action allegation, she does allege that Campanian reduced her hours. 11

11

Because Eure’s claims do not amount to constructive discharge, Eure cannot rely
on her resignation as an adverse employment action.
A resignation can only constitute an adverse employment action
where that resignation amounts to a constructive discharge. Brown v. Kinney Shoe
Corp., 237 F.3d 556, 566 (5th Cir. 2001). “To prove a constructive discharge, a
plaintiff must establish that working conditions were so intolerable that a
reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Faruki v. Parsons, 123 F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1997)).
“Discrimination alone, without aggravating factors, is insufficient for a claim of
constructive discharge.” Id. In evaluating whether a reasonable employee would
feel compelled to resign, a court must consider whether the plaintiff experienced
any demotions; reductions in salary or job responsibilities; job reassignments to
menial or degrading work, or to a younger supervisor; badgering, harassment, or
humiliation calculated to encourage resignation; offers of early retirement; or
continued employment on terms less favorable than the employee’s former status.
Id. (quoting Brown v. Bunge Corp., 207 F.3d 776, 782 (5th Cir. 2000)).
Eure’s resignation was not a constructive discharge amounting to an
adverse employment action. Eure alleges that she resigned because of the “tone”
of Campanian’s meeting with her, her understanding that Campanian had a
problem with transgender employees, and the reduction in work hours that she
experienced. Although these events may amount to an unpleasant working
environment, they transpired over the period of two days. “In the constructive
discharge context, . . . ‘part of an employee’s obligation to be reasonable is an
obligation not to assume the worst, and not to jump to conclusions too fast.”
23

Eure presents Brandon’s declaration to show that she was removed from teaching
assignments at the direction of Campanian. (Brandon Decl. ¶ 6. Compare Eure
Dep., Ex. 9 at 1 (showing a shift on 4/1/11 and possible shifts on 3/31/11 and
4/3/11), with id., Ex. 9 at 2 (showing shift on 4/1/11 with a handwritten note
“cancelled given to other Instr.” and no shifts on 3/31/11 or 4/3/11).)
Eure was a part-time instructor at Sage, who was assigned “minimal
hours,” somewhere between twenty-six and twenty-eight hours per week. (Id. at
43:24–44:11.) The evidence in the record establishes that Sage originally
scheduled Eure for 12.75 hours with the possibility of 8.5 additional hours (the
instructor on the shift assignments at issue was designated as “Kelly or Loretta”)
for the week of March 28, 2011. (Id., Ex. 9 at 1.) The revised schedule shows that
Sage scheduled Eure for 12.75 hours and removed the possibility of the 8.5
additional hours (the shifts were given to Kelly). (Id. at 2.) Brandon attests that
Campanian purposefully made this change in order to reduce Eure’s hours on the

Aryain v. Wal-Mart Stores Tex. LP, 534 F.3d 473, 481–82 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Dornhecker v. Malibu Grand Prix Corp., 828 F.2d 307, 310 (5th Cir. 1987)). The
record is clear that Eure did not give Defendant the opportunity to investigate her
claims before she stopped returning to work; rather, she reported the incident to
Brandon and Aversa and never came to work again. She did this in spite of
Aversa’s apologies, both via email and over the phone, for what she said had
occurred and his attempts to convince her to return to work. This conduct
undermines Eure’s obligation to be reasonable. Accordingly, there was no
constructive discharge amounting to an adverse employment action in this case.
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schedule. 12
Because a reduction in hours—and, consequently, the reduction in
associated income—could dissuade a reasonable employee from making or
supporting a charge of discrimination, a reduction in hours can be an adverse
employment action in the retaliation context. See, e.g., Badii v. Rick’s Cabaret
Intern., Inc., No, 3:12-CV-4541-B, 2014 WL 550593, at *17 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 11,
2014) (finding that shift reduction can be an adverse employment action in the
retaliation context); McNairy v. Chickasaw Cnty., Miss., No. 1:09-CV-59-SAJAD, 2010 WL 3813612, at *4 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 22, 2010) (finding that a
reduction in hours constituted an adverse employment action for retaliation);
Harris v. Fresenius Med. Care, No, H-04-4807, 2006 WL 2065313, at *19 (S.D.
Tex. July 24, 2006) (finding that hours reduction could be an adverse employment
action for retaliation purposes, but was not because the employer provided a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for that reduction). Accordingly, Eure has
set forth evidence to satisfy the second prong of the prima facie case.
12

The Court notes that the schedule also has a cross-out through the 4/1/2011 8.5
hour shift, accompanied by writing that reads “cancelled given to other Instr.”
(Eure Dep., Ex. 9 at 2.) It is unclear who made this marking, as well as the time at
which the cancellation occurred. However, Defendant’s evidence, which Eure
does not dispute, indicates that the shift was reassigned when Eure called in sick on
April 1, and was not cancelled at the same time that Kelly was given the undecided
8.5 hour shifts. (Mot., Ex. 2 ¶ 22.) Therefore, the Court does not consider this
evidence of an hours reduction.

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3.

