Meyer v. Livingston
Filing
65
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER, Petitioner Scott Meyer's Federal habeas Corpus relief is DENIED and Petitioner Meyer's 2254 Petition is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; No Certificate of Appealability shall issue in this case; and All other motions, if any, are DENIED, and this case is now CLOSED It is so ORDERED. Signed by Judge Jason K. Pulliam. (wg)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SAN ANTONIO DIVISION
SCOTT MEYER,
Petitioner,
v.
LORIE DAVIS, Director,
Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
Correctional Institutions Division,
Respondent.
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Civil No. SA-16-CA-0428-JKP
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are pro se Petitioner Scott Meyer’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (ECF No. 1), Petitioner’s Memorandum and Exhibits in Support
(ECF No. 6), Respondent Lorie Davis’s Answer on the Merits (ECF No. 57), and Petitioner’s
Reply (ECF No. 58) thereto. Having reviewed the record and pleadings submitted by both
parties, the Court concludes Petitioner is not entitled to relief under the standards prescribed by
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
Petitioner is also denied a certificate of appealability.
I. Background
In June 2013, a jury found Petitioner guilty of the state-jail felony offense of theft under
$1500 (habitual) as charged in the indictment. State v. Meyer, No. CR2012-431 (379th Dist. Ct.,
Comal Cnty., Tex. June 4, 2013); (ECF No. 16-1 at 60-61). At his subsequent punishment
hearing, Petitioner pleaded “true” to six enhancement paragraphs included in his indictment,
enhancing his punishment level to a second-degree felony, and the jury assessed punishment at
eighteen years of imprisonment. (ECF No. 16-5 at 99-100, 130; No. 16-6 at 5).
On appeal, Petitioner’s court-appointed counsel filed an uncontested Anders brief stating
that the record presented no arguably meritorious grounds for review.
(ECF No. 16-13).
Following an independent review of the record, the court of appeals agreed with counsel that the
appeal was frivolous and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Meyer v. State, No. 13-1300400-CR (Tex. App.─Corpus Christi, May 8, 2014, pet. ref’d) (ECF No. 17-1). The Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals (TCCA) then refused Petitioner’s petition for discretionary review on
September 17, 2014. Meyer v. State, No. 0714-14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); (ECF No. 17-5).
Following his direct appeal proceedings, Petitioner challenged his conviction and
sentence by filing a state habeas corpus application. Ex parte Meyer, No. 54,197-02 (Tex. Crim.
App.); (ECF No. 17-14 at 7-30). The TCCA denied Petitioner’s state habeas application without
written order on December 16, 2015. (ECF No. 17-8). Petitioner later filed the instant federal
habeas petition with this Court raising the same allegations that were rejected by the TCCA
during his state habeas proceedings. (ECF No. 1). Specifically, Petitioner contends: (1) the
prosecution committed misconduct by knowingly presenting the grand jury with false
information to illegally enhance his conviction, (2) his trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance, and (3) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.
II. Standard of Review
Petitioner’s federal habeas petition is governed by the heightened standard of review
provided by the AEDPA. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254. Under § 2254(d), a petitioner may not obtain
federal habeas corpus relief on any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court
proceedings unless the adjudication of that claim either: (1) resulted in a decision that was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, or (2) resulted in a decision that was
2
based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state
court proceeding. Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). This intentionally difficult
standard stops just short of imposing a complete bar on federal court relitigation of claims
already rejected in state proceedings. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011) (citing
Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996)).
A federal habeas court’s inquiry into unreasonableness should always be objective rather
than subjective, with a focus on whether the state court’s application of clearly established
federal law was “objectively unreasonable” and not whether it was incorrect or
erroneous. McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120 (2010); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21
(2003). Even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court’s contrary conclusion was
unreasonable, regardless of whether the federal habeas court would have reached a different
conclusion itself. Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. Instead, a petitioner must show that the decision was
objectively unreasonable, which is a “substantially higher threshold.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550
U.S. 465, 473 (2007); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003).
So long as “fairminded jurists could disagree” on the correctness of the state court’s
decision, a state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas
relief. Richter, 562 U.S. at 101 (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). In
other words, to obtain federal habeas relief on a claim previously adjudicated on the merits in
state court, Petitioner must show that the state court’s ruling “was so lacking in justification that
there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for
fairminded disagreement.” Id. at 103; see also Bobby v. Dixon, 565 U.S. 23, 24 (2011).
