Liquid Manna, LLC v. GLN Global Light Network, LLC et al
ORDER DENYING 44 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. The hearing for October 20, 2016, is CANCELED. Signed by Judge David A. Ezra. (rg)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SAN ANTONIO DIVISION
LIQUID MANNA, LLC,
GLN GLOBAL LIGHT NETWORK,
LLC and DAVID DARTEZ,
ORDER DENYING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment against David
Dartez (“Defendant”) filed by Liquid Manna, LLC, (“Plaintiff”). (Dkt. # 44.)
Pursuant to Local Rule CV-7(h), the Court finds this matter suitable for disposition
without a hearing. After considering the memorandum filed in support of the
Motion1, the Court, for the reasons that follow, DENIES the Motion for Summary
Judgment (Dkt. # 44.)
In 2004, Fred Neal Jr. (“Neal”) developed a proprietary process for
creating what he described as “supersaturated oxygen” water. (Dkt. # 1 ¶ 10.)
Neal began marketing the product as Regal Liquid Manna. (Id. ¶ 11.) In May
Defendant, who is proceeding pro se, has not filed a Response in opposition to
the Motion for Summary Judgment.
2013, the United States Patent and Trademark Office issued Neal a trademark for
the phrase “Liquid Manna” to be associated with his oxygen enhanced water. (Id.
Neal used Defendant GLN Global Light Network, LLC (“GLN”) as
one of his largest distributers of Liquid Manna water. (Id. ¶ 14.) Defendant Dartez
owns and operates GLN. At some point, Neal and Defendant Dartez collaborated
on a product involving gel pads that utilized Neal’s proprietary process to charge
the gel pads with oxygen. (Id. ¶ 16.) However, Neal never shared the proprietary
process with Dartez. (Id. ¶ 18.)
Neal passed away on June 1, 2014, leaving his estate, including the
rights to Liquid Manna products, to his children, Sherrie Shields and David Neal,
who subsequently transferred their rights to Liquid Manna LLC. (Dkt. # 1 ¶ 22; Id.
Ex. B.) Neal’s children continue to operate the Liquid Manna business, selling the
oxygen-enhanced water and gel pads and marketing them under the Liquid Manna
brand. (Id. ¶ 24.)
However, following Neal’s death, GLN began circulating false
information concerning the future availability of the Liquid Manna products. (Id.)
Specifically, Defendants represented that Liquid Manna would no longer be sold
by anyone, that Neal had not shared the proprietary technology used to create the
oxygenated water, but that Defendants were capable of reproducing the gel pads.
(Id. ¶ 26.)
However, GLN subsequently began asserting that they could produce
Liquid Manna’s products—oxygenated water and gel pads—using the same
process that Neal had allegedly taught Dartez. (Id. ¶¶
) Defendants also
began using Neal’s name and trademark to sell Liquid Manna products without
authorization. (Id. ¶ 34.) Further, Defendants continue to manufacture, distribute,
and sell similar products using the trademark Liquid Manna without Plaintiff’s
permission. (Dkt. # 1 ¶ 34.)
On December 22, 2014, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit pursuant to the U.S.
Trademark Act (“the Lanham Act”), codified as 15 U.S.C. § 1125 for trademark
infringement, trademark counterfeiting, false advertising, false association,
trademark dilution, common law trademark infringement, and under Texas law for
injury to business reputation, trademark dilution, business disparagement,
defamation, unfair competition, and common law unjust enrichment against GLN
and David Dartez. (Dkt. # 1.)
On March 14, 2015, the Court issued an order granting default
judgment against GLN on five claims: (1) trademark infringement in violation of
15 U.S.C. § 1114; (2) common law trademark infringement; (3) false advertising in
violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125; (4) false association in violation of 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125; and (5) trademark counterfeiting in violation of 15 U.S.C. 1114(1)(a).
(Dkt. # 35.) The Court awarded $17,462.49 in attorney’s fees and enjoined
Defendants from inter alia, selling Plaintiff’s Liquid Manna product. (Id.)
On May 25, 2016, the Court held a hearing on the issue of damages at
which Defendant Dartez did not appear. (Dkt. # 39.) On May 31, 2016, the Court
issued an order awarding Plaintiff $73,357.74 against GLN, and to pay an
additional $2,771.03 in attorney’s fees. (Dkt. # 42.)
On July 7, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment
against Defendant Dartez. (Dkt. # 44.) Defendant has not filed a Response in
opposition to the Motion.
A court must grant summary judgment when “the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Meadaa v. K.A.P.
Enterprises, L.L.C., 756 F.3d 875, 880 (5th Cir. 2014). “Substantive law will
identify which facts are material.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986). A dispute is only genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.
In seeking summary judgment, the moving party bears the initial
burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving party meets this burden,
the nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts that establish the
existence of a genuine issue for trial. Distribuidora Mari Jose, S.A. de C.V. v.
Transmaritime, Inc., 738 F.3d 703, 706 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Allen v. Rapides
Parish Sch. Bd., 204 F.3d 619, 621 (5th Cir. 2000)). “Where the record taken as a
whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there
is no genuine issue for trial.” Hillman v. Loga, 697 F.3d 299, 302 (5th Cir. 2012).
