Castro v. SN Servicing LLC
Filing
45
ORDER: (1) DENYING PETITON FOR NEW TRIAL; AND (2) DECLARING MARYANN CASTRO A VEXATIOUS LITIGANT - ORDER DENYING 44 Motion for New Trial. the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to not file any further pro se pleadings by Ms. Castro in this or any matter r elated to the foreclosure of the property located at 1501 Olive Street, Jourdanton, Texas, 78026, without first submitting the pleading to a United States District Court Judge or United States Magistrate Judge for review to determine whether the pleading is substantive in nature. Signed by Judge David A. Ezra. (rg) (Main Document 45 replaced on 6/23/2016) (tr1).
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SAN ANTONIO DIVISION
MARYANN CASTRO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SN SERVICING CORPORATION,
Defendant.
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No. SA:15–CV–925–DAE
ORDER: (1) DENYING PETITON FOR NEW TRIAL; AND
(2) DECLARING MARYANN CASTRO A VEXATIOUS LITIGANT
Before the Court is Plaintiff Maryann Castro’s Petition for a New
Trial. (Dkt. # 44.) Defendant SN Loan Servicing (“SNSC”) did not file a
response. Pursuant to Local Rule CV-7(h), the Court finds this matter suitable for
disposition without a hearing. After reviewing the Motion, the Court finds that it
should be DENIED for the reasons stated below. (Dkt. # 44.)
BACKGROUND
The instant motion involves a lawsuit Plaintiff filed against SNSC
challenging the foreclosure on her home. (“Third Am. Compl,” Dkt. # 18.)
Plaintiff’s suit sought to reinstate her mortgage, and alleged causes of action for
wrongful foreclosure, fraud, and failure to enter into a loan modification
agreement. (Id.) On May 4, 2016, this Court granted SNSC’s Motion to Dismiss
Case as Frivolous (Dkt. # 20) after finding that Plaintiff’s Third Amended
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Complaint failed to state any claim upon which relief could be granted.1 (Dkt.
# 44.)
LEGAL STANDARD
The instant motion, which was filed 14 days after the entry of final
judgment, requests a new trial. (Dkt. # 44.) Plaintiff’s case was dismissed on the
pleadings alone and no trial occurred; accordingly, the Court construes the motion
as a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend a judgment. 2 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e);
Demahy v. Schwarz Pharma, Inc., 702 F.3d 177, 182 n.2 (5th Cir. 2012) (“A
motion asking the court to reconsider a prior ruling is evaluated . . . under Rule
59(e) . . . [when] filed within twenty-eight days after the entry of judgment.”).
“A Rule 59(e) motion calls into question the correctness of a
judgment.” Templet v. Hydrochem, Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 478 (5th Cir. 2004).
“Under Rule 59(e), amending a judgment is appropriate (1) where there has been
an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) where the movant presents newly
1
This was Plaintiff’s second attempt to challenge the foreclosure on her home.
See Castro v. SN Servicing Corp., 5:15–cv–715–DAE (W.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2015).
2
Courts must liberally construe the filings of pro se litigants. Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972); Winland v. Quarternamn, 578 F.3d 314, 316 (5th
Cir. 2009) (noting the “well-established precedent requiring that [the court]
construe pro se briefs liberally”). Accordingly, courts hold pro se complaints to
“less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hale v. King,
642 F.3d 492, 499 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Calhoun v. Hargrove, 312 F.3d 730,
733 (5th Cir. 2002)).
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discovered evidence that was previously unavailable; or (3) to correct a manifest
error of law or fact.” Demahy, 702 F.3d at 182. Rule 59(e), however, is “not the
proper vehicle for rehashing evidence, legal theories, or arguments that could have
been offered or raised before entry of judgment,” Templet, 367 F.3d at 478, and it
“should not be used to . . . re-urge matters that have already been advanced by a
party.” Nationalist Movement v. Town of Jena, 321 F. App’x 359, 364 (5th Cir.
