Jamison v. Colvin

Filing 18

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS: The Court finds that sunbstantial eveidence supports the ALJ's RFC Assessment. Therefore, the Commissioner's conclusion that the Plaintiff is not disabled, and Plaintiff can return to his past relevant job as a car salesman. The Decision of the Commissioner denying plaintiff's applications for disability and SSI benefits is AFFIRMED. Signed by Judge John W. Primomo. (wg)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SAN ANTONIO DIVISION
PAUL JAMISON,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of the Social
Security Administration,
Defendant.

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

CIVIL NO. SA-15-CA-166-JWP

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
Plaintiff instituted this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. ''
405(g) and 1383(c)(3) seeking review of the determination of
Carolyn W. Colvin, the Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, that plaintiff is not disabled and, therefore, not entitled to receive disability and supplemental security income (ASSI@) benefits.

Plaintiff protectively filed his

applications for benefits on February 1, 2013 and July 2, 2013
alleging disability beginning December 31, 2012.
71).

(Tr. pp. 165-

The Social Security Administration denied the applications

both initially and upon reconsideration.

On September 11, 2014,

after a hearing, an administrative law judge (AALJ@) determined
that plaintiff is not disabled.

(Tr. pp. 14-24).

With modifi-

cations, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review, making the determination of the ALJ the final decision of
the Commissioner.

Plaintiff now appeals that determination.

Entitlement to Benefits
Every individual who is insured for disability insurance
benefits, has not attained retirement age, has filed an application for benefits, and suffers a disability is entitled to receive disability insurance benefits.

42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1).

Each aged, blind or disabled individual who meets certain income
and resources limitations is entitled to receive SSI.
§ 1382(a).

42 U.S.C.

The term "disabled" or "disability" means the ina-

bility to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason
of

any

medically

determinable

physical

or

mental

impairment

which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or
can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than
12 months.

42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A) and 1382c(a)(3)(A).

A

person shall be determined to be disabled only if his physical
or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he
is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other
kind of substantial gainful work which exists in significant
numbers in the national economy, regardless of whether such work
exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a
specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be
hired if he applied for work.

42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A) and

1382c(a)(3)(B).

2

Evaluation Process and Burden of Proof
Regulations set forth by the Commissioner prescribe five
basic steps or considerations in evaluating disability claims.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 and 416.920.

To be found disabled, the

claimant first bears the burden of proving that:
(1) he is not currently engaged in substantial gainful activity;

(2) he has an impairment or combination of impairments

that is severe; and,
(3) the impairment meets or equals a listed impairment; or,
(4) in light of the claimant's residual functional capacity
(“RFC”), the impairment prevents the claimant from returning to
his past relevant work.
(5th Cir. 2007).

Audler v. Astrue, 501 F.3d 446, 447-48

If the claimant establishes these elements, the

burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that:
(5) considering the claimant's residual capacities and his
age, education, and work experience, the impairment does not
prevent him from performing other jobs which exist in significant numbers in the national economy.

Id. at 448.

If the Com-

missioner adequately points to potential alternative employment,
the burden then shifts back to the claimant to prove that he is
unable to perform the alternative work.
F.3d 457, 461 (5th Cir. 2005).

Perez v. Barnhart, 415

A finding that a claimant is dis-

abled or is not disabled at any point in the five-step review is

3

conclusive and terminates the analysis.

Randall v. Astrue, 570

F.3d 651, 653 (5th Cir. 2009).
Standard of Review
In reviewing the Commissioner's decision denying disability
or SSI benefits, the Court must determine whether the ALJ applied the proper legal standard and, if so, whether substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s decision.

Randall, 570 F.3d at 655.

Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, less than a preponderance, and is such that a reasonable mind might accept it
as adequate to support a conclusion.

Id. at 662.

The Court

must refrain from reweighing the evidence or substituting its
judgment for that of the Commissioner.

Id.

Conflicts in the

evidence are for the Commissioner and not the courts to resolve.
Perez, 415 F.3d at 461.
ALJ's Findings and Plaintiff's Contentions
The ALJ found that plaintiff has not engaged in substantial
gainful activity since his alleged onset date.