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III. Merits Analysis
A.
Prosecutorial Misconduct (Claim 1).
Petitioner first alleges that the prosecution committed misconduct during the grand jury
proceedings by presenting false information, withholding relevant statutory law, and
intentionally misleading the grand jury on the degree of Petitioner’s offense and potential
enhancements. According to Petitioner, the prosecution knowingly misled the grand jury in
order to secure an ambiguous (and therefore unconstitutional) indictment that unlawfully
elevated the degree of the offense for which he was charged. These allegations were rejected by
the TCCA during Petitioner’s state habeas corpus proceedings. Because Petitioner fails to
demonstrate the state court’s rejection of the claims was contrary to, or an unreasonable
application of, Supreme Court precedent, federal habeas relief is unwarranted.
To start, while Petitioner challenges the conduct of the prosecution during his grand jury
proceedings, there is no record of these proceedings before the Court. Petitioner’s contentions
regarding the prosecution’s actions before the grand jury are based on nothing more than his bare
assertions as to what occurred. “Absent evidence in the record,” however, a court cannot
“consider a habeas petitioner’s bald assertions on a critical issue in his pro se petition . . . ,
unsupported and unsupportable by anything else contained in the record, to be of probative
evidentiary value.” Ford v. Davis, 910 F.3d 232, 235 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing Ross v. Estelle, 694
F.2d 1008, 1011 (5th Cir. 1983)). As such, Petitioner’s first claim could be denied solely
because it is conclusory. Ross, 694 F.2d at 1011 (finding that “mere conclusory allegations do
not raise a constitutional issue in a habeas proceeding.”).
Furthermore, while couched in terms of prosecutorial misconduct, Petitioner’s allegations
essentially challenge the validity of the indictment that resulted from his grand jury proceedings.
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But the sufficiency of a state indictment is not a matter for federal habeas relief unless it can be
shown that the indictment is so defective that it deprives the state court of jurisdiction. Evans v.
Cain, 577 F.3d 620, 624 (5th Cir. 2009). State law dictates whether a state indictment is
sufficient to confer a court with jurisdiction. McKay v. Collins, 12 F.3d 66, 68 (5th Cir. 1994).
As such, this Court is “required to accord due deference to the state’s interpretation of its own
law that a defect of substance in an indictment does not deprive a state trial court of jurisdiction.”
Id. at 69 (citations omitted). The issue is foreclosed from consideration on federal habeas review
if “the sufficiency of the [indictment] was squarely presented to the highest court of the state on
appeal, and that court held that the trial court had jurisdiction over the case.”
Wood v.
Quarterman, 503 F.3d 408, 412 (5th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
Here, Petitioner’s claims concerning the prosecution’s actions before the grand jury and
the sufficiency of the resulting indictment were presented to the TCCA during his state habeas
proceedings. (ECF No. 17-14 at 11, 18-20) (ground 1 of Petitioner’s state habeas application).
The TCCA subsequently denied the application without written order. (ECF No. 17-8). Because
the sufficiency of the indictment was squarely presented to the highest state court and that court
held that the trial court had jurisdiction over this case, this claim is foreclosed to federal habeas
review. Wood, 503 F.3d at 412.
Regardless, even assuming the claim was not foreclosed from review by this Court, any
misconduct that occurred during Petitioner’s grand jury proceedings was harmless. See Bank of
Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 254 (1988) (finding federal district courts exceed
their “powers in dismissing an indictment for prosecutorial misconduct not prejudicial to the
defendant.”). Petitioner contends that, as a result of the prosecution’s misrepresentations to the
grand jury, he was incorrectly indicted and subsequently convicted of a third-degree felony.
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Indeed, Petitioner was originally charged by indictment with habitual theft committed in a
declared disaster zone, a third-degree felony. Following a motion to quash the indictment filed
by trial counsel, however, the paragraph alleging that the offense occurred in a disaster zone was
struck. (ECF No. 16-1 at 6-13). Thus, the record clearly indicates Petitioner was indicted and
convicted of committing the theft of property valued at less than $1,500 after having been
previously convicted two or more times of theft—a state-jail felony that was later enhanced to a
second-degree felony for punishment purposes due to his six prior felony convictions. (ECF
No. 16-1 at 6-8, 45-50; No. 16-5 at 14, 94, 99-100, 130); see also Texas Penal Code
§§ 31.03(e)(4)(D) (relevant theft statute), 12.425(b) (relevant enhancement statute).1
Moreover, Petitioner’s ultimate conviction following a jury trial cured any defect that
may have occurred at the grand jury level. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 264 (1986); United
States v. Mechnik, 475 U.S. 66, 70 (1986) (finding a jury’s guilty verdict renders harmless any
error in the grand jury’s charging decision). Once a defendant has been found guilty at trial, “the
petit jury’s verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt demonstrates a fortiori that there was
probable cause to charge the defendants with the offenses for which they were convicted.”
Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 67. As the record indicates, Petitioner was properly convicted of state-jail
felony theft by a jury of his peers; thus, any error committed during Petitioner’s grand jury
proceedings is rendered harmless.
In sum, Petitioner has not stated a basis for federal habeas relief. McKay, 12 F.3d at 68.
He also has not shown that the state court proceedings resulted in a decision that was contrary to,
or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the
While both the indictment and judgment list Petitioner’s underlying offense as a third-degree felony rather
than a state-jail felony, Respondent correctly notes that this is nothing more than a clerical error, as the disaster zone
paragraph was not presented to the jury and Petitioner was sentenced under the appropriate range for a state-jail
felony enhanced by Petitioner’s habitual offender status. (ECF No. 16-1 at 45, 56); see also Texas Penal Code
§§ 12.425(b) (relevant enhancement statute), 12.33 (stating punishment for a second-degree felony is 2-20 years).
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Supreme Court of the United States, or that the decision was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
Richter, 562 U.S. at 101-03. Relief is therefore denied.
B.
Trial Counsel (Claim 2).
Petitioner next raises several ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel (IATC) claims
concerning counsel’s performance at both the guilt-innocence and punishment phases of his trial.
In essence, Petitioner challenges three aspects of counsel’s representation: (1) counsel’s failure
to explain the judicial process to him or act as an advocate on his behalf; (2) counsel’s failure to
file adequate pretrial motions; and (3) counsel’s deficient opening and closing arguments. As
discussed below, Petitioner fails to demonstrate the state habeas court’s rejection of these
challenges was either contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent.
Federal habeas relief is therefore denied.
1.
The Strickland Standard
Sixth Amendment claims concerning the alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel are
reviewed under the familiar two-prong test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984). Under Strickland, a petitioner cannot establish a violation of his Sixth Amendment right
to counsel unless he demonstrates (1) counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) this
deficiency prejudiced his defense. 466 U.S. at 687-88, 690. According to the Supreme Court,
“[s]urmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356,
371 (2010).
When determining whether counsel performed deficiently, courts “must be highly
deferential” to counsel’s conduct, and a petitioner must show that counsel’s performance fell
beyond the bounds of prevailing objective professional standards. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-
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89. Counsel is “strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant
decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 22
(2013) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). To demonstrate prejudice, a petitioner “must show
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Under this prong, the
“likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.” Richter, 562 U.S. at
112. A habeas petitioner has the burden of proving both prongs of the Strickland test. Wong v.
Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15, 27 (2009).
Finally, IATC claims are considered mixed questions of law and fact and are analyzed
under the “unreasonable application” standard of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). See Gregory v. Thaler,
601 F.3d 347, 351 (5th Cir. 2010). Where, as here, the state court adjudicated the IATC claims
on the merits, a court must review a petitioner’s claims under the “doubly deferential” standards
of both Strickland and Section 2254(d). See Woods v. Etherton, 136 S. Ct. 1149, 1151 (2016)
(citing Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 190 (2011)); Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111,
112 (2009). In such cases, the “pivotal question” is not “whether defense counsel’s performance
fell below Strickland’s standards,” but whether “the state court’s application of the Strickland
standard was unreasonable.” Richter, 562 U.S at 101. That is to say, the question to be asked in
this case is not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable, but whether “there is any reasonable
argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Id. at 105.
2.
Failure to Explain Judicial Process or Advocate on His Behalf
Petitioner first contends that his trial counsel, Case Darwin, was ineffective because
counsel failed to explain the judicial process to him. Petitioner provides no argument or support
for this self-serving allegation. But under Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases,
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a petitioner is required to plead facts in support of his claims. As discussed in the previous
section, this Court will not “consider a habeas petitioner’s bald assertions on a critical issue in
his pro se petition . . . , unsupported and unsupportable by anything else contained in the record,
to be of probative evidentiary value.” Ford, 910 F.3d at 235 (quoting Ross, 694 F.2d at 1011).
