Best-Willie v. Astrue
Filing
17
MEMORANDUM DECISION - Commissioner's decision in this case is AFFIRMED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Paul M. Warner on 3/19/12. (alp)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
NORTHERN DIVISION
MICHELLE BEST-WILLIE,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 1:10-cv-0176-PMW
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
Magistrate Judge Paul M. Warner
Before the court is Michelle Best-Willie’s (“Plaintiff”) appeal of Michael J. Astrue’s
(“Commissioner”) final decision determining that Plaintiff was not entitled to Disability
Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-434.
After careful consideration of the written briefs and the complete record, the court has
determined that oral argument is not necessary in this case.
BACKGROUND
In June 2007, Plaintiff applied for DIB, alleging disability beginning on January 25,
2007.1 Plaintiff’s application was denied initially and upon reconsideration.2 In May 2008,
Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”),3 and that hearing was
1
See docket no. 8, Administrative Record (“Tr.
2
See Tr. 84-85.
3
See Tr. 100-01.
”) 138-39.
held on March 20, 2009.4 On August 18, 2009, the ALJ issued a written decision denying
Plaintiff’s claim for DIB.5 In September 2010, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for
review,6 making the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision for purposes of judicial
review. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); 20 C.F.R. § 404.981.
On October 29, 2010, Plaintiff filed her complaint in this case, which was assigned to
District Judge Clark Waddoups.7 On March 3, 2011, both parties consented to having a United
States Magistrate Judge conduct all proceedings in the case, including entry of final judgment,
with appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.8 Consequently, the case
was reassigned to Magistrate Judge Paul M. Warner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and rule 73
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.9 After receiving an extension of time,10 the
Commissioner filed his answer on March 10, 2011,11 and the court received the Administrative
Record the same day.12
4
See Tr. 25-79.
5
See Tr. 9-24.
6
See Tr. 1-5.
7
See docket no. 3.
8
See docket no. 6.
9
See id.
10
See docket nos. 4-5.
11
See docket no. 7.
12
See docket no. 8.
2
Plaintiff filed her opening brief on June 15, 2011.13 The Commissioner filed his
responsive brief on July 15, 2011.14 Plaintiff filed her reply brief on July 29, 2011.15
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This court “review[s] the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether the factual
findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether the correct legal
standards were applied.” Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007) (quotations and
citation omitted). The Commissioner’s findings, “if supported by substantial evidence, shall be
conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It requires more than a
scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” Lax, 489 F.3d at 1084 (quotations and citation
omitted). “In reviewing the ALJ’s decision, [this court may] neither reweigh the evidence nor
substitute [its] judgment for that of the [ALJ].” Madrid v. Barnhart, 447 F.3d 788, 790 (10th
Cir. 2006) (quotations and citation omitted). “The failure to apply the correct legal standard or to
provide this court with a sufficient basis to determine that appropriate legal principles have been
followed [are] grounds for reversal.” Jensen v. Barnhart, 436 F.3d 1163, 1165 (10th Cir. 2005)
(quotations and citation omitted).
13
See docket no. 14.
14
See docket no. 15.
15
See docket no. 16.
3
A five-step evaluation process has been established for determining whether a claimant is
disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v); see also Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 75051 (10th Cir. 1988) (discussing the five-step process). If a determination can be made at any one
of the steps that a claimant is or is not disabled, the subsequent steps need not be analyzed. See
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).
Step one determines whether the claimant is presently
engaged in substantial gainful activity. If [the claimant] is,
disability benefits are denied. If [the claimant] is not, the decision
maker must proceed to step two: determining whether the claimant
has a medically severe impairment or combination of
impairments. . . . If the claimant is unable to show that his
impairments would have more than a minimal effect on his ability
to do basic work activities, he is not eligible for disability benefits.
If, on the other hand, the claimant presents medical evidence and
makes the de minimis showing of medical severity, the decision
maker proceeds to step three.