At the second

and third steps of the evaluation process, the ALJ determined,
after reviewing the objective medical evidence, that plaintiff
has the following severe impairments: cardiomyopathy with atrial
fibrillation, status-post ablation; status post left knee replacement; obstructive sleep apnea; and obesity, but that these
impairments do not, either singly or in combination, meet or
equal a listed impairment.
4

At the fourth step of the evaluation process, the ALJ assessed plaintiff's RFC and the demands of his past work.

He de-

termined that plaintiff retains the RFC to lift and carry 20
pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; stand and walk 6
hours in an 8-hour workday; and sit 6 hours in an 8-hour workday; no work at unprotected heights or around dangerous hazards;
no climbing ropes, ladders, or scaffolds; frequent crouching,
crawling, stooping, and kneeling and occasional climbing ramps
and stairs.

The ALJ determined that plaintiff’s medically de-

terminable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the
alleged symptoms; however, the ALJ found that his statements
concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of
his symptoms were not entirely credible.

Utilizing the testimo-

ny of a vocational expert (“VE”), he found that plaintiff is
able to perform his past relevant work as a car salesman and a
land surveyor helper; therefore, he is not disabled.
On review, the Appeals Council did not agree with the ALJ's
finding that plaintiff could perform his past relevant work as a
land surveyor helper, a medium level job.

(Tr. pp. 4-5).

Appeals

ALJ’s

Council

also

disagreed

with

the

finding

The
that

plaintiff’s past work as a car salesperson corresponds to DOT
listing

#273.357-010,

titled

"Sales

Representative,

Aircraft

Equipment,” and is described as a light job with an SVP level of
6.

(Tr. p. 5).

Rather, his past work as a car salesperson is
5

most consistent with DOT listing #273.357-022.
peals

Council

concluded

that

plaintiff’s

(Id.).

impairments

The Apand

the

limitations on his ability to perform work-related activities do
not preclude the performance of past relevant work as car salesperson.

(Id.).

Plaintiff contends that the decision of the Commissioner is
not supported by substantial evidence.

He states that, through-

out the decision, the ALJ references and explicitly relies upon
his own interpretation of the raw medical data to support his
conclusions.

Plaintiff also alleges that several of the ALJ’s

findings are based upon
within the record.

facts that are simply not contained

Next, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in

finding that his efforts to find a job are inconsistent with his
claim of disability.

He further disputes the conclusion that

the acceptance of unemployment benefits negatively should impact
plaintiff’s credibility.

Plaintiff also faults the ALJ for sug-

gesting that plaintiff is eligible for Social Security retirement benefits.
Analysis
Plaintiff’s

brief

begins

with

accusations

of

“unfounded

conclusions, irrelevancies, and outright misstatements” in the
ALJ’s decision with “unsupported and erroneous posturing [which]
infects and encumbers both his treatment of the medical opinion
evidence and his credibility finding.”
6

The tone towards the ALJ

throughout plaintiff’s brief is improperly and unnecessarily adversarial.

Regardless of counsel’s opinion of the number of er-

rors made by the ALJ or the degree of their severity, he would
do well to maintain the proper respect for the Commissioner and
her staff.

Such heavy-handed advocacy detracts from rather than

enhances the efficacy of counsel’s argument.
1. Raw data interpretation
This Court has been greatly impressed by the effective and
meritorious presentations by Mr. Osterhout in previous Social
Security disability appeals.
appeal

are

substantive

Notably absent from the instant

arguments

for

reversal.

Initially,

plaintiff complains that the ALJ was “playing doctor” when he
erroneously reported that plaintiff told his doctor he had a
Class III heart per the New York Heart Association standards.
(Tr. p. 18).

The ALJ noted that plaintiff denied saying that to

his doctor and concluded that either plaintiff or the report was
wrong.

Plaintiff states that review of this note, using logic

and common sense alone, plainly demonstrates that the conflict
between his testimony and the record described by the ALJ is
wholly imaginary.
In fact, the doctor’s note states, plaintiff “reports stable NHYA (sic) FC III DOE and has chronic orthopnea but no PND.”1
(Tr. p. 609).
1

The Court agrees with plaintiff that a fair read-

New York Heart Association Functional Classification Three.

