Bagwell v. Livingston et al

Filing 25

ORDER, That Referral of this cause to the Magistrate Judge is WITHDRAWN. ORDER DENYING 19 Motion to Dismiss ; DENYING 22 Motion to Dismiss ; DENYING 23 Motion to Stay, This cause is REFERRED back to the Magistrate Judge. Signed by Judge David A. Ezra. (wg)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SAN ANTONIO DIVISION
JOSHUA BAGWELL,
TDCJ No. 815991,
Plaintiff,
V.
BRAD LIVINGSTON,
JOE GRIMES,
P. CHAPS,
JESUS PARALTA,
MARIA RAMIREZ,
GENE MILLER, and
SAMMIE VALERO,
Defendants.

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§ CIVIL NO. SA-15-CV-584-DAE (HJB)
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ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND FOR STAY
The matters before the Court are (1) defendants’ motion to dismiss (based upon the Eleventh
Amendment), filed December 16, 2015 (ECF no. 19), (2) defendants’ motion to dismiss (based upon
the well-settled rule that respondent superior and other theories of vicarious liability do not apply
in Section 1983 actions), filed December 31, 2015 (ECF no. 22), and (3) defendants’ motion for stay,
filed December 31, 2015 (ECF no. 23).
Background
Plaintiff, currently an inmate at the TDCJ’s Connally Unit in Kenedy, Texas, filed this civil
rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging defendants, all supervisory TDCJ or Connally
Unit officials, had failed to furnish plaintiff and others currently housed in administrative segregation
with nutritionally adequate meals and adequate recreation to permit them to maintain their health
during their incarceration. Plaintiff sued all of the defendants in their official capacities only and

seeks only declaratory and prospective injunctive relief. The Court has denied without prejudice
plaintiff’s request for class certification and appointment of counsel.
Defendants’ Motions
Defendants have filed two motions to dismiss. In their first, the defendants rely upon the
Eleventh Amendment. Under the Eleventh Amendment, federal courts are without jurisdiction over
suits against a state, a state agency, or a state official in his “official capacity” unless the state has
waived its sovereign immunity or Congress has clearly abrogated it. Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe
of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 267, 117 S. Ct. 2028, 2033, 138 L. Ed. 2d 438 (1997); Seminole Tribe of
Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1123, 134 L. Ed. 2d 252 (1996). This is because
a suit for monetary damages against a state official in that official’s “official capacity” is actually,
a suit against the State which employs the official. See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491
U.S. 58, 71, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 2312, 105 L. Ed. 2d 45 (1989) (“[A] suit against a state official in his
or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s
office.”); Morris v. Livingston, 739 F.3d 740, 745 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding the same), cert. denied,
134 S. Ct. 2734 (2014). The Eleventh Amendment does not apply, however, to a request for a
federal court to grant prospective injunctive relief against state officials on the basis of federal
claims; thus, a request for prospective injunctive relief against state officials or employees in their
official capacities falls within an exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Ex parte Young, 209
U.S. 123, 149 (1908); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664 (1974); K.P. v. LeBlanc, 729 F.3d 427,
439 (5th Cir. 2013) (“A suit is not ‘against’ a state, however, when it seeks prospective, injunctive
relief from a state actor in her official capacity, based on an alleged ongoing violation of the federal
constitution.”). Defendants’ first motion to dismiss lacks merit.
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In their second motion to dismiss, the defendants rely upon the well-settled doctrine that
respondeat superior and other theories of vicarious liability do not apply to actions brought under
Section 1983. See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (municipality could not be held
liable under section 1983 absent proof its failure to adequately train its employees rose to the level
of deliberate indifference to the rights of its citizens); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009)
(government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates
under a theory of respondeat superior); Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S.
658, 694 (1978) (a local government may not be sued under § 1983 for injury inflicted solely by its
non-policymaking employees or agents). Under Section 1983, supervisory officials are not liable
for the actions of subordinates on any theory of vicarious liability; the doctrine of respondeat
superior does not apply to such actions. See Carnaby v. City of Houston, 636 F.3d 183, 189 (5th Cir.
2011) (under Section 1983, a government official may be held liable solely for his own conduct).
Only the direct acts or omissions of government officials, not the acts of subordinates, will give rise
to individual liability under Section 1983. See Jones v. Lowndes County, Mississippi, 678 F.3d 344,
349 (5th Cir. 2012) (“A Section 1983 claimant must ‘establish that the defendant was either
personally involved in the deprivation or that his wrongful actions were causally connected to the
deprivation.’”); Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls, Texas, 614 F.3d 161, 169 (5th Cir. 2010) (“To
support a supervisory liability claim, the misconduct of a subordinate must be conclusively linked
to the action or inaction of the supervisor.”), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 3059 (2011).
The defenses ordinarily available to state officials sued in their individual capacities under
Section 1983 (such as qualified immunity, absolute judicial immunity, prosecutorial immunity, and
the like) do not apply to an action brought against those same officials in their official capacities
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seeking only prospective injunctive relief. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 91991) (“the only
immunities available to the defendant in an official-capacity action are those that the governmental
entity possesses.”); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 (1985) (“The only immunities that can
be claims in an official-capacity action are forms of sovereign immunity that the entity, qua entity,
may possess, such as the Eleventh Amendment.”); Nigen Biotech, L.L.C. v. Paxton, 804 F.3d 389,
394 (5th Cir. 2015) (“Under the doctrine articulated in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S. Ct. 441,
52 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1908), a state official attempting to enforce an unconstitutional law ‘is stripped
of his official clothing and becomes a private person subject to suit.’ “). As long as the relief sought
against state officials in their official capacities is “declaratory or injunctive in nature and
prospective in effect,” a Section 1983 claim asserting a violation of the plaintiff’s federal
constitutional rights may proceed in federal court. Nigen Biotech, L.L.C. v. Paxton, 804 F.3d at 394.
Plaintiff’s claims against the defendants are in their official capacities and seek only declaratory and
prospective injunctive relief. The failure of plaintiff to allege specific facts showing precisely how
each of the named defendants was personally involved in the alleged denials of adequate food and
recreation to Connally Unit inmates housed in administrative segregation does not furnish a basis
for the dismissal of this action.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that:
1. The referral of this cause to the Magistrate Judge is WITHDRAWN.
2. Defendants’ motion to dismiss, filed December 16, 2015 (ECF no. 19), is DENIED.
3. Defendants’ motion to dismiss, filed December 31, 2015 (ECF no. 22), is DENIED.
4. Defendants’ motion for stay, filed December 31, 2015 (ECF no. 23), is DENIED.

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5. This cause is REFERRED back to the Magistrate Judge in accordance with 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b) and the Local Rules for the Assignment of Duties to United States Magistrate Judges,
Appendix C to Local Court Rules of the United States District Court for the Western District of
Texas.
It is so ORDERED.
SIGNED this 1st day of February, 2016.

_____________________________________
David Alan Ezra
Senior United States Distict Judge

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