Williams, 844 F.2d at 750-51 (quotations and citations omitted); see 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(ii).
“Step three determines whether the impairment is equivalent to one of a number of listed
impairments that . . . are so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity . . . . If the
impairment is listed and thus conclusively presumed to be disabling, the claimant is entitled to
benefits. If not, the evaluation proceeds to the fourth step . . . .” Williams, 844 F.2d at 751
(quotations and citations omitted); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). At the fourth step, the
claimant must show that the impairment prevents performance of his “past relevant work.” 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). “If the claimant is able to perform his previous work, he is not
4
disabled.” Williams, 844 F.2d at 751. If, however, the claimant is not able to perform his
previous work, he “has met his burden of proof, establishing a prima facie case of disability.” Id.
At this point, “[t]he evaluation process . . . proceeds to the fifth and final step.” Id. At
this step, the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner, and the decision maker must determine
“whether the claimant has the residual functional capacity [(”RFC”)] . . . to perform other work
in the national economy in view of his age, education, and work experience.” Id.; see 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If it is determined that the claimant “can make an adjustment to other
work,” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v), he is not disabled. If, on the other hand, it is determined
that the claimant “cannot make an adjustment to other work,” id., he is disabled and entitled to
benefits.
ANALYSIS
In support of her claim that the Commissioner’s decision should be reversed, Plaintiff
argues that the ALJ erred: (1) by improperly evaluating the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating and
examining medical providers; (2) by determining that Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or
equal section 12.06 (“listing 12.06”) of Appendix 1 of the relevant regulations (individually, a
“listing” and collectively, the “listings”), see 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, listing
12.06 (anxiety-related disorders); (3) in evaluating the credibility of Plaintiff’s subjective
complaints; (4) by failing to consider the statement of a lay witness; (5) in conducting the
analysis at step four of the sequential evaluation process; and (6) in conducting the analysis at
step five of the sequential evaluation process. The court will address each argument in turn.
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I. Medical Opinions
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinions of two of Plaintiff’s treating
sources, Dr. Richard G. Hall (“Dr. Hall”) and Dr. Richard A. Charlat (“Dr. Charlat”). Plaintiff
also argues that the ALJ improperly evaluated the opinions of the state agency consultants.
In deciding how much weight to give a treating source
opinion, an ALJ must first determine whether the opinion qualifies
for controlling weight. To make this determination, the ALJ . . .
must first consider whether the opinion is well[ ]supported by
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.
If the answer to this question is “no,” then the inquiry at this stage
is complete. If the ALJ finds that the opinion is well[ ]supported,
he must then confirm that the opinion is consistent with other
substantial evidence in the record. If the opinion is deficient in
either of these respects, then it is not entitled to controlling weight.
Even if a treating physician’s opinion is not entitled to
controlling weight, treating source medical opinions are still
entitled to deference and must be weighed using all of the factors
provided in [20 C.F.R. §] 404.1527. Those factors are: (1) the
length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of
examination; (2) the nature and extent of the treatment
relationship, including the treatment provided and the kind of
examination or testing performed; (3) the degree to which the
physician’s opinion is supported by relevant evidence; (4)
consistency between the opinion and the record as a whole; (5)
whether or not the physician is a specialist in the area upon which
an opinion is rendered; and (6) other factors brought to the ALJ’s
attention which tend to support or contradict the opinion.
Under the regulations, the agency rulings, and [Tenth
Circuit] case law, an ALJ must give good reasons . . . for the
weight assigned to a treating physician’s opinion . . . that are
sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the
weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source’s medical
opinion and the reason for that weight. If the ALJ rejects the
opinion completely, he must then give specific, legitimate reasons
for doing so.
6
Langley v. Barnhart, 373 F.3d 1116, 1119 (10th Cir. 2004) (quotations and citations omitted)
(sixth alteration in original); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c).
