Beckstrom v. USA

Filing 59

MEMORANDUM DECISION granting 40 Motion to Strike 23 Notice of Filing; denying 45 Motion to Amend/Correct Petition. Signed by Magistrate Judge Brooke C. Wells on 3/27/14 (alt)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, NORTHERN DIVISION
KIM DAVIS BECKSTROM,
Petitioner,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
GRANTING MOTION TO STRIKE AND
DENYING MOTION TO AMEND

v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant.

Case No. 1:12-cv-226 TC
District Judge Tena Campbell
Magistrate Judge Brooke Wells

Before the Court are two related motions. First, Defendant moves to strike Petitioner’s
pleading entitled Amended Claims Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 1 “because it was filed contrary
to the federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” 2 Second, in response to Defendant’s Motion to Strike,
Petitioner has filed a Motion to Amend the petition pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
Rule 15. 3 The Court heard argument on the motions on Tuesday March 25, 2014. Petitioner was
present and represented by Robert Breeze. Defendant was represented by Jeannette Swent.
Having considered the parties’ arguments, memoranda, and relevant case law, the Court enters
the following order GRANTING Defendant’s Motion to Strike and Denying Petitioner’s Motion
to Amend.

1

Docket no. 23.

2

Mtn. p. 1, docket no. 40.

3

Docket no. 45; Fed. R. Civ. P. 15.

BACKGROUND
Petitioner, Kim Davis Beckstrom, filed a pro se motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate,
set aside, or correct sentence by a person in federal custody (2255 motion) on October 22, 2012. 4
Petitioner argued in the motion that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based upon an
alleged failure to properly advise him of a plea offer before the Court excluded Beckstrom’s
duress defense. 5 The Government filed a court ordered response on December 10, 2012. 6 In
January 2014, the Court appointed counsel for Beckstrom. 7
On January 22, 2014, Petitioner filed “Amended Claims Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255.” 8
Petitioner sought to add the following claims in addition to his original ineffective assistance of
counsel claim: (1) failure of his trial counsel to move for appointment of new counsel after
Petitioner requested new counsel; (2) failure to request a trial continuance; (3) failure to advise
the Court that Petitioner had requested new counsel; and (4) disclosing confidential attorneyclient communications in an email to the prosecutor on September 8, 2010. 9 Beckstrom bases
these new claims on an email message attached to his motion.10 Petitioner’s counsel failed to
seek the consent of the Government and the Court in filing the amended pleadings and the instant
motions followed.

4

Docket no. 1, 2255 Motion.

5

See id. at 5; appendix A, docket no. 1-1 ¶¶2-3.

6

Docket no. 4.

7

Docket no. 14.

8

Docket no. 23.

9

Id. at p. 1-2.

10

Docket no. 23-1.

2

DISCUSSION
Rule 15(a)(2) provides that “a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing
party’s written consent or the court’s leave.” 11 The United States argues that Petitioner’s
amended claims should be stricken because they were filed more than a year from the
Government’s response and because Beckstrom failed to comply with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15(a)(2). Petitioner admits that he failed to comply with Rule 15 and argues that the
Court should overlook his technical violation and allow the amendment. In response to the
Government’s motion, Petitioner has filed a Motion to Amend pursuant to Rule 15. 12
The parties also disagree regarding the interpretation of Rule 15’s relation back
provision. Rule 15 “provides that pleading amendments relate back to the date of the original
pleading when the claim asserted in the amended plea ‘arose out of the conduct, transaction, or
occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading.’” 13 Petitioner asserts
that his new claims are timely and relate back to his original pleading. In contrast, the
Government argues that the four new claims are untimely because they do not relate back to the
date of the original pleading. This case turns on the meaning of Rule 15’s relation back
provision in the context of 2255 proceedings, the applicable one year statute of limitations and
on the interpretation of the standard set forth in the Supreme Court’s decision found in Mayle v.
Felix. 14 Petitioner argues for a broader interpretation of the holding in Mayle while the
Government argues for a more narrow interpretation of Mayle that is consistent with the Tenth
Circuit’s holding in Untied States v. Espinoza-Saenz. 15
11

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).

12

Docket no. 45.

13

Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 656 (2005).

14

Id.