2009). Reconsideration of a previous order is “an extraordinary remedy that
should be used sparingly.” Id.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff’s Petition states that “the court dismissed [her] case with
prejudice without a trial court hearing,” and appears to challenge the final
judgment on the basis that she was not afforded a hearing. (Dkt. # 44.) In the
Western District of Texas, “[t]he allowance of an oral hearing is within the sole
discretion of the court.” W.D. Tex. Civ. R. 7(h). Accordingly, Plaintiff was not
entitled to a hearing on the Motion to Dismiss. That the court dismissed her claims
without a hearing is not grounds for altering or amending the final judgment in the
case. Further, Plaintiff has not shown that there were factual issues in the case
requiring findings by a jury; to the extent Plaintiff may be stating that her right to a
jury trial has been violated by the absence of a hearing, this is not grounds for
reconsidering final judgment. See Hasee v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 748
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F.3d 624, 631 n. 5 (5th Cir. 2014) (“Dismissal of [plaintiffs’] claims pursuant to a
valid 12(b)(6) motion does not violate [plaintiffs’] right to a jury trial under the
Seventh Amendment.”); Sparkman v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 281 F.3d 1278 (5th Cir.
2001).
Further, Plaintiff has not presented the Court with an intervening
change of controlling law or alleged existence of newly discovered evidence, nor
has she identified a manifest error of law or fact in the Court’s final judgment. See
Demahy, 702 F.3d at 182. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the
grant of an “extraordinary remedy” pursuant to Rule 59(e) applies here.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s Petition for a New Trial is
DENIED (Dkt. # 44).
Ms. Castro has filed thirty-one motions, responses, notices, and
affidavits in this case; the Court has evaluated each and determined that none has
legal merit. Further, Ms. Castro has continued to file motions in a separate case
dealing with the same matter, which was dismissed on September 25, 2015. See
Castro v. SN Servicing Corp., 5:15–cv–715–DAE (W.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2015). In
that matter, Ms. Castro has filed at least twenty-seven motions, demands,
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responses, and notices. 3 The Court has evaluated each of these filings and
determined that none advances any viable legal theory.
Courts should not “deter any litigant from advancing any claim or
defense which is arguably supported by existing law, or any reasonably based
suggestion for [the law’s] extension, modification, or reversal.” Farguson v.
MBank Houston, N.A., 808 F.2d 358, 359 (5th Cir. 1986). However, a Court has
the authority to prohibit a litigant from filing where it is apparent that their “claims
and defenses . . . fall outside of this broad umbrella” of permissible claims and are
accordingly frivolous. Id. At this point, Ms. Castro has filed at least fifty-eight
motions, notices, responses, affidavits, and demands regarding the foreclosure of
her home, in this Court alone; despite this Court’s repeated findings that SNSC
validly executed a foreclosure, Ms. Castro remains undeterred.
At this point, it is clear that Ms. Castro’s “claims and defenses . . . fall
outside of th[e] broad umbrella” of permissible claims and are accordingly
frivolous. Farguson, 808 F.2d at 359. Where a litigant repeatedly brings frivolous
claims, “[t]he district court has the power under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) to enjoin
litigants who are abusing the court system by harassing their opponents.”
3
Plaintiff also brought suit against BSI Financial Service, Inc. and MBL Sub I,
LLC, prior to the foreclosure of her home, challenging the possible foreclosure.
See Castro v. BSI Fin. Servs., Inc. et al., No. 5:15-CV-037-FB (W.D. Tex. Jan. 16,
2015). United States District Court Judge Fred Biery dismissed the matter on May
29, 2015. Id. (W.D. Tex. May 29, 2015).
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Harrelson v. United States, 613 F.2d 114, 116 (5th Cir. 1980) (“A litigious plaintiff
pressing a frivolous claim, though rarely succeeding on the merits, can be
extremely costly to the defendant and can waste an inordinate amount of court
time.”) .
Ms. Maryann Castro is hereby deemed a vexatious litigant due to her
prolific and frivolous filings regarding a matter which has thrice been dismissed.
Pursuant to this Court’s power under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), the Clerk of Court is
DIRECTED to not file any further pro se pleadings by Ms. Castro in this or any
matter related to the foreclosure of the property located at 1501 Olive Street,
Jourdanton, Texas, 78026, without first submitting the pleading to a United States
District Court Judge or United States Magistrate Judge for review to determine
whether the pleading is substantive in nature.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: San Antonio, Texas, June 22, 2016.
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