Vassallo v. Goodman Networks, Inc.
Filing
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ORDER GRANTING 6 Motion to Transfer Venue to the Sherman Division of the Eastern District of Texas. Signed by Judge David A. Ezra. (rg)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SAN ANTONIO DIVISION
LOUIS VASSALLO, on Behalf of
Himself and All Others Similarly
Situated,
Plaintiff,
vs.
GOODMAN NETWORKS, INC.,
Defendant.
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Cv. No. 5:14-CV-743-DAE
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE
Before the Court is a Motion to Transfer Venue filed by Defendant
Goodman Networks, Inc. (“Defendant”) (Dkt. # 6). The Court held a hearing on
the Motion on February 5, 2015. At the hearing, Seth Grove, Esq., and Joseph
Lanza, Esq., represented Plaintiff Louis Vassallo (“Plaintiff”). Dennis A. Clifford,
Esq., represented Defendant. Upon careful consideration of the arguments asserted
at the hearing and in the supporting and opposing memoranda, the Court, for the
reasons that follow, GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Transfer Venue.
BACKGROUND
This case involves alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act
(“FLSA”). Defendant is a Texas corporation that conducts business as a registered
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telecommunications services company. (“Compl.,” Dkt. # 1 ¶ 9.) Defendant’s
headquarters is located in Plano, Texas. (Ex. B, Dkt. # 6-8 ¶ 4.) Plaintiff is a
resident of Ellisville County, Missouri, and was formerly employed as a
construction manager for Defendant. 1 (Compl. ¶ 2.) Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant violates the FLSA by failing to pay its construction managers for
overtime work as required by 29 U.S.C. § 207(a). (Compl. ¶ 23, 35.) Plaintiff
specifically alleges that he and other construction managers employed by
Defendant worked six and seven days a week and commuted eight to twelve hours
a day between work sites, and that Defendant did not pay him or its other
construction managers at the required overtime rate for the time worked in excess
of forty hours a week. (Compl. ¶¶ 19–20.)
Plaintiff filed his Complaint in this Court on August 21, 2014. (Dkt.
# 1.) Plaintiff seeks to certify as a collective action on behalf of himself and all
other similarly situated employees to recover unpaid overtime compensation.
(Compl. ¶¶ 4, 26–33.) Defendant filed an answer on October 24, 2014. (Dkt. # 5.)
On November 26, 2014, Defendant filed the instant Motion to Transfer Venue
seeking to transfer the case from the San Antonio Division of the Western District
of Texas to the Sherman Division of the Eastern District of Texas. (Dkt. # 6 at 1.)
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While Plaintiff’s Complaint states that he is currently employed by Defendant,
Plaintiff’s counsel represented at the hearing on the instant Motion that Plaintiff
has recently been dismissed and is no longer a Goodman Networks employee.
2
Plaintiff filed a Response in opposition to the Motion on December 3, 2014 (Dkt.
# 8), and Defendant filed a Reply on December 10, 2014 (Dkt. # 9).
LEGAL STANDARD
For the convenience of parties and witnesses, a district court may
transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been
brought, or to any district or division to which all parties have consented. 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a). “Section 1404(a) is intended to place discretion in the district
court to adjudicate motions for transfer according to an individualized, case-bycase consideration of convenience and fairness.” Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh
Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). The party
moving for transfer carries the burden of showing good cause. See Humble Oil &
Ref. Co. v. Bell Marine Serv., Inc., 321 F.2d 53, 56 (5th Cir. 1963); see also In re
Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 314 (5th Cir. 2008) (hereinafter
“Volkswagen II”) (“When viewed in the context of § 1404(a), to show good cause
means that a moving party, in order to support its claim for a transfer, must . . .
clearly demonstrate that a transfer is ‘[f]or the convenience of parties and
witnesses, in the interest of justice.’”) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)).
