Taylor v. 187th District Court et al

Filing 3

ORDER GRANTING #1 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis Signed by Judge Elizabeth S. Chestney. (mgr)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SAN ANTONIO DIVISION
KILIPATRICK TAYLOR,
Plaintiff,
vs.
187TH DISTRICT COURT, BEXAR
COUNTY; ARRESTING OFFICER,
STATE TROOPER, AGENCY OF
TEXAS; AND ARRESTING OFFICER,
BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS,
Defendants.

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SA-22-CV-01241-JKP

ORDER
Before the Court in the above-styled cause of action is Plaintiff’s pro se Application to
Proceed in District Court without Prepaying Fees or Costs and proposed civil complaint [#1].
This case was automatically referred to the undersigned upon filing, and the undersigned has
authority to enter this order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). By his motion, Plaintiff seeks
leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) based on an inability to afford court fees and costs.
Having considered the motion and documentation provided by Plaintiff, the Court will grant the
motion to proceed IFP, but order Plaintiff to file a more definite statement.
I. Motion to Proceed IFP
All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the United
States, except an application for a writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $350, as well as

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an administrative fee.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP includes his
income and asset information, which indicates that Plaintiff is employed but does not have
sufficient monthly resources available to pay the filing fee. The Court will therefore grant
Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP.
Plaintiff is advised, however, that although he has been granted leave to proceed IFP, this
Court may, in its discretion, impose costs of court at the conclusion of this lawsuit, as in other
cases. See Moore v. McDonald, 30 F.3d 616, 621 (5th Cir. 1994). The Court will therefore
order that Plaintiff’s Complaint be docketed, but service upon Defendant will be withheld
pending this Court’s review of the plausibility of Plaintiff’s claims under § 1915(e).
II. More Definite Statement
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the Court is empowered to screen any civil complaint
filed by a party proceeding IFP to determine whether the claims presented are (1) frivolous or
malicious; (2) fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (3) seek monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief.2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Plaintiff’s
proposed Complaint names three Defendants—the 187th District Court of Bexar County and two
unnamed arresting officers (one a State Trooper and the other a Bexar County officer from the
Bexar County Jail). (Compl. [#1-1], at 1.) Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that the Bexar County
Court (and specifically Judge Stephanie Boyd) violated his constitutional rights by denying his
motion to dismiss his counsel and by rejecting his motion for discovery of police body camera

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The administrative fee, which is currently $50, is waived for plaintiffs who are granted
IFP status. See District Court Miscellaneous Fee Schedule, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/fees/district-court-miscellaneous-fee-schedule.
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28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) does not make frivolousness review mandatory before the
docketing of a Complaint filed by a non-prisoner Plaintiff proceeding IFP. However, the San
Antonio Division has a standing order requiring all Magistrate Judges to undertake such review
in conjunction with disposing of a motion to proceed IFP.
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videos in an attempt to locate personal property he had in his possession at the time of his arrest
that has yet to be returned to him. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff’s claims against the unnamed arresting
officers also concern this personal property. (Id. at 7.)
Plaintiff’s proposed Complaint, as currently drafted, fails to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted. Plaintiff’s allegations against the Bexar County Court and Judge Boyd
are barred by the judicial immunity doctrine. Plaintiff attempts to challenge various orders of the
Court and legal decisions of Judge Boyd in his criminal case. Judges enjoy judicial immunity
from suit as to those acts taken in their judicial capacity. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991).
This immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice. Id. Because Plaintiff’s
Complaint attempts to sue Judge Boyd for acts taken in her judicial capacity, Plaintiff’s claims
against the Bexar County Court and Judge Boyd should be dismissed.
As to Plaintiff’s claims against the unnamed arresting officers seeking the return of his
property, Plaintiff has not established that the Court has jurisdiction over these claims. First, the
way Plaintiff’s Complaint is worded, it appears his criminal proceedings in state court are
ongoing and that there are mechanisms for him to request the return of his seized property in
state court. Therefore, assuming Plaintiff could state a constitutional claim against these officers
or the Bexar County Jail for failure to return his personal property, this Court likely lacks
jurisdiction over these claims under the Younger abstention doctrine.
The Younger doctrine requires that federal courts decline to exercise jurisdiction over
lawsuits when three conditions are met: (1) the federal proceeding would interfere with an
“ongoing state judicial proceeding”; (2) the state has an important interest in regulating the
subject matter of the claim; and (3) the plaintiff has an adequate opportunity in the state
proceedings to raise constitutional challenges. Bice v. La. Pub. Def. Bd., 677 F.3d 712, 716 (5th

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Cir. 2012) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim related
to his arrest in underlying state court proceedings could implicate Younger if the criminal
proceedings are ongoing. The Court will therefore give Plaintiff the opportunity to file a More
Definite Statement regarding his claims against the officers before recommending dismissal
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
III. CONCLUSION
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s pro se Application to Proceed in
District Court without Prepaying Fees or Costs [#1] is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Complaint shall be filed by the Clerk
without prepayment of fees, costs or the giving of security therefore, and the Clerk shall, until
further Order of this Court, waive the collection of any other fees or costs from Plaintiff. Service
upon Defendants should be withheld pending this Court’s review under § 1915(e).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that on or before December 9, 2022, Plaintiff shall file a
More Definite Statement of the claims he seeks to present to this Court. Plaintiff is reminded to
keep his statement “short and plain,” detailing only the facts relevant to his claims. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

In this More Definite Statement, Plaintiff should include the following

information:
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Please provide the Court with the status of your criminal proceedings in Bexar
County Court, including the case number. Are the proceedings ongoing?

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You allege that your constitutional rights were violated by Defendants’ failure to
return personal property seized at your arrest. What have you been told regarding
the property? Was it lost, misplaced? Or do you believe there is just a delay in
returning it to you?

Plaintiff shall include the following declaration at the end of his more definite statement:

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I declare, under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America, that the
foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on this ____ day of _____2022.

____________________
Signature of Plaintiff

If Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order, the Court could dismiss this case for failure to
prosecute. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). If Plaintiff does not wish to file a more definite statement,
he may request voluntary dismissal of these claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
41(a).
SIGNED this 18th day of November, 2022.

ELIZABETH S. ("BETSY") CHESTNEY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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