7

ing of the report suggests that plaintiff presented symptoms
which led the physician to make that assessment, not that plaintiff described his cardiac functional class to his doctor.
ALJ’s mistake has no consequence.

The

He neither found that plain-

tiff’s heart condition was less serious because he thought the
classification was self-reported nor did he discount plaintiff’s
credibility based upon the statement.
Plaintiff then argues that the “Class III heart” designation, authored by a cardiologist, is consistent with other evidence of record that he is limited to sedentary work.2

Plaintiff

accuses the ALJ of relying upon his own interpretation of the
raw medical data to support his conclusions.
tiff does precisely that.

Yet, here, plain-

He offers his own opinion that a per-

son with a Class III heart is unable to perform his past relevant work of a car salesman, with no regard for any other cardiac findings in that physician’s report, not to mention the medical findings in the remainder of the record.

Instead, he con-

tinues to challenge the ALJ’s methods of analysis, not the substance of his decision.
2. Stress test and knee surgery
The ALJ found that plaintiff’s clearance to undergo an exercise treadmill test “seems to suggest that claimant’s heart is
strong enough to do light work.”
2

(Tr. p. 20).

He also noted

Although plaintiff indicates the other evidence in the record will be “discussed momentarily,” it is never mentioned.

8

that “[t]here would necessarily have been some type of examination [prior to plaintiff’s total left knee replacement] to assure that claimant’s heart was strong enough for this operation,
which of course it was.”

(Id., p. 21).

Plaintiff states that

the ALJ does not explain how being strong enough to undergo knee
surgery has any bearing on a person’s physical ability to work
on a full-time basis.

He also argues that clearance to undergo

an exercise stress test is in no way definitive evidence of the
ability to perform “light work”.

Plaintiff cannot argue and

does not contend that such evidence carries no weight in the
ALJ’s analysis.

As the Commissioner noted these were only two

of many factors that the ALJ considered in making his decision.
3. Failure to attend consultative examination
Plaintiff also complains of the ALJ’s determination to discount his credibility because he failed to attend a scheduled
internal medicine evaluation by Yu Kuo, M.D.

(Tr. p. 23).

The

ALJ notes that plaintiff was notified of the appointment and
sent a reminder letter, yet failed to appear.

Plaintiff states

that the record is completely devoid of any facts surrounding
this event, making it entirely impossible to determine the circumstances under which he did not attend.

Plaintiff does not

dispute that a consultative examination was scheduled or that he
failed to attend.

Instead, he asserts that the ALJ was duty

9

bound to inquire at the hearing as to why plaintiff did not attend.
Because hearings under the Social Security Act are nonadversarial, “[t]he hearing examiner has the duty, accentuated
in the absence of counsel, to develop the facts fully and fairly
and to probe conscientiously for all of the relevant information.”

Sun

v.

Colvin,

793

F.3d

502,

509

(5th

Cir.

2015)(quoting Ware v. Schweiker, 651 F.2d 408, 414 (5th Cir.
1981)).

The court may reverse the ALJ's decision if the claim-

ant can show that “(1) the ALJ failed to fulfill his duty to develop the record adequately and (2) that failure prejudiced the
plaintiff.”
Cir. 2012)).

Id. (quoting Jones v. Astrue, 691 F.3d 730, 733 (5th
Title 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1518 and 416.918 provide:

“If you are applying for benefits and do not have a good reason
for failing or refusing to take part in a consultative examination ..., we may find that you are not disabled or blind.”
In this case, the ALJ fulfilled his duty to develop the
facts fully and fairly and to probe conscientiously for all of
the relevant information when he sent plaintiff for the consultative examination.
(W.D.Pa. 2015).

Glass v. Colvin, 2015 WL 5732175, at *1

Despite being notified of the appointment, and

sent a reminder of the date, plaintiff failed to appear.

His

argument that the ALJ’s duty to fully and fairly develop the
facts extends to seeking an explanation for that failure is
10

wholly unpersuasive.

As in Glass, nothing in the record indi-

cates that plaintiff or his counsel requested a new examination
date, or that plaintiff or his counsel provided an explanation
for his failure to appear.