Because Petitioner offers no facts or evidence to support his accusation, his claim is conclusory
and is denied. See Miller v. Johnson, 200 F.3d 274, 282 (5th Cir. 2000) (stating a petitioner is
not entitled to relief on the basis of a conclusory allegation).
Similarly, Petitioner’s allegations that counsel refused to fight the charges against
Petitioner or advocate on his behalf are also unsupported and conclusory. Petitioner has offered
no evidence to substantiate his allegations that counsel was “unwilling” to effectively represent
Petitioner, instead providing only conclusory and self-serving accusations to support his claims.
Again, such allegations are insufficient to support habeas relief. See Miller, 200 F.3d at 282.
Furthermore, Petitioner’s allegation is contradicted by the record. As noted by Respondent, the
record clearly demonstrates that counsel cross-examined witnesses, gave opening and closing
arguments attempting to minimize the punishment assessed, and successfully sought to have the
disaster zone enhancement paragraph from the indictment removed.
Thus, Petitioner’s
contention that counsel refused to represent him is meritless.
3.
Failure to File Adequate Pretrial Motions
Petitioner next contends trial counsel was ineffective for not filing adequate pretrial
motions. For instance, Petitioner contends counsel should have filed a motion to quash the
indictment based on the fact that the indictment illegally elevated his offense to a third-degree
felony because it was allegedly committed in a declared disaster zone. As discussed in the
previous section, however, counsel did file such a motion that resulted in the disaster zone
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paragraph being struck. (ECF No. 16-1 at 6-13). While Petitioner now contends that the motion
filed by counsel was inadequate because it was “not supported by law,” Petitioner’s argument is
irrelevant because the ultimate goal of the motion—to have the disaster area enhancement
removed—was achieved. Indeed, it is hard to imagine how counsel can be found deficient in
such a scenario.
Petitioner further faults counsel for not filing additional motions challenging the
indictment because one of the predicate convictions used to elevate his offense to a state-jail
felony was allegedly void. Based on this argument, Petitioner contends counsel should have also
filed a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction, a motion to dismiss due to prosecutorial
misconduct, and a motion to change venue. But as discussed further in the following section
concerning Petitioner’s insufficient evidence claim, Petitioner’s argument that his predicate
conviction was void is incorrect because the conviction was still valid at the time of Petitioner’s
trial for the instant offense. As such, any motion made by counsel on such grounds would have
been futile, and “counsel is not required to make futile motions or objections.” Koch v. Puckett,
907 F.2d 524, 527 (5th Cir. 1990); see also Sones v. Hargett, 61 F.3d 410, 415 n.5 (5th Cir.
1995) (counsel cannot be deficient for failing to press a frivolous point). In fact, counsel chose
not to file a motion based on this argument because he believed such a challenge was not
supported by law. (ECF No. 16-4 at 4). As a result, Petitioner has not shown counsel’s
performance was deficient or that the state court’s denial of this claim was an unreasonable
application of Strickland.
4.
Counsel’s Opening and Closing Arguments
In his next allegation, Petitioner contends trial counsel was ineffective at the
guilt/innocence phase during his opening and closing arguments to the jury. According to
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Petitioner, counsel’s statements were condescending and effectively conceded his guilt while
attempting to focus on punishment issues instead of the question of his guilt. Petitioner raised
these allegations during his state habeas proceedings, to which trial counsel submitted an
affidavit in response. In relevant part, counsel stated he tried to prevent Petitioner from even
going to trial because “[t]he evidence was not simply beyond a reasonable doubt that he
committed such offense, but rather beyond all doubt.” (ECF No. 17-14 at 32-33). Also, because
Petitioner’s prior record was “atrocious,” counsel stated he tried to influence the jury “by
showing that, even though he did not like him, a sentence for stealing $53 worth of items should
be time served, even for an unlikeable person with a horrendous record.” Id.
“[C]ounsel has wide latitude in deciding how best to represent a client. . .” Yarborough
v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5-6, 8 (2003) (“When counsel focuses on some issues to the exclusion of
others, there is a strong presumption that he did so for tactical reasons rather than through sheer
neglect.”). “A conscious and informed decision on trial tactics and strategy cannot be the basis
for constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel unless it is so ill chosen that it permeates the
entire trial with obvious unfairness.” Cotton v. Cockrell, 343 F.3d 746, 752-53 (5th Cir. 2003).