Causal Link

“At the prima facie stage, ‘the standard for satisfying the causation
element is ‘much less stringent’ than a ‘but for’ causation standard.’ Nevertheless,
the plaintiff must produce some evidence of a causal link between the protected
activity and the adverse employment action to establish a prima facie case of
retaliation.” Ackel v. Nat’l Commc’ns, Inc., 339 F.3d 376, 385 (5th Cir. 2003)
(quoting Fierros v. Tex. Dep’t of Health, 274 F.3d 187, 191 (5th Cir. 2011)).
Eure has failed to produce such evidence, either in direct or
circumstantial form. The hours reduction that Eure alleges occurred before she
made any reports to Brandon or Aversa. Similarly, Eure chose to stop returning to
work before submitting her EEOC discrimination charge. Compare with
Shackelford v. Deloitte & Touce, LLP, 190 F.3d 398, 409 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding
that termination after submitting an EEOC charge was sufficient to meet the causal
link showing). Accordingly, there is no causal link between Eure’s reduction of
hours and the adverse employment actions. Therefore, the Court finds that
summary judgment on the retaliation claim is warranted and the Court GRANTS
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to the retaliation claim.
C.

Negligent Hiring, Supervision, Training, and Retention Claims
Finally, Defendant contends that summary judgment on Eure’s

negligent hiring supervision, training, and retention claims is proper because

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(1) negligence claims based on acts of discrimination or harassment are preempted
by the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (“TCHRA”); (2) negligence
claims against an employer are preempted by the worker’s compensation remedy;
(3) there is no evidence that a Sage employee committed a tort against Eure; and
(4) Eure has failed to show any negligence on the part of Defendant. (Mot. at
17–19.)
1.

Preemption

The TCHRA is a Texas statute prohibiting discrimination and
retaliation against employees on the basis of race, sex, and other protected
characteristics. Tex. Labor Code § 21.051. When the facts underlying a plaintiff’s
negligence claims are entwined with facts that would give rise to a harassment
claim under the TCHRA, the TCHRA is the exclusive state-law remedy for the
harassment. Waffle House, Inc. v. Williams, 313 S.W.3d 796, 799 (Tex. 2010).
Although Eure does not identify the specific facts giving rise to her
claim based in negligence, the only possible basis for her claims is the same set of
facts that form the basis of her discrimination, harassment, and retaliation claims.
Because the TCHRA is the exclusive state-law remedy for those claims, Eure’s
negligence claims fail as a matter of law.
2.

The Merits

Even if Eure’s negligence claims were not preempted by the TCHRA,

27

her claims would nevertheless fail. Although the Texas Supreme Court has “not
ruled definitively on the existence, elements, and scope” of negligent hiring claims,
a few broad principles are clear. First, like a general negligence action, a negligent
hiring action requires a showing of duty, a breach of that duty, and damages
proximately caused by the breach. Castillo v. Gulf Coast Livestock Mkt., L.L.C.,
392 S.W.3d 299, 306 (Tex. 2012); see also Wansey v. Hole, 379 S.W.3d 246, 248
(Tex. 2012); Kroger Co. v. Elwood, 197 S.W.3d 793, 794 (Tex. 2006). Second,
the plaintiff must show that she “suffer[ed] some damages from the foreseeable
misconduct of an employee hired pursuant to the defendant’s negligent practices,”
which amount to an independently actionable tort. Wansey, 379 S.W.3d at
247–248. Third, when the claim is based on failure to screen, as it is in the instant
case, the plaintiff must show that the “employer’s failure to investigate, screen, or
supervise its [hires] proximately caused the injuries the plaintiffs allege.” Fifth
Club, Inc. v. Ramirez, 196 S.W.3d 788, 796 (Tex. 2006) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dall., Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472, 477
(Tex. 1995)). Accordingly, this Court has previously concluded that:
[A] negligent hiring and management claim in Texas requires a
plaintiff to establish that: (1) an employee of the defendant committed
an actionable tort against the plaintiff, (2) the plaintiff suffered
damages as a result of the employee’s foreseeable misconduct, (3) the
employer was negligent in hiring or supervising the employee, and
(4) the employee’s misconduct would not have occurred but for the
employer’s negligence.

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Ayres v. Parker, No. 5:12-CV-621-XR, 2013 WL 4048328, at *18 (W.D. Tex. July
29, 2013).
Although Eure names negligent hiring, supervision, training, and
retention as the basis of her claim, she does not identify any actionable tort
committed by Campanian (or any other Sage employee). Having failed to identify
any particular tort, she has not met her burden under Wansey.
Even if Eure had identified a particular tort committed by Campanian,
the Court cannot find any support in the record showing that Campanian’s alleged
harassment was foreseeable. Plaintiff presents no evidence that Campanian had
received discipline or been subject to termination for gender-based harassment at
Sage or any other prior employer. See Ogunbanjo v. Don McGill of W. Hous.,
Ltd., No. 1-13-406-CV, 2014 WL 298037, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
Jan. 28, 2014) (finding that a previous termination, without an evidentiary showing
of the basis for that termination, was insufficient to raise a fact issue regarding
foreseeability of sexual harassment). The only evidence in the record addressing
Campanian’s disciplinary record is her own attestation that she has never had a
complaint of harassment or discrimination made against her during her thirty years
working in driving schools, as well as her attestation that she previously trained a
transgender driver at another school without incident. (Mot., Ex. 3 ¶ 5.)
Accordingly, Eure has failed to show that any alleged harassment by Campanian

29

was foreseeable to Defendant.
Therefore, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the
negligence claims is GRANTED.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Dkt. # 21). Accordingly, all claims made against Defendant
are DISMISSED. In conjunction with this ruling, the Court GRANTS IN PART
AND DENIES IN PART Defendant’s Motion to Strike (Dkt. # 27).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: San Antonio, Texas, November 19, 2014.

_____________________________________
David Alan Ezra
Senior United States Distict Judge

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