Ball et al v. Division of Child and Family Services et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM DECISION granting 46 Motion to Dismiss. Accordingly, Plaintiffs claims against the Carper Defendants are dismissed because the Carper Defendants were notacting under color of state law. Alternatively, even if the CarperDefendants were state actors, the Court Plaintiffs claims would failbased on the doctrine of qualified immunity. See order for further details. Signed by Judge David Sam on 6/14/12. (jmr)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
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JAMES BALL and SARAH BALL,
individually and on behalf
of J.B.,
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
Case No. 1:11CV00028 DS
MEMORANDUM DECISION
vs.
)
)
DIVISION OF CHILD AND FAMILY
SERVICES, DAVIS COUNTY,
MARIBETH MAYFIELD, HEATHER
BAKER, ROSIE HOLMES, DANNY
THOMAS, JOSEPH LEIKER, DEANN
TAYLOR, MARK ROBERTSON, JOANN
CARTER, TEENA CARPER, SCOTT
CARPER, and DOES 1-10,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Statement of Facts
Defendants Teena Carper, Scott Carper, and Joann Carper (“the
Carper Defendants”) submit a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims.
Plaintiffs seek to recover damages from the Carper Defendants
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violation of Plaintiffs’ civil rights.
See Pl.’s Am. Compl. ¶ 3.
Plaintiffs’ complaint asserts a single
cause of action against the Carper Defendants for depriving the
Plaintiffs “of their rights under the United States Constitution to
the familial love, society and companionship of their daughter, and
did intend to deprive the Balls of their rights of association,
without substantive due process required by state statutes and
protected by the substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”
Id. at ¶ 59.
Plaintiffs’ complaint also presents causes
of action against the Utah State Department of Child and Family
Services (“DCFS”), Davis County, and certain individuals working for
the aforementioned organizations, generally asserting that they failed
to act reasonably in conducting their investigations.
See Pl.’s Am.
Compl.
Plaintiffs assert that in August 2009, Teena Carper, Scott
Carper, and Joann Carper, sought to remove J.B. from the custody and
care of her parents, Plaintiffs James and Sara Ball.
Joann Carper is Sarah Ball’s biological mother.
Carper is Sarah Ball’s sister-in-law.
Ball’s brother-in-law.
Id.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 31.
Id. at ¶ 32.
Teena
Scott Carper is Sarah
Plaintiffs claim that the Carper
Defendants improperly attempted to remove J.B. from her parents’
custody and care by making reports to the Utah Division of Child and
Family Safety (“DCFS”) and to the Davis County Sherriff’s office.
at ¶ 31.
Id.
The Plaintiffs believe the Carpers sought to remove the
child because of the Plaintiffs’ decision to raise their child in a
different religion than that of the Carpers.
Id. at ¶ 33.
It is
alleged that Teena and Joann went to Beth Mayfield, a DCFS employee,
“in an effort to spearhead the operation through DCFS.”
Id. at ¶ 35.
Prior to this, Joann was working on an action against James with
numerous police reports to the Davis County Sheriff.
Id.
The
Plaintiffs also believe “Joann Carper used her close relationship with
the Mayor of Bountiful in a smear campaign against James Ball.”
Id.
DCFS and Child Protective Services conducted an investigation as
to the safety of J.B. in the Plaintiffs’ custody.
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Specifically, the
DCFS investigated the possibility of prior cohabitant abuse by James
Ball.
Id. at ¶ 39.
DCFS case workers visited the Plaintiffs’
residence and met with Sara Ball.
Id. at ¶ 40.
interactions of the Ball’s and their child.
DCFS observed the
Id. at ¶¶ 46-47.
DCFS
representatives communicated with counselors at Davis Behavioral
Health regarding the assessment of James Ball and a treatment plan.
Id. at ¶ 50.
The Carper Defendants deny that they conspired in any way to harm
the Plaintiffs or deprive them of any constitutional right.
The
Carper Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs’ claim is deficient
because first, the Carper Defendants are not state actors; and second,
even if they were state actors, the Carper Defendants are protected by
the doctrine of qualified immunity.1
The Court agrees.
Applicable Law/Analysis
I.
State Actor Test
To prevail on a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 a
plaintiff must prove first, that they have been deprived of a federal
right, and second, that the deprivation was caused by a person acting
under color of state law.
(10th Cir. 2002).
See Johnson v. Rodrigues, 293 F.3d 1196
A private citizen’s conduct constitutes state
action only if that person “may fairly be said to be a state actor.”
Id.; citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
A
private actor becomes a state actor if one of four tests is satisfied:
(A) the public function test, (B) the nexus test, (C) the symbiotic
1
The court previously issued a memorandum
defendants based on qualified immunity.
3
decision dismissing
all state
relationship test, and/or (D) the joint action test.
See Johnson 293
F.3d at 1202.
Under the public function test, a private party becomes a state
actor if he/she performs a function that is generally exclusively
performed by the state itself.
Id. at 1203.
To qualify as an actor
under the nexus test a private party must demonstrate “a close nexus
between the government and the challenged conduct” such that a private
person’s conduct “may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.”
Id.
“Under the . . . symbiotic relationship test, the state must have
so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with [the]
private party” that it and the private party are recognized as joint
participants.
Id. at 1204.
Lastly, the joint action test is
satisfied if the private person is a willful participant in joint
action with the state.
Generally this is acquired through a
“substantial degree of cooperative action between the State and
private [person].”