Thus, counsel’s choice of a defense and his strategy in arguing that defense to a jury are
“virtually unchallengeable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690; Trottie v. Stephens, 720 F.3d 231, 243
(5th Cir. 2011) (holding the failure to present a particular line of argument is presumed to be the
result of strategic choice).
Here, in light of the overwhelming evidence of Petitioner’s guilt, as well as the laundry
list of prior offenses committed by Petitioner, there was nothing objectively unreasonable with
trial counsel’s chosen strategy to focus on limiting Petitioner’s potential punishment due to the
severity (or lack thereof) of Petitioner’s offense. Because counsel’s decisions regarding cross-
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examination were strategic and imminently reasonable, they will not support an ineffective
assistance claim. Clark v. Thaler, 673 F.3d 410, 427 (5th Cir. 2012) (recognizing the broad
deference to which counsel is entitled in making tactical decisions in closing argument).
Petitioner has therefore not shown counsel’s performance was deficient, much less that the state
court’s denial of this claim was an unreasonable application of Strickland. Thus, under the
“doubly” deferential review encompassed by Strickland and the AEDPA, Petitioner’s claim
cannot survive. Richter, 562 U.S at 105.
5.
Lack of Prejudice
Finally, even if Petitioner could establish that counsel’s performance in this case
constituted deficient performance, he still fails to demonstrate that the alleged errors were
prejudicial to his defense. Again, to demonstrate prejudice, a petitioner “must show that there is
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “[A] court assessing prejudice must
consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury.” Mejia v. Davis, 906 F.3d 307, 315
(5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Petitioner has not established that the alleged errors were prejudicial with regard to his
guilt because, as the record demonstrates, the State’s case was strong and there was substantial
corroborated evidence against Petitioner. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 390 (2010)
(noting the weight of the evidence of guilt in finding alleged deficient performance of counsel
not prejudicial); Pondexter v. Quarterman, 537 F.3d 511, 525 (5th Cir. 2008). As counsel noted
in his affidavit before the state habeas court, “[t]he evidence showed that [Petitioner] confess[ed]
to stealing, two civilian witnesses testified they saw him steal, and video showed that he stole
[the] items.” (ECF No. 17-14 at 33). With regard to his punishment, Petitioner also has not
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established prejudice given his lengthy criminal history and the fact that counsel successfully had
his charge reduced so that he faced a punishment range for a second-degree felony (2-20 years)
instead of a first-degree felony (25 years to life).
Because Petitioner is unable to establish that counsel’s performance was deficient or that
he was prejudiced by counsel’s alleged errors, the state court’s denial of Petitioner’s IATC
allegations was not an unreasonable application of Strickland. Relief on these claims is therefore
denied.
C.
Sufficiency of the Evidence (Claim 3).
In his last allegation, Petitioner contends the evidence was insufficient to support a
conviction for a state-jail felony under Texas Penal Code § 31.03(e)(4)(D). Under this statute, a
person commits a state-jail felony theft if (1) the value of the property stolen is less than $1,500
and (2) the person has been previously convicted of two or more theft offenses. Petitioner argues
the State failed to meet this statutory definition because one of the predicate offenses used to
elevate the offense to a state-jail felony was later vacated.2 Petitioner’s allegation was raised and
rejected during his state habeas proceedings. As discussed below, Petitioner fails to demonstrate
the state court’s rejection of this allegation was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,
Supreme Court precedent.
1.
Relevant Facts
Petitioner was charged by indictment with theft of property valued at less than $1,500
with two or more convictions for the same offense, a state-jail felony. (ECF No. 16-1 at 6-8). In
relevant part, the indictment alleged:
2
Petitioner does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence regarding his underlying conviction for theft,
only that the State did not establish the requisite predicate convictions necessary to elevate his offense to a state-jail
felony.
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And the said Defendant had previously been convicted two or more times for the
offense of theft, to-wit:
1.
In No. 82CR2591, in the 187th Judicial District Court of
Bexar County, Texas, on the 20th day of September, 1982;
and
2.
In Cause No. 649664, in the County Court at Law No. CC5
of Bexar County, Texas, on the 6th day of December, 1996.
Id.
2.