“The preliminary question under § 1404(a) is whether a civil action
‘might have been brought’ in the destination venue.” Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at
312. If this requirement is met, “[t]he determination of ‘convenience’ turns on a
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number of public and private interest factors, none of which can be said to be of
dispositive weight.” Action Indus., Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 358 F.3d 337,
340 (5th Cir. 2004). The private factors include: “(1) the relative ease of access to
sources of proof; (2) the availability of compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses; (3) the cost of attendance for willing witnesses; and (4) all
other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and
inexpensive.” In re Volkswagen AG, 371 F.3d 201, 203 (5th Cir. 2004)
(hereinafter “Volkswagen I”) (citing Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235,
241 n.6 (1982)). The public factors include: “(1) the administrative difficulties
flowing from court congestion; (2) the local interest in having localized interests
decided at home; (3) the familiarity of the forum with the law that will govern the
case; and (4) the avoidance of unnecessary problems of conflict of laws of the
application of foreign law.” Id.
A plaintiff=s choice of venue is not an independent factor in the venue
transfer analysis, and courts must not give inordinate weight to a plaintiff=s choice
of venue. Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 314 n.10, 315 (“[W]hile a plaintiff has the
privilege of filing his claims in any judicial division appropriate under the general
venue statute, § 1404(a) tempers the effects of the exercise of this privilege.”).
However, “when the transferee venue is not clearly more convenient than the
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venue chosen by the plaintiff, the plaintiff's choice should be respected.” Id. at
315.
DISCUSSION
Defendant moves for this case to be transferred to the Sherman
Division of the Eastern District of Texas pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), arguing
that the location of the witnesses and other evidence in Plano, Texas makes the
Eastern District a clearly more convenient forum. (“Mot.,” Dkt. # 6 at 1–2.) It is
undisputed that this case could have originally been brought in the Sherman
Division of the Eastern District, where Defendant has its corporate headquarters
and thus “resides” for the purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 1391. Defendant must also
“clearly demonstrate that a transfer is for the convenience of parties and witnesses,
in the interest of justice.” Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 315.
Plaintiff argues that the Plaintiff’s choice of forum is owed “great
deference.” (Resp. at 4.) As stated above, a plaintiff=s choice of venue is not an
independent factor in the venue transfer analysis, and courts must not give
inordinate weight to a plaintiff=s choice of venue. Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 314
n.10, 315. The deference owed to a plaintiff’s choice of forum is instead reflected
in the burden on the defendant to show good cause for transfer. Id. at 315. The
Court further notes that Plaintiff here seeks to certify as a class action under the
FLSA, and that a plaintiff’s choice of venue is generally accorded less deference
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when the plaintiff seeks to represent a class of individuals. See Koster v. Am.
Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524 (1947) (reasoning, in the context of
the doctrine of forum nonconveniens, that “where there are hundreds of potential
plaintiffs, all equally entitled voluntarily to invest themselves with the . . . cause of
action . . . the claim of any one plaintiff that a forum is appropriate . . . is
considerably weakened”); see also Mateos v. Select Energy Servs., LLC, 919 F.
Supp. 2d 817, 821 (W.D. Tex. 2013) (citing cases).
However, “less deference is not the same thing as no deference,” and
Defendant must still clearly demonstrate that its preferred venue is more
convenient than the venue chosen by Plaintiff. Mateos, 919 F. Supp. 2d at 821.
Upon consideration of the private and public interest factors described in
Volkswagen I and Volkswagen II, the Court concludes that the Sherman Division
of the Eastern District of Texas is a clearly more convenient venue than the San
Antonio Division of the Western District of Texas. The Court will address these
factors in turn.
I.