As in Glass, even in plaintiff's

brief, no explanation is provided for his failure to appear at
the examination.
the

administrative

Furthermore, as in Glass, at no point during
hearing

itself—during

which

plaintiff

was

represented by, and questioned by, counsel—did plaintiff's counsel take the opportunity to explain why plaintiff had neglected
to attend his consultative examination.

The ALJ fully and fair-

ly developed the facts and was fully warranted in discounting
plaintiff’s credibility based upon his failure to appear for his
consultative examination.
4. Seeking work and unemployment benefits
In

recounting

plaintiff’s

testimony,

the

ALJ

noted

that

plaintiff stated he was able to drive to the grocery store and
had been going to the Texas Workforce Commission since 2009 to
find a job.

(Tr. p. 18).

The ALJ believed the latter was “in-

consistent with a claim of disability.”

Later, the ALJ indicat-

ed that plaintiff was receiving unemployment benefits.
23).

(Tr. p.

He stated, “While acceptance of unemployment benefits in

no way impacts a medical determination of disability, as the two
systems differ in policy goals, regulations and acceptance criteria, such acceptance does impact the claimant's credibility.
11

Such acceptance shows that the claimant was actively applying
for work, claimed to be available for work and held himself out
to another agency to be able and willing to work during the adjudicative period.”

(Id.).

Plaintiff asserts that it is altogether consistent with an
allegation of disability that there are some types of jobs that
he can still perform.

He also points out that Memorandums from

the Chief ALJ, the most recent dated August 9, 2010, indicate
that the receipt of unemployment insurance benefits does not
preclude

the

receipt

of

Social

Security

disability

benefits.

The Memorandum states that receipt of unemployment benefits is
only one of many factors that must be considered in determining
whether the claimant is disabled.
and 416.912(b)(2012).

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(b)

The Memorandum notes that a person can

qualify for Social Security disability benefits even though he
or she remains capable of performing some work.
The Chief ALJ’s Memorandum does not support plaintiff’s assertion that plaintiff’s attempt to find work and/or receipt of
unemployment compensation has no bearing upon his credibility.
As noted, receipt of unemployment benefits is one factor that
can be considered.

While a person can qualify for Social Secu-

rity disability benefits even though he remains capable of performing some work, the type of work he is seeking could well be
inconsistent with his disability claim.
12

Plaintiff testified he

has been trying to find a job through the Texas Workforce Commission since 2009, five years prior to the administrative hearing and three years prior to his onset date.

(Tr. pp. 44-45).

He does not specify what types of jobs he is seeking.
time, he has received no jobs and no job interviews.
46).

In that
(Id., p.

Considering the length of time plaintiff has sought a job,

the Court finds that the ALJ was warranted in concluding that
these efforts are inconsistent with his claim for disability.
Despite the Chief ALJ’s Memorandum, courts have held that,
seeking work, as well as receipt of unemployment benefits is inconsistent with a claimant's claim of being disabled.

Hammock v.

Colvin, 2014 WL 7013886, at *10 (W.D.Tex. 2014)(citing Celebrezze v. O'Brien, 323 F.2d 989, 992 (5th Cir. 1963).

See Jones

v. Astrue, 2015 WL 1346244, at *5 (M.D.La. 2015)(ability to obtain unemployment benefits, actively seek employment, and attend
job interviews were three factors which contributed to substantial evidence that supported ALJ's determination).

In Robinson

v. Colvin, 2013 WL 3480731, at *9 (S.D.Tex. 2013), plaintiff admitted he had been receiving unemployment benefits and that he
had been applying for jobs in order to continue to receive benefits.

The ALJ there noted, as did the ALJ here, that, “[w]ith

his application and receipt of unemployment insurance benefits,
the claimant is aware that he holds himself out to be ready,
willing, and able to work. This assertion is inconsistent his
13

allegations

of

credibility.”

being

disabled

Id., p. 10.

and

further

detracts

from

his

The Court found that, because the

ALJ made and supported his credibility determination with references to medical evidence and plaintiff's testimony about his
daily activities, and because the ALJ did not rely on any improper factors, the subjective evidence factor also weighs in
favor of the ALJ's decision.”

Id.