In deciding whether a fact issue has been created, “the court must
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not
make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Kevin M. Ehringer
Enters. v. McData Servs. Corp., 646 F.3d 321, 326 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Reeves
v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000)). However,
“[u]nsubstantiated assertions, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation
are not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.” United States v.
Renda Marine, Inc., 667 F.3d 651, 655 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Brown v. City of
Hous., 337 F.3d 539, 541 (5th Cir. 2003)).
Since judgment has already been entered against GLN Global Light
Network, LLC, Plaintiff seeks to pierce the corporate veil and impose individual
liability on Defendant Dartez through an “alter ego” theory.
“There are three broad theories of corporate disregard” under Texas
law. S.E.C. v. Res. Dev. Intern., LLC, 487 F.3d 295, 302 (5th Cir. 2007). “The
corporate veil is pierced when: (1) the corporation is the alter ego of its owners or
shareholders; (2) the corporation is used for an illegal purpose, and (3) the
corporation is used as a sham to perpetrate a fraud.” Id. Under the first theory,
“[a]lter ego applies when there is such unity between the corporation and
individual that the separateness of the corporation has ceased and holding only the
corporation liable would result in injustice.” Id. (quoting Castleberry v. Branscum,
721 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex. 1986), superseded by statute on other grounds
recognized by SSP Partners v. Gladstrong Inv. (USA) Corp., 275 S.W.3d 444, 455
(Tex. 2009)). Alter ego is shown from:
(1) the total dealings of the corporation and the individual, including
the degree to which corporate formalities have been followed and
corporate and individual property have been kept separately;
(2) the amount of financial interest, ownership and control the
individual maintains over the corporation; and
(3) whether the corporation has been used for personal purposes.
See Castleberry, 721 S.W.2d at 272. Under Texas law, “factual disputes related to
the bases for alter ego liability, like factual disputes generally, are for the jury.”
Phillips v. Carlton Energy Grp., LLC, 475 S.W.3d 265, 286 (Tex. 2015).
However, “when the facts are not disputed, whether an imposition of alter ego
liability is justified is a matter of law for the court.” Id.
Here, Plaintiff has failed to present sufficient evidence to show that
Defendant Dartez is the alter ego of GLN. Plaintiff relies almost exclusively on
two pieces of evidence to support his alter ego theory. First, Plaintiff provides a
special warranty deed showing that on December 16, 2004, David Dartez sold
property known as “Lot 2, MYERS RIDGE” located in Comal County, Texas to
GLN, a Nevada entity, for $10.00. (Dkt. # 44submitted a second special warranty deed showing that on March 12, 2008, GLN
sold “Lot 2, MYERS RIDGE” to New Life Group, LLC, a Florida entity, for
$10.00. (Dkt. # 44-
Defendant Dartez signed the second deed as CEO
of GLN. (Id.) Plaintiff presents no other proper summary judgment evidence
indicating that Dartez is the alter ego of GLN.
Instead, Plaintiff only makes allegations unsupported by evidence.
First, Plaintiff alleges that Dartez created two corporate entities within 48 hours of
being served process in this lawsuit: Global Light Network, LLC, a Delaware
entity; and (2) an irrevocable trust under Delaware law. (Dkt. 44 ¶ 4(c).) Second,
Plaintiff alleges that Dartez transferred his residence 2 from New Life Group, LLC
to the Delaware irrevocable trust by way of quit claim deed. (Id. ¶ 4(d).) Finally,
Plaintiff alleges that Dartez used the irrevocable trust to obtain a Canadian
Plaintiff also alleges that Dartez’s residence is the same as the “Lot 2” sold in the
special warranty deeds. However, Plaintiff has provided no evidence that the two
are the same.
mortgage for $65,000. (Id. ¶ 4(e).) For each of these allegations, Plaintiff has
submitted no evidence to show that the allegation is true.
In failing to submit evidence of these allegations, Plaintiff has failed
to show that the total dealings of GLN and Dartez results in a finding that Dartez is
the alter ego of GLN. Plaintiff has only shown that Dartez was the CEO of GLN,
but has failed to present any evidence of his financial interest in and ownership of
the corporation. Further, Plaintiff has only alleged that Dartez used GLN for his
personal purposes, but fails to proffer any proper summary judgment evidence to
that end. Instead, Plaintiff has established only that Dartez sold real property to
GLN, and that while acting as GLN’s CEO, Dartez transferred that same real
property to New Life Group, LLC. Importantly, Plaintiff also alleges that the
transferred real property is Dartez’s residence, but fails to offer any summary
judgment proof that the two are the same. Therefore, these real property transfers
appear to be legally permissible, and do not show “such unity between the
corporation and individual that the separateness of the corporation has ceased and
holding only the corporation liable would result in injustice.” Castleberry, 721
S.W.2d at 272. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of
demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact that Dartez is the
alter ego of GLN. Since “factual disputes related to the bases for alter ego liability
. . . are for the jury,” Phillips, 475 S.W.3d at 286, Plaintiff may only impose
individual liability on Dartez by trial.
For the reasons explained above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s
Motion for Summary. (Dkt. # 44.) The hearing for October 20, 2016, is
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATE: San Antonio, Texas, August 19, 2016.
DAVID ALAN EZRA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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