Private Factors
The first private factor requires a court to determine which of the two
venues provides easier access to relevant sources of proof. Defendant argues that
the sources of proof are found primarily at its headquarters in Plano, Texas, where
it keeps payroll data, personnel files, job descriptions, and other documents
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relevant to Plaintiff’s payment and whether he was exempted from the
requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 207. (Ex. B, Dkt. # 6-8 ¶ 4.) Additionally, many of
the relevant witnesses work at Defendant’s Plano headquarters, including
Defendant’s Director of Compensation, Vice President of Performance
Management, Senior Manager of Employee Relations, and Director of Human
Resources. (Ex. B, Dkt. # 6-8 ¶ 5.)
Plaintiff’s Response does not identify any evidence that is found in
San Antonio. Plaintiff instead argues that the nearly 300 miles separating Plano
and San Antonio is less than the 1,600 miles separating the defendant from the
Plaintiff’s chosen venue in Farmers Select, LLC v. United Motor Freight, Inc., No.
EP-07-CV-342-DB, 2008 WL 5351731 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2008), in which a
district court denied a motion to transfer venue under § 1404(a). (“Resp.,” Dkt. # 8
at 3.) In that case, however, the venue in which the suit was originally brought was
substantially connected to the litigation—the suit was brought in El Paso, and
related to goods purchased by an El Paso company damaged in transit to El Paso.
Farmers Select, LLC, 2008 WL 5351731 at *5. By contrast, Plaintiff here has set
forth no argument that San Antonio has any connection to the claims in this
litigation.
Plaintiff also argues that because “many documents are stored
digitally or capable of being digitized,” and because witness depositions can be
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taken in the districts in which witnesses reside, the Sherman Division of the
Eastern District is not significantly more convenient than the San Antonio Division
of the Western District. (Resp. at 3–4.) The relevant inquiry for the first private
factor, however, is the relative convenience of the two venues, and the fact “[t]hat
access to some sources of proof presents a lesser inconvenience now than it might
have absent recent developments does not render this factor superfluous.”
Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 316. Given the complete absence of any sources of
proof in San Antonio, the first private factor weighs in favor of transfer.
The second factor addresses the availability of compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witnesses. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 45, a
subpoena may compel a non-party witness to attend a trial more than 100 miles
away from the witness’s residence or place of employment only if the trial is
within the state where the person resides and the witness would not incur
substantial expense to travel to the trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(1). Additionally, a
subpoena may command a non-party to attend a hearing or deposition only if it is
within 100 miles of where the person works or resides. Id. Here, non-party
witnesses who may testify concerning Defendant’s data storage procedures are
located in Dallas, Texas, well over 100 miles from San Antonio. (Ex. B ¶ 6.)
Plaintiff submitted no evidence concerning the availability of compulsory process
to secure witness attendance in this case, and the Court notes that the Sherman
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Division is less than 100 miles from Dallas. This factor therefore also weighs in
favor of transfer.
The third factor considers the cost of attendance for willing witnesses,
which has been recognized as “the most important factor under § 1404(a).”
Bascom v. Maxim Integrated Prods., Inc., 534 F. Supp. 2d 700, 704 (W.D. Tex.
2008) (quoting Spiegelberg v. Collegiate Licensing Co., 402 F. Supp. 2d 786, 790
(S.D. Tex. 2005)). “When the distance between an existing venue for trial of a
matter and a proposed venue under § 1404(a) is more than 100 miles, the factor of
inconvenience to witnesses increases in direct relationship to the additional
distance travelled.” Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 317. Defendant has identified
seven witnesses, including two non-party witnesses, who would have to travel
nearly 300 miles from Plano and Dallas for a trial in San Antonio. (Ex. B ¶¶ 4, 6.)
Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s travel costs would not be
unreasonable because Defendant regularly incurs travel costs in the normal course
of its business operations. (Resp. at 3–4.) This argument is unpersuasive both
because it does not apply to the identified non-party witnesses, whose convenience
is given greater weight than party-witnesses under the § 1404(a) analysis, FritoLay N. Am. v. Medallion Foods, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 2d 859, 869 (E.D. Tex. 2012),
and because Defendant’s usual business travel costs have no bearing on the relative
convenience of traveling to the venues in question. Plaintiff has identified no
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witnesses for whom San Antonio would be more convenient, and Plaintiff himself,
as a resident of Missouri, cannot argue that San Antonio is substantially more
convenient for him that the Sherman Division, whose Plano location is just outside
of Dallas. Given the significant cost of travel from the greater Dallas area to San
Antonio, this factor weighs in favor of transfer.