With respect to the opinions of nonexamining physicians, the relevant regulation
indicates that the ALJ still considers those opinions as opinion evidence. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(e). Further, the ALJ is required to consider nonexamining opinions in accordance
with the same standards used for considering treating source opinions. See id.; see also id.
§ 404.1527(c).
As with other evidentiary matters, when an ALJ is considering medical opinion evidence,
it is the ALJ’s role to weigh and resolve evidentiary conflicts and inconsistencies. See, e.g.,
Rutledge v. Apfel, 230 F.3d 1172, 1174 (10th Cir. 2000); Eggleston v. Bowen, 851 F.2d 1244,
1247 (10th Cir. 1988).
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by rejecting the opinions of Dr. Hall and Dr. Charlat.
Because the ALJ concluded that Dr. Hall’s and Dr. Charlat’s opinions were entitled to
diminished weight, it is implicit that the ALJ also viewed those opinions as not being entitled to
controlling weight. Accordingly, the court turns to the deference and weight the ALJ gave to Dr.
Hall’s and Dr. Charlat’s opinions. See Langley, 373 F.3d at 1119; see also 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(c).
In her decision, the ALJ stated that she was not accepting Dr. Hall’s and Dr. Charlat’s
opinions. In reaching that conclusion, the ALJ relied upon proper factors. First, the ALJ
properly relied upon the fact that the doctors’ opinions were not well supported by medically
acceptable clinical and diagnostic techniques. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3). Second, the ALJ
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properly relied on the inconsistencies between the doctors’ opinions and Plaintiff’s description of
her activities of daily living. See id. § 404.1527(c)(4). Third, the ALJ properly relied on the
inconsistencies between the doctors’ opinions and their own treatment reports. See id. Finally,
the ALJ properly considered the inconsistencies between the doctors’ opinions and the other
medical evidence in the record. See id.
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to identify the alleged inconsistencies between Dr.
Hall’s and Dr. Charlat’s opinions and the remaining medical evidence in the record. That
argument is without merit. While it is true that the ALJ did not specifically identify that record
evidence in the portion of her decision concerning Dr. Hall’s and Dr. Charlat’s opinions, another
portion of the ALJ’s decision contains a thorough discussion of the medical evidence in the
record.16 A review of that portion of the ALJ’s decision demonstrates that the ALJ discussed
substantial evidence in the record that was inconsistent with the extreme limitations contained
within Dr. Hall’s and Dr. Charlat’s opinions.
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred in the treatment of the opinions of the state agency
consultants. In essence, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ should have given more weight to Dr.
Hall’s and Dr. Charlat’s opinions than she gave to the opinions of the state agency consultants
because Dr. Hall and Dr. Charlat are treating physicians, while the state agency consultants are
nonexamining physicians. That argument fails for the following reasons. First, simply because
Dr. Hall and Dr. Charlat are treating physicians, that does not require the ALJ to give their
16
See Tr. 18-19.
8
opinions more weight than those of nonexamining physicians like the state agency consultants.
Furthermore, as noted above, the ALJ considered proper factors in rejecting the opinions of Dr.
Hall and Dr. Charlat. Second, the ALJ properly considered the fact that the state agency
consultants were experienced and knowledgeable regarding the requirements for demonstrating a
disability. See id. § 404.1527(c)(5)-(6).
To the extent that Plaintiff attempts to reargue the weight of the evidence before the ALJ
on this issue, the court notes that such a tactic is futile on appeal because it is not this court’s role
to reweigh the evidence before the ALJ. See Madrid, 447 F.3d at 790. Indeed, it is the ALJ’s
role to weigh and resolve evidentiary conflicts and inconsistencies. See, e.g., Rutledge, 230 F.3d
at 1174; Eggleston, 851 F.2d at 1247. From an evidentiary standpoint, the only issue relevant to
the court is whether substantial evidence exists in the record to support the ALJ’s conclusions.
See Oldham v. Astrue, 509 F.3d 1254, 1257 (10th Cir. 2007) (providing that the court reviewing
the ALJ’s decision reviews “only the sufficiency of the evidence, not its weight” (emphasis
omitted)).
Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that the ALJ did not err in her treatment of
the opinions of Dr. Hall, Dr. Charlat, and the state agency consultants.
II. Listing 12.06
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred at step three of the sequential evaluation process by
failing to properly evaluate whether Plaintiff’s impairments met or equaled listing 12.06. See 20
C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, listing 12.06; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1525, 404.1526.
More specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to conclude that Plaintiff
9
established the “C” criteria of listing 12.06. See 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, listing
12.06(C) (requiring “complete inability to function independently outside the area of one’s
home”).
At step three, a claimant has the “burden to present evidence establishing her impairments
meet or equal listed impairments.” Fischer-Ross v. Barnhart, 431 F.3d 729, 733 (10th Cir.
2005). In order to satisfy this burden, a claimant must establish that her impairment “meet[s] all
of the specified medical criteria. An impairment that manifests only some of those criteria, no
matter how severely, does not qualify.” Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530 (1990).
Plaintiff appears to argue that because Dr. Charlat made the finding required to establish
the “C” criteria of listing 12.06, the ALJ should have concluded that the “C” criteria were
satisfied. Because the court has already concluded that the ALJ did not err in rejecting the
opinions of Dr. Charlat, that argument necessarily fails.
III. Credibility
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in evaluating the credibility of Plaintiff’s subjective
complaints. In general, “[c]redibility determinations are peculiarly the province of the finder of
fact, and [this court] will not upset such determinations when supported by substantial evidence.”
Kepler v. Chater, 68 F.3d 387, 391 (10th Cir. 1995) (quotations and citation omitted). Although
credibility determinations “should be closely and affirmatively linked to substantial evidence,”
id. (quotations and citation omitted), they “do[] not require a formalistic factor-by-factor
recitation of the evidence.” Qualls v. Apfel, 206 F.3d 1368, 1372 (10th Cir. 2000).
10
SSR 96-7p clarifies the standards an ALJ must apply when evaluating the credibility of an
individual’s statements, including his or her allegations of pain. See SSR 96-7p. In addition to
the objective medical evidence, an ALJ should consider the following factors when assessing the
credibility of an individual’s statements:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
The individual’s daily activities;
The location, duration, frequency, and intensity of the
individual’s pain or other symptoms;
Factors that precipitate and aggravate the symptoms;
The type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any
medication the individual takes or has taken to alleviate
pain or other symptoms;
Treatment, other than medication, the individual receives or
has received for relief of pain or other symptoms;
Any measures other than treatment the individual uses or
has used to relieve pain or other symptoms (e.g., lying flat
on his or her back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every
hour, or sleeping on a board); and
Any other factors concerning the individual’s functional
limitations and restrictions due to pain or other symptoms.
Id.; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c); see also Thompson v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 1482, 1489 (10th Cir.
1993).
In this case, the ALJ considered proper factors in reaching the determination that
Plaintiff’s testimony and her subjective complaints were not fully credible. First, the ALJ
properly relied upon the fact that evidence of Plaintiff’s daily activities was inconsistent with
Plaintiff’s allegations about the degree of her limitations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i);
SSR 96-7p. The ALJ noted that the evidence of record established that Plaintiff was able to
independently perform her activities of daily living, including doing some household chores and
laundry with assistance; preparing simple meals; handling personal finances; watching television;
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and spending a good deal of time writing her husband’s, her father’s, and her own history for
genealogy.17 Second, the ALJ properly noted that the record evidence established that Plaintiff’s
medical evaluations had been within normal limits, except for some abdominal tenderness; her
diagnostic tests had been within normal limits; she had been treated solely with conservative
care; she had required no surgery or extended periods of hospitalization; she had received very
little physical therapy; and had received no mental health treatment. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1529(c)(3)(iv)-(vi); SSR 96-7p. Third, the ALJ properly referenced Plaintiff’s
noncompliance with her medical providers’ recommendations to lose weight and exercise.18 See
20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(iv)-(vi); SSR 96-7p. Finally, in reaching her overall credibility
determination, the ALJ noted her own observations of Plaintiff at the administrative hearing,
including Plaintiff’s ability to move back and forth freely and to maintain concentration and
attention throughout the hearing. See SSR 96-7p (“In instances where the individual attends an
administrative proceeding conducted by the adjudicator, the adjudicator may also consider his or
her own recorded observations of the individual as part of the overall evaluation of the credibility
of the individual’s statements.”).