15

235 F.3d 501 (10th Cir. 2000).

3

In Mayle, the petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner’s motion to amend
the petition to add new claims was denied initially, but subsequently allowed by the Ninth
Circuit. The Supreme Court analyzed the petitioner’s motion under Rule 15’s “relation-back
provision in the context of federal habeas proceedings and [the requisite] one-year statute of
limitations.”16 The Supreme Court stated that the key words in interpreting Rule 15’s relation
back provision are “conduct, transaction, or occurrence.” The Court noted the split in the federal
circuits between those that interpreted these words “to allow relation back of a claim first
asserted in an amended petition, so long as the new claim stems from the habeas petitioner’s
trial, conviction, or sentence.” 17 And those that took a more restrictive approach allowing
“relation back only when the claims added by amendment arise from the same core facts as the
timely filed claims, and not when the new claims depend upon events separate in ‘both time and
type’ from the originally raised episodes.” 18
The Court then went on to reject the comprehensive definition and instead adopted a
more restrictive definition that is “mindful of ‘Congress’ decision to expedite collateral attacks
by placing stringent time restrictions on them.’” 19 The Court held that an amended habeas
petition does not relate back “when it asserts a new ground for relief supported by facts that
differ in both time and type from those the original pleading set forth.” 20
Of particular importance to the instant matter is that in Mayle, the Supreme Court sided
with the Tenth Circuit’s restrictive definition of “conduct, transaction, or occurrence” as set forth

16

545 U.S. at 656.

17

Id.

18

Id. at 657.

19

Id. at 657 (quoting United States v. Hicks, 283 F.3d 380, 388 (C.A.D.C. 2002)).

20

Id. at 650.

4

in Untied States v. Espinoza-Saenz. 21 In Espinoza-Saenz the defendant’s supplemental motion to
amend his 2255 petition was filed two months after the one year statute of limitations and raised
new claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 22 The Espinoza-Saenz court analyzed cases
from other circuits that dealt with the intersection of Rule 15 and an untimely amendment to a
2255 petition. 23 Ultimately the Tenth Circuit adopted a restrictive approach. The court
concluded that an untimely amendment may relate back if it “clarifies or amplifies a claim or
theory” in the original motion. 24 The court held that the petitioner’s motion to amend was
untimely because it did not relate back to the original timely filed motion, where it raised
completely new claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 25
Here, Petitioner sought to amend his 2255 petition on January 22, 2014, more than a year
from both his original filing and the Government’s response. During oral argument Petitioner
argued that his filing was within the statute of limitations asserting that he did not learn of the
new claims until February 2014 when the email was discovered. 26 The Court, however, is not
convinced because each of Petitioner’s new claims was readily discoverable during trial. For
example, it would have been clear that a trial continuance was not granted and that trial counsel
did not move for new counsel because there was no ruling on any such motion. Thus, the Court
finds this case analogous to Espinoza-Saenz.
In Espinoza-Saenz the court specifically rejected new claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel asserted after the expiration of the one-year limitations period under the Antiterrorism
21

235 F.3d 501 (10th Cir. 2000); see Mayle, 545 U.S. at 657 (citing to the more restrictive definition found in
Espinoza-Saenz).
22

Id. at 505.

23

Id. at 504-505.

24

Id.

25

Id. at 505.

26

Mtn. to amend p. 2.

5

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). In doing so the court specifically noted the
reasoning behind its holding was “because a majority of amendments to § 2255 motions raise
issues which relate to a defendant's trial and sentencing [and] to allow amendment under that
broad umbrella would be tantamount to judicial rescission of AEDPA's statute of limitations
period.” 27 Contrary to Petitioner’s arguments, Mayle did not change this restricted approach to
the intersection between Rule 15 and 2255 motions. Instead the Mayle court specifically adopted
a restricted approach that prohibited new claims “that differ in both time and type from those the
original pleading set forth.” 28 Here, Petitioner raises new claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel that were not filed in his original motion. Further, they differ in time and the Court
declines to allow an amendment under a broad umbrella of events related to trial. 29 Accordingly,
under Mayle and Espinoza-Saenz the relation back provision of Rule 15 cannot be applied to
save Petitioner’s new ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
Finally, the Court is not persuaded by Petitioner’s remaining arguments including
equitable tolling to permit the amendment. The Court declines to overlook a “technical
violation” of Rule 15 or adopt Petitioner’s lenient Rule 15 standard as set forth in patent cases. 30

27

Espinoza-Saenz, 235 F.3d at 505.

28

Mayle, 545 U.S. at 650.

29

Espinoza-Saenz, 235 F.3d at 505.

30

Petitioner cites to Kimberly Clark Worldwide v. First Quality, 757 F.Supp.2d 520 (M.D.Pa. 2010), the Court finds
this case irrelevant because it does not deal with the intersection of Rule 15 and 2255.

6

CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Based upon the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the United States’ Motion to
Strike and DENIES Petitioner’s Motion to Amend.

DATED this 27 March 2014.

Brooke C. Wells
United States Magistrate Judge

7