Id. at 1205.
Under the joint action test, courts
examine whether state officials and private parties have acted in
concert in effecting a particular deprivation of constitutional
rights.
Gallagher v. Neil Young Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d 1442, 1454
(10th Cir. Utah 1995).
I.
The Carper Defendants are not state actors.
The existing law provides that, in general, private persons do
not become state actors when they report problems or concerns to
appropriate state agencies.
See Brown, 291 F.3d 89 (1st Cir. 2002).
The Tenth Circuit has also recurrently concluded that citizens who
make reports to the police are not state actors.
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See Lee v. Town of
Estes Park, 820 F.2d 1112 (10th Cir. 1987).
In addition, DCFS has
been found to act independently when completing investigations, and
making custody determinations.
See Weaver v. State of Utah, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 69746 (D. Utah 2008).
Because private citizens are not
generally considered state actors, the claimant must satisfy one of
the four state actor tests.
A. The Carper Defendants are not state actors under the public
function test.
By reporting their concerns to DCFS, the Carper Defendants did
not perform a function generally exclusively performed by the state.
The state encourages and should continue to support private
individuals in reporting potential dangers and crimes to appropriate
organizations.
The Plaintiffs have not offered any evidence to
convince the Court that the state conferred its authority to
investigate custody and parental rights issues on the Carper
Defendants.
B. The Carper Defendants are not state actors under the nexus
test.
Plaintiffs’ complaint does not present any allegation that DCFS
or any other state authority exercised coercive power over the Carper
Defendants or that the state provided significant encouragement to the
Carper Defendants during the course of the investigation.
C. The Carper Defendants are not state actors under the symbiotic
relationship test.
The Carper Defendants and the DCFS are not recognized as joint
participants.
The contact between DCFS and the Carper Defendants was
casual and independent.
The Carper Defendants provided a report to
DCFS, upon which the DCFS commenced its own investigation.
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The Carper
Defendants did not maintain an ongoing relationship with DCFS after
the submission of their report.
There are no factual allegations
present which indicate that the DCFS relied upon the Carper Defendants
to perform investigative functions.
D. The Carper Defendants are not state actors under the joint
action test.
Plaintiffs argue that the Carper Defendants are private actors
who have become state actors under the joint action test because they
acted in concert in effecting a particular deprivation of
constitutional rights.
However, the joint action test requires a
substantial degree of cooperative action between the private person
and the state.
The conduct of the Carper Defendants is independent
and separate from the conduct of the DCFS.
The complaint does not
present factual allegations to establish that the Carper Defendants
were involved in conducting the investigation or that DCFS gave the
Carper Defendants subsequent assignments.
As set forth in the analysis above, the Carper Defendants are not
state actors under the public function test, the nexus test, the
symbiotic relationship test, and/or the joint action test.
II. The Doctrine of Qualified Immunity
Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, state actors are immune
from suit if the alleged wrongful conduct does not violate clearly
established law.
See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
Federal law is clearly established when there is a Supreme Court or
Tenth Circuit decision on point or where the weight of authority from
other jurisdictions provides clarity concerning the status of the law
in a particular context.
See William v. City of Denver, 99 F.3d 1009,
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1020 (10th Cir. 1996).
The Tenth Circuit has held that qualified
immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who
knowingly violate the law.”
(10th Cir. 2001).
Gross v. Pirtle, 245 F.3d 1151, 1155
Qualified immunity may be denied, “only if, on an
objective basis, it is obvious that no reasonably competent [official]
would have concluded that the actions were constitutional.”
Wood, 451 F.3d 1122, 1134 (10th Cir. 2006).
Gomes v.
Once a defendant raises
the issue of qualified immunity the burden shifts to the plaintiff to
demonstrate that the defendant is not entitled to the immunity.
Akins v. Rodriquez, 59 F.3d 1034 (10th Cir. 1995).
See
“Unless the
plaintiff’s allegations state a claim of violation of clearly
established law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled
to dismissal before the commencement of discovery.”
Mitchell v.
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 26 (1985).
II. Even if the Carper Defendants were state actors, the Court
dismisses Plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to the Doctrine of Qualified
Immunity.
Even if the Carper Defendants were state actors, they are
entitled to the protections provided by the doctrine of qualified
immunity.
The Plaintiffs do not provide any cases to indicate that an
actor violates clearly established law by reporting suspected abuse or
danger to the relevant state authorities.
The Carper Defendants
report of suspected abuse to DCFS is not a sufficient basis for a
civil rights action.
Individuals should be encouraged to report
concerns and dangers to the proper authorities.
These reports ensure
investigation by relevant authorities specialized in resolving
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problems and dangers before they compound.
Conclusion
The Court finds, based on the factual allegations in the
Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, that none of the Carper Defendants
committed a constitutional violation.
The Carper Defendants took
reasonable precautions as private parties to report a case of possible
child abuse to the DCFS.
Furthermore, there is no factual basis to
illustrate that the Carper Defendants continued to participate in the
investigation jointly with the DCFS.
Rather, the facts indicate that
the DCFS took the sole and primary responsibility for conducting the
investigation itself.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claims against the
Carper Defendants are dismissed because the Carper Defendants were not
acting under color of state law.
Alternatively, even if the Carper
Defendants were state actors, the Court Plaintiffs’ claims would fail
based on the doctrine of qualified immunity.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 14th day of June,2012.
BY THE COURT:
DAVID SAM
SENIOR JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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