The ALJ articulated sufficient reasoning and relied upon proper factors in determining
that, overall, Plaintiff’s testimony was not fully credible. Furthermore, the court concludes that
the ALJ’s determination is “closely and affirmatively linked to substantial evidence.” Kepler, 68
17
See Tr. 169-81, 608.
18
See Tr. 670.
12
F.3d at 391 (quotations and citation omitted). Accordingly, the court concludes that the ALJ did
not err in reaching her determination about Plaintiff’s credibility.
IV. Lay Witness
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to consider Plaintiff’s husband’s lay witness
statement. Because the lay witness statement was not specifically mentioned in the ALJ’s
decision, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ gave the statement “no consideration whatsoever” and
“never even acknowledged its existence.”19 Plaintiff’s husband’s statement, which was
submitted in the form of a letter, contains Plaintiff’s husband’s opinions about Plaintiff’s
limitations.20
Plaintiff has failed to persuade the court that the ALJ did not consider Plaintiff’s
husband’s lay witness statement, even though it was not specifically referenced in the ALJ’s
decision. The ALJ specifically stated in her decision that she had considered all of the record
evidence.21 See Flaherty v. Astrue, 515 F.3d 1067, 1071 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[O]ur general
practice, which we see no reason to depart from here, is to take a lower tribunal at its word when
it declares that it has considered a matter.” (alteration in original) (quotations and citation
omitted)). Furthermore, the ALJ’s decision contains an extensive discussion of the evidence and
demonstrates that the ALJ considered all of Plaintiff’s impairments and limitations. See id. In
19
Docket no. 14 at 21.
20
See Tr. 236.
21
See Tr. 14.
13
addition, the court notes that the ALJ is not required to discuss every piece of evidence in the
record. See, e.g., Clifton v. Chater, 79 F.3d 1007, 1009-10 (10th Cir. 1996) (“The record must
demonstrate that the ALJ considered all of the evidence, but an ALJ is not required to discuss
every piece of evidence.”).
For these reasons, the court concludes that the ALJ did not err in her consideration of
Plaintiff’s husband’s lay witness statement.
V. Step Four
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in conducting the analysis at step four of the sequential
evaluation process. At step four of her decision, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff could return to
her past relevant work as a photocopy machine operator. In addition, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff
could perform a significant number of other jobs in the national economy, including those of a
parking lot attendant, a ticket seller, and a call-out operator.
In order for an ALJ’s determination that a claimant can perform his past relevant work to
be proper, the ALJ’s decision must contain the following findings of fact:
1.
2.
3.
A finding of fact as to the individual’s RFC.
A finding of fact as to the physical and mental
demands of the past job/occupation.
A finding of fact that the individual’s RFC would
permit a return to his or her past job or occupation.
SSR 82-62; see also Winfrey v. Chater, 92 F.3d 1017, 1023-26 (10th Cir. 1996).
With respect to the first finding, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to
incorporate into Plaintiff’s RFC the limitations expressed by Dr. Hall and Dr. Charlat. The court
rejected that argument above and rejects it again here. The ALJ did not err in her treatment of
14
the opinions of Dr. Hall and Dr. Charlat. Accordingly, the ALJ was not required to include the
limitations expressed by those doctors in Plaintiff’s RFC.
