Department of Workforce Services v. Geddes et al

Filing 5

MEMORANDUM DECISION granting 2 Motion to Remand to State Court. Signed by Judge Ted Stewart on 4/4/13. (ss)

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE
SERVICES,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
REMAND

v.

DERALD WILFORD GEDDES, MOUNT
OGDEN DENTAL, P.C.,

Case No. 2:13-CV-24 TS

Defendants.

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Utah Department of Workforce Services
Motion to Remand to State Court. For the reasons discussed more fully below, the Court will
grant Plaintiff’s Motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, in an effort to properly administer Utah’s unemployment insurance fund,
commenced an investigation of Mount Ogden Dental P.C., a Utah corporation, and Derald
Wilford Geddes. As part of their investigation, Plaintiff served Defendants with a subpoena for
business records on August 1, 2012. The Second District Court signed an Order Enforcing
Subpoena, and later an Order to Show Cause for failure to obey a lawful order of the court. A
1

hearing in state court was scheduled for February 6, 2013, and Defendants filed a Notice of
Removal with this Court on February 1, 2013.
Defendant Geddes states that he is a direct descendant of Nathaniel Hatch, who was a
citizen of “the Commonwealth of Massachusetts at the time of its inception.”1 As such, he
argues that by “birthright” he is a sovereign unto himself, and therefore claims sovereign
immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”).2 Defendant Geddes also
argues that, as a sovereign citizen, he is a foreign state and entitled to remove any pending state
action to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d). Plaintiff submits that remand to state court is
warranted because Defendants have not demonstrated that they are a foreign state as defined in
28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) and, therefore, their request for removal under 28 U.S.C § 1441(d) is
without merit.
II. DISCUSSION
The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction rests with the party seeking removal.3 The
Tenth Circuit has stated that “there is a presumption against removal jurisdiction.”4 Further,
“[r]emoval statutes are to be strictly construed . . . and all doubts are to be resolved against

1

Docket No. 1, at 1.

2

See id. at 2.

3

Capital One Bank v. Glavin, 2011 WL 1211512, at 1* (W.D. Wis. Mar. 31, 2011)
(quoting Doe v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 985 F.2d 908, 911 (7th Cir. 1992); Illinois v. Kerr-McGee
Chem. Corp., 677 F.2d 571, 576 (7th Cir. 1982)).
4

Laughlin v. Kmart Corp., 50 F.3d 871, 873 (10th Cir. 1995).
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removal.”5 An action may be removed to federal court if it involves a federal question,6 or if
diversity of citizenship exists between the parties and the amount of controversy is more than
$75,000.7
Diversity may be claimed between: “(1) citizens of different States; (2) citizens of a State
and citizens or subjects of a foreign state . . . (3) citizens of different states and in which citizens
or subjects of a foreign state are additional parties; and (4) or a foreign state . . . as plaintiff and
citizens of a State.”8 A foreign state includes:
(a) . . . a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of
a foreign state . . . (b) An “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state” means an
entity-(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and (2) which
is an organ of a foreign state . . . (3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the
United States, nor created under the laws of any third country.9
Applying this standard, the Court finds that Defendants have failed to meet their burden
to establish federal jurisdiction. First, this case does not meet the amount in controversy
requirement. Defendant offers no evidence that the amount in controversy in the administrative
action with Plaintiff exceeds the $75,000 required by 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
Second, Defendants do not qualify for diversity of citizenship. Mount Ogden Dental P.C.
is a Utah corporation. Therefore, there is no diversity as to that entity. Defendant Geddes does
not claim that he is domiciled or that his principal place of business is in another state, or that he

5

Fajen v. Found. Reserve Ins. Co., 683 F.2d 331, 333 (10th Cir. 1982).

6

28 U.S.C. § 1331.

7

Id. § 1332(a).

8

Id. § 1332(a)(1)-(4).

9

Id. § 1603(a)(1)-(3).
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has citizenship in a foreign state. Instead, he claims that because he is “one of the direct posterity
of the original sovereign American people” that he is “one of the sovereign American people by
Inheritance of Birthright,” and therefore a foreign state unto himself.10
“This ‘sovereign citizen’ argument has been rejected repeatedly by courts.”11 Like others
who have made this type of argument before this Court, Defendant has “proffered numerous
quotations from judicial opinions . . . as well as law dictionaries” weaving a “rambling and
circuitous dissertation, rich in sweeping abstractions phrased in oft-capitalized and abstruse
legalistic prose.”12
Simply by “labeling one’s self as a ‘Sovereign Citizen’” an individual does not immunize
himself from the jurisdiction of the state or federal courts.13 “Jurisdiction is a matter of law,
statute, and constitution, not a child’s game wherein one’s power is magnified or diminished by
the display of some magic talisman or by the use of special seals . . . or by the recitals of Special
Words, Phrases or Arcane Incantations.”14 Even though Defendant Geddes may hold a “sincere
belief” that he is “an alien beyond the jurisdictional reach” of the courts, he is “simply wrong.”15

10

Docket No. 1, Exhibit C, at 1.

11

Capital One, 2011 WL 1211512 at *1.

12

Richmond v. Wampanoag Tribal Court Cases, 431 F. Supp.2d 1159, 1161 (D. Utah

13

Id. at 1182.

14

Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).

15

United States v. Hilgeford, 7 F.3d 1340, 1342 (7th Cir. 1993).

2006).

4

Courts have routinely found the sovereign citizen argument as “completely without merit” and
“patently frivolous.”16
In short, Defendants have not shown that their claim meets the amount in controversy,
nor are they diverse. Therefore, Defendants have failed to meet their burden and the Court will
grant Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand to State Court.
In addition, though not discussed by the parties, the Court would note that its conclusion
is supported by the doctrine set out in Younger, which, in any event, would mandate abstention in
this case.17
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand to State Court (Docket No. 2) is
GRANTED.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to remand this case to the Second Judicial District
Court of Weber County, State of Utah.
DATED April 4, 2013.
BY THE COURT:

_____________________________________
TED STEWART
United States District Judge

16

Id. (quoting United States v. Jagim, 978 F.2d 1032, 1036 (8th Cir. 1992)).

17

See iMergent, Inc. v. Giani, 2007 WL 895128 at *4 (D. Utah); Sammons Transp. Inc. v.
Warmington, 2008 WL 314680 at *1 (D. Utah).
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