Christensen v. State of Utah

Filing 3

MEMORANDUM DECISION and Order-Absent subject matter jurisdiction, Mr. Christensen's Petition must be dismissed. Signed by Judge David Sam on 7/19/13. (jmr)

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
NORTHERN DIVISION
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
REED K. CHRISTENSEN, next
)
Case No. 1:13CV00093 DS
friend of persons under 18
years of age; A.C., L.C. , and )
R.C.,
)
Petitioner,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
vs.
)
AND ORDER
STATE OF UTAH,
)
Respondent.

)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
I.

INTRODUCTION

Reed K. Christensen, proceeding pro se, has filed a Petition
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for writ of habeas corpus by a person
in state custody.

Although the Petition is couched in terms of

addressing the rights of three referenced minor children, the
essence of it is that the State of Utah improperly terminated Mr.
Christensen’s parental rights with regard to those three minor
children in

violation

of his

rights

under

the

United States

Constitution.1

1

Prior to filing this action Mr. Christensen appealed the
lower court decision to both the Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah
Supreme Court which denied relief.

II.

Discussion

A. Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over petition.
Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the United
States District Courts (Habeas Rules) requires the Court to make a
preliminary review of each petition for writ of habeas corpus. The
Court must summarily dismiss a petition “[i]f it plainly appears
from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is
not entitled to relief in the district court....”.
Habeas corpus relief is not available to challenge state
courts’ decisions regarding child custody and parental rights.
Lehman v. Lycoming County Children’s Services Agency, 458 U.S. 502,
510-12 (1982)(noting that “federal habeas has never been available
to

challenge

parental

rights or

child

custody”

and

that the

“‘custody’ of foster or adoptive parents over a child is not the
type of custody” that can be challenged through a 2254 petition,
the Court declined to extend habeas jurisdiction to a mother’s
petition challenging a state court’s termination of her parental
rights); see also Roman-Nose v. New Mexico Dep’t of Human Servs.,
967 F.2d 435,436 (10th Cir. 1992)(citing Lehman for the proposition
that state-court judgment involuntarily terminating parental rights
cannot be collaterally attacked by way of federal habeas corpus
petition).
Moreover, Petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 involve “challenges
to state-court judgments in situations where-as a result of a
2

state-court

criminal

conviction-a

petitioner

has

suffered

substantial restraints not shared by the public generally.” Lehman,
458 U.S. at 510.

No such situation is presented here.

Mr.

Christensen is not challenging the legality of any state criminal
conviction or sentence, and he is not challenging the fact or
duration of any current confinement.

The right Mr. Christensen

seeks to protect is not any right of the children.
seeks

to

challenge

a

state

court

judgment

Rather, he

relating

to

the

termination of his parental rights which has no custodial effect on
him.

“[F]ederal district courts lack subject matter jurisdiction

to consider a petition under § 2254 unless the petitioner is ‘ “in
custody” under the conviction or sentence under attack at the time
his petition is filed.’” Neiberger v. Rudek, 450 Fed. Appx. 719,
723 (10th Cir. 2011)(quoting Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490-91
(1989)).
Because Mr. Christensen has not presented any claim that can
properly be entertained in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, this
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over his habeas corpus
petition and it must be dismissed.
B. Petitioner has no viable action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Pro se complaints are liberally construed. Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).

Therefore, when a pro se litigant labels

a complaint seeking relief from alleged constitutional violations
as a habeas corpus petition, a court may treat it as a civil rights

3

action.

Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 251 (1971).

Even

if the Court construed Mr. Christensen’s allegations as an attempt
to state claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 19832, dismissal is
still warranted.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits a losing party in state
court “‘from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of
the state judgment in a United States district court, based on the
losing party’s claim that the state judgment itself violates the
loser’s federal rights.’”

Knox v. Bland, 632 F.3d 1290, 1292 (10th

Cir. 2011)(quoting Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994)).

The

doctrine applies to suits filed after state proceedings are final.
Guttman v. Khalsa, 446 F.3d 1027, 1032 (10th Cir. 2006).

The

doctrine is not limited to actions in federal court that explicitly
seek review of a state court decision, but also bars jurisdiction
over claims that are “‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state
court’s judgment.”

Mann v. Boatright, 477 F.3d 1140, 1147 (10th

Cir. 2007)(quoting Exxon-Mobil Corp. V. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,
544 U.S. 280, 284(2005)), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1098 (2008).3

2

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for constitutional or
statutory violations committed by a person acting under color of
state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
3

A claim is inextricably intertwined with a state court
judgment if the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the
state court wrongly decided the issues before it or if the relief
requested in the federal action would effectively reverse the state
court decision or void it ruling. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc.
481 U.S. 1, 25 (1987)(Marshall, J., concurring).
4

The allegations and injuries set forth by Mr. Christensen are
directly traceable and intertwined with the state court judgment
and he explicitly requests review and rejection of that judgment.4
Stripped to its core, Mr. Christensen’s allegations are nothing
more

than

a

collateral

attack

on

the

state

court

judgment

terminating his parental rights. Because those allegations and his
requests for relief are inextricably intertwined with the state
court judgment and either expressly or implicitly

would require

this court to overturn the decision of the state court regarding
the termination of his parental rights, consideration of his claims
is precluded.
III.

CONCLUSION

Absent subject matter jurisdiction, Mr. Christensen’s Petition
must be dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 19th day of July, 2013.
BY THE COURT:

DAVID SAM
SENIOR JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

4

Mr. Christensen asks this Court to “stay ... [the state
court] proceedings”, “issue an order to show cause and order an
evidentiary hearing” and “vacate the [state court] judgment”. Pet.
at 19.
5

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