As for the second finding, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred by concluding that the job
of photocopy machine operator qualifies as past relevant work because there is no evidence
demonstrating that Plaintiff could perform that work. In response, the Commissioner correctly
notes that Plaintiff’s own paperwork submitted in connection with her DIB application indicates
that she performed the job of a night operations manager at a print and copy store, which
included the duties required of a photocopy machine operator.22 In her reply, Plaintiff argues that
because the job of night operations manager requires exertional and skill levels that are greater
than those required for a photocopy machine operator, there is no evidence in the record
establishing that Plaintiff could perform the job of a photocopy machine operator. The court
concludes that Plaintiff’s arguments are without merit. Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, there is
evidence in the record, as noted above, that establishes that Plaintiff had performed past relevant
work that encompassed the duties of a photocopy machine operator. Further, Plaintiff’s
argument in her reply brief is illogical. If Plaintiff had the ability to perform the job of a night
operations manager at higher skill and exertional levels, it logically follows that she had the
ability to perform the job of photocopy machine operator at reduced skill and exertional levels.
Concerning the second and third findings, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred by failing to
satisfy her burden under SSR 82-62 to make those findings. The court disagrees. The ALJ
22
See Tr. 180, 197.
15
considered the testimony of the VE, which included a description of the exertional level and skill
requirements for the relevant jobs.23 The ALJ also noted that the VE reduced the number of the
jobs in the national economy to accommodate for a sit/stand option.24 After obtaining that
testimony, the ALJ posed a hypothetical question to the VE that required consideration of the
exertional and skill level demands of the relevant jobs. Based on the VE’s response to the
hypothetical question, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s past work did not require demands in
excess of her RFC. That analysis was sufficient. See, e.g., Doyal v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 758,
760-61 (10th Cir. 2003); see also Jordan v. Barnhart, 213 Fed App’x 643, 646 (10th Cir. 2006)
(unpublished).
With respect to the third finding, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by relying on the
VE’s testimony because the hypothetical posed to the VE did not include the limitations
expressed by Dr. Hall and Dr. Charlat. Again, the court has already rejected that argument and
rejects it again here.
As a final matter on this issue, the court notes that harmless error is an alternative ground
for determining that the ALJ did not err at step four. In addition to determining that Plaintiff
could return to her past relevant work as a photocopy machine operator, the ALJ noted that
Plaintiff could perform a significant number of other jobs in the national economy, including
those of a parking lot attendant, a ticket seller, and a call-out operator. As such, any errors that
23
See Tr. 23, 66-68.
24
See Tr. 23.
16
the ALJ may have committed concerning Plaintiff’s ability to return to her past relevant work as
a photocopy machine operator were harmless. See Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009)
(“[T]he burden of showing that an error is harmful normally falls upon the party attacking the
agency’s determination.”); see also Fischer-Ross, 431 F.3d at 733-34 (recognizing applicability
of harmless error analysis in Social Security context).
Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that the ALJ did not err in her analysis at step
four of the sequential evaluation process.
VI. Step Five
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred at step five of the sequential evaluation
process by giving a hypothetical to the VE that did not reflect all of Plaintiff’s limitations.
Plaintiff again asserts that the hypothetical given to the VE should have included the limitations
expressed by Dr. Hall and Dr. Charlat. That argument fails. Again, the court has already
concluded that the ALJ did not err in his treatment of Dr. Hall’s and Dr. Charlat’s opinions.
Accordingly, the ALJ was not required to include the limitations expressed by those two doctors
in the hypothetical provided to the VE. See Qualls, 206 F.3d at 1373 (“The ALJ propounded a
hypothetical question to the VE that included all the limitations the ALJ ultimately included in
his RFC assessment. Therefore, the VE’s answer to that question provided a proper basis for the
ALJ’s disability decision.”).
17
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
The court concludes that all of Plaintiff’s arguments fail. Therefore, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED that the Commissioner’s decision in this case is AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 19th day of March, 2012.
BY THE COURT:
PAUL M. WARNER
United States Magistrate Judge
18
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