Castro v. SN Servicing Corporation

Filing 43

ORDER DENIED AS MOOT 39 Motion for Default Judgment; DENIED 40 Motion to Set Aside ; DENIED 41 Motion to Vacate ; DENIED AS MOOT 42 Motion to Continue Signed by Judge David A. Ezra. (sf)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SAN ANTONIO DIVISION
MARY ANN CASTRO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SN SERVICING CORPORATION,
Defendant.

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No. SA:15–CV–715–DAE

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION
Before the Court are four motions filed by Plaintiff Mary Ann Castro.
(Dkt. ## 39–42.) Pursuant to Local Rule CV-7(h), the Court finds these matters
suitable for disposition without a hearing. After reviewing the Motions and the
supporting memoranda, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motions. (Dkt. ## 39–42.)
BACKGROUND
The instant motions involve a lawsuit Mary Anne Castro filed against
SN Servicing Corporation (“Defendant”) challenging a then-pending mortgage
foreclosure action. Liberally construed, 1 the lawsuit challenges the foreclosure on
the grounds of breach of contract and fraud. (Dkt. # 1, Ex. A-1.)

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Courts must liberally construe the filings of pro se litigants. Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972); Winland v. Quarternamn, 578 F.3d 314, 316 (5th
Cir. 2009) (noting the “well-established precedent requiring that [the court]
construe pro se briefs liberally”). Accordingly, courts hold pro se complaints to
“less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hale v. King,
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On August 28, 2015, the Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss. (Dkt.
# 7.) This Court issued an order on September 25, 2015 granting Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss, and specifically finding that Ms. Castro failed to state a claim
either for breach of contract or anticipatory breach of contract related to the loan
modification, and failed to allege facts to support a cause of action for fraud. (Dkt.
# 34 at 6–9.) At that time, Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim was dismissed with
prejudice, her fraud claim was dismissed without prejudice, and all other pending
motions were denied as moot. (Id. at 9.)
On the same day, Ms. Castro filed a notice of appeal with this court.
(Dkt. # 36.) On November 3, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit issued its mandate dismissing Plaintiff’s appeal for want of
prosecution. (Dkt. # 38.) On November 5, 2015, Ms. Castro filed the four instant
motions: (1) Notice of Default Judgment in the Amount of 200,000 (Dkt. # 39); (2)
Motion to Set Aside Foreclosure Judgment (Dkt. # 40); (3) Motion to Vacate
Foreclosure Sale (Dkt. # 41); and (4) Plaintiff’s Request to Reset Nonjury Trial
(Dkt. # 42).
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) allows a court to grant relief
from a final judgment in certain circumstances:
642 F.3d 492, 499 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Calhoun v. Hargrove, 312 F.3d 730,
733 (5th Cir. 2002)).
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mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly
discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3)
fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or
discharged, it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed
or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6)
any other reason that justifies relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). “The purpose of Rule 60(b) is to balance the principle
of finality of a judgment with the interest of the court in seeing that justice is
done in light of all the facts.” Hesling v. CSX Transp., Inc., 396 F.3d 632,
638 (5th Cir. 2005). This relief “is considered an extraordinary remedy,”
and “the desire for a judicial process that is predictable mandates caution in
reopening judgments.” In re Pettle, 410 F.3d 189, 191 (5th Cir. 2005)
(quoting Carter v. Fenner, 136 F.3d 1000, 1007 (5th Cir. 1998)).
DISCUSSION
I.

Motion to Set Aside and Motion to Vacate
It appears that Plaintiff’s Motion to Set Aside Foreclosure Judgment

(Dkt. # 40) and Motion to Vacate Foreclosure Sale (Dkt. # 41) are effectively Rule
60(b) motions for relief from the Court’s final judgment granting Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss. (Dkt. # 34.) Ms. Castro does not allege any new facts
supporting grounds for relief; rather, she repeats the allegations and arguments
made throughout the course of the lawsuit. The court considered these allegations
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and arguments when it issued the order dismissing the case, and Ms. Castro does
not suggest any reason why the Court’s judgment is void. Ms. Castro has not
demonstrated that any other conditions exist justifying the grant of an
“extraordinary remedy.” Accordingly, these motions are DENIED.
II.

Notice and Request
Ms. Castro also filed what is effectively a motion for default judgment

(Dkt. # 39) and a motion challenging removal of a complaint to federal court (Dkt.
# 42). These motions involve a separate lawsuit currently pending between the
same parties: Castro v. SN Servicing LLC, 5-15-CV-00925-DAE (W.D. Tex. filed
Oct. 26, 2015). Accordingly, these motions are not pertinent to the instant action
and are DENIED AS MOOT.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court hereby DENIES AS MOOT
Plaintiff’s Notice of Default Judgment (Dkt. # 39), DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to
Set Aside Foreclosure Judgment (Dkt. # 40), DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate
Foreclosure Sale (Dkt. # 41); and DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff’s Request to
Reset Nonjury Trial (Dkt. # 42).

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: San Antonio, Texas, December 10, 2015.

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David Alan Ezra
Senior United States Distict Judge

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