Reviewing Sufficiency Claims Under the AEDPA
In Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979), the Supreme Court enunciated the
standard of review when a state prisoner challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in a federal
habeas corpus proceeding. The Court stated the issue to be “whether, after viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. In applying this standard, the
Court went on to say that “[t]his familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier
of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable
inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Id. Thus, all credibility choices and conflicts in
inferences are to be resolved in favor of the verdict. United States v. Resio-Trejo, 45 F.3d 907,
911 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Nguyen, 28 F.3d 477, 480 (5th Cir. 1994).
In addition, the AEDPA imposes a “twice-deferential standard” when a federal court
reviews a state prisoner’s claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. Parker v. Matthews,
567 U.S. 37, 43 (2012). As the Supreme Court has explained:
The opinion of the Court in Jackson v. Virginia . . . makes clear that it is the
responsibility of the jury—not the court—to decide what conclusions should be
drawn from evidence admitted at trial. A reviewing court may set aside the jury’s
verdict on the ground of insufficient evidence only if no rational trier of fact could
have agreed with the jury. What is more, a federal court may not overturn a state
court decision rejecting a sufficiency of the evidence challenge simply because
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the federal court disagrees with the state court. The federal court instead may do
so only if the state court decision was “objectively unreasonable.”
Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1, 2 (2011) (citations omitted).
3.
Application of the Jackson Standard
Petitioner claims the evidence is insufficient to support his state-jail felony conviction
because one of the predicate convictions—cause number 649664—was unsigned and
subsequently vacated. Because this predicate conviction was rendered “void,” Petitioner argues
the State failed to establish his guilt for a state-jail felony as alleged in the indictment. Petitioner
is mistaken.
As the record indicates, the predicate offense in cause number 649664 was
established at Petitioner’s trial by both testimony and the presentation of the judgment in that
cause to the jury. (ECF No. 16-5 at 65-68, No. 16-7 at 19-29). While cause number 649664 may
have later been set aside on collateral review, the conviction was still valid at the time of
Petitioner’s trial for the instant offense.
See Ex Parte Jimenez, 361 S.W.3d 679 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2012) (finding that subsequent reversal and dismissal of predicate felony did not render
void an otherwise valid conviction for possession of firearm by a felon). Because the predicate
offense in cause number 649664 clearly could be used to establish Petitioner’s habitual status
until such time as it was in fact invalidated, the fact the offense was vacated after Petitioner’s
June 2013 conviction for the instant offense is irrelevant.
As such, Petitioner fails to show that the state court’s determination was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, federal law, or that it was an unreasonable
determination of the facts based on the evidence in the record.
Moreover, this Court has
independently reviewed the record and finds the evidence sufficient to support the verdict. Thus,
viewing all of the evidence under the doubly-deferential standard that applies on federal habeas
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review, Petitioner has not shown that the state court’s decision was objectively unreasonable or
that he is entitled to relief under Jackson. Federal habeas relief is therefore denied.
IV. Certificate of Appealability
The Court must now determine whether to issue a certificate of appealability (COA). See
Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings; Miller–El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S.
322, 335-36 (2003) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)). A COA may issue only if a petitioner makes
“a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). If a
district court rejects a petitioner’s constitutional claims on the merits, the petitioner must
demonstrate “that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the
constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). This
requires a petitioner to show “that reasonable jurists could debate whether the petition should
have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.’” Miller–El, 537 U.S. at 336 (citation omitted).
A district court may deny a COA sua sponte without requiring further briefing or
argument. See Alexander v. Johnson, 211 F.3d 895, 898 (5th Cir. 2000). For the reasons set
forth above, the Court concludes that jurists of reason would not debate the conclusion that
Petitioner was not entitled to federal habeas relief. As such, a COA will not issue.
V. Conclusion and Order
Petitioner has failed to establish that the state court’s rejection of the aforementioned
claims on the merits during his state habeas proceedings was either (1) contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States, or (2) based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
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the evidence presented during Petitioner’s state trial and habeas corpus proceedings.
Accordingly, based on the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.
Federal habeas corpus relief is DENIED and Petitioner Scott Meyer’s § 2254
petition (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;
2.
No Certificate of Appealability shall issue in this case; and
3.
All other motions, if any, are DENIED, and this case is now CLOSED.
It is so ORDERED.
SIGNED this 7th day of February, 2020.
____________________________________
JASON PULLIAM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
17
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