Yanez v. Richardson et al

Filing 34

MEMORANDUM DECISION and ORDER granting 27 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Ted Stewart on 10/1/2014. (blh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
AURORA LAUREL “LAURIE” YANEZ,
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
v.
DAVIS COUNTY,

Case No. 1:12-CV-200 TS
Defendant.

District Judge Ted Stewart

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 1 For the
reasons discussed below, the Court will grant Defendant’s Motion.
I. BACKGROUND
On August 12, 2010, Davis County correctional officers locked Plaintiff in a holding cell
with several male inmates. Plaintiff was the only female in the cell. While Plaintiff was in the
cell, at least one of the male inmates urinated in the cell. Later that day or the following day,
Plaintiff filled out a complaint form, detailing her grievances about being held in a cell with male
inmates. After Plaintiff completed the form, a correctional officer called Plaintiff a liar in front
of several female inmates. Finally, when correctional officers questioned Plaintiff, the officers
acted rudely and made light of Plaintiff’s complaint.
On May 6, 2013, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint asserting the following claims
against Defendant Davis County (the “County”): (1) cruel and unusual punishment, in violation
of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) cruel
1

Docket No. 27.

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and unusual punishment, in violation of Article I, section 9 of the Utah Constitution; (3) denial of
the right to petition the government and seek redress for grievances, in violation of the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, or alternatively, cruel and unusual punishment based on the
County’s retaliation against Plaintiff for engaging in protected activity, in violation of the Eighth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, brought under § 1983; and (4) denial of the right to protest
wrongs and petition for redress of grievances, in violation of Article I, section 1 of the Utah
Constitution.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 2 In considering
whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists, the Court determines whether a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party in the face of all the evidence presented. 3 The
Court is required to construe all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. 4 “[T]here is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the
nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.” 5 “If the burden of persuasion at
trial would be on the non-moving party, . . . the moving party may demonstrate to the Court that
the nonmoving party’s evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of the
2

Fed R. Civ. P. 56(a).

3

See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Clifton v. Craig, 924
F.2d 182, 183 (10th Cir. 1991).
4

See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986);
Wright v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 925 F.2d 1288, 1292 (10th Cir. 1991).
5

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.

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nonmoving party’s claim.” 6 “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the
[nonmoving party’s] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could
reasonably find for the [nonmoving party].” 7
III. DISCUSSION
Defendant moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s two § 1983 claims. Defendant
argues that Plaintiff has failed to present evidence that the correctional officers acted according
to an official County policy or that Plaintiff suffered a violation of her constitutional rights.
Plaintiff argues that the undisputed facts raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence
of a custom or practice of deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of inmates.
“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by
the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.” 8 The Tenth Circuit has explained that
§ 1983 claims based on municipal liability involve the following three elements: “(1) official
policy or custom, (2) causation, and (3) state of mind.” 9

6

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 331 (1986).

7

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.

8

West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299,
326 (1941)).
9

Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police Dep’t, 717 F.3d 760, 769 (10th Cir. 2003).

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Plaintiff must show the existence of an official policy or custom “to distinguish acts of
the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality.” 10 Municipal policies or customs
include the following:
(1) a formal regulation or policy statement; (2) an informal custom amounting to a
widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law or express
municipal policy, is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or
usage with the force of law; (3) the decisions of employees with final
policymaking authority; (4) the ratification of such final policymakers of the
decisions—and the basis for them—of subordinates to whom authority was
delegated subject to these policymakers’ review and approval; or (5) the failure to
adequately train or supervise employees, so long as that failure results from
deliberate indifference to the injuries that may be caused. 11
Plaintiff has not provided evidence demonstrating that the correctional officers acted
according to a custom or practice that is so widespread that it can be considered a well-settled
custom with the force of law, or that the correctional officers’ conduct was the result of
inadequate training or supervision. Instead, Plaintiff has only presented evidence of the
correctional officers’ conduct in this one instance. In fact, Plaintiff concedes that she has “not
adduced any evidence beyond what she has alleged happened to her (in her Amended Complaint)
by which she can seek to hold Davis County liable.” 12 This mere scintilla of evidence is
insufficient to establish the first element of both of Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims. Based on the
foregoing, the Court will grant summary judgment to Defendant on Plaintiff’s two § 1983
claims.
10

Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986).

11

Bryson v. City of Okla. City, 627 F.3d 784, 788 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting BrammerHoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 602 F.3d 1175, 1189–90 (10th Cir. 2010)) (internal
quotation marks and alteration omitted).
12

Docket No. 31, at 5.

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Defendant also argues that, if summary judgment is granted to Defendant as to the § 1983
claims, then the two remaining state-law claims should be dismissed without prejudice for lack
of jurisdiction. Plaintiff does not oppose this argument.
Under United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 13 “a federal court can retain jurisdiction following
dismissal of all federal claims if the remaining state claims derive from the same common
nucleus of operative facts and a plaintiff would ordinarily be expected to try all of them in one
proceeding.” 14 However, “[e]ven where a ‘common nucleus of operative fact’ exists, federal
jurisdiction is not mandatory over pendent claims or parties.” 15 Federal district courts may
decline supplemental jurisdiction in certain situations, including when “the claim raises a novel
or complex issue of State law, [or] . . . the claim substantially predominates over the claim or
claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction.” 16 “[T]he Supreme Court
repeatedly has determined that supplemental jurisdiction is not a matter of the litigants’ right, but
of judicial discretion.” 17 Because Plaintiff does not oppose Defendant’s argument for dismissing
the remaining state-law claims in this case, and the claims involve complex issues of state law,
the Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

13

383 U.S. 715 (1966).

14

Bank of Okla., N.A., Grove Branch v. Islands Marina, Ltd., 918 F.2d 1476, 1479–80
(10th Cir. 1990) (citing Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725).
15

Estate of Harshman v. Jackson Hole Mountain Resort Corp., 379 F.3d 1161, 1165
(10th Cir. 2004).
16

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (2012).

17

Estate of Harshman, 379 F.3d at 1165 (citing City of Chi. v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons,
522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997); Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726).

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IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby
ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 27) is
GRANTED.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendant and against
Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s federal-law claims. Plaintiff’s state-law claims are dismissed without
prejudice. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case forthwith.
DATED this 1st day of October, 2014.
BY THE COURT:

Ted Stewart
United States District Judge

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