Similarly, plaintiff’s ef-

forts to obtain employment and receipt of unemployment benefits
are not improper factors to be considered and were not the only
factors the ALJ took into account in weighing plaintiff’s credibility.

Therefore, no error was committed.

5. Advice about retirement benefits
Next, plaintiff complains that the ALJ advised plaintiff at
the administrative hearing that, being age 62, he was eligible
for retirement benefits.

The issue was raised twice.

The ALJ

explicitly told plaintiff that the matter of his eligibility for
retirement benefits would have nothing to do with the disability
decision.

(Tr. p. 63).

He stated that there would be a reduc-

tion at his age, and he was not advising him that he should seek
Social Security retirement, only that he should “look at it.”.
(Id.).
hearing.

The issue was raised again briefly at the end of the
(Id., pp. 74-75).

This discussion had no bearing

whatsoever on the ALJ’s decision and requires no further consideration.
14

6. Treating provider opinions
In his most substantive claims, plaintiff contends that the
ALJ failed to accord sufficient weight to the opinions of Dr.
Phillip Rinn concerning limitations due to his knee impairment
and Traci Forrest, R.N., concerning his cardiac impairment.

On

July 7, 2013, Dr. Rinn wrote that plaintiff could not walk more
than two blocks or carry over 30 pounds due to his knee injury.
(Tr. p. 350).

Also, on July 29, 2014, Traci Forrest, a regis-

tered nurse for Dr. Ronnie Garcia, one of plaintiff’s cardiologists, completed a questionnaire concerning plaintiff’s ability
to perform physical activities.

(Id., pp. 589-91).

She found

that plaintiff could walk maybe two blocks without resting, can
continuously sit for more than two hours, can continuously stand
for 15 minutes, and can stand/walk less than two hours in an 8hour workday.

She stated he would need about three unscheduled

breaks per day, and could occasionally lift less than 10 pounds.
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly rejected these opinions without analyzing the factors set forth for evaluating the
opinion of a treating source in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c) and
416.927(c).
The opinion of a treating physician who is familiar with
the patient's impairments, treatment, and responses should be
accorded great weight in determining disability.
fel, 209 F.3d

448, 455 (5th Cir. 2000).
15

Newton v. Ap-

However, the opinions

of a treating physician are not conclusive.

Id.

The ALJ may

give less weight, or no weight, to a treating physician's opinion when there is good cause shown to the contrary, as when his
statement as to disability is brief and conclusory, is not supported by medically acceptable, clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques or is otherwise unsupported by the evidence.

Id.

at 455-56.
Absent reliable medical evidence from a treating or examining physician controverting the claimant's treating specialist,
an ALJ may reject or give little weight to a treating physician's opinion only if the ALJ performs a detailed analysis of
the following factors: (1) the physician's length of treatment
of the claimant, (2) the physician's frequency of examination,
(3) the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, (4) the
support of the physician's opinion afforded by the medical evidence of record, (5) the consistency of the opinion with the
record as a whole, and (6) the specialization of the treating
physician.

Newton,

209

F.3d

at

404.1527(c) and 416.927(c) (2012).

453,

456-57;

20

C.F.R.

''

Newton is inapplicable when

there is competing first-hand medical evidence and the ALJ finds
as a factual matter that one doctor's opinion is more wellfounded than another.
ALJ

weighs

the

Id. at 458.

treating

Nor does it apply when the

physician's

opinion

on

disability

against the medical opinion of other physicians who have treated
16

or examined the claimant and have specific medical bases for a
contrary opinion.
Dr.

Rinn’s

Id.
opinion

that

plaintiff

cannot

carry

over

30

pounds due to his knee injury is not inconsistent with the ALJ’s
finding that plaintiff can carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10
pounds frequently.

Whether Dr. Rinn’s opinion that plaintiff

could not walk more than two blocks is inconsistent with the
ALJ’s RFC requirement that plaintiff stand and walk 6 hours in
an 8-hour workday is not as clear.

Assuming it is inconsistent,

the Court finds that the ALJ was warranted in rejecting Dr.
Rinn’s restriction.
The ALJ noted that plaintiff underwent a total left knee
replacement on November 12, 2012.

(Tr. pp. 21, 296).

