Dearborn National Life Insurance Company v. Alfred Jeitani, et al

Filing 13

ORDER AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES - the Court finds that Dearborn is entitled to be paid $5,030.00 from the registry of the Court... The Guardians, as the Temporary Joint Sole Managing Conservators for Sydney Jeitani, may now apply to the regi stry of the Court for $94,970.00. the Court DISMISSES the action, subject to its continuing jurisdiction to disburse payment of funds on behalf of Sydney Jeitani. Signed by Judge David A. Ezra. (rg) (Main Document 13 replaced on 6/23/2016) (tr1).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SAN ANTONIO DIVISION
DEARBORN NATIONAL LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY,

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Plaintiff,
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vs.
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ALRED JEITANI, JAMAL YOUSSEF §
YAMMINE, SAM ALFRED JEITANI, §
and ANNA JEITANI,
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Defendants.
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No. SA:15–CV–855–DAE

ORDER AWARDING ATTORNEY’S FEES
Before the Court is the declaration of Andrew F. MacRae, filed on
behalf of Plaintiff Dearborn National Life Insurance Company (“Dearborn”) in
support of an award of attorney’s fees and costs in this interpleader action (Dkt.
# 12). For the reasons stated below, the Court finds these fees are reasonable and
should be deducted from the proceeds of the life insurance policy prior to payment
of the funds on behalf of Sydney Jeitani.
BACKGROUND
On October 2, 2015, Dearborn brought a Complaint in Interpleader
against Defendants Alfred Jeitani, Jamal Youssef Yammine, Sam Alfred Jeitani
(collectively “Guardians”), and Anna Jeitani. (“Compl.,” Dkt. # 1.) On May 12,
2016, the Court adopted the Report and Recommendations of Magistrate Judge
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John W. Primomo on Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment. (Dkt. # 10.) In the
order, the Court concluded that it had jurisdiction to consider the matter. (Id. at 4–
5.) The Court found that Sydney Jeitani, the contingent beneficiary named in the
insurance policy, was entitled to receive the proceeds of the policy because the
primary beneficiary, Anna Jeitani, had pled guilty to murdering the insured. (Dkt.
# 10 at 6.) See Tex. Ins. Code §§ 1103.151 & 1103.152(a). The Court ordered that
the proceeds of the insurance policy—$100,000.00—should be paid to the registry
of the Court, and directed Dearborn to apply to the registry to recover its costs in
bringing this action. (Dkt. # 10 at 7.) The Court further ordered that the remainder
of the proceeds should be paid to the Guardians, as the Temporary Joint Sole
Managing Conservators for Sydney Jeitani. (Id.) Dearborn complied with the
order, deposited the proceeds of the policy into the registry, and filed the instant
affidavit with the Court to recover its costs.
ANALYSIS
“[A]s a general rule, when an interpleader action is successful, the
court often awards costs, as well as attorney’s fees, to the stakeholder.” Murphy v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 534 F.2d 1155, 1164 (5th Cir. 1976). “The award of attorney’s
fees is in the discretion of the district court, and fees are available when the
interpleader is a disinterested stakeholder.” Rhoades v. Casey, 196 F.3d 592, 603
(5th Cir. 1999). The attorney seeking to recover fees should submit an affidavit
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stating the number of hours expended on work necessary to the interpleader action.
See id. “Assuming that the interpleader is entitled to a fee . . . the district court
first calculates the ‘lodestar.’” Helt v. Sambina Properties, Ltd., No. 4:15–cv–760,
2016 WL 3198623, at *1 (E.D. Tex. June 9, 2016) (quoting Forbush v. J.C. Penney
Co., 98 F.3d 817, 821 (5th Cir. 1996)). The lodestar is calculated by
“[m]ultiplying the number of hours reasonably spent on the case by an appropriate
hourly rate in the community for such work . . . .” Saizan v. Delta Concrete
Products Co., Inc., 448 F.3d 795, 799 (5th Cir. 2006).
“Second, in assessing the lodestar amount, the court must consider the
twelve Johnson factors before final fees can be calculated.” Helt, 2016 WL
3198623 at *2 (citing Rutherford v. Harris Co., Tex., 187 F.3d 173, 192 (5th Cir.
1999); Johnson v. Georgia Hwy. Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th Cir.
1974), overruled on other grounds, Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 109 S. Ct.