The final private factor covers all other practical problems, and the
parties have not raised any such issues here. Defendant has filed the Motion to
Transfer Venue early in the litigation, prior to the issuance of a scheduling order or
discovery. (Mot. at 7.) Transfer would not cause substantial delay, and this factor
is thus neutral.
II.
Public Factors
The first public factor considers the relative congestion of the courts
in question. “Generally, this factor favors a district that can bring a case to trial
faster.” Frito-Lay, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 871. As of September 2014, the median
time from filing to trial for civil cases in the Western District of Texas was 19.1
months.2 In the Eastern District of Texas, the median time to trial was 21.9
months.3 The Court is careful, however, not to place undue weight on these
statistics. Court congestion is considered the “most speculative” of the factors,
2
U.S. Courts, Federal Court Management Statistics, September 2014, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalCourtManag
ementStatistics/2014/district-fcms-profiles-september-2014.pdf.
3
Id.
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since “case-disposition statistics may not always tell the whole story.” In re
Genentech, 566 F.3d 1338, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Given the relatively slight
difference of less than three months, this factor, at most, weighs only lightly
against transfer.
The second public factor considers the local interest in the litigation.
“Jury duty is a burden that ought not to be imposed upon the people of a
community which has no relation to the litigation.” Volkswagen I, 371 F.3d at
206. “[T]he location of the alleged injury is an important consideration in
determining how to weigh this factor.” Frito-Lay, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 872 (citing In
re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). Defendant argues
that the Sherman District has a greater interest in the litigation because the alleged
wrong, Defendant’s decision to classify construction managers as exempt from
overtime, occurred at its headquarters in Plano. (Mot. at 8.) Plaintiff’s Response
makes no argument regarding this factor, and his Complaint does not identify
where he was employed as a construction manager, stating only that he currently
resides in Missouri. (Compl. ¶ 5.)
The Court notes that Defendant has a project office in San Antonio,
and that the Western District thus has at least some interest in the litigation. The
focus of the inquiry here, however, is the relative connection of the localities to the
events giving rise to this suit and their corresponding interests in the resolution of
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this controversy. See Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 318. National companies may
have offices in virtually every judicial district, “leav[ing] no room for
consideration of those actually affected . . . by the controversy and the case.” Id.
The presence of a project office in San Antonio therefore has little weight in the
absence of any indication that the events giving rise to this suit occurred in San
Antonio—for example, that Plaintiff, or indeed any construction managers
employed by Defendant, work or worked in or around San Antonio, or that
corporate decisions regarding their compensation were made in San Antonio. This
factor thus also weighs in favor of transfer.
The third and fourth public factors consider familiarity with governing
law and avoidance of unnecessary conflicts of law. Because this case will apply
federal law and does not raise conflict of law issues, these factors do not favor
either venue.
Based on its analysis of the private and public factors, the Court finds
that Defendant has clearly demonstrated that the Sherman Division of the Eastern
District is a more convenient venue. Three of the private factors weigh in favor of
transfer, and the fourth is neutral. Of the public factors, local interest in the case
weighs in favor of transfer, while the relative congestion of the courts weighs, at
most, only lightly against transfer. The remaining public factors are neutral. The
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Court therefore finds good cause to transfer the case to the Sherman Division of
the Eastern District of Texas pursuant to § 1404(a).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons given, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to
Transfer Venue to the Sherman Division of the Eastern District of Texas.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: San Antonio, Texas, February 5, 2015.
_____________________________________
David Alan Ezra
Senior United States Distict Judge
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