When seen

on December 21, 2012 by Dr. Jack Deetjen, he was complaining of
knee swelling but did report the knee pain was improving.
p. 260).

(Id.,

Examination showed the surgical wound was healing and

there were no signs of infection; no erythema, no ecchymosis and
2+ effusion; and diffuse edema and no deformities.
261).

(Id., p.

Plaintiff had a limited active range of motion with flex-

ion to 100 degrees.
compression.

(Id.).

(Id.).

He had no pain with patellofemoral

The ligamentous was stable to varus/valgus

stress, anterior/posterior drawer, and Lachman's exam.

(Id.).

The meniscal had medial joint line tenderness and there was lateral joint line tenderness.

(Id.).
17

Sensory and motor was in-

tact.

(Id.).
On January 22, 2014, the ALJ noted that plaintiff was seen

by

Dr.

Sanon

Prlyanka

when

plaintiff

reported

that

he

was

"largely sedentary" and had intermittent lower extremity swelling.

(Tr. pp. 21, 609).

(Id.).
pain.

Examination showed there was no edema.

There was no annotation of any pain medication for knee
(Id.).

When seen by Dr. Garcia on May 16, 2014, examina-

tion showed that plaintiff was negative for limb pain and myalgias.

(Id., p. 578).

In light of the competing first-hand med-

ical evidence from other treating physicians, it was unnecessary
for the ALJ to evaluate each of the regulatory factors prior to
rejecting Dr. Rinn’s opinion.

Newton, 209 F.3d at 458.

Dr.

Rinn’s brief and conclusory hand-written note is not supported
by

medically

acceptable,

clinical

and

laboratory

techniques and is contradicted by other evidence.

diagnostic
Id. at 455-

56.
The

ALJ

also

properly

rejected

Nurse

Forrest’s

opinion.

While according some weight to her assessment, the ALJ stated
that her opinion was not fully consistent with the other evidence of record.

(Tr. p. 22).

He noted that her report did not

list the nature, frequency or length of contact.

(Id.).

The

ALJ found no evidence to support the asserted limitations that
plaintiff cannot lift even 10 pounds, and needed to avoid presumably any excessive dust, gas chemicals, etc.
18

(Id.).

The ALJ

also pointed out that Nurse Forrest is not an acceptable medical
source, though her opinion must be (and was) considered.
C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(a),(d) and 416.913(a),(d).

See 20

Muniz v. Colvin,

2015 WL 5062303, at *8 (W.D.Tex. 2015)(nurse is not an acceptable medical source under the regulations).
The ALJ also discounted Nurse Forrest’s functional report
because plaintiff reported that he is able to complete all of
his activities of daily living - without any major complications
and has described his daily activities, which are not limited to
the extent one would expect, given the complaints of disabling
symptoms and limitations.
pute this finding.

(Tr. p. 22).

Plaintiff does not dis-

The ALJ further pointed out that when plain-

tiff was seen by Dr. Garcia on May 16, 2014, two months prior to
Nurse Forrest’s functional report, it was noted that the disease
had been stable.

(Id., p. 578).

He reported chest pain but was

negative for dizziness, palpitations, pedal edema, and tachycardia.

(Id.).

Plaintiff did not report symptoms related to atri-

al fibrillation.

(Id., p. 580).

7. RFC

In reviewing the Commissioner's decision denying disability
or SSI benefits, the Court must determine whether the ALJ applied the proper legal standard and, if so, whether substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s decision.

Randall, 570 F.3d at 655.

Clearly, the ALJ applied the properly legal standards.
19

(Tr. pp.

15-16).

He discussed the plaintiff’s testimony from the admin-

istrative hearing and conducted an extensive review of the medical evidence in the record of plaintiff’s impairments.
pp. 18-22).

(Id.,

The Court finds that substantial evidence supports

the ALJ’s RFC assessment.

Therefore, in light of the vocational

expert’s testimony that plaintiff can return to his past relevant job as a car salesman, substantial evidence supports the
Commissioner’s conclusion that plaintiff is not disabled.

The

decision of the Commissioner denying plaintiff’s applications
for disability and SSI benefits is AFFIRMED.
SIGNED October 5, 2015.

_ ________________________________
JOHN W. PRIMOMO
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

20