939 (1989)). These factors include: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty
and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill required to perform the legal services
properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance
of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7)
time limitations imposed by the client or circumstance; (8) the amount involved
and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney;
(10) the undesirability of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional
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relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases. Id. at 717–19. The
Fifth Circuit maintains that courts should also consider the degree of success
obtained by the attorney. See Saizan, 448 F.3d at 799.
Dearborn, the interpleader in this action, is a disinterested party; it
filed this action to determine the beneficiary under the policy, and does not dispute
payment under the policy. (Dkt. # 1.) As a disinterested stakeholder, Dearborn is
entitled to recover the reasonable costs and attorney’s fees associated with bringing
this interpleader action. See Murphy, 534 F.2d at 1164.
Andrew MacRae submitted an affidavit stating that he, as counsel of
record for Dearborn, spent at least fifteen reasonable and necessary hours handling
this case. (“MacRae Decl.,” Dkt. # 12, ¶ 3.) He stated that he bills at an hourly
rate of $300.00 per hour, and that this is a reasonable fee for a lawyer of his
expertise working on a case of this nature. (Id.) Mr. MacRae accordingly seeks
attorney’s fees in the amount of $4,500.00. Mr. MacRae states that he was
required to investigate Dearborn’s claims, draft pleadings, conduct research,
communicate with counsel for the Guardians, and file the Motion for Default
Judgment in order to appropriately represent his client. (Id.) Mr. MacRae further
states that has been licensed to practice law in Texas since 1992 and in the Western
District since 1993. (Id.) The Court finds that fifteen hours is an appropriate
amount of time to expend upon an interpleader action of this nature, and an hourly
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rate of $300.00 is reasonable for an attorney who has been licensed to practice law
for nearly fifteen years. Accordingly, the lodestar amount is $4,500.00.
Applying the Johnson factors, the Court finds that there is no reason
to adjust the lodestar. Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717–19. The time and labor required
in this matter were adequately considered in Mr. MacRae’s billing hours. Id. at
717. The legal questions presented in this case were not particularly difficult or
novel, and did not require exceptional skill. Id. at 718. There is no indication that
Mr. MacRae was precluded from accepting other employment during the duration
of this case, or that the case or client imposed particular extenuating limitations on
his time. Id. at 718. The fee is not considerably larger or smaller than is
customary for a similar amount of work, and Mr. MacRae obtained a result that
released his client from further liability. Id. at 718–19; Saizan, 448 F.3d at 799.
Based upon these factors, the Court finds that the lodestar calculation arrives at the
appropriate amount of attorney’s fees to be awarded to Mr. MacRae. See Casey,
196 F.3d at 603.
Mr. MacRae also states that Dearborn has incurred court costs in the
amount of $530.00, for the filing fee and for service of summons on the
Defendants. (MacRae Decl. ¶ 4.) The record indicates that Dearborn paid a
$400.00 filing fee. (Dkt. # 1.) Expending $130.00 to serve summons is not

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unreasonable. Accordingly, Dearborn should also be reimbursed for its court
costs. Murphy, 534 F.2d at 1164.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that Dearborn is entitled
to be paid $5,030.00 from the registry of the Court, as reimbursement for the
reasonable costs and attorney’s fees associated with bringing this interpleader
action. The Guardians, as the Temporary Joint Sole Managing Conservators for
Sydney Jeitani, may now apply to the registry of the Court for $94,970.00, the
funds remaining after the payment of costs and attorney’s fees to Dearborn.
Finding there are no further matters to address in this interpleader action, the Court
DISMISSES the action, subject to its continuing jurisdiction to disburse payment
of funds on behalf of Sydney Jeitani.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: San Antonio, Texas, June 22, 2016.

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